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
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**ANNALS**  
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# THE DOCTRINE OF PRATIBHĀ IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ.

## A—INTRODUCTORY.

In the history of philosophical thought in India one very often meets with the problem which starts from a sense of the inadequacy of intellectual powers and points to the necessity of recognising a distinct faculty for the explanation of phenomena beyond the range of these powers. It was in attempting to offer a solution of this problem that the doctrine of Pratibhā, or as it is somewhere called, Prajñā, had its origin.

✓The word Pratibhā, which literally means a flash of light, —a revelation, is usually found in literature in the sense of wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness. It might be called the supersensuous and supra-rational apperception, grasping truth directly, and would, therefore, seem to have the same value, both as a faculty and as an act, in Indian Philosophy as Intuition has in some of the western systems.) From a general survey of the literature concerned and a careful analysis of its contents it would appear that the word is used in two distinct but allied senses :

(i) to indicate any kind of knowledge which is not sense-born nor of the nature of an inference. But as such knowledge may range over a wide variety of subjects, it is possible to distinguish it again as lower and higher. The phenomena of ordinary clairvoyance and telepathy are instances



of the former, while the latter kind is represented in the Supreme Wisdom of the Saint.

(ii) In the latter sense, however, the use of the term is restricted to the āgamic literature, where it stands for the Highest Divinity, understood as Principle of Intelligence and conceived as Female. In other words, pratibhā, otherwise known as परा संवित् ( or चितिशक्ति ), means in the āgama, especially in the Tripurā and Trika sections of it, the power of self-revelation or self-illumination of the Supreme Spirit, with which it is essentially and eternally identical. The employment of the word in the meaning of 'guru' ( as in Abhinavagupta, Tantra Sāra, p. 120 ) comes under this second head.

The prime characteristic of this supersensuous knowledge is, as we have observed, its immediacy and intense clarity. According to all the systems such knowledge is considered transcendental, being held to be free from the time and space limitations which are imposed as a matter of necessity on all inferior knowledge and from the indispensable conditions which govern the origin or manifestation of the latter. Consequently we find in every respect a strongly marked contrast between the two. This higher knowledge dispenses in its rise with the need of sense-organs and, unlike reflective judgment, with that of the rational faculty. It reveals the past and the future as in a single flash, and also the absent and the remote. Nothing escapes its searching light. It is aptly described as simultaneously illuminating everything in every aspect and as eternal (Yoga Sū. III. 84).

In Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and occasionally in Vedānta the term pratibhā (and sometimes अवज्ञान) is employed to express this supreme knowledge, a term which has the sanction of usage in Yoga literature. The word prajñā too is sometimes used in Yoga works as a synonym of pratibhā. In Vyākaraṇa both prajñā and pratibhā are to be found and these are declared identical in sense with the paśyantī stage of the fourfold Vāk. The āgamas retain all these terms and add samved to the list of synonyms. The Buddhists are familiar with the name prajñā even in their oldest canonical literature, but do not seem to know anything of pratibhā or the other terms. But the Jains have, curiously enough, not a single one of these words in their philosophical vocabulary, though they have fully treated of the subject in their works. They have discussed the question in their own way and under their own technical appellations, e. g., avadhijñāna, Kevalajñāna and so forth. From a

survey of the entire field it will be evident that the problem has recurred everywhere and has everywhere to all appearances been similarly dealt with.

## B—HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE SCHOOLS.

### § 1

#### NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA.

In early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya literature we find not only indications of the existence of the doctrine, but even the very term pratibhā used in its technical sense. But since these systems busied themselves particularly with the empirical forms of reality and more or less with dialectics, they could not give the subject the same fulness and precision in its treatment as its nature demanded. The little, however, that has been left on record by these philosophers is highly interesting and would enable us, following along their lines, to have an idea of what they really meant.

While mentioning the various kinds of knowledge derived from ordinary sources, Kaṇāda confines himself to sense-perception, inference and verbal cognition, of which the first two he conceives as really independent and the last one as only a form of the second. This shows that according to Kaṇāda the senses, aided by the natural light of reason, constitute for the average man the only valid source of knowledge. The testimony of the senses is sometimes deceptive, and so, when a doubt arises as to its correctness, it has to be verified either by an appeal to Reason or by प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य, and the certitude which the verification thus results in establishing must be regarded for all practical purposes as sufficient and final. And consequently the Reality which such a certitude discloses is only empirical. Further, the scope of the natural faculties is very limited; they cannot operate except under definite physical and physiological conditions. Absolute knowledge, in every sense unlimited and revealing the Heart of Reality, is therefore not within the reach of ordinary humanity.

But such knowledge is declared to exist and is said to be attainable by every man who develops within himself, by continued effort, the faculty of immediate vision and becomes in this way a ṛṣi or seer. And for this reason it is known as āṛsa. The Vaiśeṣika

Sūtra 9.2.13 mentions this, in association with what it calls *siddhadarśana*, and explains its supersensuous character.<sup>1</sup>

✓ The process of the genesis of this knowledge may be easily explained. It is assumed in this system that its origin explained, no knowledge can arise except through the contact of the *manas*, the atomic intra-organic faculty of attention, with the self, this contact being an invariable causal antecedent to the phenomena of conscious life in general. The character of the resulting knowledge is determined by the state of the *manas*, viz. whether it is at rest or in motion. If it is moving,—and all movement is ultimately due to the action of prior dispositions (traces, &c.) and of *adr̥ṣṭa*—it comes of necessity into relation with the senses which may (as in walking) or may not (as in dream, somnambulism, &c.) be in touch with the objects; and the ensuing consciousness is either जग्रत् or स्वप्न. But if the *manas* be absolutely motionless, two states may follow according as this motionlessness is consequent merely upon Nature's demand for rest or on intense concentration. In the former case, consciousness will be in total abeyance until it emerges again, along with the renewal of motion in *manas*, under a Vital Impulse (*जीवनयोनिप्रयत्न*) acting from beyond. This is the state known as *Susupti* (dreamless sleep). The second state is called *Yoga* or *Samādhi*, in which consciousness, far from subsiding, is exalted into an extraordinary clarity of Immediate Intuition. Time, space and other limitations having vanished, the *manas* stands face to face, as it were, not only

1 Śaṅkara Miśra points out that both this *ārśajñāna* and *siddhadarśana*, referred to in the sūtra, have for their objects things which are not accessible to the ordinary means of knowledge; but while the former reveals the past and the future, the latter which is artificially induced clairvoyance, makes known what is hidden or distant (*spatially*) from the senses. This distinction is evidently unfounded. For if *ārśajñāna* is held to be identical with *prātibhā*, as certainly it is (cf. the statement of Padārthapraveśa quoted by Śaṅkara Miśra), there is no reason for setting limits to its power. It illuminates the distant in *space* with as much perspicuity as it does the distant in *time*, and moreover it is not restricted by the conditions which are found to be indispensable for the origin of ordinary knowledge. Pañcānana Tarkaratna, in his commentary on the *upaskāra*, takes *ārśa* (as an alternate explanation) as equivalent to the unobstructed illumination of *Yuktayogin* and *siddhadarśana* as the reflective omniscience of a *yujñāna-yogin* (Baṅgabāsi Edition of *Vaiśeṣika Darśana*, p. 462).

with the pure self but with the realities of all things. This vision is Pratibhā or āṛṣajñāna.<sup>2</sup> )

This is yogipratyakṣa, pure and simple.<sup>3</sup> But Jayanta, in his Nyāyamañjari, does not seem to be inclined to accept it as identical with pratibhā. He distinguishes between two kinds of intuition, viz. the one which arises in the manner of a sudden flash even in the life of an ordinary individual (usually female) at some rare lucid moment and the other which appears when the mind has gone through a process of regular discipline and purification by yoga. Jayanta would restrict the use of the term pratibhā to the former kind of intuition alone.

But this restriction is apparently arbitrary. The term being really a coinage of the yoga system it is unreasonable why it should be narrowed down so as to exclude the vision of the yogins and to signify merely the sporadic intuitions of average humanity. It would be simpler therefore and more consistent with the general laws of argumentation to maintain that pratibhājñāna is one in its essence but differing in kind according as it is developed by a steady and continuous effort or produced automatically by virtue of bare adṛṣṭa.

In both cases, however, the essential characteristics of pratibhā are to be observed; and it is these which differentiate it from sense perception and the other forms of inferior knowledge. What Jayanta says of yogipratyakṣa holds good of pratibhā in all its aspects, of course with varying degrees of applicability. Though simple and indivisible in its unity it comprehends the entire objective world in a single moment, i. e. simultaneously: युगपदेकयेव बुद्ध्या द्रश्यन्ति सर्वत्र सर्वानर्थान् योगिनः.<sup>4</sup> The usual conditions of knowledge which preclude the possibility of two cognitions rising simultaneously in the field do not avail in the case of pratibhā, for the simple reason that it is a single act, and does not consist of a series of separate states. So long as it endures it is a con-

2 One to whom such a vision reveals itself is called a ṛṣi, the word ṛṣi etymologically meaning a 'seer'.

3 Cf. Kāliśara Vedāntavāgīśa, Sāṅkhyā darśana, p. 147.

4 Nyāya Mañjari, p. 107.

tinuum, and it endures till there is no break in its unity. But as soon as this unity is dissolved pratibhā also disappears, being superseded by the ordinary life with its chain of successive and mutually exclusive mental states.

Thus understood pratibhā would seem to be an approximation to the Wisdom of the supreme being. It is distinguished from the divine wisdom only in this that it is a product which the manas brings occasionally into existence through a certain process of self-immobilisation, whereas the latter is eternal and stands eternally adjoined to Him in which the necessity of an organ is out of question (Cf. Nyā. Mañj. p. 178<sup>e-p</sup>).

In the Bhāṣāpariccheda (verse 66) Viśvanāth Nyāyapañcāna describes the Yoga intuition as of a two-fold character, viz. that of the Yogin *en rapport* (युक्तयोगी) and the other of one just a degree below (युज्जानयोगी). The former is the Mirror of Eternal Light in which the totality of things remains perpetually in manifestation (युक्तस्य सर्वदा मानं), but the latter requires the aid of Reflection and contemplation for such manifestation.

## § 2

### YOGA

In the Yoga system, especially in that represented by Patañjali, pratibhā is synonymous with an aspect of Prajñā. It is said to be the supreme faculty of omniscience which is evolved through a continued practice of concentration on the self, not in its absolute and transcendent nature, but as appearing in the form of the phenomenal ego (व्यावहारिक प्रहीता). The Pure Self is not an object of contemplation. It is said that as practice continues, and before the glory of the final Illumination yet breaks forth, there dawns on the zone, in the fashion of the effulgence of the morning sun before the actual rise of the orb above the horizon, an unspeakable splendour in which the entire universe stands fully revealed. It is a vision in Eternity, *sub specie aeternitatis*—simultaneous (अकम), truthful-all-comprehending and serene. It is, so to speak, the vision of the many as reflected in the Mirror of the one, and although there is still predominance of multiplicity it is at this stage so thoroughly infused with the unity that it is in a sense iden-

tical with it. In view of this multiplicity in the object of this vision it is held to be an impediment to kaivalya and to the highest wisdom which leads through the cessation of all mental life to that supreme state. And when in course of 'sādhana' this multiplicity disappears from the field of vision, and the one—the Pure Self—begins to shine upon itself, there being nothing left external to it, the highest wisdom takes its rise as an Immediate Consciousness of Pure Being with reference to the self. To know itself as pure is, for the self, to know itself as distinct from the objective phenomena. Such knowledge is called विवेकख्याति and is the immediate antecedent of kaivalya. For to know oneself as pure is verily to be pure.

From the above it would follow that in Yoga though a slight distinction is made between pratibhā and the highest kind of prajñā called तारकज्ञान, pratibhā in its ultimate nature is nevertheless nothing but the Light of this Prajñā falling upon the Many instead of the one. That it is an अनौपदेशिकज्ञान, as much as the prajñā itself and is, therefore, to be differentiated from the ordinary kinds of knowledge, more or less conceptual, is recognised; but how such a knowledge is gained and how it embraces as its object the entire universe (सर्वं) on which the Citta was not concentrated are questions which present themselves in this connection.

To answer the questions properly we must inquire into Patañjali's theory of intuitive knowledge and study the cognate notions of his school. It is assumed that word (शब्द), idea (ज्ञान) and object (अर्थ) are really distinct entities, and that though in ordinary experience they are found to be inter-related they may be separated from one another by a process of abstraction. It is indeed true, the Yogin would say, that thinking is impossible without some kind of language; in other words, it is admitted to be a fact that except through the use of a series of symbols with a certain conceptual value attached to them no mediate knowledge can possibly arise. But this does not imply that the symbol is in truth identical with the object for which it stands or with the idea to which it is correlated. The cow as an *idea* is certainly distinct, from the cow as an external *object* visible to the eye and both, from the cow as the *name*, which expresses this idea and this object. The very nature of discursive thought is based on the non-

A relative problem.

Yoga theory of intuitive illumination explained.

recognition of this distinction and on the consequent assumption of a real identity among these three things. In the technical language of Yoga such thought, thus confused and indiscriminate, is said to be dominated by Vikalpa.

But a discrimination is possible. It is by the exigencies of our practical life founded on convention Their separation ensures clarity of prajñā. (सङ्केत) that this identity of reference is established, so that the presence of one thing (*e. g.* the word) revives the memory of another (*e. g.* the object) and *vice versa*. Practice in meditating upon the object without any conscious verbal reference is, therefore, supposed in course of time to succeed in breaking this false notion of identity (स्मृतिसाङ्कार्य) and illumining the object *qua* object, pure and simple. In this system an object is held to possess a two-fold aspect of reality, one universal (सामान्य) and the other individual (विशेष), of which the former is amenable particularly to those forms of knowledge in which the conceptual element (शब्दजविकल्प) predominates, viz. āgama and anumāna; but the latter aspect, *i. e.* the object as an individual with a nature of its own and as such distinguished from other individuals belonging to the same or to a different class, cannot be made known except by direct perception. But in ordinary perception, which for practical purposes is equivalent to सविकल्पज्ञान, the conceptual element is not wholly removed. When, however, this element is eliminated and the purity of the intention ensured, the prajñā becomes intensely clear and reveals the object wholly and faithfully until at last it sinks altogether and the object shines by itself. It sounds absurd to say that the object alone remains, without the citta or jñāna to take cognisance of it, but what is meant seems to be that the citta, through extreme purity, becomes at this stage so tenuous as to be in fact a luminous void;—it does not exist and it must do so until kaivalya is reached<sup>5</sup>, though identified in a sense with the object. And when there is a falling off from this state of *ekstasis* and a subsequent recoil from the object, it retains a dim sañskāra of that Supreme Experience which it formulates in terms already familiar to it. It is needless to add that this is an intellectual act in the making

5 I have elsewhere tried to show at some length what is meant by saying that in Kaivalya the citta is non-existent. The whole question turns upon the admissibility and meaning of what is technically designated śuddhasattva, *i. e.* sattva *absolutely* free from rajas and tamas.

of which the concepts known to the mind play an important part. The freshness of the original intuition is then gone; and thought and language grope about in vain to seize and express a truth beyond their farthest reach.

It is then clear that as soon as the mind, by gradual training, is freed from the invading influence of the concepts and the 'memory images of the past' (vikalpas), it acquires the power of merging itself in unity with any object (च्यय) which may be presented to it—of indeed being filled with it and pervaded by it (समाधि). No matter what this object may be it is then fully illumined and its real nature perfectly brought out. This illumination (the act and the power both) is called by the name of prajñā and is characterised as ऋतम्भरा because it reveals the whole truth and is never falsified.

But even at this stage it cannot make known every thing—the All; it discloses that alone,—whether a concrete whole (अवयवी) as in nirvitarka samādhi or the infra-atomic particles तन्मात्रा: as in nirvicāra—from the contemplation of which it arose. But with continued practice this limitation is transcended. It is explained in the Yoga Sūtras that when the aspirant steps beyond the first two stadia of ecstasy, viz ब्राह्म and प्रहणसमापत्ति and concentrates his citta on its own self (i. e. अस्मिता or phenomenal ego, the subject of relative consciousness) as illumined by the light of the Spirit Above, he becomes self-conscious. This is प्रहीतृसमापत्ति (=सास्मिन्समाधि) or what we might loosely describe as a subjective intuition; and the consciousness is self-consciousness in its utmost purity. But it must be remembered that this self-consciousness, which is the last term of our phenomenal life, consists in the relative unity of subject and object, and is equivalent to the सोऽहंज्ञान of Vedānta. It is the pointed apex of a broad-based pyramid-like edifice, beyond which is Eternity.

But how is it that concentration on *asmitā* (i. e. प्रहीतृ-समापत्ति) leads to omniscience? How does concentration on *one* thing result in the knowledge of *all*? The question is rather perplexing, but it becomes very much simplified if we remember that the one here referred to is a composite unity—a unity holding in its bosom the germs

The truthful and illuminating character of prajñā.

Ecstatic Self-consciousness involves All-consciousness. Sāsmitā Samā-dhi.

Nature of asmita Unity involving plurality, Pratibhā.



of plurality, so that the vision of one is also at this stage the vision of all. The *asmitā* is the essence of *citta* and is the empirical subject. The *Yogabhāṣya* remarks that when the *Yogin* succeeds in realising himself as *subject* by means of *प्रदीप्तमापत्तिः*, the objective phenomena, infinite as they are, and their knowledge become simultaneously present to his cosmic consciousness: *सर्वात्मनो गुणा व्यवसायायवसायात्मका स्वामिन् क्षेत्रज्ञं प्रत्यक्षेदृश्यात्मत्वेनोपतिष्ठन्ते* (Yo. Bhā. 3. 49). This Self-consciousness, which is All-consciousness, is *pratibhā*, in the light of which all things are simultaneously (*अक्रमं*) and in all their aspects *सर्वथाविषयं* revealed. It constitutes the highest mystic acquisition of the *Yogin*, next only to his self-realisation.

A question may here be asked : what is the moral value of such a consciousness, however exalted ? Does it serve any practical purpose in the way of restoring the soul to its lost glory ? To this question it is replied by pointing out that it does, because *pratibhā* merges ultimately in *तारक* or saving knowledge, which leads to Deliverance. The soul on its way to Liberation needs must pass through this stage of Omniscience. For without the direct knowledge of All there can be no Absolute Detachment, i. e. detachment from *every* thing alien or external to the self (*परवैराग्य*), which is a precondition of *kaivalya*. In other words, detachment from everything presupposes a knowledge of everything. This detachment of the *jñāna* or *citta* from everything is held to be its highest purity and is immediately followed by *kaivalya*. It is called the *dharmamegha samādhi* representing the highest form of *prajñā*, in which the *citta* (*सत्त्व*) attains in purity to the likeness (*शुद्धिसाम्य*) of the Self, so that the subject and object are now eternally and *absolutely* lost in unity, and the din of phenomenal existence is for ever hushed in the calm of sweet repose.

But before the actualisation of *kaivalya*, when the *citta* still stands at the crest of the universe, ready to sink, the *yogin* feels within him as it were a fresh emotional stir. For it is said that the rise of *prajñā* is accompanied by the awakening of a deep compassion on suffering humanity. In the *Yogabhāṣya* the sage (*प्राज्ञ*) is likened to one standing on the hill-top and looking down from his tower of glory on the toiling-moiling multitude below : *प्राज्ञाप्रासादमारुह्य अशोच्यः शोचतो जनान् । भूमिष्ठानिव शैलस्थः सर्वं प्राज्ञोऽ-*

नुपश्यति (1.47). This infinite compassion is the only justification of his abstention from a plunge into the kaivalya which is immediately to follow. ✓ Under deep compassion he then builds up a new citta, the so-called *nirmāṇacitta*, from the stuff of *asmitā*, and a new body, called *nirmāṇakāya*, from the *tanmātrās*, and having assumed these teaches wisdom to the world sunk in ignorance<sup>6</sup>. ) The only motive for him is philanthropy (भूतानुग्रह). According to Yoga, as to Mahāyāna Buddhism, the sage owes it as a duty to his less fortunate brethren to inspire them with hope and courage and to point out to them the way to Final Release.

§ 3

VYĀKARAṆA.

Having given an outline of the views of yoga school in regard to pratibhā, I now pass on to consider at some length what the *Vaiyākaraṇas* have to say on this question. I may take liberty to suggest here that the philosophy of grammar built upon the basis of *Patāñjali's Mahābhāṣya* by the great savant *Bhartṛhari* was affiliated to the āgama literature akin to the Śaiva and Śākta āgamas of Kashmir.<sup>7</sup> With this in our mind we shall be able to follow its conclusions without any difficulty.

The grammarian's doctrine of pratibhā is intimately bound up with his view regarding the origin of knowledge and of the objective world, and as this subject has not yet been dealt with elsewhere it would be well to furnish a short account of it there.

It is the fundamental thesis of the Śābdika that the source of all phenomena is the Eternal Verbum, called *Śabda Brahman* or *Parā Vāk*. This is of the nature of simple unity, Pure Being (महासत्ता), Great Universal (महासामान्य). To it belongs an infinite number

6 It was thus that *Kapila* is said to have taught *Āsuri* : आदिषिद्वा न निर्माण-चित्तमविष्टाय कारुण्याद् मगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं श्रोवाच ( *Yogabhāṣya* under 1. 25. )

7 *Bhartṛhari* complains that this āgama had been practically lost for long ages when it was recovered and proclaimed by *Candrācārya*. *Puṇyarāja* according to tradition, attributes the original *Vyākaraṇāgama* to *Rāvaṇa* and ascribes its recovery through a *Brahmarākṣasa* to *Candrācārya*, *Vasurāta* ( the teacher of *Bhartṛhari* ) and others. For *Candrācārya* see *Rājatarāṅgi* I. 176.

of Śaktis, mutually exclusive, but in essence identical with it (एकत्वाविरोधिन्; अविभक्ता; आत्मभूताः). Of these Avidyā, viz. the power not only of veiling the Essence but of exhibiting the Many, and Kāla, viz. the power of projecting the eternal Kalās of Śabda Brahman in succession<sup>8</sup>, may be regarded as the chief. These two śaktis are closely associated. But even of these two, Kāla śakti is held to be the Supreme Power (स्वातन्त्र्य) to which all other Śaktis are subordinate and under the influence of which the eternal Kalās within the Śabda (अव्याहर्ताः कलाः), though many, yet so long mysteriously identified with it, are apparently sundered from it and become the sources of the manifoldness of the phenomenal world (भावभेदस्य योनयः).

The world of phenomena, when analysed, exhibits a perpetual flux, which may be said in some sense to be cyclic. Motion begins from the Unmanifest and ends in the Unmanifest—and the two moments of appearance and disappearance of a phenomenon represent only the two opposite directions (अनुलोम) and प्रतिलोम of the same wheel of movement (परिणाम).

The Primal Being (सत्ता), though in itself one and immutable, yet appears as many and in motion by virtue of Its own Inalienable Power (साहाय्यात्), as already pointed out. This appearance of one as many constitutes its division, by which what is incomprehensible and unnameable becomes subjective and objective, so that herein we have a distinction between ज्ञान (knowledge) and ज्ञेय (knowable) on one hand and वाचक (name) and वाच्य (nameable) on the other. The Kālaśakti being conceived as an eternal and innate power of the Pure Being, we may assume that to the Śābdika, as to the Tāntrika elsewhere, the Godhead has a two-fold aspect—as *Transcendent beyond Time* in which it is above all predication in thought and language, and as *Immanent in Time* in which it is the subject, as well as predicate, of all judgments.

8 The Śābdika, indeed every exponent of āgamic philosophy, rejects the Vaiśeṣika view of Kāla as an independent and supersensible substance, but conceives it as a Power, really indivisible, but appearing as discrete (प्रविभक्त), i. e. prior and posterior, on account of what might be called movement-particles or units of movement.

Now it is assumed that knowledge as a *mode*<sup>9</sup> (वृत्तिज्ञान) is never free from verbal associations (शब्दानुगम), evidently for the reason that it originates from śabda. Hence an object. (अर्थ) which is knowable (ज्ञेय) is also nameable (अभिधेय, λεκτου); and the relation between the name and the nameable, as between knowledge and knowable, is an eternal relation (अनादियोग्यता), which the Supreme Being simply manifests in the beginning of each aeon. The manifestation of this relation is co-eval with the origin of the objective world. In other words, in the womb of the supreme Word or the Highest Universal, after its seeming Self-division or self-multiplication, there appears an infinite number of eternal Kalās (= Śāktis, potencies) or universals (अपरसामान्य)—a hierarchy of ideas—each of which has its appropriate name and thought through which it is revealed. It is through this name<sup>10</sup> and through this thought that the Universal is manifested, i. e. creation in time (= production of individuals) follows. Naming and thinking being virtually an identical process, this manifestation of the universals is the same as the revelation of Veda, which is nothing but the Body of the eternal Names and Thoughts in eternal relation to the Universals.

9 I say knowledge as a *mode* (वृत्ति) only to exclude Eternal Jñāna or Brahma, which is no other than the Supreme Word in the system. In the expression न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके (Vāk. pad. 1. 124) the word लोके implies modal consciousness. This consciousness is discursive and relative. It must be borne in mind that the grammarian does not admit what is ordinarily known as निर्विकल्पक वृत्तिज्ञान; cf. the Stoic View on the connection between Language and Thought (Janet and Sèailles, History of the Problems of Philosophy, vol. I.p. 208)

10 The subject is as complicated as it is interesting. A detailed study of the issues involved will appear in the writer's forthcoming work of Yoga and ancient Indian Mysticism. It may just be noted here that creation following from 'name' is a conception very old in India; cf. the Vyāhṛti theory of creation; Ved. Sūt. 1. 3. 28; Manu Smṛiti 1. 21. That it follows from 'thought' is illustrated in the operation of the so-called icchā-śakti of the Yogin, in which an idea or thought-image, as soon as formed, may be externalised into a real material object; cf. in Yoga Vāsisṭha (Nirvāṇa prakaraṇa, I, ch. 82, 24) अन्ये च विदितात्मानो भावयन्ति यथैव यत् । तच्छेषास्तु पश्यन्ति दृढभावनया तया ॥ To the grammarian the thought is the same as the object, with this difference that the former is an internal, while the latter is only an external, aspect of one and the same Reality. The *thought* relates to the Universal in itself (abstract) as well as to the Universal revealed in the Individual (concrete.) So with the *name*.

The Veda, as thus understood, is really synonymous with pratibhā. It is the self-revelation of the supreme Śabda, which in revealing itself reveals everything within it at the same time. Puṇyarāja (under Vāk. pad. 2. 493) describes it as the purest form of prajñā (भगवती विद्या विशुद्धप्रज्ञा प्रतिभाख्या) and identifies it (1. 14) with the paśyantī stage of Vāk (पश्यन्त्याख्या प्रतिभा). It is eternal (अनपायिनी), undivided (अविभागा) and devoid of succession (अक्रमा), i. e. is 'of the nature, of an Intuition continuum. The Supreme transcendent śabda is as it were the Dark Background of all manifestation and forms the Absolute of the grammarians. But the paśyantī stage, though also eternal like the parā, differs from it in being, as its name indicates, luminous. Having realised this light by mode of spiritual culture to which the grammarian applies the term Vāgyoga, the self attains peace and may be said to have fulfilled its highest destiny. There is nothing left for it to strive after.<sup>11</sup> Indeed paśyantī or pratibhā represents the very essence of the self—the Inner Light of its Nature (स्वरूपज्योतिरेवान्तः). It is of an infinite variety according as it reveals the object as one with it or as distinct from but related to it or as it stands alone in its own glory.<sup>12</sup> In any way it is above the ceaseless flux of the phenomenal world, and whether conceived as the Pure One or as the One with the eternal and infinite Kalās held within, it is the Highest End of human aspirations.

Puṇyarāja quotes a passage, apparently from an old Trika Āgama in which the Paśyantī or the Divine Pratibhā is described as the 16th (षोडशी) or the Immortal (अमृता) Kalā of the Moon (i. e. the self, Puruṣa). This immortal Kalā is elsewhere known as देवी वाक्.<sup>13</sup>

11 अविभागा तु पश्यन्ती सर्वतः संहतक्रमा । स्वरूपज्योतिरेवान्तः सैषा वागनपायिनी ॥ सैषा सङ्कीर्त्यमाणायपि नित्यमागन्तुकैर्मलैः । अन्या कलेच सोमस्य नात्यन्तमभिभूयते ॥ तस्यां दृष्टस्वरूपायामधिकारो निवर्त्तते । पुरुषे षोडशकले तु तामादुरहतां कलाम् ॥ (Quoted in com. on Vāk. pad., under 1. 145).

12 पश्यन्ती तु सा चलाचलप्रतिबद्धसमाधाना सन्निविष्टज्ञेयाकारा प्रतिलीनाकारा निराकारा च परिच्छिन्नार्थप्रत्यवभासा संछ्छेदार्थप्रत्यवभासा च प्रशान्तसर्वार्थप्रत्यवभासा चेत्यपरिमितभेदा । (com. on. Vāk. pad., I. 145).

13 Cf. Bhavabhūti's benedictory line at the beginning of his Uttararāma-carita. वन्देम देवतां वाचममृतामात्मनः कलाम् । If this, the Paśyantī, is the 16th or pūrṇa (full) Kalā, as the extract cited by Puṇyarāja shows, the Parā of the grammarians would correspond to the 17th or Amā (Void) Kalā of the Tāntrikas.

Helārāja, in introducing his commentary on the 3rd Kaṇḍa of Vākyapadiya, gives a beautiful description of pratibhā. He says there that as soon as this celestial Light dawns on the soul, the heart begins to taste of an ineffable Joy that is not born of the senses and knows no fading, and the consciousness of Divine Majesty wells up from within in ever newer forms.<sup>14</sup> It is a state of Ecstasy in which the Soul is wrapped in the veil of the Supreme Glory of the Highest.

This pratibhā, viz. paśyanti, which is Veda proper, is Subtle, Eternal and Supersensuous. On realisation of this the Rsis, desirous of communicating it to the world, are said to have expressed it in the form of the so-called 'Vedas' and Vedāṅgas' ( विल्म ), i. e. of articulate language.<sup>15</sup> Hence, it is declared to be the source of all sciences and arts. It is clear, therefore, and so it is asserted, that to the grammarian the term pratibhā has the same connotation as the mystic praṇava which is the essence of revealed literature and of human sciences ( प्रवादाः )<sup>16</sup> which is the creator ( विधाता ) of the worlds, the fount of all ( Vidyās and Mantras ), and the matrix of all names and forms<sup>17</sup>. But as pratibhā and parā are the two eternal aspects of the same Vāk it is also intelligible why the praṇava is sometimes, though rarely, used as a synonym of the parā.

It may be of interest to note here that the Vāk qua वाचक is the sphoṭa and qua वाच्य is the mahāsattā. Bhartṛhari says plainly that there is only one Supreme Object ( अर्थ ), viz. Universal Being which is the true वाच्य of all words and which though indivisible and undivided appears as many ( बहुरूपः प्रकाशते ) by reason of the differentiation of its power ( शक्तिविभागेन ). It is on this

- 14 यस्मिन् सम्मुखतां प्रयाति रुचिरं कोऽप्यन्तरुज्जृम्भते  
नेद्रीयान् महिमा मनस्यभिनवः पुंसः प्रकाशात्मनः ।  
तृप्तिं यत् परमां तनोति विषयास्वादं विना शाश्वतीं  
धामानन्दमुधामयोजितवपुस्तत् प्रातिभं संस्तुमः ॥

15 यो सुक्ष्मां नित्यामतीन्द्रियां वाचस्पयः साक्षात्कृतमणीं भन्वद्दशः पश्यन्ति तामसाक्षात्कृतधर्मस्यः परम्यः प्रतिवेदयिष्यमाणाः बिल्मं समामनन्ति ( Com. on Vāk. pad., I. 5 ).

16 The word प्रवादाः means systems of thought devised by human intellect on the basis of, or independently of, revealed scriptures. These do not proceed from personal intuition on the part of their authors.

- 17 स ( i. e. प्रणवः ) हि सर्वशब्दार्थप्रकृतिः ।

object as the background that the Vikalpas of Seer, Seen and Light are being constantly manifested. And similarly, he points out, there is one indivisible वाचक, viz. the Eternal Light of Sphoṭa<sup>18</sup> which reveals every वाच्य. Just as, inspite of multiplicity in appearance, the Object (अर्थ) is ultimately one, viz. Brahma conceived as Sattā,<sup>19</sup> so the word (शब्द) too is really one in the end, viz. Brahma as Sphoṭa, and thus the two are identical in Essence.<sup>20</sup> Although we are employing the time वाच्य and वाचक in reference to one and the same Reality they convey here no sense, except that there is only one Reality which reveals Itself by means of Itself (for Śakti too is nothing distinct from this reality). This self-revelation is pratibhā.

Besides this primary meaning of pratibhā, viz. Intuition or Revelation (as used in the mystic sense), there is another, a secondary one, which is also found in this literature. In this sense pratibhā may be supposed to agree in its main features with the conception of Instinct. Thus it is said that when come in contact with an object which is felt to be pleasurable or painful something from within impels us to go out towards the object in search of it or else to withdraw from it. Now this impulse is said to be due to pratibhā, which stands therefore at the bottom of all our activities (प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति) and is the main-

18 The वाचकता of individual letters is denied. The real वाचक is either *pada* (according to Kaiyaṣa) or more properly *Vākya*. Sphoṭa is essentially an indivisible *Vākya* (अखण्डवाक्य) with a unity of its own.

19 Cf. वाच्या सा (i. e. सत्ता) सर्वशब्दानां शब्दाच्च न पृथक्त्वतः ।

अपृथक्त्वेऽपि संबन्धस्तयोर्नानात्मनोरिव ॥

Also—एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदे शब्दार्थोवपृथक्स्थितौ ।

20 The words Sphoṭa and Sattā refer obviously to the *cit* and *sat* aspects of the Supreme Lord, and mean the same thing as applied to the Lord. But they appear as distinct to the eye of Ignorance, the one as वाचक (or ज्ञान) and the other as वाच्य (or ज्ञेय). This वाच्यवाचकभाव of the One constitutes its multiplication. But we must bear in mind that this Many is eternal and simultaneously shining on the One in Paśyanti, but it is successive and subject to appearance and disappearance in Saṁsāra after its fall from the paśyanti stage. We should also remember that in the paśyanti stage there is no विभाग (actual split) or क्रम (succession) in Vāk. This stage is distinguished from the Parā in this only that It is aware of Itself, whereas the Parā is beyond such self-awareness. To put the matter a little differently we may say that it is the self-awareness of Parā which is known as Paśyanti.

spring of our practical life (सर्वव्यवहारयोनिः). It is this flash from within which, revealing the truth (though perhaps subconsciously and in a dark mysterious way not analysable by the intellect), spontaneously determines the इतिकर्तव्यता of all creatures; so that even the movements of the beasts (तिरश्चामपि समारम्भाः) are ultimately traceable to its guiding influence. The class-instincts of certain animals, which are so varied and so marvellous, are instances of the multifarious manifestations of pratibhā. Being an innate unerring faculty, it does not require to be trained from outside. Though incommunicable and inexpressible in language, its existence and even its working is justified by the inner experience of every man (प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिसिद्धा). It rises spontaneously (अयत्नज) in the mind and would appear to the superficial observer to be quite of an accident. But on closer examination it is found to be, so far as its manifestation in a definite manner is concerned, a result of continued effort (अभ्यास) in the past.

This explanation of our practical life by the principle of an innate sense, named pratibhā, is opposed to the rationalistic view of Maṇḍana Miśra who in his Vidhiviveka lays down the principle that the only impetus to all conscious action is the origin of action. उपायज्ञान (adaptation of means to ends) without which no action would be possible.

But this objection of the Mīmāṃsaka is brushed aside by the grammarian on the ground that the principle of उपायज्ञान cannot be maintained in all the cases. Thus even when the right means to the accomplishment of an end are unknown and under circumstances unknowable even by the wise (दुर्ज्ञानोपायेषु च प्राज्ञैरपि), the end in question is observed to be successfully realised through the instincts of the animals. Even the learned man, for instance, with his accumulated experience, does not know the means whereby he may be able to modulate his voice exactly as the *Koīl*? does, so easily and gracefully, on the advent of spring. The wonderful instincts of bees and ants are well known. The Vaiyākaraṇa points these out as illustrations of his thesis that Instinct and Intuition are really far more potent faculties than the Intellect or even the Senses (प्रमाणेभ्योऽपि सामर्थ्यातिशयं प्रतिभायाः). Besides, these never err, while the accredited means of right (?) knowledge are known to be deceptive on occasions. It is further added, in repudiation of

Vindication of  
the Vaiyākara-  
ṇa's position.



the Mīmāṃsaka's theory, that the उपायज्ञान, which arises directly from repeated personal observation (असकृद्दर्शन) and indirectly from the testimony of others (उपदेश), is not capable of explaining what the instincts actually accomplish.)

Regarding the origin, or rather the manifestation of  
 Manifestation of Instinct. Instinct, the grammarian accepts the conclusions of the Yoga system and connects it with the question of antenatal dispositions. It is well known that every Karman, every experience, leaves behind it a definite saṃskāra, a trace, which remains impressed in a subtle state on the citta. The saṃsāra being without beginning, these saṃskāras are numerically infinite and exist from eternity in the citta. Some of these are known as vāsanās and serve, when awakened by a stimulus, as psychological antecedents to memory and recognition. But there are others called Karmāśayas which determine the formation of a particular kind of corporeal existence, i. e. rebirth, as a particular being fitted with a particular organic vehicle. Thus the Karmāśaya, as a bundle of similar saṃskāras grouped together, appears at the dying moment of the individual under the influence of his predominant thought of the moment; this is the so-called prārabdha, the seed, which explains the nature of the next birth, with the joys and sorrows of that life and the term of its continuation. Instincts peculiar to a particular species are also evolved out of the stock from which prārabdha originates. Prior Karma being the determinant of both birth and instincts, it is easy to see how certain saṃskāras are intimately associated with certain forms of existence.)

( *To be Continued.* )

THE VIRĀTAPARVAN OF THE MAHĀBHĀRATA Edited from Original Manuscripts as a Tentative Work with Critical and Explanatory Notes and an Introduction by NARAYAN BAPUJI UTGIKAR, M. A., with three Illustrations drawn by SHRIMANT BALASAHEB PANT PRATINIDHI, B. A., Chief of Aundh. (The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1923.)

Tentative editions have often been published of texts of which there existed scanty MS. materials or even one MS. only. Here we have a tentative edition of a text the restoration of which offers peculiar difficulties, not on account of lack, but on account of superabundance, of materials. The Mahābhārata Editorial Committee of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, is to be congratulated on this idea of publishing a critical edition of one of the smaller Parvans "on lines, which though indeed not quite so elaborate as contemplated for the final edition, should approximate these as far as possible." In science *experiment* has always been the acknowledged means of arriving at truth. It is a new and extra-ordinary, but a happy idea to proceed experimentally in editorial work, and to publish a text, in order to "gain first hand acquaintance with the Mahābhārata problems, and also with a view to invite helpful suggestions and criticisms to be utilised in the preparation of the main edition." And the very fact that the Editorial Committee agreed to making such a costly experiment shows, how earnestly the Poona scholars desire to make the *Final Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata* a work that should be really "final," and come up to the highest standard of text criticism, an edition worthy of the Great National Epic of India.

The responsibility, however, for this Edition of the Virāṭa-parvan rests not with the Editorial Committee, but with the Chief Editor of the Mahābhārata, Mr. Utgikar.

The materials on which this edition is based are the following: two old and good Nāgarī MSS. (A and F), one modern Nāgarī MS., that is, however, probably copied from an old MS. similar to A and F, two fairly old Nāgarī MSS. (K and L), and six modern Nāgarī MSS. (BCDEGH), two of which (DH) show traces of being influenced by the Southern Recension, while

the others seem to represent Nīlakaṇṭha's text. Only one MS. (N) is in Bengālī characters. The South Indian Recension is represented only by one modern Grantha MS., one Telugu MS., one transcript of two Malayalam MSS., and the fragment published by Prof. Lüders in his "Grantha-recension des Mahābhārata" (Göttingen 1901). Besides these MSS. the Editions of Calcutta (1839), of Bombay (1862) and of Kumbhakoṇam (1906-10), partly also the Tanjore edition in Grantha characters have been used. Fortunately eight commentaries to the Virāṭaparvan have been published in the Gujrāthi Press Edition (1915), which have also been made use of by the Editor, and he has shown that the Viṣamapadavivarāṇa is older even than Arjunamiśra who is known to be older than Nīlakaṇṭha. The readings of the Viṣamapadavivarāṇa are given in Supplement III. Finally the Editor has also availed himself of the Javanese version of the Virāṭaparvan, and has compared the quotations in this version with the present text (in Supplement II). The Javanese version has the advantage of being dated (viz. 996 A. D.) As Utgikar has shown that this version is based on the Southern Recension, the latter cannot be later than 1000 A. D.

I may be allowed to make a few remarks on these materials—remarks which are intended rather for the final than for this tentative edition. As far as it was possible, the Editor has tried to group his MSS. in a broad way, but he was quite justified in leaving the construction of a pedigree of the MSS. or a more exact classification for the final edition, when it will be possible to survey the complete material available. But even from his MSS. it may be seen that we shall have to distinguish not only a Northern and a Southern, but also a Mixed Recension. The latter is represented by the MS. H and by the Kumbhakoṇam Edition. For the latter, which contains all the interpolations of the Southern as well as of the Northern Recension, cannot be quoted as a fair representative of the Southern Recension. I doubt, if the terms "Southern" and "Northern" will finally be found practicable at all. As far as I remember, (I have not the book at hand), the Madras edition of the Mahābhārata in Telugu characters does not give the "Southern" text at all and a Telugu MS. of the Sabhāparvan which I have collated, agrees more with the "Northern" text than with the Grantha and Malayalam MSS. The Bengālī MSS., of which—thanks to the zeal and efforts of our excellent Pandit R. Ananta-kṛishna Śāstri—we have a good collection at Santiniketan, are

istinctly different from the Nāgarī MSS., though I would not speak of a Bengali "recension." I have no doubt that the Nepālī and Kashmirī MSS., which will, I am sure prove of great importance, will have peculiarities of their own.

Therefore I think, we shall have to group our MSS., first of all, according to the script and (what generally means the same) according to the part of India from which they come. Among the Nāgarī MSS. we shall have to make a separate group of those MSS. which give the text of Nilakanṭha. And here it may be said at once, that these MSS. are the least important and, unless they are very old, may be dispensed with, as Nilakanṭha's text—unfortunately, as Utgikar rightly states (p. XLIII) a text of a very inferior kind—is quite well represented in the current Bombay and Calcutta editions. As to the Commentaries, they will have to be used for the edition systematically. Not only their own readings will have to be quoted along with the various readings of the MSS., but also the "pāṭhāntaras," mentioned by them.

Among his material Utgikar also mentions a *transcript* of two Malayalam MSS. He does not tell us, what guarantee he has that it is an accurate and reliable transcript. He only says that it was "secured" through the kindness of the well known Editor of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series T. Ganapati Śāstri, but he does not say that the transcript was made under the responsibility or supervision of that eminent and highly esteemed scholar. I only mention this, in order to emphasize how very unsatisfactory copies or transcripts are. Of course, if we cannot get the MSS. themselves, we shall have to content ourselves with having them transcribed or copied. But in such a case it is incumbent on the responsible editor, that he should make sure of the copyist being a thoroughly reliable scholar. It is not sufficient, if the owner of the MS assures him that the copy or transcript was made by a "very learned man." In short, the original MSS. ought in all cases to be made accessible to the Editors or their assistants, known to them as competent and reliable. As the Mahābhārata itself is a literary monument of which all India is justly proud, so the Critical Edition of the Epic to be brought out at Poona will be a monumental work of learning of which every Indian should be proud. And therefore *all owners of Mahābhārata Manuscripts, whether rulers, or public institutions, or private persons, should consider it a duty, and a pleasant duty, to their country, to contribute something towards the accomplishment of the great work by*

placing their manuscripts freely—of course on loan and with all necessary guarantees only—at the disposal of the editors or of the Editorial Committee at Poona. This is really no sacrifice at all. It ought to be understood by this time, that it is useless and worse than useless to keep MSS. hidden in libraries without anybody seeing and using them. I would suggest that each volume should contain an *honorary list* of all persons and Institutions that have supplied MSS. for the Critical Edition,—perhaps also a “black list” of those who have refused to do so.

From what I said above about the “Northern” and “Southern Recensions,” it will appear that I cannot approve of drawing a line (literally) between the readings of the Northern and the Southern group of MSS. This would only be justified, if the Editor had wanted to give the *text of the Northern Recension*, only indicating the deviations of the Southern Recension in the critical apparatus. But this was not his intention. He tells us himself, that he has sometimes adopted readings of the Southern MSS. where these seemed to be better and older. He also shows that at least in the Virāṭaparvan much enlarged and sometimes changed as the Southern text is, yet with few exceptions “the sequence of the text is generally speaking the same.” If it were otherwise, that is to say, if the differences between the recensions were so great as, for instance, between those of the Rāmāyaṇa or of the Abhijñānaśākuntala, it would be necessary to give *two* different editions of the two recensions. As far as I can see at present, the differences between the Northern and Southern Recensions of the Mahābhārata are on the whole not so great as to make separate editions of any Parvan necessary, though in some cases for smaller portions it might be necessary to print parallel texts. The Southern Recension of the Virāṭaparvan offers, as already mentioned, an enlarged text. A glance at the Appendix shows how numerous the additions are in the Southern MSS. So much is this the case that it has often “led to the original nucleus of the text being practically swept away in the S. Recension under the force of such interpolations” (p. XVII). This is no doubt due, as U. suggests (p. XIV), to “the extreme popularity of the Virāṭaparvan” and “the desire of lengthening out some much-liked or impressive scene.” This does not mean that it will be the same in other Parvans also. But yet even in the Virāṭaparvan the Southern MSS. often bear out the results to which a comparison of the best Northern MSS. has led the Editor. And in this lies the importance of the Southern

MSS., that whenever they agree with any other class of Northern MSS., such as Bengali MSS. for instance, we may be almost sure that they have preserved the original text.

With this, however, we approach the fundamental questions of the Mahābhārata text problem, discussed by the Editor in his Introduction (p. xix ff.). U. touches here the question whether the Virāṭaparvan itself is not a big interpolation in the Mahābhārata, a view held by most Western scholars. I too believe, that the Virāṭaparvan did not form part of the oldest nucleus of the Great Epic. I will only mention that we find in this book the whole battle of Kurukṣetra—shall we say foreshadowed or repeated?—but with this difference, that in the main story of the Epic it takes eighteen days of hard fighting, to conquer the Kauravas, and the final victory is only won by employing stratagems which are anything but fair, while in the Virāṭaparvan Arjuna puts the Kauravas to flight almost in no time. However, as U. himself admits, this question has nothing to do with the Critical Edition. Yet it is of primary importance to be clear about the real aim of our Edition. U. says that “the main object of a critical edition of the Mahābhārata is, in the first place, to have a text of the Mahābhārata, which contains no external interpolations, and secondly, to have also a text which intrinsically approximates to the spirit and characteristics of the period to which by tradition as corroborated by external evidence, the Epic is generally assigned.” I fear, this is more than we can ever hope to attain to on the basis of our MSS. Besides, the words “tradition as corroborated by external evidence” seem to imply what can hardly be proved. Tradition ascribes the Mahābhārata to Vyāsa, a Rṣi and a contemporary of the Pāṇḍavas in a past far removed from any historical period. External evidence does not corroborate such a hoary antiquity, but all the evidence we have tends to show that our Mahābhārata is a composite work consisting of earlier and later parts, the oldest parts probably going back to the 4th century B. C. or even one or two centuries further back, while the latest parts can on the whole not be later than the 4th century A. D. That is to say, additions of whole Parvans or of any large portion of the Mahābhārata have not been made after the 4th century A. D. Both MSS. and Editions, however, contain numerous smaller interpolations (of Adhyāyas and Ślokas). It is these, of which the text has to be purged by the Critical Edition. If we can arrive at a text of the Mahābhārata which approaches as nearly as possible that

text which existed in the 4th century A. D., we shall probably have done all that can be done by an Editor. And such a critical edition is needed to form the *basis* of all further critical and historical Mahābhārata studies. It is impossible to decide which parts are old and which are late, as long as we do not know the state of the oldest text offered by the *MS. evidence*.

To give an example, some scholars have used the Durgāstotra-Adhyāya in the Virāṭaparvan as an argument for the lateness of this Parvan. Now U. has proved, that by the unmistakable evidence of the MSS. the Durgāstotra is a late interpolation in the Virāṭaparvan, and has to be excluded from the text altogether. U. (p. xxii) is perfectly right in saying that no absolutely certain historical argument could have proved the Durgāstotra to be an interpolation, while the evidence of the MSS. is an absolute proof. And altogether it must be frankly admitted, that as long as we rely on the evidence of the MSS., we are on much safer ground than when we begin to reason with historical or other arguments. This only shows, that the Critical Edition will not be the end, but rather the *beginning* of a true critical study of the Mahābhārata from a historical point of view.

Happily, as U. has already pointed out before, it can be proved that the Mahābhārata at least at the time of Kumārila (about 700 A. D.) already contained a full table of contents, the *Parvasaṃgraha* in the second Adhyāya of the Ādiparvan, in which the number of Adhyāyas and Ślokas is given for each Parvan. There is good reason to believe that it formed part of the Mahābhārata as it was in the 4th century A. D. Now U. has found that three of his Nāgarī MSS., the two old MSS. F and A, and in a lesser degree his MS. M., offer a text that with regard to the number of Adhyāyas and Ślokas agrees far more closely with the numbers given in the Parvasaṃgraha than any of our present Editions or any other MSS. Moreover, on analysing the Adhyāyas and Ślokas which are omitted in the MSS. AM., he found that some of them are also omitted in other MSS., more especially in the Bengali and the Southern MSS. As it is further found that none of the passages omitted is necessary for the context, their exclusion from the critical text seems to be fully justified, and with it also the pre-eminence given to the MSS. FA and (in a lesser degree) M.

These are thoroughly sound and scholarly principles, and it will be very interesting to see whether and how far it will be possible in the other Parvans also to find out such a group of

MSS. agreeing with the Parvasamgraha more than others. Probably it will not always be possible to reach the exact numbers found in the Parvasamgraha. We must not forget, that the division of Adhyāyas is often arbitrary. In many cases it matters little whether an Adhyāya is separated in two, or two or three Adhyāyas are contracted into one. And MSS. differ in this respect. As to the number of Slokas, it sometimes happens that original Slokas have been replaced by interpolated ones, so that the same number of Slokas does not necessarily mean that the Slokas are the same. But here we have also to take into account, as U. also has done, the agreement or non-agreement of MSS. coming from different quarters. If, as is often the case, the Bengali MSS. agree with the Southern MSS., or if it should be found that Kāshmiri and Nepāli MSS. agree with Southern MSS. against the current Editions, we may be pretty sure of having come as near as possible to the original text. Thus, the *Parvasamgraha argument coupled with the evidence of MSS. coming from different parts of India* will, I have no doubt, always enable us to find out the best MSS. on which to base our Edition, as U. has succeeded with the present edition of the Virāṭaparvan.

Of course, if we speak of "best MSS.", this can only be meant relatively. It is an oversight, when U. speaks (p. xl) of F and A "being quite free from interpolations." A glance at the Appendix (pp. 67, 104, 107, 112, 114, 121, 138, 272), shows, that there are interpolations also in the "best MSS." This is only natural, as there is no chance of our ever discovering an archetypus of the Mahābhārata or one of its Parvans. U. himself states that his text is "mainly based on F A M", but that he has given preference to other evidence, "whenever it was necessary and justifiable," and that "each individual reading is based on its own merits" (p. xvf.). This is quite right. He has not even refrained from emendating the text conjecturally against all the MSS. This, too, is unobjectionable, *if such an emendation is absolutely necessary*, that is, if the reading of the MSS. is absolutely impossible. It is not sufficient that "the emendated" reading in the opinion of the Editor would make better sense.

Take, for instance, the Śloka (48, 17):

किं नो गावः करिष्यन्ति धनं वा विपुलं तथा ।

दुर्योधने पार्थजले पुरा नौरिव मज्जति ॥

Here all the Northern and Southern MSS. read दुर्योधनः, and in my humble opinion this reading gives not only a good sense,



but is even better than U.'s "emendation." I translate; "What use are cows to us or wealth ever so great? Here before our eyes Duryodhana is submerged, as it were, like a boat, in the flood of Arjuna." दुर्योधनः is emphatically placed at the head of the sentence, to emphasize the fact that there is no time now to think of cows or wealth, since Duryodhana is in danger. The two short sentences placed side by side are very effective to paint the situation.

In 19, 9 b U. reads :

पश्य मां दुःखितां तच्च त्वमिष्टोऽसि ब्रवीमि ते ॥

Here the case is different and really difficult. The numerous various readings show, that the text is not in order. All the MSS. except FM read पृच्छ for पश्य. Only FM read तच्च, the other MSS. vary between तत्त्वं, एव, सत्त्वं and एनां. U.'s conjectural reading त्वमिष्टोऽसि is based on तमेष्टमि, the impossible reading of F. The other MSS. read : पृष्टा चात्र, अपृष्टा च, अपृष्टापि, संपृष्टा प्र० and नापृष्टा च. Against the reading पृच्छ U. rightly urges that Bhīma has already asked Draupadī the cause of her grief (16, 57). I, therefore, think that he is right in following FM in reading पश्य. But the conjecture त्वमिष्टोऽसि seems to me not at all plausible, and palaeographically not sufficiently supported by the corrupt reading of F. I should either keep the reading of the old editions पृष्टा चात्र ब्रवीमि ते, or I should read :

पश्य मां दुःखितामेव तत्त्वं पृष्टा ब्रवीमि ते ।

the reading दुःखितामेव being supported by the old Nāgarī MS. A and by the Malayalam MSS. The reading I propose would also be conjectural, but only very slightly differing from the readings of the MSS. But the final decision must be put off, until more MSS. have been consulted.

In 45, 18b there is no justification for putting तार्क्ष्य into the text, as no MS. reads like this, for K has तार्क्ष्य not here, but in the last pāda, and U. himself conjectures तार्क्ष्यो. He ought either to have given his conjectural reading in the text or left the reading of the MSS. unaltered. I should have preferred the latter course. The line, as it stands in the new edition, is the opposite of an emendation. If we read, as the MSS. almost unanimously read :

यं यमेषोऽभिसंकुद्धः संग्रामे निपतिष्यति ।

वृक्षं गरुडवेगो वा विनिहत्य स मेध्यति ॥

we might take वा in the sense of इव and translate : "Whomsoever he, when in wrath, will strike down in the battle, smashing him like Garuḍa's violence a tree, he will perish."

Here, as in many other cases where there is a great divergence of readings, it is not easy to gather the readings of the MSS. from the *varietas lectionis* as given in the critical notes. It would be much better, and would not take more space, to give the readings of a complete *pāda* in such cases. And it would probably be more convenient throughout, to divide in the critical notes the Ślokas (as is done in the case of the Upajātis) into 4 *pādas* (a, b, c, d,) instead of lines (a, b). It is not necessary to begin a new line with each *pāda*. In this way space will be saved.

In one case U. has gone far beyond the evidence of the MSS. He has relegated 35 verse lines to the Appendix, though they occur in all the MSS., both Northern and Southern. He has done so only hesitatingly and fully aware of the boldness of such a step. His purpose in this was to get rid of the three-lined Ślokas, and to give a text in which every Śloka should form a unity in sense. I confess, I do not like the Ślokas of three lines, nor the Śloka arrangement in the current editions, where often the second line of a Śloka forms one sentence with the first line of the next. And wherever it is possible to get rid of third lines of Ślokas on the basis of MS. evidence they should be eliminated by all means. But I should never go beyond the evidence of *all* MSS. Let me give only one example, to show that U. in his critical zeal sometimes goes too far:

In 16, 46 ff. the MSS. read :

गात्राणि वाससी चैव प्रक्षाल्य सलिलेन सा ।  
चिन्तयामास रुदती स्वस्य दुःखस्य निर्णयम् ॥  
किं करोमि क्व गच्छामि कथं कार्यं भवेन्मम ।  
इत्येवं चिन्तयित्वा सा भीमं वै मनसागमत् ॥  
नान्यः कर्ता ऋते भीमान्ममाद्य मनसः प्रियम् ।  
तत उत्थाय रात्रौ सा विहाय शयनं स्वकम् ॥  
प्राद्वन्नाथमिच्छन्ती कृष्णा नाथवती सती ।  
भवनं भीमसेनस्य क्षिप्रमायतलोचना ॥

Here U. has relegated the lines किं करोमि etc. and भवनं भीमसेनस्य etc. to the Appendix. In my opinion the line किं करोमि etc. is absolutely required on account of the following इत्येवं चिन्तयित्वा and the line भवनं भीमसेनस्य etc. is also required as an object to प्राद्वत्. The two last Ślokas form a Yamaka. The whole passage is written in Kāvya style with an abundance of similes, which may be a proof of later origin. But I do not think, we have a right to reduce the passage, as U. does, against the evidence of all MSS.

It is not necessary to enter into more details. Nor need I mention all the individual cases, in which I differ from the Editor as regards the choice of readings. But I can say this, wherever I differ from him, it is not because I follow other principles of textual criticism, but rather because I stick to his own principles more strictly than he himself does. Nor must I omit to mention, that in all cases where we differ, it is never a question of his having adopted a reading or excluded a line lightly or carelessly, but on the contrary, it is always clear from his searching Notes that he has considered and reconsidered the problems most thoroughly. It is often rather a question of hypercriticism, of doing too much than of doing too little.

On the whole, I believe, everybody will admit, that even this tentative text of the Virāṭaparvan is older and more genuine than that found in any other edition, and that it approaches as nearly as at present possible the text as it was in the 4th century A. D., though we must wait to see whether the text thus reconstructed will be corroborated by the MSS. which have not yet been examined.

I have still to refer to a few external details which will have to be seen to in the final edition. The typographical get-up leaves much to be desired, and the number of misprints is larger even than it might appear from the "additions and corrections" at the end of the volume. This is of greater importance than it would seem to some of my Indian friends. Personally if I find too many misprints in any of my own publications, I have the same feeling, as if I were going into society in a dirty and tattered coat. But in a critical edition of a text, where often everything depends on the reading not only of a single word, but also of a single syllable, misprints are not only æsthetic blemishes, but spoil the value of the critical text.

The designation of the MSS. by the letters A B C D etc. is not practical. It will be advisable to find such designations as will at once show to which group a MS. belongs, for instance B should stand for Bengālī MSS., and B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, B<sup>3</sup> etc. for the single MSS. of this type. Typographically the bold capitals used for the designation of the MSS. do not look well. By using smaller capitals not only space will be saved, but they will also be more in accordance with the type in which the Notes are printed.

It is wrong to put a *danḍa* at the end of the first and third *pāda* of an *Upajāti*.

The number of pages of this volume is, apart from LVI pages of Introduction : 540 + 146 + 2 + 286 + 2 + 24 + XXVIII + 6, text, Notes, Appendix, Supplements, Concordance and Corrections having each a separate paging. This is very awkward, and in the final edition we shall, apart from the introductory matter, expect to have only one pagination throughout.

Both in the critical apparatus, and in the Notes much space could be saved, and the space thus won could be used to print the *varietas lectionis* also for the texts given in the Appendix. If this will be done, the new edition of the Mahābhārata will not only be the first *Critical Edition* of the Great Epic so urgently needed by the scholar, but it will also embody *the whole MS. tradition of the Mahābhārata*, as the critical notes and the Appendix will register everything of any importance found in any MS. or commentary. Up to this day we practically only know the Mahābhārata of Nilakaṇṭha, who is certainly not an old author. When the Poona Edition will be published, we shall have *the Mahābhārata* in its original form after the last redaction ( about the 4th cent. A. D. ), and besides a full account of all later accrescences in the North and in the South. Thus also those pious readers of the Mahābhārata will be satisfied who fondly would not miss any line of their favourite poem found in any MS. or edition.

This pious reader of the Mahābhārata will also be pleased to have an *illustrated* edition of his rightly beloved book. I am not a competent judge of the pictures drawn by *Shrimant, Bāṣaheḥ Pant Pratinidhi*, the enlightened Chief under whose auspices the Critical Edition is being prepared. But the principles on which the illustrations are made—viz. following the text of the Mahābhārata wherever detailed descriptions of personages are available, following the Sanchi sculptures with regard to mode of ornaments, and the Ajanta paintings for the manner of colouring—are certainly such as will be approved from a scholarly point of view.

This edition of the Virāṭaparvan has been published “by way of a foretaste and a forecast” of the final Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata, and I am convinced, it will serve this purpose to the best. But it may also be turned to good use in another way. I have been using this Edition at *Visvabharati University* as a text book for my students whom I wish to make acquainted with the principles of textual criticism, and I find it very useful for this purpose, and the students also find the work interesting. I should recommend the volume to all

Sanskrit Colleges and Seminaries for the same purpose. Nothing seems to me more important, than that Indian Sanskrit students should learn the principles of textual criticism. A student who learns how to edit a text critically, will learn three things—accurateness, conscientiousness, and a spirit of criticism—which are necessary also for scholarly work of any kind. Thanks to the inspiration coming from the revered veteran Sanskrit Scholar *Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar*, we have had many good critical editions from the Bombay-Poona side of India. It is much to be desired that we might get similar reliable editions from other parts of India also.

I have pointed out all faults and blemishes of this tentative Edition, certainly not for the sake of faultfinding, but simply and solely with a view to the final Edition which we should like to see as perfect as any human work can be. But however much I may differ from the Editor with regard to individual readings, and whatever I may have to blame in details and externals, I am happy to say that the principles on which the Edition is made seem to me perfectly sound and will in all probability be found to hold good also for the final Edition. And the experiment made by the Mahābhārata Editorial Committee with the Virāṭaparvan has in my opinion proved beyond doubt, that *N. B. Utgikar* is the most competent Chief Editor for the Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata, and the Committee may be congratulated upon having put the right man in the right place.

GANDERBAL (Kashmir)

M. WINTERNITZ.

*June 5th, 1923.*

# THE VĀKĀTAKAS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA.\*

BY

DR. S. K. AIYANGAR, M. A., Ph. D.

Among the many periods in the History of Hindu India which have remained obscure to a degree notwithstanding the great progress that has been made in the study of the early History of India in recent years, the period from the disappearance of the Āndhras as a great power to the rise of the Guptas remains perhaps one of the darkest yet. So much is this the case that the beginnings of Gupta history, one of the most brilliant periods in Indian History, is still wrapped in obscurity. This obscurity can be relieved somewhat by a careful study of what is known of the Vākātakas from *paurāṇic*, inscriptional and other sources so far as they have been made recently accessible to us in a form suitable for historical use. The name Vākātaka does not appear in any of the other sources of the Indian History of the period than the inscriptions of the particular dynasty to which they refer. This has so far left the Vākātakas of the inscriptions alone and isolated from the known dynasties of the Purāṇas and other inscriptions as well. Hence their importance in history had been neglected to the detriment of correct historical perspective even of the achievements of the most brilliant sovereigns of the Gupta empire.

## THE VĀKĀTAKAS IN INSCRIPTIONS.

Of the Vākātakas themselves there are a number of inscriptions accessible to us now of the greatest historical value. Of these, a number are copper-plate grants the typical of which may be taken to be the Chammak<sup>1</sup> grant of Pravarasena II

\* Special Course of lectures in the Department of Indian History and Archaeology, for 1923, University of Madras.

1. A. S. W. I. IV. pp, 116 ff. and C. I. I. III. pp. 235 ff.

and Balaghat plates<sup>1</sup> published by Professor Kielhorn in the *Epigraphia Indica*.

The most important inscription, unfortunately a very mutilated one, is the great Ajanta inscription<sup>2</sup> of one of the feudatories of this dynasty. According to this last the genealogy of the Vākātakas would stand as follows :—

1. Vindhyaśakti.
2. Pravarasena I, son of (1) ?
3. Rudrasena I, son of (2) ?
4. Pr̥thvisena, son of (3)
5. Pravarasena II, son of (4) ?
6. (Name omitted), son of (5)
7. Devasena, son of the predecessor.
8. Harisena, son of the predecessor.

According to the most complete copper-plate grant, the so-called Balaghat plates of Pr̥thvisena II, the genealogy begins with,

1. Pravarasena I,  
His son, Gautamīputra, who married Bhavanāgā,  
the daughter of the ruler of the Bharaśiva  
dynasty (did not rule).
2. Rudrasena, Gautamīputra's son, and grandson  
of (1)
3. Pr̥thvisena I, son of (2)
4. Rudrasena II, son of (3), married Prabhāvati-  
guptā, daughter of Devagupta and Kubhera-  
nāgā.
5. Pravarasena II, son of (4), otherwise Damo-  
dharasena.
6. Narendrasena, son of (5), married Ajjhitabha-  
t̥tārikā, a princess of Kuntala.
7. Pr̥thvisena II, son of (6).

A comparison of these lists shows that in the Ajanta cave inscription there are two names omitted, those of Gautamīputra, son of Pravarasena I, and Rudrasena II. It is possible to ex-

1. *Epigraphia Indica* IX. pp. 267 ff.  
2. A. S. W. I. IV. 124.8.

plain the omission of the first name as due to the fact of his not having ruled, while the omission of the second does not admit of that explanation. In the present state of the document it is even possible to say that the first name is gone. In regard to the omission of the second, however, the only possible explanation<sup>1</sup> seems to be that it is due to the carelessness of the transcriber from the written document to the stone. Otherwise it is almost impossible to understand that a document not many generations removed from Rudrasena II should commit such a blunder as to make the grandson the son, as in the case of Pravarasena II. Assuming, therefore, that the first is omitted in this inscription because he did not rule, and the second is omitted through the inadvertence of the sculptor of the inscription, the genealogy from Vindhyaśakti to Pravarasena II may be held to be in substantial agreement in all the Vākāṭaka documents that have come down to us, both on copper-plates and on stone. After Pravarasena II, the Ajanta inscription contained the name of a son who came to the throne in his eighth year and ruled well. His son was Devasena and his son Harisena according to the same record. The name of Pravarasena II's son is now obliterated in the record. The Balaghat copper-plates of Prṭhvisena II, however, describes the son of Pravarasena II as Narendrasena by name and states the fact that "the Lakṣmī of the family was forcibly drawn to him by his possession of great good qualities." He married a Kuntala princess by name Ajjhita Bhaṭṭārikā and by her had a son Prṭhvisena II, who apparently intended to issue the actual record. Thus then we have in succession to Pravarasena II one list of three generations and one of two of which it is possible that the son and successor of Pravarasena II was only one if we could assume that the name that is omitted in the Ajanta inscriptions is Narendra itself of the Balaghat record. The only difficulty in this equation would be whether the forceful drawing of the Lakṣmī of the family by Narendrasena is not in some contrast to the eight-years-old child who succeeded Pravarasena II and who ruled well. The succession of a boy eight years old would be quite possible under normal circumstances, and there is nothing at all improbable in his having ruled well. The actual difficulty does come in when the Balaghat inscription says that

1. It is just possible to assume that Rudrasena II did not rule; but this assumption will be in direct opposition to the explicit statement of these records that Prabhāvatī was the crowned Queen of Rudrasena II,




it is Narendrasena's good qualities that forcefully drew to him (apahrta) the Śrī of the family. This seems almost to imply a disputed succession which ended in favour of Narendrasena. In other words, Narendrasena succeeded to the throne of his father either after a war, or as the result of a demonstration almost amounting to war against an elder brother. On this assumption the accession of the other son of Pravarasena II in his eighth year would become impossible apparently as he could have succeeded only after Narendrasena and Prthvisena II. This assumption would give to the two reigns of Narendrasena and Prthvisena the comparatively short period of less than eight years which seems impossible in the circumstances. If in spite of the contrast involved in the 'forceful drawing of the prosperity of the family' to Narendrasena, we assume Narendrasena as the name omitted in the Ajanta inscription, it would perhaps make a more legitimate arrangement of the genealogical succession to assume that Prthvisena was the elder son of Narendrasena, and Devasena another son, it may be of a different wife, and making Prthvisena and Devasena brothers. The omission of the name Devasena in the Balaghat record would then be natural and the omission of the name Prthvisena II in the Ajanta cave inscription could be explained as due to his being not in the regular line of succession of Harisena or Devasena.

In neither of these cases, however, is the proper weight given to the expression which describes the character of Narendrasena's succession to the position of his father as recorded in the Balaghat plates. According to Professor Kielhorn, Narendrasena, "from confidence in the excellent qualities previously acquired by him, took away (or appropriated) the family's fortune his commands were honoured by the lords of Kosala Mekala, and Malava, and he held in check enemies bowed down by his prowess."<sup>1</sup> This interpretation goes too far in clearly indicating a disputed succession, and taken along with the succession of the other son in his eighth year of age, would seem inevitably to involve the inference of Professor Kielhorn that Narendrasena probably took the kingdom from an elder brother, or at any rate occupied the throne as against an elder brother. Assuming this to be the correct state of affairs the genealogy of the family would stand as exhibited in the following table, taking the

1. Ep. Indica IX. 269. The reading of the original text is corrupt and therefore uncertain.

elder brother to be the son whose name is gone in the Ajanta inscription.



## POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE VĀKĀTAKAS.

The first point that arises in the political history of the Vākātakas is whether the Vindhyaśakti of the Purāṇas was the Vākāṭaka or no. It was pointed out above that in the genealogies of the Vākātakas that have come down to us it is only the genealogy in the mutilated Ajanta cave inscriptions of Varāhadeva that mentions the name Vindhyaśakti at the head of the list. Vindhyaśakti is there described as a *dvija* (twice born) equal in prowess of his arms to both Indra and Upendra, and as the banner of the family of the Vākātakas. He is also given credit for great achievements against the rulers of the earth. The other inscriptional records that have come down to us do not mention the name Vindhyaśakti in the list. It was Dr. Bhau Daji that made the first attempt to identify Vindhyaśakti of the Ajanta inscription with the Vindhyaśakti of the Purāṇas. This identification was objected to by Dr. Bühler and others that followed him on two grounds: (1) that Vindhyaśakti is described as a *dvija* in the Ajanta inscription and not a single name in the Kailāṣa

list agrees with those of the Vākātakas; (2) that all the manuscripts of the Vāyupurāṇa so far consulted gave the name of his son as Pravīra and not Pravara. These objections have since lost a considerable amount of their force. According to the collated texts given by Mr. Pargiter in the Dynasties of the Kali Age, Vindhyaśakti followed the Kailakilas,—whether they be Yavanas or others, notwithstanding the statement in the Viṣṇupurāṇa. The possibility of corruption of Pravara into Pravīra is so easy that it would be going too far to make that the decisive test on a question like this. The name Vindhyaśakti occurs in the *paurāṇic* lists in two connections. First it occurs in the list of the local dynasties who rose to importance during the period of decadence of the Āndhra power. There Vindhyaśakti is supposed to have followed the Kilakilas or the Kolikilas. It occurs for the second time among the rulers of Vidiśā. There the son of Vindhyaśakti by name Pravīra would, according to the Purāṇas, enjoy the rule for sixty years and, 'will celebrate great sacrifices giving abundant largesses.' There follows the further statement that four of his sons would be kings. Taken together these statements indicate that Vindhyaśakti succeeded to the possessions of the Kolikila Yavanas whoever they were, and probably had a long reign. Or, it is possible to interpret this statement that he came into possession of the earth after it had been in the possession of the Yavanas for ninety-six years. This does not give us any indication as to what exactly was the territory of Vindhyaśakti. It merely gives us to understand that he acquired the territory in the occupation of the Kilakilas. The next passage has reference to the rulers of the territory depending on Vidiśā. After a series of names, Pravīra or Pravara it is said would enjoy the city of Kāñcanaka. In other words it was he that acquired the territory depending upon Vidiśā which he did not inherit from his father. Since our authority for the statement that Vindhyaśakti was a Yavana has lost a considerable amount of its force, the difficulty about Vindhyaśakti being described as a *dvija* in the Ajanta record need not prove an insuperable obstacle to the identification of the two Vindhyaśaktis. The rest of the description in the inscription, mutilated though it be, would be in keeping with the achievements of a petty chief who had by his own exertions raised himself to considerable political power. There is one expression in the mutilated record which seems to let us into the secret of this identification. According to the transcript

of Paṇḍit Bhagavan Lal Indraji as edited by the late Dr. Burgess, line 3 of the Ajanta inscription reads :

Purandaropendrasamaprabhāvaḥ  
svabāhuvīryy(ārjita)sarvalokaḥ  
+ + + + + kānām  
babbhūva vākātakavamaśaketuḥ.

I would prefer to read the second half of the first part of the line.

*Svabāhuvīryyārttitaśatrulokaḥ.*

But this is not very material to the discussion. We want a word ending in *ka* for the 'kānām' which obviously is the latter end of the word, a genitive plural. It seems to me obviously to stand for Vindhyakānām, and I would read this part of the line,

*Rājā Mahendra Iva Bhuvi Vindhyakānām.*

This would give us the detail that Vindhyaśakti who was the banner of the Vākātakas came of the family of the Vindhya-kas. It seems to be the name under which the family of Vindhyaśakti and Pravīra is described in the Purāṇas. The first line of the passage under the dynasties of the 3rd century A. D. in Pargiter's text reads,

*Vindhyakūnām Kule'tite.*

This must refer to the dynasties described in the previous section. We seem therefore to have very much more support for the identification of the two Vindhyaśaktis than these learned scholars who studied these inscriptions in a previous generation almost. We seem to arrive, however, by adopting this conclusion, at a new difficulty with the statement when the family of the Vindhya-kas had become extinct in the next passage. This means that when Pravara had ruled for sixty years in Kāñcanaka and four of his sons, not necessarily after him, the family became extinct. This could only refer to the extinction of the rule of the family in the Vindhyan regions. This one could understand from what appears in the copper-plate grants in regard to the Vākātika Pravarasena I. According to these copper-plates, the illustrious Pravarasena celebrated the Agniṣṭoma, āptoryāma, ukthya, ṣoḍāśya, atirātra, vājapeya, bṛhaspatisava, and sādyaskara, and four aśvamedha sacrifices. He is further given the title 'Samrāt'. The detailed list of sacrifices given in this recital of them seems to be details of the sacrifice from day to day leading to the final aśvamedha, as

described in the śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, and therefore it amounts to no more than the celebration of the aśvamedha sacrifice of which he is said to have celebrated four. The assumption of the title 'Samrāt' or his accession to a 'Sāmrājya' could only mean that he acquired new territory, or that he got into possession of such extensive territory that he had kings under him, and it may be that four of his sons had the title 'Mahārāja' and ruled over various portions of his territory thus entitling him to the higher dignity of 'samrāt'. According to these inscriptions none of his sons appears to have succeeded, his successor on the throne, according to them uniformly, being his grandson by Gautamīputra by name Rudrasena. That means, therefore, that none of his sons survived him. What is more significant, this successor Rudrasena I, drops the title 'samrāt.' Does it not mean that some calamity befell the family at the death of Pravarasena, and that when his grandson ultimately succeeded to the territory of his grandfather what came to him was nothing more than the original family possession, i.e. the territory round Bhojakaṭa, the territory peculiarly of the Vākātakas? This seems what is actually intended when the Purāṇas state 'when the rule of Pravarasena became extinct in the territory of the Vindhyaś.' In other words, the authority of Pravarasena's family ceased to be a force in his newly acquired possessions, of which perhaps the most important was the territory of the Vindhyaś. There seems, therefore, to be nothing irreconcilable between the statement contained in the Purāṇas regarding Vindhyaśakti and Pravarasena, and the more detailed statements that we get from the inscriptions of the Vākātakas. There is a further fact which appears in the inscriptions which seems equally significant also. In speaking of Rudrasena I, much is made of his maternal grandfather Bhavanāga of the Bharaśiva family. In the Vākāṭaka inscriptions as a whole, it is only twice that we are given information about the maternal grandfathers or fathers-in-law of the members of this dynasty. Such information is given to us in connection with the two Rudrasenas. In the case of the second Rudrasena, as it will appear later, the person that is brought into connection with the dynasty is acknowledged to be one in a superior position, and in all probability the maternal grandfather of Rudrasena I must have been an equally important person from the point of view of the Vākātakas to be given the distinction of a description such as he is given. The plain meaning of that would be that some great calamity befell the empire of Pravarasena I, and that this

Nāga chieftain rendered valuable assistance in saving for the family an important block of the territory which belonged to the Vākātaka empire.

The real explanation of this will depend upon the actual chronology of the family. The late Professor Kielhorn, careful and judicious epigraphist though he was, has offered it as his opinion that the Balaghat record of Pr̥thvisēna II<sup>1</sup> 'may be assigned with probability to about the second half of the eighth century A. D.' From what we know of the record of the regent-queen Prabhāvatīguptā the late Dr. Bühler seems to have come far closer to the fact in assigning the Ajanta inscription<sup>2</sup> to the first quarter of the sixth century A. D. we may now say definitely on the strength of the Prabhāvatīguptā inscription, and also from other confirmatory evidence from literature, that Rudrasēna II was the son-in-law of Candragupta II, Vikramāditya. As we have already pointed out that the long reign of Pr̥thvisēna I must have been contemporary with a considerable part of Candragupta II's, and possibly the whole of Samudragupta's reign. Candragupta I therefore must have been the contemporary of Rudrasena I, and perhaps even partly of that of his predecessor, his grandfather, Pravarasena I. It thus becomes clear that the calamity that befell the Vākātaka dynasty on the death of Pravarasena I was an event contemporary with Candragupta I and his rise to imperial power. Has the rise of Candragupta to an imperial position any connection with the fall of the Vākātakas from that position to that of a ruler of a kingdom merely? The two events seem to have had a vital connection, and the connection is partly exhibited in what was stated above regarding the actual possessions of Vindhyaśakti and Pravarasena I. From what we know of early Gupta history these facts stand out, that the Guptas before Candragupta I were rulers of Magadha, i. e. the territory close to the Ganges depending upon Prayāga, Sāketa, and Magadha according to the Purāṇas. The Licchavi alliance, which is referred to as a matter of great importance in inscriptions and even coins as of vital importance to the rise of the Guptas, must have brought in a fresh accession of territory and influence. Thus early in his career Candragupta must have risen to a position of great importance as a king with all the resources that would enable a man of genius to rise to an imperial posi-

1. E. P. Ind. IX. 270.

2. A. S. W. I. IV. 138.

tion. The only obstacle in his way must have been another powerful aspirant to the empire in Pravarasena I of the Vākātakas. In accordance with historical (and even *Śāstraic*), precedent there cannot be two emperors at the same time. Either Candragupta must stand aside or the Vākāṭaka Pravarasena. The latter having achieved a position would not perhaps willingly surrender it. If he died, as he did after a very long reign and leaving a young grandson to succeed to the throne, that would be the occasion for the new aspirant to make the most of his position. That seems to be what exactly had happened. The Vākātakas must have been hard pressed and Candragupta must have gained the upper hand either by actual war and conquest, or by the slow extension of his influence and absorption of territory. Whichever was the actual line that Candragupta adopted, the fact seems clear that he aggrandised himself at the expense of the Vākātakas under Rudrasena I. Nothing else can satisfactorily account for the dropping of the much-prized title '*samrāj*' by Rudrasena I, the successor of Pravarasena I, and the assumption of the imperial dignity by Candragupta I.

From the above it would seem clear that Vindhyaśakti and Pravarasena of the Vākāṭaka inscriptions are identifiable with Vindhyaśakti and his son Pravira of the Purāṇas who are clearly referred to as Vindhyaśakti. The career of these two, father and son, must have followed the complete extinction of the Āndhra power, and must have reached a stage of advance towards the establishment of an empire in the comparatively long reign of Pravarasena I. The petty state of the Guptas according to the Purāṇas must also have started on a career of expansion under Candragupta I. From what is known of the history of the Guptas the inference seems justifiable that the Licchavi alliance of this Candragupta contributed in an important degree to this expansion. This by itself could not have led to the assumption of a higher title by Candragupta I. This must have been followed by some signal achievement of the rising monarch, and that achievement seems indicated in the lowering of the prestige of Pravarasena's successor. It would therefore be a justifiable conclusion that the rival imperial ambitions of the Vākātakas and the Guptas got settled in a manner apparently satisfactory to both the parties, and perhaps in the best interests of the country at the time. What these last were will be discussed in another connection. What is clear so far is that the high position achieved by Pravarasena

- suffered an eclipse either at the very end of his reign, or as the direct result of his death, and when the Vākāṭaka state emerges under his grandson, it did so with diminished lustre.

#### THE REVIVAL OF THE VĀKĀṬAKA POWER.

Rudrasena I's reign seems to have been a comparatively short one, wedged in as it were between the long reign of his grandfather Pravarasena I and that of the equally long one of his son and successor Prṭhvisena I. It was already pointed out that Rudrasena succeeded to the possessions of his grandfather much reduced in prestige and that he was able to come to that position possibly through the good offices of a powerful family of Nāga chieftains known in these documents as Bharaśivas, whose modern representatives, according to the late Dr. Bühler, are the Bhar Rajputs. However this might turn out to be, the Bharaśivas played a decisive part in the restoration of the Vākāṭakas. Rudrasena's successor, according to all the available documents, was Prṭhvisena I. These inscriptions ascribe to him certain features as sovereign. Prṭhvisena is said to have been possessed of all the great qualities that his ancestors Vindhyaśakti and Pravarasena had possessed, and is said to have ruled righteously and well. Further he is said to have succeeded to the elements of royalty which had been steadily growing in prosperity for a hundred years, the elements so indicated being, treasure (kośa), army (daṇḍa), other instruments of royalty (sādhana), descendants (santāna), and is said to have had a number of sons and grandsons as well. He is said to have followed in his rule the example of Yudhiṣṭhira. This recital of his qualities and rule indicates a long reign of prosperity, and, if we add to this what we glean from other records, even of an extensive kingdom. The Ajanta inscription seems to give him credit for the conquest of Kuntala, which is the south-western portion of the Dakhan, perhaps then passing from the possession of the Nāga Cūtus into that of the Vākāṭakas, to pass over again into that of the Kadambas. That is at one end of the Vākāṭaka territory. Almost at the other end diagonally, Prṭhvisena's authority seems to have been recognised in the reign of Bundelkhand as the short records of a Vyāgrarāja in Nachneka Talai show. These two records are of a feudatory chieftain Vyāgrarāja who is said to have done something in the reign of Prṭhvisena. Whether this is the Vyāgrarāja of the Mahākāntāra of the Samudragupta inscription is as yet open to doubt. Possibly he was. But in any case this is a clear indication



that the authority of Pravarasena was recognised diagonally across the whole plateau of India from the north-east corner in Bundelkhand to the south-west corner in Kuntala. The feature that Prthvisena succeeded to the possessions which have been continually augmenting for a period of hundred years seems to find its echo in the seal of his successors '*kramaprāptanṛpaśriyaḥ*' which seems to be more or less in contrast with '*tatparigrhīta*' of the Gupta inscriptions. While therefore the Vākātakas boasted of a regular lineage of rulers from father to son in unbroken succession, the Guptas always made it a point that each ruler was chosen by his predecessor, as a worthy successor. The repetition of this feature in their official records by both the dynasties seems clearly to indicate a feeling of rivalry which however had been kept under control from considerations of political prudence. The long reign of Prthvisena I must have corresponded to that of Samudragupta and in part of Candragupta II's reign. So far, all the Vākātika rulers claim to be zealously devoted to the worship of Śiva. But the son and successor of Prthvisena I is described as one devoted to the worship of Cakrapāṇi (Viṣṇu). It is this Rudrasena, the successor of Prthvisena I, the devout worshipper of Viṣṇu, that took for his crowned queen Prabhāvatīguptā, the daughter of Devagupta and Kubheranāgā. One particular feature in this is that all the successors of Pravarasena among the Vākātakas call themselves simply Mahārājas, while this Devagupta whose daughter Rudrasena II married is described as a Mahārājādhirāja. This is a clear recognition that whoever Devagupta was he occupied a position of higher political status than the Vākātakas, and the marriage of the Vākātika ruler with a princess of the family of Devagupta must have been regarded as an alliance exalting to the dignity of the Vākātakas. The way that the records make the statement has a similar tendency.

#### CANDRAGUPTA II AND THE VĀKĀTAKAS.

The problem of this Devagupta remained unsolved for a long time since the Gupta inscriptions were edited by the late Dr. Fleet. It was Professor K. B. Pathak of Poona that gave an account in the Indian antiquary for 1912 of a copper-plate charter issued by Prabhāvatīguptā, as the regent of her minor son Divākarasena, as he is called in the record, who is probably an elder brother of Pravarasena II, known to us from other records. Dr. Fleet definitely committed himself to the opinion that this Devagupta was a different person from Candragupta II as he

has indicated in a note to the Sāñci inscription where the name Devagupta occurs. On page 33 of the Gupta inscriptions he has a note that Prinsep translated this passage where the name Devarāja occurs so as to make the Devarāja another name of Candragupta II. While admitting the possibility of the correctness of this statement, he filled up the unfortunate lacuna of six letters in the line in such a way as to give it the interpretation that Devarāja was the name of the minister. The line reads,

*ardhena mahārājādhirājasya Candraguptasya Devarāja  
iti priyanāma.....tasya sarvaguṇasampattaye yāvaccandrādittya  
tāvat pañcabhikṣavo bhuñjatam.*

The sense of the passage is quite clear that five 'bhikṣus' were to be fed perpetually from out of half the income from what was given in order that somebody may be possessed of the wealth of all good qualities. The grant of course is made by a subordinate ruler, and the natural interpretation would be that he made it for the possession of all the good qualities by his king. The idea of doing it for a minister would seem on the face of it somewhat peculiar though not impossible. It is generally for the spiritual or the moral benefit of the parents and of himself, the donor. It can equally appropriately be for the benefit of one's sovereign. But to consider that a subordinate governor made a donation like this in favour of an amātya seems an unusual procedure when the sovereign is also brought into close connection with the donor. Apart from that, the reading suggested is,

Devarāja iti priyanāma (amātyo bhavat) y (e) tasya.

The words supplied do not seem very particularly appropriate, so far as the lacuna itself is concerned. It strikes me from the plate given that there is no letter lost just before *tasya* and the lacuna after 'nāma' can be supplied by the words

dheya-alāṅkṛtasya

so that the whole will read,

nāmadheyālāṅkṛtasya tasya

which would simply mean Candragupta who bore the pet name or the affectionate name Devarāja.

The Prabhāvatīguptā grant gives the genealogy of the regent-queen in her own line, and brings the Gupta genealogy down to Candragupta II. She describes herself, as in all the Vākāṭaka grants, the crowned-queen of Rudrasena II and daughter of Mahārājādhirāja Devagupta and Kubheranāga.

The prince's name occurs in this grant as Divākarasena; but we know from other Vākāṭaka grants that she had another son, Pravarasena II. We seem then to be led by this grant of the regent Prabhāvatīgupā to the identification of Devagupta with Candragupta II, establishing by means of this identification the contemporaneity of the Vākāṭaka Rudrasena II with Candragupta II. We may go farther and state that Rudrasena II was the younger contemporary, and therefore Candragupta II must have been partly the contemporary of Pṛthvisena I as well.

It was already stated that Pṛthvisena's was a long reign. That, coupled with the regency of Prabhāvatīguptā for her son, makes the inference that Rudrasena's was a short reign, probable. Candragupta's having been a comparatively long reign it is equally probable that it ran into a part, may be even a considerable part, of Pravarasena II's reign. Whatever may have been the actual relationship between Pṛthvisena I and Candragupta II there can be no doubt that Candragupta's influence dominated in the reign of Rudrasena II, the regency of Prabhāvatīguptā, and a considerable part of the reign of Pravarasena II. That this was so can be proved by certain details of literary evidence recently made available. The Prākṛt Kāvya Setubandha has long been recognised as the work of a Pravarasena. So it is described in one of the introductory *ślokas* of Bāṇa's Harṣa-Charita. The work itself contains a reference in Book I, verse 9, that it was begun by a recently installed monarch and received a critical revision by a great poet, and thus attained ultimately to the great fame that it did, the author being classed with such great literary luminaries as Kālidāsa, Guṇādhya, etc. in the estimation of Bāṇa. The commentary on the work compiled by a member of the Jaipur Rajput family in the court of Akbar, named Rāmasetu Pradīpam, explains this newly installed monarch as a Bhojadeva 'according to accepted tradition.' Rāmadāsa, the commentator, elaborates the position further by stating it that the work was composed by Pravarasena who was in the court of Candragupta, and received the critical revision of the master-poet Kālidāsa at the instance of the emperor Vikramāditya. This statement is embodied in a verse of his introduction to the commentary where he states it broadly that 'he composed the commentary at the instance of emperor Jallāladindira (Jallalu-din-Akbar) just as Kālidāsa wrote the work at the instance of the emperor Vikramāditya'. This makes the posi-

tion absolutely clear so far as Rāmadāsa was concerned t ht Vikramāditya, Kālidāsa, and Pravarasena were contemporaries. How far is this literary tradition historically correct? Rāmadāsa lived in the sixteenth century A. D. We can carry the tradition seven centuries back from him at any rate. Rājaśekhara in his Kāvya-mīmāṃsā quotes a verse to illustrate the complete change of meaning by the slight alteration of a word or two in a verse. The meaning of that verse is "a king of Kuntala having laid the burden of administration upon you and disports himself with drink in the company of sweet friends." This very verse is quoted in Bhoja's Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharaṇa and in his Śiṅgāra prakāśa (prak. IX). In the latter work the author states it that Kālidāsa was sent on an embassy to a Kuntala king. When he returned from the mission he made his report to Vikramāditya who sent him on the mission in the verse quoted, which is,

Asakalahasitatvāt kṣālitānīva kāntyā  
Mukulītanayanatvādvvyaktakarnotpālāni  
*Pibati* madhusugandhīnyānanāni priyāṇām  
*Tvayi* vinihitabhāraḥ Kuntalānām adhiśaḥ.

Change *Pibati* into *Pibatu*, and *Tvayi* into *Mayi*.

Vikramāditya construed the 'tvayi' with 'Pibati' and charged him with making a report of ambiguous import. According to Rājaśekhara the change of 'pibati' into 'pibatu' and 'tvayi' into 'mayi' alters the sense completely, and that was presumably what was suggested as an emendation by Vikramāditya. Kṣhemendra in his *Aucitya-Vicāracarca* quotes the same verse and ascribes it to a work of Kālidāsa which he cites as Kunteśvara-dautya which seems to be obviously a mistake for Kuntaleśvara-dautya, from the expression in the verse itself. We have seen already that Pṛthvisena I lays claim to having conquered Kuntala among other places, and we pointed out that it was probably from the Cūṭu-Nāgas, the successors of the Śātavāhanas that he conquered it. There is nothing in the evidence accessible to us so far, that the whole of his territory such as it was, did not descend to Rudrasena II. There is very good reason for assuming that Rudrasena's territory descended quite intact to Pravarasena II. Since we know from the Gupta records the whole of the region of Malva had passed into the hands of the Guptas, Kuntala must have been perhaps the most important portion of the territory of the Vākātakas under Rudra-

sena II. and his son Pravarasena II. Hence it would not be inappropriate to describe Pravarasena II as Kuntaleśa or Kuntalādhiśa. If, according to Rāmadāsa, Pravarasena lived in the court of Vikramāditya along with Kālidāsa, and if he was a king who could be described, as he does, as a Bhojadeva, the author of the Setubandha must have been the Vākātaka Pravarasena II. The question now is whether the Vākātaka monarch could be rightly described as Kuntaleśa. We have already pointed out it would not be inappropriate so to describe him. There is evidence that he was actually so described, in a verse<sup>1</sup> in the Bharata-carita which describes the author of the Setubandha as Kuntaleśa. It thus becomes clear that the tradition embodied in the commentary by Rāmadāsa has at least good literary support, and confirms what is inferable from epigraphical evidence, namely that Pravarasena II is the Kuntaleśa referred to, and that he was the author actually or nominally of the Prakrit classic Setubandha. This would make Kālidāsa, Candragupta II, Vikramāditya, and Pravarasena II contemporaries, and the date according to the Mahāvamsa of Ceylon for Kumāradāsa may seem to confirm the tradition that Kumāradāsa, the author of Jānakīharana, was a contemporary of Kālidāsa also. The Mahāvamsa date for Kumāradāsa cannot be regarded as beyond question. The diplomatic relationship into which Ceylon was brought with Samudragupta would make a friendship between the Ceylon monarch and Candragupta Vikramāditya not improbable, and if Kālidāsa travelled as far as Kuntala there is nothing to prevent his having gone to Ceylon on another occasion. Rāmagiri in the Central Provinces seems to have been one of the capitals at the time and the reference to it in Kālidāsa's Meghadūta may be in compliment to the Vākātaka monarch. We can, therefore, take it that the reign of Candragupta II was for a considerable part of it contemporary with that of Pravarasena II as well. The administration of the large kingdom of the Vākātakas was neglected to a certain extent in the reign of Pravarasena II, but remained intact

1. Jadaśayasyāntaragādhamūrga—

malabdhbarandhraj giricauryavṛtyā ।

Lokeśvalāṅkāntamapūrvasetum

babandha kīrtiyā saha Kuntaleśaḥ ॥

- \* through the dominating influence of Candragupta II, Vikramāditya.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE VĀKĀTAKAS AND THE KṢATRAPAS.

From all that we know from the Vākāṭaka records so far accessible to us, the territory of the Vākāṭaka must have lain adjacent to that of the Kṣatrapas in Surāṣṭra and varying portions of the Koṅkan. The history of the Kṣatrapas, as far as we know at present can be studied only from their coins, and Professor Rapson's study of the subject in the catalogue of Indian coins in the British Museum is an illuminating contribution on the subject. According to his investigations based on the study of the Kṣatrapa coins, the period extending from A. D. 305 to A. D. 348 is marked by great changes in the political history of the Kṣatrapas, one clear indication of which is the office of Mahākṣatrapa being in abeyance during the period. In the first part of this period there were two Kṣatrapas, and in the latter part Kṣatrapa coinage ceases altogether. From these facts Professor Rapson proceeds to make the following observations. "All the evidence afforded by coins or the absence of coins during this period,—the failure of the direct line and the substitution of another family, the cessation first of the Mahā-Kṣatrapas and afterwards of both, Mahā-Kṣatrapas and Kṣatrapas, seems to indicate troublous times. The probability is that the dominion of the Western Kṣatrapas were subject to some foreign invasion; but the nature of this disturbing cause is at present altogether doubtful, and must remain so until more can be known about the history of the neighbouring peoples during this period." It must be noted that the period has reference to A. D. 305 to 348, and so far as Kṣatrapa history is concerned there is a change of dynasty, which means that the older dynasty ceases and a collateral dynasty sets itself up in its place. The latter does so with the inferior rank of a Kṣatrapa and not of the higher Mahā-Kṣatrapa, and in the latter part of the period coins cease entirely, indicating that perhaps there were not even Kṣatrapas.

1. For the literary references compiled in this paragraph I am obliged to Mr. A. Rangaswami Sarasvati B. A., in the first instance, and to Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi, M. A. Reference may be made to the forthcoming edition of a Drama by name 'Kundamāla' ascribed to Dinnāga by the latter, who discusses in the introduction the age of Dinnāga and arrives at the conclusion that Dinnāga, Nicula, and Kālidāsa, and Kumāradasa were contemporaries.

This cessation of even the inferior position of the Kṣatrapas relates to the period A. D. 352 to 348. What does this indicate? The period 305 A. D. to 348 would include in the first half the period of expansion of the Vākāṭaka power under Pravarasena I. Pravarasena I achieved greatness, according to the Purāpas, by extending his authority into the territory of the Vindhyakas which was dominated by Vidiśā, in all probability the capital city. This progress of Pravarasena must have contributed at least to the narrowing of the territory held by the Kṣatrapas, if not to its utter extinction. If therefore we could regard that the first part of this period corresponded to the latter part of the reign of Pravarasena I, we could understand the power of the Kṣatrapas narrowing to make the assumption of the title Mahā-Kṣatrapa impossible. They had in all probability to abandon Malva which constituted the central block of their territory. It may even possibly be that Pravarasena conquered the territory of the Kṣatrapas and put an end to the ruling dynasty; and there was a revival of this dynasty possibly at the end of his reign, or in the disturbances following his death, and therefore corresponding to the reign of Vākāṭaka Rudrasena I. This period would at any rate correspond to the reign of Candragupta I. The latter half of this period 332 to 348 A. D. would fall in the reign of Candragupta I and his son Samudragupta. It would correspond to the period of Pṛthvisena I among the Vākāṭakas more or less. Samudragupta among his conquests claims to have subdued a certain number of kings in the region at least of Eastern Malva. Pṛthvisena's authority extended into Bundelkhand according to the Nachne-ki Talai inscriptions of Vyāgra. If this Vyāgra could be held to be the same person as Vyāgrarāja of Mahākāntāra reduced to vassalage by Samudragupta, his reduction must have taken place in the reign of Pṛthvisena I. That together with the expansion of Samudragupta's authority over various tribes, including the Sanakānikas, and the Ābhīras must have brought his authority quite close to the Vindhya mountains, and have contributed narrowly to reduce the extent of territory of the Kṣatrapas. Pṛthvisena, on the other hand, claims credit for having conquered Kuntala. It was likely that for what he lost perhaps in the north, he compensated himself in the south. They must have naturally brought about a reduction of the dominions of the Kṣatrapas south of the Vindhya mountains. This seems the explanation of the gap in the coinage of the Kṣatrapas and the abeyance of the title Mahākṣatrapa during the period.

We come upon another period of break between the years A. D. 351 and 364 marked by a similar political disturbance, and this period perhaps marks the expansion of Vākāṭaka authority under Prthvisena I, whose reign was a long one according to the Ajanta inscription. The so-called Uparkot hoard gives striking evidence in this connection. There were 90 Kṣatrapa coins in this hoard, all of them belonging to the reign of the ruler Rudrasena III, who called himself Mahā-Kṣatrapa Svāmī Rudrasena. According to the Rev. H. R. Scott, who examined this hoard carefully, all of these coins belong to the years from 270 to 273 of the Śaka era, that means A. D. 348 to 351. He makes the following observation in regard to this. "Many of these coins, especially those of the last years, are in mint condition and therefore unworn. From these facts we may fairly conclude that the hoard was secreted at the end of the first period of Rudrasena's reign, and most probably it was because of the revolution which then took place, rendering life and property insecure, that the money was hidden." Another peculiarity of this period, noted by Professor Rapson, is the introduction of certain lead coins with the humped bull on reverse, and the Caitya, crescent, and the sword on the obverse. Since they belong to the period of the absence of silver coins, it is possible that these are the introduction of a new dynasty. Professor Rapson surmises that the foreigner who introduced this must have come from a region where coins of lead had been in use. It is just possible that this is connected with the extension of power of the Vākāṭaka Prthvisena I, in certain parts of whose territory lead coins were in currency under the Āndhras. The successor of this Rudrasena III is like him a Mahā-Kṣatrapa Svāmī Simhasena, his sister's son. The only date known about him is read 304 with the alternative possibility of 306. That would mean either A. D. 382 or 384. One peculiar distinction that Professor Rapson noted between the two varieties of coinage of Simhasena is that in one, his title appears Rāja Mahā-Kṣatrapa, and in the other it is Mahārāja Kṣatrapa. The latter transformation, he considers, may be due to the Traikūṭaka title Mahārāja. It might as well be due to the Vākāṭaka title Mahārāja, as every Vākāṭaka ruler excepting Pravarasena had this title. If this change was due to the imposition of his authority by a foreign ruler, it might just as well be the Vākāṭaka monarch as the Traikūṭaka. We know of a great Vākāṭaka monarch at the time who extended his



territory by conquests, and we have no knowledge of the Traikūṭaka ruler about the same period. There is a process of Sanskritisation also, introduced in the coinage of these rulers, which might be due to the same cause. There are two rulers whose names we know, the first from a single coin of his, the second from the coins of his son and successor. They have the usual style both of them of Mahā-Kṣatrapa, and the same prefix to their name Svāmi, and have to be assigned to a date (Śaka dates) between 304 or 306 and 310, which would be A. D. 382 or 384 to 388, which is the last known date on Kṣatrapa coins.

### THE GUPTA CONQUEST OF THE KṢATRAPAS.

The year Śaka 310 or A. D. 388 is the last known date of the Kṣatrapas according to their coins. The earliest known date of the silver coinage of the Guptas, in the region which was peculiarly the territory of the Kṣatrapas, comes almost twenty years later and it is generally taken, on the strength of this numismatic evidence, that the Gupta conquest of the west must have taken place some time about A. D. 409 or somewhat later possibly. As Professor Rapson has already pointed out, this period is somewhat narrowed by the existence of the Udayagiri inscriptions of date 82, A. D. 401-2. There is another undated inscription which the late Dr. Fleet ascribes to Candragupta II,—the inscription only mentions Candragupta without further distinctive epithets,—which is a record of the excavation and dedication of a cave to Śambhu (Śiva) by order of a certain Virasena, otherwise called Śāba, one of the ministers of the king. The minister is described as the minister for peace and war, a man of learning and a native of Pāṭalipura. This inscription at Udayagiri indicates the extent of Candragupta's authority, and brings it quite close to Ujjain, the capital of Malva, and the headquarters of the Kṣatrapas. The last line of the inscription gives us clearly to understand that the minister and the king were both there on an expedition of 'conquest of the world.' The process of conquest therefore of this region must have been gradual. We find already in the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta mention of the Mālavas among the various tribes that he conquered. We have already pointed out that the Vyāgrarāja of Mahākāntāra probably refers to the same chieftain as the Vyāgra of the Nachne-ki Talai inscriptions. Probably the region Mahākāntāra of this inscription stands for the eighteen forest

countries of the Parivrājaka Mahārāja Hastin.<sup>1</sup> On this side therefore Samudragupta's conquests seem to have begun with the region of modern Bundelkhand and extended southwest-wards indefinitely as far as Malva at any rate. The tribes mentioned in this group, Mālavas, Ārjunāyanas, Yaudheyas, Ābhīras, and Sanakānikas, all of them seem referable to this region. Candragupta's inscriptions in the locality do not make us feel that they were new conquests. They seem much rather to have been settled conquests in his time. It would be much more reasonable to regard this region as having been acquired by his predecessors. We have already noted that the title Mahākṣatrapa falls into abeyance from A. D. 305, and the coinage of the Kṣatrapas ceases from 332 onwards up to 348, the title being revived possibly somewhat earlier than Śaka 270. If therefore the narrowing of the limit of the complete cessation of the position Mahākṣatrapa be allowed so far as to cover half, the period, the period A. D. 332-40 would be a period of complete cessation of the authority of the Mahākṣatrapas. How could that have come about? That could only be by the deprivation either of all, or of the great bulk, of the territory of the Kṣatrapas. If the whole of Malva had been taken from them, even temporarily, it would account sufficiently for the cessation of the title. The probabilities therefore seem to be that the wars between the Kṣatrapas and the Guptas began almost with perhaps Candragupta I himself, if the Mehrauli pillar inscription is his, and the Bāhlikas across the seven mouths of the Sindhu could be regarded as the Śakas and the Parthians of that region. At any rate it is not possible to refer the Śakas of the Harisena Inscription, who were among the people whose ambassadors waited, with various items of tribute, to pray and obtain from Samudragupta the charters imprinted with the Garuḍa seal for the enjoyment of territories which were their own, to any other than the Śakas of this region. The reference to their obtaining a charter with the Garuḍa seal may have reference to a recent conquest or to a conquest some time before. In either case the Śakas must have been conquered before the date of this record and had then obtained a charter permitting them to rule over their territory. This may account for the revival of their power after A. D. 340, which the resumption of the title Mahākṣatrapa, according to the coins of the

1. C. I. I. III. pp. 13.n., 113 & 116.

Kṣatrapas, would seem to bear witness to. What is said therefore in the Udayagiri inscription of Candragupta's coming there on a world-conquest must have reference to a renewed war which itself must have been a prolonged affair. The statement that we find made in Bana's Harsa-Caritam that the last of the Kṣatrapas got killed, while courting another man's wife in the enemy's territory, by the injured husband in the guise of a woman is supported by a newly discovered drama by name 'Devī-candraguptam.' According to this, Dhruva Devī, the Queen of Candragupta, fell into the hands of the western Kṣatrapas and became a prisoner. As a prisoner she was courted by the Kṣatrapa<sup>1</sup> king whom, in the guise of the queen herself, Candragupta killed. The commentator Śāṅkara Kavi's explanation of the incident is borne out by the drama in every detail except that the commentator mistakes the queen for the brother's wife of Candragupta<sup>2</sup>. This probably happened in the campaign on which he had come according to the Udayagiri inscription, which may refer to a time somewhat earlier than that of the other Udayagiri inscription referring itself to the year 82, which would be A. D. 401-3, while there is the possibility that the inscription may after all refer to Candragupta I. The interval of a little over twenty years noticed by Professor Rapson between the last Kṣatrapa coin of Śāka 310 and the first Gupta coin of 90 or more, *i. e.* A. D. 409 or later, need not be a bar to this, as a monarch would issue his own coinage in a conquered territory only after it had been brought finally into a settled government, and the need for coinage actually arises, which must be a matter of some time, and this probably refers merely to the conquest of Surāṣṭra, not Malva. It would seem therefore that both the Vākātakas and the Guptas contributed to the gradual reduction of the territory and the power of the Kṣatrapas. Their final extinction was due to the Gupta emperor Candragupta II.

1. Nirṇayasāgara edition p. 223; vide article in the Indian Antiquary for May 1923 by Mr. A. S. Sarasvati, B. A.

2. I suspect the reading of the comment, as printed, is an error, and that *bhrātrjāyām* ought to read *bhartṛjāyām*. If this should turn out correct, the Śakas or Kṣatrapas under reference must have been already reduced to vassalage to be Guptas.

## THE VĀKĀTAKAS AND THE DECLINE OF THE GUPTA EMPIRE.

The death of Pravarasena II appears to have introduced a change in the political relationship between the Guptas and the Vākātakas. The succession, as given in the Ajanta inscription of Varāhadeva, does not let us into the secret. The Balaghat copper-plates, however, give a clear indication that there was a disputed succession and that Narendrasena occupied the throne either by a coup d'état or, what is less likely, as the result of a successful war. What is really significant in this record of his son Prthvisena II is that Narendrasena's authority is said to have been acknowledged by the lords of Kosala, Mekala, and Mālava, the region over which Candragupta II extended his authority comparatively early in his reign, and maintained it inviolate by his matrimonial alliance with the Vākātakas and the uprooting war against the Kṣatrapas of Gujarat and Kathiawar. Kosala, Mekala and Mālava among the three will include all the Vindhyan region extending from the coast of the Bay of Bengal in the south-east, north-westwards at least as far as the Aravalli hills and it may be even beyond. As far as we can make out from the Gupta records, Kumāragupta's accession to the throne was a peaceful one and perhaps during the early years of his reign he enjoyed peace also. It is from the inscriptions of his son Skandagupta that we hear of disturbances in this region from the tribes of Puṣyamitras and Paṭumitras, whom Skandagupta successfully brought back into allegiance according to his records. Did the Vākātaka Narendrasena bear any part in this disturbance along the outermost frontier of the Gupta empire, did he also suffer with the Guptas from this rising of the tribes? Prthvisena II, the successor of Narendrasena, is credited, in the same record, with 'having raised his sunken family'. What was the sinking of the family due to and in what particular did he manage to raise it? If the severe defeat administered to Puṣyamitras and Paṭumitras by Skandagupta, which is supposed to have destroyed their power and brought them back into obedience, involved the submission directly or indirectly of the Vākātakas as well, Prthvisena might then have recovered at any rate partly the important position which his family occupied in the days of his predecessors from Pravarasena II backwards. He would have found occasion for this in the irruption of the Hūnas on this very frontier of the Gupta empire. It would thus be seen that the Vākātakas bore their

own share in bringing about the decline of the Gupta empire. In the whole period of the struggle of the Guptas against the Hūnas, the Vākātakas must have been left more or less to themselves, and this enabled Pṛthvisena and his successors to rehabilitate themselves to a very considerable extent, and that is what seems to be indicated in the records of the time of Harisena and his father Devasena. Harisena's is the last reign of which we have any knowledge, and then the region which is peculiarly the dominion of the Vākātakas passes into the hands of the new dynasty of the Cālukyas. The Vākātakas thus provide as it were a bridge that fills the gap between the Āndhras and the Cālukyas in the history of the Dakhan.

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# THE ETHICS OF THE UPANIṢADS.

BY

M. HIRIYANNA.

The word 'upaniṣad' as commonly used denotes a large number of words which neither belong to the same age nor inculcate the same system of doctrines. We shall not take into account all these works here, but shall confine our attention to the most ancient of them. They are hardly more than a dozen in number; but though so few, they constitute almost the whole basis of the *Vedānta* as systematised later in the *Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*. Even in these classical Upaniṣads, it is true, chronological differences and variations of doctrine can be traced; but they yet exhibit a certain family resemblance and may all be referred to practically the same phase in the evolution of Indian thought. Our object here is to sketch in outline the ethical teaching of these *Upaniṣads*.

In the second section of the *Taittiriya-Upaniṣad-Brahma-Vallī*—we have a description of the five *kośas*, which are so termed because they are conceived as forming "sheaths" to the soul of man. In simple unfigurative language, we have here a statement of five different phases of man's being,—his body, his subconscious, conscious and self-conscious life, and last, a still higher grade of existence which he sometimes manifests, as for instance, when he is contemplating the true and the holy. Of these five *kośas*, according to the description found here, it is only the third and the fourth—the *manomayakośa* and the *vijñānamayakośa*—that are directly related to moral life. Thus the former is expressed in terms of the four *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas* which, according to orthodox opinion, together constitute a divine moral code; and the latter is described by means of conceptions such as truth and righteousness, which are universally associated with ethical conduct. Evidently they represent two successive stages in moral training and the distinction between them is based upon the fact that the performance of a right deed and the abstention from a wrong one may result from external compulsion or from an inner sense of rectitude. The *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* in terms of which the third *kośa* is described are an external authority

enjoining on us the practice of virtue and the avoidance of vice. In the next stage, the ethical standard changes altogether and becomes internal. "Of it faith is the head; purity of thought, the right side; purity of deed, the left side; application, the trunk, and the Great<sup>1</sup> (or Universal Mind) the tail that supports." In one sense, no doubt, the latter alone is genuine moral life; but the former is not therefore to be counted unnecessary; for right conduct is at first learnt through obedience to external law. That is how moral education begins and it is only by and by that one comes to practise virtue in its two-fold aspect of purity of thought (*ṛta*) and purity of deed (*satya*) through a belief (*śraddhā*) in its intrinsic worth. Of the remaining three *kośas*, the first two have nothing in their constituent nature suggesting their connection with morality. They are intended only to mark off the life of the organism which man possesses in common with the rest of animate creation. The last or the *ānandamaya-kośa* again, whose essential nature—joy or bliss—implies the cessation of all strife, indicates the culmination rather than the process of ethical training. Here then we have an important principle enunciated in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, viz., that the sphere of morality is narrower than the sphere of life; and we shall try to elucidate it as we proceed.

In whatever manner we may express the end of morality, the essential feature of ethical training, considered as a practical process, is the over-coming of evil. For one that has no evil impulses at all, moral education loses all its meaning. In the Upaniṣadic answer then to the question "what is evil?" we should look for light on the course which the education should take. Evil according to the Upaniṣads has its basis in narrow selfish desires, "Hunger is death" says the *Bṛhadā. Upaniṣad* (I. ii 1) and the same is repeated in several others<sup>2</sup>. Desire is no doubt something more than hunger and the latter is not always evil. But the identification of evil with it is intended to suggest two characteristics which hunger possesses in common with other natural cravings. These cravings seek immediate satisfaction and are affections of the individual organism as distinguished from its environment. Evil then is the tendency on the one hand to satisfy present needs without any thought of the future; and, on the other, to satisfy one's needs

1. *Mahāḥ iti mahat-tattvam prathamajam*—Śaṅkara.

2. Compare e. g. *Ait. Up.* ii, 1; *Kaṭh. Up.* I, 12.

as distinguished from those of the environment. In this two-fold character of our first impulses for which really the word "hunger" stands in the Upaniṣads, we discover the need for moral training in two stages: one, in which the chief emphasis is laid on the performance of *kāmya-karmas* or 'optional deeds,' and the other, in which that emphasis is transferred to *nitya-karmas* or 'obligatory deeds.' The Upaniṣads do not explicitly distinguish these two stages for a reason which we shall presently state, but the distinction is throughout implied; for whenever they prescribe *karma*, they prescribe it as *nitya*, thereby suggesting another stage in which *kāmyakarmas* occupy the more important place.

Each of these stages has its own use in ethical training. The *kāmya* stage, no doubt, fosters the thought of self by recommending selfish ends, but yet it stands higher than mere animal life because the self for which exertion is permitted here is a better understood self than when the end is immediate gratification. There is a clear moral problem even here, viz., how the claims to satisfaction of the actual self of the moment are to be reconciled with those of the ideal self of the future. Again while the main thought is occupied here with the self, it must be remembered that the environment is not altogether lost sight of. If it were, morality would be another name for prudence or forethought. The *kāmya-karmas* have all a reference to social environment and, though apparently performed for securing individual well-being, are yet beneficial in some form or other to society as well. The fact is that there is no contradiction between the well-being of the individual and the well-being of society. The two may not always coincide; but there is no necessary opposition between them, so that asserting the one is not the same as denying the other. But the peculiarity of the training of this stage is that the reference to society in it is implicit. This reference becomes explicit in the next stage, where the object of moral training is *consciously* to reconcile the respective claims of the individual and his environment. One's own desires, to gratify which there is a natural propensity, are here adjusted to the requirements of society. The problem is once again how to reconcile the claims to satisfaction of apparently contradictory impulses. Only, now the adjustment is not between the present and future interests of one and the same

1. Compare Br. IV. iv, 22. See also Vedānta Sūtras III. iv, 26 and 32.



individual, but between those of the individual and of his fellow-beings. Morality in this stage thus becomes explicitly social. This is the significance of the shifting of the emphasis once laid on *kāmya karmas* to *nitya-karmas*, otherwise known as *varṇāśrama-dharmas*. It is the fulfilment of social obligations to the best of one's ability that constitutes one's first aim in this stage. But at the same time it should be stated that the rights of the individual are not at all forgotten. He who makes an honest effort to discharge his duties has a right to expect from society the kind of treatment proper to him, as is clear, for instance, from the fact that according to Hindu *Śāstra*, it is obligatory on a householder to feed a *brahmacārin* or religious student who is discharging his duty,—very essential to a progressive society,—of receiving instruction in the ancient learning of the community, with a view to preserve and transmit it to his successors. Thus in neither of the states is the good of either the society or the individual neglected; only the emphasis on the two is differently distributed in them.

If the training in both these stages be conducted properly, the progress made will indeed be great. As compared with the original conception of the self, the one now reached will certainly be far advanced; but it is clear from what has been stated already that the individual will still continue to be set over against society. In other words, the morality practised will be relatives, life being viewed as comprehending rights and duties. The conception of duality thus persists; and so long as it does, the possibility of conflict is not wholly excluded. As the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* (ii, 7) has it, the slightest notion of distinction is fraught with fear. Thus the training so far in progress, however beneficial, has its own deficiency. It has undoubtedly deepened the conception of the self by pointing out its dependence upon and the consequent obligations to other selves: but these other selves are still viewed as distinct from one's own self. So long as such a distinction is maintained, perfection, according to the Upaniṣads, cannot be reached. Where the thought of diversity endures, no deed, however altruistic, is without its own bearing upon the self of the doer. This bearing may be remote, but all the same it is there, so that what is sought in all duties, is, in the last instance, some form of one's own satisfaction. No voluntary action according to the Upaniṣads is intelligible without some reference to the self. That is the teaching of the *Maitreyī-Bṛāhmaṇa*; 'Verily nothing is

loved for its own sake ; but only for the sake of one's own self' (Br. Up. II. iv, 5). This statement, however, should not be understood as denying differences of moral worth between one deed and another. An element of such difference should be clear from what has already been stated. The life of one who cares only for the vulgar pleasures of the moment, certainly stands much lower than that of one whose activity is based upon an apprehension of the ideal self. Similarly, one duty *as such* may not be different from another in point of moral value ; but there can be no question whatever that duties, as a whole, in which the reference to the self is mediate, are morally more commendable than deeds in which that reference is immediate. What the *Maitreyī-Brāhmaṇa* signifies is that egoism and altruism, being correlates, necessarily imply each other ; and that to attain absolute unselfishness the contrast between them should be transcended. So long as this contrast is present to the mind, there can be no truly disinterested activity, which arises only when the conception of the self is so enlarged as to become all-comprehensive. In other words moral perfection is not achieved until the metaphysical nature of the self is apprehended. That is why *Yājñavalkya*, after pointing out to his wife *Maitreyī* what may be called the 'paradox of altruism', instructs her to realise the true self as the sole means of overcoming egoism. "Whoever regards anything as other than himself is discarded by it." ( Passage 6 ).

In the case of every individual, a time will come when the thought of this deficiency in the morality of even the second stage will force itself on the mind and cause a deep dissatisfaction. He will then refuse to look upon either the individual or society as ultimate and strive to reach a level of action which is at once super-individual and super-social. It is to people upon whom such consciousness has dawned that the Upaniṣads address themselves ; and it is this feeling of dissatisfaction with not only the first stage of moral education but also with the second, that is termed *vairāgya*, the importance of which is so much emphasised in all the Upaniṣads. As the *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* has it (ii, 13), the Upaniṣadic knowledge should be imparted only to a pupil 'whose thoughts are not troubled by any desires and who has obtained peace.' Being thus addressed to a particular class of students, viz., those that have already reached a considerable degree of moral development, the Upaniṣads do not treat of the entire range of ethical life ; but only of its culminat-

ing stages. The training of the *vedāntin* begins much earlier than his formal initiation into the proper study of the Upaniṣads. The failure to recognise this fact has been the source of some incorrect views regarding the place of morality in the Upaniṣadic scheme of life. Thus one of the common criticisms levelled against it is that it cares little or nothing for social morality and concerns itself solely with pointing out the way to individual perfection. Even a well-informed and sympathetic critic like Deussen has stated<sup>1</sup> that among the ancient Indians 'the consciousness of human solidarity, of common needs and interests was but slightly developed.' Such conclusions are due to a lack of appreciation of the specific standpoint of the Upaniṣads to which attention has just now been drawn. As a matter of fact, the Hindu conception of life is very much wider than what we find it to be from the Upaniṣads, which are not interested in traversing the entire field of ethical training. They presuppose a certain moral equipment in the *vedāntic* initiate and proceed to explain the course he has to pursue thereafter. This is the significance for instance of the question of *adhikāra* or 'fitness' which is explicitly discussed in the beginning of *Vedāntic* works and is found implicit in so many Upaniṣadic passages. For one that is an *adhikārī* and therefore possesses, among other things, the required degree of preliminary moral culture, the 'objective worth' of a moral deed may not count for much. But this does not warrant us in assuming<sup>2</sup>, as Deussen does, that its 'subjective worth' is overestimated. The aim in this final stage is rather to transcend both; and we ought not therefore to conclude that in the view of the Upaniṣads, either is less important than the other. There is a whole field of Sanskrit literature, *Dharmaśāstras* and *Smṛtis*,—that is directly concerned with the elaboration of this preliminary moral training intended for persons in lower stages of spiritual evolution. Although based upon ancient Vedic literature, these works are generally posterior to the Upaniṣads and [their evidence accordingly is not of much consequence here. But the Upaniṣads themselves are not without clear references to this preliminary training. In fact, the whole of their teaching is set in this ethical background; and it would be quite unfair to condemn their view of

1. 'The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads' pp. 364-5.

2. Ibid P. 365.

life as defective after disengaging it from its setting. The description of this preliminary training, however, as already stated, lies outside the proper sphere of the Upaniṣads; but yet they do at times digress into an exposition of it, the passage which we have already quoted from the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* being one of the clearest.

Of other passages that may be cited in this connection, we shall mention but one,—the *Puruṣa-Vidya-brāhmaṇa* (Br. Upaniṣad I, iv), which contains, in a nut-shell the entire Upaniṣadic teaching of idealistic monism. There are two movements of thought here, the first (1-10),—the metaphysical one,—showing how the manifold universe is the result of self-evolution on the part of *Ātman* or ultimate Reality, and the second (11-17),—the ethical one,—indicating the path which one has to follow if one has to recover from the lapse implied by individuation and realise the essential unity of all. In this section then, contrary to the general plan of the Upaniṣads, the practical teaching is set in the back-ground of the theoretical. In the ethical part, with which alone we are at present concerned, is briefly traced the evolution of the several *varṇas* or social classes. What was originally but a simple social structure came to be differentiated into four classes in course of time. Of these the Kṣatriya is represented as the mainstay of society, since it is to his prowess and control that it owes its preservation from external as well as internal danger. But physical might and external control do not adequately explain social order. It has a deeper basis and the stability of society has eventually to be traced to the moral idea implanted in man. Accordingly the upaniṣad represents it in its inner (*satya*) as well as its outer (*dharma*) aspects as the mainstay of the Kṣatriya himself,—‘the mainstay of mainstays’ of society. It is through this moral idea that both the individual and the society are maintained. He who follows the *varṇa-dharmas* befriends all and all befriend him (passage 16). The individual and his environment are thus shown to be interdependent,—environment not understood merely socially, but in the widest sense so as to include not only the actual and the seen, but also the possible and the unseen; even beings of far higher grade than human. The Upaniṣad indicates at the same time that this conception of interdependence is not ultimate. All this, even the highest moral merit (*punya*) sooner or later fails to give satisfaction; so one should seek only to realise the

true self. That is the only true end where all will be attained (passage 15). The final aim of life accordingly consists not in working for any object, no matter how high, considered as extrinsic, but for the all-inclusive whole, of which 'end' and 'means', 'doer' and 'deed' are only different phases (pas. 17). But the previous stages are by no means regarded as futile. Passage 10 for example, represents the *devas* as unwilling to allow man to emancipate himself from the sphere of relative morality, which, according to Śāṅkara, is merely a rhetorical way of expressing that man ought not to break away from society until he has discharged his duty towards it and so to speak, gained its good-will.

Thus the specific teaching of the Upaniṣads is that the highest good is not reached until one gets beyond relative morality to the level of life marked by the *ānandamaya-kośa*, where all moral strife ceases once for all. Our first efforts no doubt should be directed towards co-ordinating social and individual needs; but eventually the distinction between the two is itself to be transcended. The notions of self and of society are not to be understood as destroyed thereby; they only merge in the notion of the whole. The individual and society are no longer viewed as two separate entities related externally to each other; but merely as different aspects of a single whole.' 'From death to death, passes he who perceives only variety here' (*Kaṭh. Up.* iv, 10). Through such transcendence of the common consciousness, the moral agent realises that society has no wants apart from those of the individual or the individual apart from those of the society. He beholds all beings in the self, and the self in all beings (*Īśa Up.* 6). Accordingly the object aimed at in this final stage is neither the good of the individual nor of society as such, but common good; or rather individual good itself now becomes identical with common good. In other words, the distinction between rights and duties is here annulled and the relative morality of the previous stage now becomes transformed into absolute morality. Two important results follow from this transformation. First the moral end becomes fixed once for all. New interests may arise or old ones disappear in the course of time; but they have value only from the lower standpoint of the individual as such or society as contrasted with him. Such changes may disturb the mutual relations of internal factors, but cannot affect the whole, whose end, as we have stated, now constitutes the sole criterion of

conduct. This end does not admit of any change (Kāth. Up. iv, 13). 'It rules the past as well as the future—is the same to-day as well as to-morrow.' 'If a slayer think of slaying, if the slain think of being slain,—(then) both of them know not the self. It neither slays nor is slain' (Ibid ii, 10). The earlier stages of morality only pave the way for this. 'That, all penance presupposes; seeking that, men practise continence' (Ibid ii, 18). Secondly, evil, which as defined above has its roots in narrow selfish desires, is now completely overcome. 'When to a knower, discovering unity, all beings become his very self, what delusion, then and what sorrow?' (Īśa Up. 7). The Upaniṣadic seers almost revel in describing the peace and tranquillity of this super-moral condition. The most important of these descriptions is to be found in a section of the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* (ii, 8) entitled 'Inquiry into Happiness' (*ānandasya mīmāṃsā*). According to the teaching of this section there is no qualitative distinction in pleasure, all pleasures eventually emanating from the same source.<sup>1</sup> All estimate of happiness, when it can be estimated at all, is quantitative. Apart from this relative happiness which can be presented in a series of graded<sup>2</sup> values, there is another experienced by the morally perfect, which baffles all measurement. This is indicated with characteristic emphasis when the Upaniṣad gives in this section what may be described as a 'Table of Pleasure Values,' inserting at every stage the identical statement 'the joy of one uninfected with personal desires is a hundred times more.' The import of this is that the blessedness of moral perfection cannot be expressed in terms of pleasure derived from the satisfaction of particular desires. It is not a mere aggregate of pleasures such as we know; but absolute bliss due to the conviction that one's own self is identical with the whole. Consequently it is often stated in the Upaniṣads that all desires are fulfilled here<sup>3</sup> and that, no want being felt, true inward freedom is here reached.<sup>4</sup>

1. This is the highest bliss. Of that bliss all other beings draw a little. *Br. Up.* IV, iii, 32.

2. Compare e. g. *Ch. Up.* VII. 23, *Tait. Up.* ii. 8.

3. Compare *Ch. Up.* VIII i and ii. All this, by the way, tells us what the Upaniṣadic conception of pleasure is. Whenever we feel happy we transcend the antithesis of common consciousness. The thought of the ego is in abeyance then and we get a glimpse of the wider self which is the truth. All pleasure, as we know it, is thus a revelation in greater or less degree of absolute pleasure.

We have said that in this final state, the distinction between duties and rights is annulled. It is of great importance to note that this annulment does not mean the cessation of activity itself, even supposing such a thing is possible. The *Iśa Upaniṣad* (2) for example to which we have alluded more than once, after prescribing renunciation, adds that the life led should be a strenuous one. 'One should live all his days only working.' It is thus only that the relative aspect of rights and duties disappears. They endure as activity, which is now controlled by the thought of not what is only a partial good, but of the good of the whole. It would therefore be more correct to say that morality is now fulfilled, not destroyed. Life's activities are not abandoned, but only come to be viewed from a new standpoint. As in the case of the transition from the first to the second stage, life once again comes to be planned on a new basis. All this makes it clear that the charge of promulgating a doctrine of absolute quietism commonly brought by critics against the Upaniṣads is unfounded. The ideal of *upaniṣadic* ethics is rather the attainment of impersonal activity; and its import, not redemption from the world, but only from *rāga* and *dveṣa*, hatred and narrow love. The *varṇa-śrama-dharmas* no doubt cease to be binding upon one that enters upon the final stage of the ideal life, for implying as they do an external relation between the individual and the environment, they cannot appeal to him who realises in his own experience the unity of both. *Sanyāsa* or renunciation is an outward sign of this transcendence of social morality and selfish needs. But virtues of a general nature such as kindness and charity, he will of course continue to practise; but even they become transformed in his eyes, since they involve no thought of owed and owing.

उत्पन्नात्मप्रबोधस्यादेष्टृत्वादयो गुणाः ।

अयत्नतो भवन्त्यस्य न तु साधनरूपिणः ॥

*Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi* iv. 69.

Several illustrations are given in the Upaniṣads to impress on our mind the importance of such disinterested activity. The most notable and the most common of them is that relating to *Prāṇa*. The various senses and other life-organs function for the sake of the whole bodily system. But over and above contributing to the general well-being of the body, these organs operate in a manner which ministers directly to their own

**gratification.** The eye, for example, sees and thus protects the organism from possible destruction which might arise in its absence. But it also often indulges in seeing for its own sake. Again, in the case of the sense of taste, the food that is eaten contributes to the upkeep of the body ; but the organ of taste seeks also its own gratification in the process. It is quite different in the case of *Prāṇa* whose outward expression is the "breath in the mouth" (Br. Up I, iii). It has no purpose of its own to serve and functions solely for the organism. This is merely an allegory intended to show what entire unselfishness means. A person that wishes to rise above the stage of social or relative morality should keep this ideal before him ; and whatever he may do, he should do it, not for himself or even for others as distinguished from himself, but for the whole of the universe. That marks the achievement of life's object as conceived in the Upaniṣads.

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## MŪLA—RĀMĀYAṆA.

BY

S. N. TADPATRIKAR. B. A.

The attentive efforts of the Western Orientalists in the matter of the Rāmāyaṇa, have led to many important conclusions which are of great interest to every Sanskrit scholar. That this Epic like its great sister—the Mahābhārata—as well as the the Purāṇas, has undergone great additions is a fact admitted by all. The first and last kāṇḍas of the Rāmāyaṇa seem to be comparatively later additions, as has been proved by Prof. Jacobi and others. The existence of as many as three Recensions of this Epic has led to a careful comparison, and Prof. Winternitz has suggested that the original Epic should have consisted of six thousand couplets only.

Thus, although the development of this Epic can be traced back, it has yet been a matter of doubt as to whether there was originally, in fact, such a smaller Rāmāyaṇa, and if so, whether it laid claims to independent authority, for a period at least, side by side with its developed form. In the case of the Mahābhārata there are definite statements in the body of the Epic, showing that there was originally a Bhārata of twenty four thousand couplets and it can reasonably be suggested that this Bhārata was ultimately submerged in the Mahābhārata. Possibly the original text was in vogue for some time, even after its developed form, as the separate reference to the two forms in Aśvalāyana, would show; but the attraction and reverence for this Mahābhārata grew with time, and the original Bhārata, which was only a pure history, lost its independent existence.

The Rāmāyaṇa too, has perhaps suffered the same fate. There was a *Mūla*—Rāmāyaṇa, and the same was remodelled after the fashion of the *Mbh.* by addition of Upākhyānas etc. There is at present no definite means to go back to this original portion, the existence of which was put forth as a mere guess, for want of definite statements, in or outside the Epic; but certain

references that I have come across, would prove that there was a Mūla-Rām. and that it has been mentioned side by side with the present enlarged form being called the Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa, this too perhaps, in imitation of the Bhā. and Mahā-Bhārata.

Madhvācārya, the pronagator of the Dvaita philosophy, lived, according to Bhandarkar and others in the thirteenth century A. D. He has written, along with many others, a work named the *Mahā-Bhārata-Tātparīya-Nirṇaya*, a critical thesis, on the subject matter of the great Epic, a work seldom, if ever, brought to the notice of the Oriental scholars. I wish to devote a separate monograph to the *Mbh.* study in this work. But the author has here included the Rāmāyaṇa story also, and a few references from this part form the subject of these lines.

The Rām. story in this work, summarised on the basis of the Epic now in vogue, occupies 3-9 Adhyāyas, and at the conclusion of the Story, the author says that he has based his statements on the authority of the Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa.

इत्यशेषपुराणेभ्यः पञ्चरात्रेभ्य एव च ।

भारताच्चैव वेदेभ्यो महारामायणादपि ॥

So also, in the Adhyāya following--the 10th.--it is stated that Nārada begot रोमहर्षण from his रोमांच, and taught him the Epics and the Purāṇas : भारतपुराणानां महारामायणस्य च । Here too, the Rām. is referred to with the distinguishing prefix 'महा'.

A distinct reference to the Mūla--Rām. occurs in the first Adhyāya : having shortly detailed his system of Dualism, the author quotes as authorities to his statements :--

ऋगादयश्च चत्वारः पञ्चरात्रं च भारतम् ।

सुलरामायणं ब्रह्मसूत्रं मानं स्वतः स्मृतम् ॥

In the few MSS. that I referred to in this matter, there is no difference in reading these lines.

The words Bhārata and Mahā-bhārata are often used synonymously by some writers. Thus, to take the example at hand, the lines quoted above have named the Bhārata, but all along the writer means the Mahā-bhārata. But in the case of the Rāmāyaṇa, the author mentions the Mūla and the Mahā, trying to distinguish the one from the other. Although this Mūla-original-form is not yet found, still, would this statement not support the view that the original--the Mūla--and its developed form--the Mahā--were separately known the former at least in name to the author in the 13th. century A. D. ?

An additional reference occurs elsewhere. Rāma, the famous author of the comm. Tilaka on the Rāmāyaṇa quotes

at the very beginning a whole verse from the Mūla-Rāmāyaṇa, the portion that precedes this being helpful to our purpose in that it distinguishes the two forms:—‘इदं पवित्रं पापघ्नम्’ इत्यादि ‘जनश्च शूद्रोऽपि महत्वमीयात्’ इत्यन्तश्चोक्तैः...स्पष्टमत्रैव श्रूयमाणत्वात्...‘शृण्वन् रामायणं भक्त्या यः पादं पदमेव वा । स याति ब्रह्मणः स्थानं ब्रह्मणा पूज्यते सदा ।’ इति मूल-रामायणवचनेन...”. these two quotations immediately following under different names ‘अत्रैव’ and मूलरामायण, would show that the author not only knew of these two forms, but could even quote from both.

If the above be accepted, and there is no reason against it, the statements being quite clear, it would seem that even as late as the 13th century the tradition about the two forms of the Epics continued and the people could even quote solitary verses from the Mūla-forms. What then became of these originals? When insignificant works do continue to exist till now, it is curious that the original forms of the Epics should have died away, and no trace of their text be yet had. The only plausible guess under the circumstances seems to be, that these Mūlas were fully embodied almost word for word in their developed forms, and as these new forms were such as to suit the superstition of the people, the original forms, which were bare history—mere facts,—had no attraction for the masses. Besides in reading the greater Epics, the student could reap the benefit of studying the original and as time elapsed the Mahā-forms were generally approved, respected, and studied, while the originals gradually fell back and totally faded away at last.

The developed forms in their turn received polish from time to time, yet there are many traces of the original even in the present forms, and although, most of the task be now guess-work, the originals in some form can be found out after a most careful study of the texts. This the time to come may bring about; for the present it would be some satisfaction to know on the of best authorities that such originals did for a period exist separately and side by side, with their developed forms.

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## WHO FIRST INTRODUCED NĀṬYA ON EARTH ?

BY

H. R. DIVEKAR.

An offhand and generally assumed answer to the above query would be that the sage भरत introduced it. This is partly inaccurate and the present note is written with a view to correct it.

The History of Indian Drama, as given in नाट्यशास्त्र can be recapitulated as given below:—In the त्रेतायुग of वैवस्वत मनु, Brahmā, at the instance of devas invented the science of dramaturgy, consisting of पाठ्य, गीत, अभिनय and रस, borrowed respectively from ऋग्वेद, सामवेद, यजुर्वेद and अथर्ववेद. The Science was then taught to भरत and the first play enacted was असुरविजय. It comprised नान्दी and अनुकृति. The Gods were naturally pleased to see how they won victory, but the defeated party did not like to witness its own defeat represented by actors. They therefore tried to make the play a failure by creating disturbances in the way of actors. They were at last pacified partly by persuasion and partly by force. But to ensure such performances from being further disturbed, Brahmā ordered Viśvakarman to erect a theatre and when it was completed, the समवकार named अमृतमंथन composed by Brahmā, was first played in it. With another डिम named त्रिपुरदाह, it was once more represented before शिव on Kailāsa mountain. It was after this representation that Śiva introduced the element of dancing in the महागीतानि and पूर्वर्ग, which latter was also elaborated by नारद with the introduction of निगीत. Thus was the art of drama fully developed. It proved a good means of entertainment and raised its promulgators to high distinction. But representation slowly dwindled down to mimicry. A play of शिल्पक type, badly caricaturing some obscene actions of sages, was played before the audience and it was this play which kindled the wrath of sages, who imprecated the curse, proscribing dramatic representation and lowering the status of the actors to the level of Śūdras. Implored by Gods,

the sages revoked the first part of the curse. The disciples of भरत then initiated Apsaras in this art and thus was the art continued for a long time in the Kingdom of Gods. Once when King नहुष went there and saw a drama performed by these heavenly nymphs, he keenly desired to have it played at his own house on earth. 'अप्सरोभिरिदं सार्धं नाट्यं भवतु नो गृहे' was his request, but Brhaspati explained the impossibility of celestial nymphs being associated with mortals. Bharata was however desired to take the art to and to introduce it on earth. His disciples were sent to earth where they propagated their race as well as their art; एवमुर्गीतले नाट्यं शिष्यः समवतारितम्. But there is an obscure point in this history. The verses describing the request of नहुष to भरत are printed on P. 445 of Nirṇayasāgara edition of नाट्यशास्त्र. They contain the following lines:—

पितामहगृहेऽस्माभिरेतदन्तः पुरे जने ॥ ९ ॥  
 पितामहक्रियायुक्तं पूर्वस्यां संप्रवर्तितम् ।  
 तस्याः प्रणाशशोकेन उन्मदोपरते नृपे ॥ १० ॥  
 विपन्नेऽन्तःपुरजने पुनर्नाशमुपागतम् ।  
 प्रणाशमेतदिच्छामि भूयस्तत्संप्रयोजितम् ॥

The lines as they are, do not elicit any clear meaning except that the art was formerly introduced in his grandfather's house, was once more lost and was to be revived. To get at the exact meaning, two Mss. were compared, but to no effect. The second line clearly stands in both as पितामहक्रियायुक्तपूर्वस्या संप्रवर्तितम्, i. e. without any अनुस्वार either on युक्त or on पूर्वस्या. It made the reading more difficult. Purāṇas were therefore consulted for the genealogy of नहुष, in order to find who his grandfather was. All agree on this point that he was पुरुरवस्. नहुष is stated to be the son of आयुस् and the grandson of पुरुरवस् by all. If the नृप mentioned in verse no. 10, is पुरुरवस्, तस्याः must refer to ऊर्वशी, whose loss maddened the king, and if she is to be mentioned in the verse no. 9, as the noun for which the pronoun तस्याः stands, the line should be read पितामहक्रियायुक्तमूर्वस्या संप्रवर्तितम्. In this light the lines may be amended as given below:—

पितामहगृहेऽस्माकमेतदन्तःपुरे जने ।  
 पितामहक्रियायुक्तमूर्वस्या संप्रवर्तितम् ॥  
 तस्याः प्रणाशशोकेन उन्मदोपरते नृपे ।  
 विपन्नेऽन्तःपुरजने पुनर्नाशमुपागतम् ॥  
 प्रणाशमेतदिच्छामि भूयस्त्वत्संप्रयोजितम् ॥

The lines would thus mean that the dramatic art was first introduced at the palace of पुरुरवस् by ऊर्वशी. Scenes were taken

from the life of पुरुषवत् and were enacted by the ladies of the harem. But when Ūrvaśī followed by पुरुषवत् in madness and by the inmates of the harem passed away, the art was lost again. It was the same art which नहुष wished to be revived by भरत. The honour of being the usher of dramatic art on earth thus falls to Ūrvaśī.

And is it not quite natural that it should be so? Her whole life was full of dramatic scenes. The way in which she comes in contact with पुरुषवत्, the degree to which she is enamoured of him, the point at which she is called to act in a drama, the depth of emotion which causes her slip of the tongue, the curse which is turned into a boon, the pleasure which she takes with the king and the satisfaction of having a complete hold on her lover, which she must have felt while witnessing the ravings of the king, are all so dramatic and are so effectively drawn by our play-wright that her very name stirs all these reminiscences in our heart. Moreover she was, if any, really and greatly indebted to the art and it was quite natural on her part to revive all these memories by getting them represented. Ūrvaśī therefore appears to be the first person who introduced the art of dramatic representation on this earth.

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# THE PROPOSED ILLUSTRATED MAHĀBHĀRATA.

BY

H. G. RAWLINSON.

I am sorry to disagree with the views put forward by Sir Richard Temple in the March number of the *Indian Antiquary* on the above subject. I do not see why we should be any more "safe" in going to the Ajanta frescos, which represent life in the Deccan in the 7th century, A. C., to illustrate the *Mahābhārata* or *Rāmāyaṇa* than we should be, say, in utilising the Bayeuse tapestries to illustrate a work on the wars of the Roses. Modern Indian art is corrupt beyond redemption. The hideous atrocities of the school of the late Ravi Varma, oleograph copies of which, alas, are found in almost every home in Western India, are striking examples of this. As for the work of some of our newer Indian artists, trained in Western schools of art, which are in so much request for book-illustrations, they are graceful enough, but they no more represent ancient India than pageants like "Cairo" represent ancient Egypt. A little more may be said for our Indian prae-Raphaelites of Bengal, but they are artificial and self-conscious and lack spontaneity. Why not go back to the magnificent work of the older Indian artists of Rajputana and the Punjab? Here we have indigenous Indian drawing and painting at its zenith, uncontaminated by Western contact, representing the scenes as Indian draughtsmen of the best period imagined them. As an example, taking the superb illustrations of the Nala-Damayanti episode in Dr. Ananda Coomara-Swamy's *Indian Drawings*, vol. ii. plates vi-x. could anything be more suitable for the purpose? There must be many more similar Indian drawings and paintings available in the various collections. I should suggest that those in charge of the work of bringing out this edition of the *Mahābhārata* should apply to Dr. Coomara-Swamy, who would, I am sure, be happy to assist them with his advice. He is at present working in the Museum of Fine arts, Boston, Mass.

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SELECTIONS FROM AVESTA AND OLD PERSIAN (First Series) Part I. Edited with Translations and Notes by I. J. S. Taraporewala, B. A., Ph. D., Bar-at-law, Professor of Comparative Philology in the University of Calcutta. Calcutta, 1922.

Of the strictures passed of late so generously on the Post-Graduate Department—both men and work—of the Calcutta University none should fall on this book. For, the verdict of every fair critic on it will be “good”, both from the point of its scientific value and the practical purpose it is meant to serve. In fact, this publication offers so little for criticism that the reviewer may only quibble about an expression or some individual view here and there.

In discussing the relation between *Haoma*, the deity, and *Haoma*, the plant, the author says:—“In course of time we do find that the plant is coming more and more to the front and the person who introduced it is getting forgotten. It were well if the upholders of the “Personification—theory” would bear this fact constantly in mind.”<sup>2</sup> The author, then, seems to consider the later prominence of *Haoma*, the plant, over *Haoma*, the deity, as an argument against the Personification—theory. But this coming into prominence of the plant and the receding into the background of the deity may have had other reasons than a mere accidental fading of the Person *Haoma*, such as frequent and important use of the *Haoma* plant in the ritual. The development of ideas put forth in the *Brāhmanas* as compared with those expressed in the *Samhitās* of the Vedic Śruti would seem to bear out our point.—One might like to find a little more material than is brought together in the book,<sup>3</sup> as well as to learn the writer’s own view, on the origin of the name of *Zaradustra* and especially on his date. The problem of the age of the Veda—to mention only one reason—is sure to derive light from the age of *Zaradustra* when once settled. And it seems to go against all the canons of criticism to attempt to

1. Cp. Modern Review, July 1923.

2. P. 14.

3. P. 15.



fix the date of the Veda by a date of the Avesta still, so far less certain than even that of the Veda.<sup>4</sup>

The Gothic *memdon*, Greek *μυροδρα* and the Sanskrit *मेघस्* but especially the Avestan *mazdā* seem to point to the root *mand* and the related meaning wisdom for Avesta *mastay*, accus. *mastim*,<sup>5</sup> though the New-persian *mastī* with its meaning seems to refer to a group of ideas represented by the Sanskrit root *mad*.—*Kərəsūnay*<sup>6</sup> (and *kerasa*?) shows the consistency with which in the Avesta the *daēvas* were handed over to condemnation, but raised to the rank of gods in the Veda, where *Kṛśānu* is just as zealous a guardian of Soma as he is an opponent of Haoma in the Avesta.—The author says “There is another *daēnā* ) which means the inner Ego or conscience ) which also may be connected ”<sup>7</sup> with *daēnā*, religion. To judge from the meaning of the latter *daēnā* in Avesta, one should say that that indeed is an essential element in the notion of *daēnā* religion. For, a simple philosophical reasoning would show that there are two factors making up religion, the one is God, the objective factor, the other is Man, the subjective element. Religion, after all, is nothing else but bringing into relation and true proportion God and Man. This is well brought out by the most likely etymology of the word religion itself, which goes back to the Latin *religare*,<sup>8</sup> to tie, viz., man to God by intellectual recognition and voluntary submission. This being so, one should feel inclined to connect the latter *daēnā*, “the inner Ego,” with the root *dāy*, rather than the former *daēnā*, which would correspond with the objective factor in religion. But then this former *daēnā* remains without an etymological root. Because the roots *dī* and *dī̌v*, to shine, whose meaning would suit well enough, are phonetically impossible. There remains then the alternative either that the root for the former *daēnā* has been lost wholly, or that from the root *dāy* a noun with a bifurcated meaning has descended (Geldner). This double meaning may even originally have been in the root *dāy*, but of that there is outside the word *daēnā* no more trace than of the root from which the former *daēnā* independently might have

4. Cp. Second Selection of Hymns from the Rgveda, B. S. P. S. LVIII. Appendix V, pp. CXXXII ff.

5. P. 35.

6. P. 42.

7. P. 45.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, IV. XXVIII.

come.—Under *drafsəm*<sup>9</sup> the author gives as a descendant the French *drapeau*. The etymology is tempting, no doubt, but is it certain?

The writer translates<sup>10</sup> the German rendering of the difficult passage *Ya'ci<sup>t</sup> ušastaire.....nigne* (Yasna LVII. 29) proposed by Bartholomae: "Whether he seizes it in Eastern India or (whether) he is in the West and throws it down."<sup>11</sup> It ought to run: "Even though it be in Western India, he catches (it); even though it be in Western India, he throws it down." *Nigne* seems to have got out of etymological control, if we do not wish to connect it, as Bartholomae does with the root *gan*;<sup>12</sup> other sources have to be tapped and, pending some better explanation, "it is really not so fanciful as may appear at first sight" that *nigne* may be Ninive, as the author says.<sup>13</sup>—A comparison of the *Fravašis* and *daēnā*<sup>14</sup> with the *Liṅgaśarīram* of the brahmanical literature might afford a good deal of interest. Under *χραδwiš-tamām-ca* the Professor says, "The word *χra'u* (𐬕𐬀) is used more for soul-force ( *Geistes-kraft* ), rather than physical force. The Vedic 𐬑𐬀 and 𐬑𐬀𐬕𐬀 have probably a similar connotation".<sup>15</sup> The word probably may safely be dropped.— s. v. *χraūbairiūt*<sup>16</sup> Bartholomae's<sup>17</sup> rendering 'das gute Empfangen Einheimen, nämlich des Lohns am Ende der Dinge', is given by welcome-home during long ages. It should be, 'the good receiving, the gathering in, viz., of the reward at the end of things (days).'

Vendidād II. 20-43--The Vara of Yima--has given the author<sup>18</sup> an opportunity for some appropriate remarks on the original home of the Āryas. He takes care to point out that there are two versions of the universal disaster that befell mankind at some point of its prehistoric period: one is the destruction of nearly the whole race by water the Deluge version, current among almost all the nations of the earth; the other is the destruction of a fair land by snow and ice the version

9. P. 81.

10. P. 85.

11. Altiranisches Wörterbuch, column 1814.

12. L. C. col. 492.

13. P. 85.

14. P. 94 and Bartholomae, Wörterbuch, col. 994.

15. P. 96.

16. P. 117.

17. Wörterbuch, col. 1878.

18. P. 226.

expressed in the Avesta, l. c. and, according to B. G. Tilak,<sup>19</sup> suggested by the Vedas. Rightly the author only concludes that the human race must have been in existence when these two elemental catastrophes took place. He appears to be inclined to fall in with Tilak's view on the Arctic home of the Āryas. It seems indeed that Tilak's hypothesis finds a strong, if not the strongest, support in the Vendidad. The interpretation of the Vedic passages offered by Tilak in proof of his opinion has not been accepted all round. Moreover it would seem that all the data of all the Āryan peoples would have to converge towards the Arctic home, if the Arctic regions are to be accepted as the home of all the nations of Āryan kinship. Without such a convergence the Arctic home of the Āryas remains a mere hypothesis, though it may reach a high degree of probability at least with reference to one or the other branch of the Āryan family.

The excellent book before us is called *Selections from Avesta and Old Persian*. This is a nomenclature which seems to use the term selection in a somewhat unusual connotation. But these "Selections" are well-chosen from the point of language, mythology and religion: the student of any of these three will find much useful information on his subject here. The pieces chosen are interesting and important throughout; orthodox Parsis, who duly recite their daily prayers, will discover among them old friends, such as Yesna XII, the Zoroastrian Creed.<sup>20</sup> The arrangement of the book evidently is the outcome of practical experience: the Avesta text is put opposite the translation, itself apparently the fruit of much thought and reading. After the text come copious and conscientious Notes. The desire to help the student in every possible way has led the writer to affix corresponding figures to the individual words of both text and translation. This may be comfortable, but it is also a fairly efficient means to assist the student in overcoming any temptation he may experience of thinking and finding for himself that which every average student delights in discovering without the *pons asinorum*.

It is very gratifying to see the efforts the author has made to restore the text—a sore point in many portions of the Avesta—by filling in the *lacunae* and finding out the metre where possible. The attempts have produced in places a text improved

19. Arctic Home in the Vedas, *passim*.

20. P. 124.

beyond that of Geldner. The Abbreviations, containing an imposing bibliography, offer a fair game of hide and seek. A (n) g (lo) S (axon) would look quite well as an algebraic formula. Geld for Geldner, Ger for German, neu for neuter, are not fortunate; Bg for Bhagavadgita, v (aries 'lectionis) are incorrect. The get up of the book leaves very little to be desired; the correctness and neatness of print reflects equally well on author and press. Indeed, the good impression the book gives from cover to cover makes one eagerly look forward to the promised Second Part.

Last but not least, we learn from the Foreword something about the author and his aims. The gratefulness to all his Gurus in various lands, the hard work it needed to get up the book, the desire to learn from critics and pupils: all this shows the writer to be that scholar whom we feel him to be from the book he has produced. The last para of the Foreword sounds like an apology for having religious views and professing them. With the intellectual, moral, and material ruins heaped up by theoretical and practical materialism and staring us right and left in the face, no scholar need proffer an apology for "notions of life and religion" and for saying that "religions have their roots in WISDOM and not in Ignorance."

R. ZIMMERMANN, S. J.

**LE VĀRTIKA DE KĀTYĀYANA**, une étude du style, du vocabulaire et des Postulats philosophiques, par VASUDEO GOPAL PARANJPE, Heidelberg, 1922;

**ÉTUDES SUR ĀRYADEVA ET SON CATUḤŚATAKA**, chapitres VIII-XVI, par P. L. VAIDYA, Paris (Geuthner), 1923;

**LES THEORIES DIPLOMATIQUES DE L' INDE ANCIENNE ET L' ARTHAŚĀSTRA**, par KALIDAS NAGA, Paris (Jouve et Cie), 1923.

It is with the greatest pleasure that we take this opportunity of writing notices of this group of three theses presented for the doctorate of the Paris University in the brief interval of a twelvemonth.

The first of these, that on the Vārtika of Kātyāyana is a first sketch rather than an achieved work. It, however, reveals the great importance of Kātyāyana to the historian of ancient Indian philosophy, especially of the Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools. P. 67, ll. 7-10, p. 70 ll. 20 ff., and p. 77 ll. 1-9, for instance, contain proofs for saying that the Jaimini Sūtras are older than the Vārtika; Chapter IV gives an insight into the metaphysical views, manifestly of the Sāṅkhya type, with which the grammatical work is saturated; while the style and the philosophical terminology, especially that relating to vicious argumentation, have been shown in Chapter II, where the philosophical style itself has been analysed and its successive stages described, to have reached a high level of elaboration in the Vārtika and to be not far removed from those of the Nyāya Sūtras. Chapter I contains the material which would substantiate these conclusions and consists of a selection of the most important passages of the Vārtika with introductory observation and an explanatory translation. The brochure is disfigured by a good many typographical mistakes.

Dr. Vaidya's Studies on Āryadeva contain the Tibetan text of chapter VIII-XVI of Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka with a Sanskrit S'loka rendering, part of which consists of fragments of the original discovered by M. M. Haraprasāda S'astri, a very small portion being found in quotation in the commentaries of Candrakṛti, and the remainder, which forms more than a half of the whole, being reconstructed with the help of a Tibetan-Sanskrit

vocabulary, based on these fragments, and a Chinese version of chapters IX—XVI by Hiuen Tsang. The Sanskrit rendering may thus fairly claim to be a restoration of the Sanskrit original, and is followed by a French translation and the Tibetan-Sanskrit vocabulary used for reconstructing the text. Not satisfied with this remarkable proof of ingenuity and indefatigable industry, Dr. Vaidya has set off the whole by a valuable introduction, which in about 30 pages crammed with information; deals with the history of the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. With the exception of Burnouf's and Wassiljew's great books on Buddhism, and possibly also of Satis Chandra Vidyabushana's Mediaeval Schools of Indian Logic, there has not appeared any book so far which could be said to throw such light on the obscurities of the history of early Buddhist philosophy as does the Introduction, especially as it incorporates in itself all the information to be derived from Taranath, Wassiljew and Cordier, and the results of the author's own thorough study of the Prasannapadā. We therefore give below a brief outline of this part of Dr. Vaidya's valuable work for the benefit of those of our readers who cannot read French.

Dr. Vaidya gives at the outset a brief outline of the origins of the Mādhyamika school. It arose as a consequence of the intense activity of the Buddhist church in the three centuries preceding the Christian era. That activity was evidenced by an immense theological literature no doubt, but more so by the ever growing differences of the numerous schools that were formed.

Signs of dissensions in the church were already visible in the lifetime of Buddha and according to Cullavagga there was a council held immediately after Buddha's death to settle all doctrinal differences. A hundred years after, the monks of Vaiśālī having created trouble over ten points of the doctrine, another council met for fixing the Dharma and the Vinaya, with the effect that the split between the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṅghikas was confirmed. Among the orthodox Sthaviras themselves there were in course of time sub-divisions, the Mahīśāsakas and Vṛjīputras being the most important ones; they in their turns gave rise to still newer schools; so that, at the council of Pāṭaliputra, which met in the reign of Aśoka, there were as many as eighteen schools, and a new Piṭaka, due mainly to the activity of the Dhammabhāṇakas or Dharmottarikas, was recognised as canonical, the last book to be added,

the Kathāvatthu, being the work of the president of the council, Moggalāyana.

The composition of the Kathāvatthu gave an enormous impetus to the metaphysical activity of the Buddhists. The schools of the Sutta-bhāṇakas, Dhammabhāṇakas, Paññaptivādins &c. systematised the teachings of the canonical texts. The doctrinal differences were thus only accentuated and for metaphysical purposes, the eighteen schools have come to be classed, perhaps arbitrarily, under four heads, and these under two schools; the Sarvāstivādins and Sammitīyas constituting the Vaibhāsika school, the Mahāsāṅghikas and Sthaviras, the Sautrāntika school.

The period that intervenes between the council of Pāṭali-putra and the next council, that of Jālandhara, i. e. between the reigns of As'oka and Kaniska (circa B. C. 265 to 78 A. D.) is the most obscure in Buddhist church history, although their literary activity at this time must have been immense. All the four church heads had now their separate canons, some in Sanskrit, some in Prakrit or Apabhraṃśa. Some of the Sanskrit Sūtras, later on appropriated by the Mahāyāna, also belong to this period. The council of Jālandhara held under the joint presidency of Pārśva and Vasumitra achieved important results inasmuch as it compiled the huge commentaries called Vibhāṣās on the Tripiṭaka; but like the preceding councils, this one also accentuated the new tendencies of the Buddhist church, which were partly of a religious and partly, of a metaphysical character. On the religious side, the new faith, proudly calling itself Mahāyāna, while it stigmatised the old church as Hīnayāna, appealed to the popular sentiments by some distinctive features of its own: a simplified ritual, a new order of Bodhisattvas, and the cult of the six Pāramitās or transcendental virtues. Philosophically it developed the Prajñāpāramitā literature and rejected the old psychology.

The Mahāyāna also was destined to have various schools of its own. The Satyasiddhi school, of which the only source of information now left consists of Chinese translations, marks a transition between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, although the author of the Satyasiddhīśāstra, Harivarmā, who probably only systematised the doctrine, belongs to the third century A. D. This school was the first to distinguish the conventional (व्यावहारिक) from absolute truth (परमार्थ).

About sixty years after the council of Jālandhara Rāhulabhadra, also called Śrīsaraha, founded the Mādhyamika school.

His pupil Nāgārjuna (170-200 A. D.), of Vidarbha origin and author of the famous मूलव्यमकशास्त्र, विप्रह्व्यावर्तनी, सूत्र्यसप्तति and other works, is the greatest exponent of Mādhyamaka school. The main thesis of his Madhyamakasāstra is the doctrine of Śūnya, which is the same as प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद (conditional causation), the canonical texts being for that purpose classed into नेयार्थ (conventional sense) and नीतार्थ (absolute truth) and the refutation of the Hinayāna psychology and the Pudgalavāda (soul-doctrine). His works presuppose the पञ्चापरमिता and other Sanskrit Sūtras. With his pupils Āryadeva and Nāgāhvaya the old Mādhyamika school comes to an end.

According to Tārānātha's History of Buddhism, the first five Ācāryas of the Yogācāra school were contemporaries of Rahulabhadra, the founder of the Mādhyamika school. There is every reason to believe the statement. The Mādhyamika and Yogācāra philosophies are developments of essentially the same doctrine, the theories of change and causality, of the two aspects of truth, of illusion, and of the eight negations being common to both; the main ground of difference between them being that while the latter admits the Citta-mātra as real, the former considers it also as an illusion (संवृति). Although thus of an early origin the composition of what are called the 'Maitreya books' gave the school its first impetus. Asaṅga (350-400 A. D.) is the most illustrious name of the school, and a succession of equally brilliant men, like वसुबन्धु, दिङ्नाग, स्थिरमति enabled it to eclipse its rival for a time.

Buddhapālita, (400-450 A. D.) the founder of the Prāsaṅgika branch, restored the Mādhyamika school to all its old glory. With Candrakīrti and Śāntideva the Prāsaṅgika philosophy reached its highest water-mark.

Bhavya (500-550 A. D.), author of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakakārikas, started another branch of the Mādhyamika school, the Svātantrika. This was further developed in its two branches, one started by Śāntirakṣita (750-800 A. D.) and continued by his pupils Kamalaśīla and Āryamukta and the other, founded by Haribhadra.

The main differences between the two schools might be summarised as follows: While the Svātantrika school maintains a pure Śūnyavāda and having no *pakṣa* of its own acknowledges only the *prasaṅga* method of argumentation (*reductio ad absurdum*), the Svātantrika school accepts a Citta-mātra for purposes of refutation and adopts *Svatantra* inference as their method of argumentation.



The Svātantrikas further were progressive in their philosophical outlook and were being constantly influenced by contemporary currents of philosophy. Thus the Bhavya branch may be styled Svātantrika-Sautrāntika, while the later branch, Svātantrika-Yogācāra. If for the Yogācāra, all that we know about the *graha* (notion) and *guhya* (object) that is outside ourselves is *parikalpita*, the Svātantrika-Sautrāntika would regard the *graha* and *guhya* as having an independent existence, as not being simply based on *Svasaṃvedana*, (of which they deny the existence), and therefore as forming atoms of substances. The Svātantrika Yogācāra branch of Śāntirakṣita accepts the relative reality of notions such as blue, yellow, based on consciousness, the base itself being within us. Haribhadra admits the reality of the *Ālayavijñāna* alone, declaring all notions whatsoever to be unreal; he attributes all notions in the *Ālayavijñāna* to its being contaminated by *saṃvṛti*. The later Svātantrikas, on the other hand, believe in a *pravṛtti-vijñāna* as distinct from an *ālaya-vijñāna*.

Side by side with these epistemological differences there are differences of view as to ideals and paths of salvation according to the different schools. The Yogācāra believe the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* to belong to the order of the *tathāgatas*, which the old Svātantrikas deny and would regard the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* as having realised the *पुद्गलनैरात्म्य* and not the *धर्मनैरात्म्य*, which alone can dispel ignorance; the later ones hold views which resemble those of the Sautrāntikas.)

After this sketch of the Mādhyamika schools, Dr. Vaidya proceeds to explain the doctrine of *śūnyatā* according to the Mādhyamika philosophy, which has been so grossly misunderstood. It is the same as the मध्यमा प्रतिपद, the doctrine of the middle path, or of प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद (conditional causation). 'The I is an extreme, the not-I is another; the mean of these two extremes in the Indescribable, the Incomprehensible; that, Kaśyapa, is the middle path, the real vision of the true nature of things.' This negation of extreme metaphysical views constitutes the doctrine of *śūnyatā*. On the ethical side, it accepts the conditional nature of all things, denying only their real existence, and hence does not amount to the negation of morality, which the nāstika systems imply.

Bibliographical and biographical notices of the foremost among the Mādhyamika philosophers brings to a close the excellent introduction of Dr. Vaidya.

• Dr. Nag's thesis presents a bird's-eye view of all the important developments in the political thought of ancient India, and it studies them with special reference to the environment which moulded each succeeding ideal. In particular, he studies Kautilya's theory of the state as the centre of an international system.

Thus, for example, he surveys the different tribes of the Vedic Aryans to give us an idea of their political struggles and their growing aspirations. He next passes the Brahmanic period under review to note how the geographical extension and the ethnic enrichment, and the consequent racial and cultural fusion, in ancient India led to the centralisation of political life under a king and the evolution of the idea of a *sārvabhauma*, and how the monarchy was still a constitutional monarchy. The control of the king's powers came from the *rājakartarūḥ*, from the *viśaḥ* and even in a greater degree from the priestly class, who demanded purity in a king before he was consecrated. Instances of elected kings were not unknown in these early days. On the other hand, the growing importance of the *Aśvamedha*, which required almost unlimited power in the king, would mark the period of transition between an age dominated by Brahmanas and the epic age dominated by the ruling class.

In the epic age we find Indian society passing from tribal and limited monarchical forms of government into big nationalities with the spectre of international wars looming in the background. It is the age of an aristocracy of the ruling class, which was elastic enough to include all successful adventurers. The literature of the period, though aristocratic in form, is yet calculated to democratise brahmanical culture. There is no longer a priestly atmosphere as in the Brahmanas; the court forms the centre of gravity of the national life and the realism of the political ethics is absolutely at variance with the normal brahmanical view of life. With this introduction on the epic literature, the author gives us an exposé of the *nīti* according to the Mahābhārata, especially the Kaṇika and Nārada-praśna chapters.

Dr. Nag next turns to the political science as it appears in the regular text-books, i. e. the sūtras and the śāstras, among which he includes the late books of the Mahābhārata. After pointing out the relationship of the Arthasūtras with the Ved-āṅga literature on the one hand and the Dharma- and Kāma Sūtras on the other, he studies the special relations between

the Dharma-and Artha-sūtras. He makes clear what Kauṭilya understands by the historical science, of which dharma and artha only form two members, and points out how according to Kauṭilya consideration of equity (धर्मन्यायः) ought to be for a king higher than even the sacred texts.

In Chapter V. Dr. Nag treats of political science as it figures in the Arthasāstra of Kauṭilya, but he confines himself to the sixth and seventh adhikaraṇas, which deal with foreign politics. In doing so he has laid the student of ancient India history under distinct obligation by reason of the parallel passages from the Mahābhārata, from Manu, Yājñavalkya, Sukranīti, Bṛhaspatinīti, Kāmandakīyanītisāra and the commentaries of Medhātithi &c., which he has indicated in his study of Kauṭilya.

In the concluding chapter, Dr. Nag has valuable observations to make on the date and the character of the Arthasāstra. The legal, chemical, geographical, stylistic and political data of the work make it impossible that the work should be of one period, at any rate of an ancient date, viewed as a whole. It is a political encyclopædia of gradual growth. He further deals with the question how the Arthasāstra came to fall into oblivion. He attributes it to the ethical ideals of Buddhist India and the India that followed, when political terms were employed for religious purposes, when, for instance, Aśoka began to speak of *dharmarājya*, *dharmayātrā*, *dharmamahāmātras*, and when the word *artha* itself lost its political significance.

Two useful appendices and an index enhance the value of this excellent book.

P.

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जयरामकविविरचित पर्णालपर्वतग्रहणाख्यान edited with a Marathi translation by S. M. DIVEKAR, Kalyan (Thana) 1923.

Here is one more proof of the extraordinary character of the age dominated by the genius of Shivaji, and one cannot adequately thank Mr. Divekar for the service that he has rendered to the cause of history as well as of Sanskrit culture. The Ākhyāna, teeming as it is with modern proper names, which give it an uncouth appearance, is however conceived in a style and has a subject matter, well worthy of the Mahābhārata. One could say that the genius of ancient India after a temporary lethargy has once more found its old life and virility in the life of the great Shivaji no less than in the muse of Jayarāma.

The poet has further a distinct historical sense. He has told us that he bases his narrative on the recitals of bards, who were eye-witnesses, and hence the poem would be of the utmost value to the historian also. Mr. Divekar has in a short introduction given a resumé of the historical events described in the poem. We shall look forward with eagerness to the edition of the *Śivabhārata* of Shivaji's court poet, Paramānanda, which he has announced in the introduction.

P.

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ETERNAL TRUTH by JWALAPRASAD SINGHAL, M. A., Aligarh (1923).

The author's chief claim to our notice is his originality, if nothing else. In a little book of 164 pages he has given us a philosophical synthesis which does not servilely follow either the Western or the Eastern philosophers, but presupposes them and tries to improve on them in its own fashion. His conception of God will be clear from the following extracts: such a cry (for deliverance from misery) rising from millions of pure and loving minds has a tremendous attractive force. Whenever it reaches some soul, which has developed the spiritual forces necessary for setting right the world's progress, that soul may become attracted and may take a human form in a virtuous family.....Such a soul.....is the nearest approach to a perfect being, God.' God is neither omniscient nor a moral governor of the Universe. The primal reality, the Par-brahma (sic), is an infinite unity, possessing not only the essence of matter, i. e. extension, but also the essence of spirit, i. e. consciousness. The differentiation in this unity proceeds in a manner resembling the condensation and rarification which disturb the homogeneity of gas contained in a jar. 'The continuity of the primal reality will not be broken, but it will be now manifesting itself in two forms.' From the differentiated primal reality, rays of concentrated consciousness permeate the mass; 'the portion in which these rays may pass may develop into souls, while the portions in-between such rays may develop into material atoms.' 'The soul-atoms, which are subtler than air and ether, must necessarily possess elasticity and so the soul-atom should be capable of a change in its form.' His basic principles thus set forth, the author proceeds to enunciate his ethical doctrines and his methods of purification, and ends the whole with a lyrical out-burst on divine love.

P.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

We owe an apology to our readers for the unusual delay in the appearance of this number of the Annals. The last number was published in June and we had hopes of bringing out this one in October; but our printer's difficulties were apparently insuperable.

Resuming the work of chronicling where it was left in the last issue, we have to note the resignation of Dr. Karmarkar of his office as secretary of the Institute. Dr. Karmarkar's period of office coincided with probably the most critical period in the life of the Institute and he has richly earned the thanks of all well-wishers of the Institute for all the worry to which he has cheerfully submitted and the sacrifice of time and energy with which he has served it.

The outstanding feature of our literary activity for this year would probably be the publication of a tentative edition of the Virāṭaparvan of the Mahābhārata early in April. Copies were distributed among scholars in India and in England and America and their opinion invited. We publish in this number a review of the tentative edition by Prof. Winternitz. The opinions and reviews were duly considered by the Mahābhārata Editorial Committee, which met in October, and it has made its own recommendations for the organisation of the collating and editing work of the Mahābhārata. The work will now be entrusted to a small committee of workers, which will take the place of the old Advisory Board as well as the Editorial Committee.

Of the new arrangements made by the Executive Board for the current year, the main changes to be reported are: Sardar K. C. Mehendale becomes the chairman of the Executive Board, Dr. V. G. Paranjpe, Secretary and Editor of the Annals; a new department, that of Sales, has been created and joined on to the General Department, it being understood that the bulk of the profits of the department will be spent on the

library and the other branches of literary utility; further a Resource Committee has been newly appointed and other Committees of a miscellaneous nature were amalgamated.

The annual meeting of the General Body was convened this year in May instead of on the 6th of July, and the seventh Anniversary of the Institute (which coincides with the 87th birth-day of Dr. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar) was solemnised this year by an Address delivered by the venerable savant Shams-ul-ulma Dr. J. J. Modi. The address had for its subject 'The social life of ancient Iranians as presented in the old Parsee books.' The first part of this exceedingly instructive discourse will be published in the next issue of the Annals.

It is our painful duty to record the death of Sir Narayan G. Chandavarkar, a patron of the Institute. The whole country is mourning the loss of this great citizen of India and the Institute can only join its voice with the general cry of lamentation.

We have to offer our sincere condolences to Shrimant Balasabib Pant Pratinidhi, the Chief of Aundh for the grievous loss that he has sustained in the death of his son, Shrimant Rajesahib, B. A., LL. B., Bar-at-law. Shrimant Balasahib could very well have left the cares of administration to a son, as amiable as he was capable, and devoted himself heart and soul to the work of the Mahābhārata edition, which he had made his own. Fate has decreed otherwise and his loss is as much his as it is of the Institute. We pray that fortitude might be granted to him to bear his sorrow.

Certain matters, of a legal or otherwise unpleasant character have been ended, if not satisfactorily, at least finally, which itself is a great thing. An amicable settlement has been arrived at in regard to Mr. Gowaikar's bills against the Institute. Mr. Modak's bill has been paid off. Mr. Kelkar's claim was allowed by the court and our appeal has been dismissed. Mr. Kelkar has filed another suit against the Institute; this time we have every hope he will not succeed. The draft of the Trust-deed has been finally approved and the schedules and plans to be annexed to it have been completed, so that it remains only to be formally executed. The Draft of the colony sale-deeds has at last been finally approved of by the colonists, the Executive

Board and the Regulating council and is on the agenda of the General Body, which meets on the 3rd of February.

At the instance of Mr. V. R. Shinde, the Executive Board and the Regulating Council has recommended to the General Body that library books may be issued to members on certain conditions; and a resolution to that effect may be expected to pass at the next meeting of the General Body.

We are very glad to be able to convey excellent news of Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's health. Two months ago his health had occasioned the gravest apprehensions, but we are thankful that he has now completely recovered and can enjoy his daily drive to the Bund-gardens.

\* \* \* \*

The K. R. Cama Oriental Institute (172, Sukladvala Building, Hornby Road, Ravelin Street, Fort, Bombay), invites competitive essays for the Sarosh K. R. Cama prize of the value of Rs. 225 on the following subject:—

“A lucid and thoroughly intelligible translation in English of the 43rd, 44th, 45th and 46th chapters of the Yasna, the four chapters of the Ushtavad Gatha, in due accordance with grammar and philology, with notes and comments wherever necessary, and with the substance of the whole at the end”.

The essay should be designated by a motto and should be accompanied by a sealed cover containing the name of the competitor and his post office address, and should reach the Honorary Secretaries of the Institute on or before the 5th July 1924. The competition is open to all.

\* \* \* \*

Mr. G. M. Jadhav has sent us an appeal for publication in the Annals. We reproduce below the material part of it. Mr. Jadhav also wants to purchase for a professor friend the following numbers (first-hand or second-hand) of the Bibliotheca Sanskrita of the Mysore Government: 3, 23, 24, 31. Gentlemen having copies to spare may please communicate with Mr. Jadhav (Shivaji Road, Baroda).

“There are twenty three universities in Germany and in all these universities with but one or two exceptions Sanskrit is taught.

Indologists in Germany are carrying on their work under difficulties. It is almost impossible for them to buy Sanskrit books published in India. We have to remember that the German Mark has no value at all and it is more than possible that the Mark will go on sinking.

I shall feel very grateful to all Indians who will send Sanskrit books to Germany. These gifts should be sent to Prof. H. Lüders, Berlin University. Prof. H. Lüders will then distribute them among the different universities.

When we remember the work which German scholars have done in Indology and which they are still trying to do under the very difficult conditions of life in Germany, we should do all we can to help them. I hope every reader of the Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute will send at least one or two Sanskrit books to Germany. The more books we send the better it will be. This will show the German scholars that we have not forgotten them and that we wish them all good luck in their work."

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OF THE  
**BHANDARKAR INSTITUTE**

1923-24.

Vol. V

Part II



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1924.

# BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE POONA.

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THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE  
ANCIENT IRANIANS, AS PRESENTED  
BY THE AVESTA.

*A Discourse before the Bhandarkar Oriental  
Institute at Poona, on the Occasion of its  
7th Anniversary, on 6th July 1923.*

BY

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI, B. A., Ph. D., C. I. E.

It has given me great pleasure, for various reasons, to accept the kind invitation of the learned Secretary of this Institute, Dr. V. G. Paranjpe, to stand before you to deliver a discourse this day, when your Institute enters into the eighth year of its existence. Your Institute, with its spacious surroundings is intended to be a Vidyālaya, as well as a Vidhyāśrama, where those scholars, who choose to do so, may have their own homes. If the object is further developed, you will make your Institute a house of learning, which may gradually grow to be a "veritable académie", reminding one of the Academy of Athens. This anticipation reminds me of the 22nd and 23rd of November 1889, when, with many a pleasant thought, I wandered, on the classical battlefield of Marathon, where the ancient Greeks and Persians fought, and in the pleasant surroundings of Athens with the ruins of its grand Acropolis and the distant site of its ancient Academy. What Academica, a suburb of Athens, was to the historic city of Athens, your suburb here will be to the historic city of Poona. Your fine surroundings, if further beautified with groves of trees, will remind one of the groves at Athens, described by Horace and others. Horace, in one of his epistles, the Epistle addressed to Julius Florus, said: "Good Athens gave me some additional learning: that is to say, to be able to distinguish a line from a curve, and seek after truth in the groves of Academus.<sup>1</sup> May many a student come to your Institute to have "some additional learning, to be able to distinguish a right line from a curve."

1. Epistles of Horace, Bk. II Epistle II. Works of Horace, translated by C. Smart (1859) p. 292. The Horati Flacci Epistolæ, edited by Dr. Augustus S. Williams (1872), Liber II Epistle II 1-45.

It is well known that Plato possessed a piece of ground in the Academy of Athens, and he lived, learnt and taught there for a number of years, and his pupils and followers were known after him for decades as Academici or Academics, as distinguished from the Peripatetics of Aristotle. Dr. Bhandarkar has lived, learnt and taught in this historic city for a number of years. May this Institute, like the the Academy, produce for decades and centuries, numbers of scholars like those trained by him, and may they bring all honour to his distinguished name and to this Institute.

There was one statement in Dr. Paranipe's letter of invitation to me which touched me. He therein spoke of Dr. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar as "Our Ornament and Pride". I may say, that Dr. Bhandarkar is not only your "Ornament and Pride" but the ornament and pride of whole India, the Indology of which he has raised to a higher platform. I join you all in your love and admiration of India's "Ornament and Pride" in the field of ancient Indian literature.

The subject of my paper this evening is The Social and Communal life of the Ancient Iranians as presented by the Avesta. The extant Avesta books, that have come down to us after the devastation, first, at the hands of Alexander, and then, by the hands of the Arabs, are few in number and small in bulk; yet, as said by M. Hovelacque they present "really a very rich mine"<sup>2</sup> for the supply of materials to form a picture of the life of the ancient Iranians. I will generally base my discourse on the extant Avesta, but, where required, I will refer to later Pahlavi, Persian and other writings. The picture, thus drawn, will refer to a long extended period and to a somewhat extended area.

I will treat my subject under three principal heads.

1. The House.
2. The Family.
3. The Community.

## I.

### THE HOUSE.

I will first describe the structure of an Iranian house of the Avesta times and then speak of the requisites of the house which all go to make a Home.

2. "L' Avesta, en effet, est une mine fort riche" (Le Chien dans l' Avesta par A. Hovelacque (1876) p. 2.

\* We find from the Avesta, that there were houses of varying capacity and appearance, rising from lowly huts to splendid structures, but all, one-floored i. e. without any storey. According to the Vendidad (VIII, 2), some of the lower classes of houses, were made of wood (dâuru-upa-daranô) and some of felt (nematô<sup>3</sup>-aiwi-varanê). The latter kind of houses were a kind of tents, the like of which we see, even now, among nomadic or wandering tribes. The wooden houses were of various types, varying from small wooden huts to large structures. In case of death in such houses, if the house was easily removable (yezi aêtem nmânem upabêrê-thwôtarem ava-zanân, Vend. VIII, 3), they removed it and fumigated it with the germ-killing smoke of some fragrant wood, four kinds of which are specially mentioned.<sup>4</sup> If the house was not removable, then the dead body was removed early after death, and the whole house was fumigated with the smoke of the above mentioned wood.

We learn from the Meher Yasht<sup>5</sup>, that some houses were well-built with good foundations (nishtarêtô-spayâo) and lofty structures (nidhâtô-barêzishtâo) and were well laid out and extensive.<sup>6</sup> King Yima (Jamshid) is spoken of as one who provided well-lighted houses to his people, in his newly constructed colony (Vara).<sup>7</sup> Stone and mortar were used in buildings.<sup>8</sup> According to the Aban Yasht<sup>9</sup>, there stood on the banks of the river<sup>10</sup> Ardisura,<sup>10</sup> some huge structures with 100 win-

3. Pers. namd ٠٠٠, Gujarati ૦૦૦

4. For the sanitary use of fire, vide Vend. VIII, 79-80. Cf. the Old Testament for the sanitary treatment of a temporary house like a tent: "When a man dieth in a tent, all that come into the tent and all that touch the tent shall be unclean seven days.....and a clean person shall take hyssop and dip it in the water (i. e. the water of separation made of the ashes of a red heifer) and sprinkle it upon the tent Numbers XIX. 14-18).

5. Meher Yasht, 30.

6. Ibid. 44.

7. Vendidad II. 26, 38.

8. Ibid VI. 51

9. Yt. V 101

10. This river is identified with the Oxus (Vide my Gujarati Essay on the Geography of the Avesta pp. 189-192. I think that the name Aksu, the name of a tributary of the Oxus, which has given the river its name Oxus, is a later form of Ardisu (ra).

dows, 1000 columns and 10,000 pillars (satô raochanem, hazahgrô stûnem, baêvarê fraskembem). These structures may be the palatial buildings of kings or noblemen.

King Yima Khshaêta or Jamshed was, as it were, the first town-planner or a colony-founder (Vendidad II). Some scholars see in his enterprise a reference to something like the flood of Noah, but, I think, it was a great enterprise to found a new city or colony (vara). When a particular town, city, or place, was required to be left, either for over-population or for some sanitary or other purpose, he founded a new town with well-lighted and ventilated houses. When he saw his new town with new commodious houses soon filled up, he extended it three times. These three extensions are supposed to have followed, according to a learned Dastur, a kind of census taken by Jamshed, who, accordingly, was, as it were, the first census-taker of Irân, as Moses was that of Palestine and Chandragupta, of India.<sup>11</sup>

A well-built house was a gift of Mithra. This Angel of Light presents to the man, with whose worship he is pleased, a house built on a strong foundation, with a lofty structure, with a high plinth, a house provided with a good wife (srao-genão) and a good chariot (srao-rathão, Meher Yasht 30).

When a new house was built, it was used after a kind of house-warming ceremony. The Vendidad (XI. 4),  
 House-Warming Ceremony. enjoined the recital, on that occasion, of a chapter of the Spentomad Gatha (Yasna XLIX). The chapter is variously translated by different translators. I prefer the translation of Darmesteter (Zend Avesta I. pp. 323 et seq.), who is well guided in his translation by the Pahlavi Translation. In this chapter, the worshipper prays to God for protection against evil times (Av. Bendvô, Pahl. badtûm Zamân, Sans. nikriṣṭatare yuge), illness (Pahl. vimariḥ, Neryosang's Sans. rendering, māndyasyu),<sup>12</sup> injustice, and wickedness.<sup>13</sup>

11. "The Studies in Ancient Hindu Policy, based on the Arthśāstra of Kauṭilya," by Narendra Nath Law. Introduction by Prof. Mukerjee. Vide my paper on Census in my Gujarati Dnyân Prāsarak Essays (Part. IV pp. 19-41.)

12. Mill's Gathas p. 307

13. Though thus enjoined, this chapter is not recited at present. The chapter, entitled Tào ahmi nmānê jamyāresh (Yasna LX), forms, at present an appropriate recital.

Besides the usual conveniences for sitting, sleeping, and eating, a well-provided house of a middle class man had the following conveniences: (A) a place for women in menses; (B) a place for women in accouchément; (C) a place for keeping the dead before the body was carried to the Dakhmâ or Tower of silence; (D) a place for the performance of Religious Ceremonies.

All these places were required to be dry, clean and healthy. The third place had to be specially separated from the other three, to which a certain kind of impurity was attached for the time being.

"The Ancient Iranians had", as said by Dr. Rapp, "a cultivated sense for purity and decency; whatever has, in the slightest degree, anything impure, nauseous in itself, instils into them an unconquerable horror. This has a connection in part with the fact, that the impure is mostly even unhealthy and harmful, but in several cases the cause of the impurity does not allow of being traced back to that fact. The Iranians had in a certain measure a distinct sixth sense for the pure"<sup>14</sup>. As said by Prof. Darmesteter, 'The axiom that 'cleanliness is next to godliness,' shall be altogether a Zoroastrian axiom, with this difference, that in the Zoroastrian religion 'Cleanliness is a form itself of godliness.'<sup>15</sup> Yaozdâo mashyâi aipi zānthem Vahishtâ<sup>16</sup>, i. e., "Purity is best from birth," is one of the sayings of the Avesta.

According to the above Iranian view of cleanliness, whatever passed out of the human body was unclean and likely to be injurious to the living. So women's menses also fell under the category of unclean issues. Not only were others required to be taken care of and prevented from coming into contact with women in menses, but the women themselves were required to be taken care of. So, a house-builder had to provide in the house a place where women could comfortably remain in isolation during the period of their menses. In the large houses of the well-to-do or the

14. Die Religion und Sitte der Perser und übrigen Iranier (Religion and Customs of the Persians and other Iranians), translated from the German of Dr. Rapp, by Mr. K. R. Cama, in his Zoroastrian Mode of Disposing of the dead, p. 19.

15. Le Zend Avesta II, Introduction p. x.

16. Yasna (Gâthâ) XLVIII, 5; Vendidad V, 21.



upper middle class men, a separate place for the purpose could always be easily provided for. But that could not be done in all ordinary houses. So, it seems, that in later times, a separate quarter was provided for the purpose in every street. It was known as Dashtânistân, i. e. the place for Dashtân.<sup>17</sup> Women retired to this isolated place during the period of their monthly course. Persons touching them were held to be unclean. Their diet was regulated and they were required to take their meals from metallic trays with spoons in gloved or covered hands.<sup>18</sup>

As enjoined in the Vendidad, they provided for women in childbirth "the cleanest and the driest"<sup>19</sup> part (B) A place for women in Ac-couchôment of the house, which was less frequented by others, and was separated from the ceremonial part of the house. Special precautions were taken if the child was still born, in which case some purification was necessary for the mother's womb and she was fed on the freshmilk<sup>20</sup> of a mare, cow or she-goat, on meat, on barley cooked without water<sup>21</sup>, and on wine unmixed with water (an-âpem). Such a careful diet was necessary at least for three days. A few drops of the sacred Haoma juice was the first diet of the new born baby. The woman had to remain isolated. The period of isolation in case of a still-born child was 12 days. The injunction was then applied to all women in child-birth, and extended, later on, to 40 days, at the end of which she had to go through a purification. All her belongings during the period were rejected from ordinary use.

17. Dashtân is the later Persian word دشتان for the Avesta *dakhś.ta*, a mark (lit. evident, manifest with a mark or sign). The woman in such a state is spoken of as *nâirika dakhshaveiti* (Vend XVI. 17.) or as *nâirika chithravaiti* meaning a woman with a mark or a sign. The word *chithravaiti* is from *Chithra*, चित्र evident, perceptible. (The woman is so called, because in the particular condition some emanation is clear or perceptible). The Gujarati phrase used at times સ્પષ્ટ થાય leads to that interpretation. For further particulars about the women in this state of health, and for some similar observances of the Hebrews and Greeks, vide my "Religious Customs and Ceremonies of the Parsees", pp. 171-77.

18. For similar customs among the Hebrews and the ancient Christians (Leviticus XV) and among the Romans, vide *Ibid.* pp. 173-75.

19. Yaozdâtô—zemôtememcha huskô—zemôtememcha. (Vend. V 46)

20. Aipi-ghzaurvatâm, from *ghzar*, گز to flow, to milk (*Ibid* 52).

21. Vend. V, 10.

All houses were provided with separate arrangements for placing the dead bodies before their removal to the Towers of silence<sup>22</sup>. Owing to the rigour of winter in the cold country, at times, bodies had to be kept for more than one day till the inclement weather passed away. So, a sequestered place, pure, clean and unfrequented by many, was specially required. It seems that when separate apartments could not be provided for this purpose, a part of the front room was dug a little and the body was deposited there on a layer of sand.<sup>23</sup> For the poor, whose houses cannot afford space for this convenience, there were separate houses in each street, formerly known as Nasai-katas<sup>23a</sup> (corpse-chambers) and latterly known as Marg-zâds.<sup>24</sup> The poor carried the bodies there. The place to be chosen for such apartments or houses was required to be free from dampness and was isolated.

All Iranian houses were provided with a place for the performance of religious ceremonies.<sup>25</sup> It was separated from the place of women in menses and accouchement.

Among the various requisites of a house, (a) Fire, (b) Water and (c) Barsam were important and religiously indispensable. The happiness of a house, as it were, depended upon the care of these three.

(a) Fire was always kept burning in a house. Urvâçna, Vohugaona, Vohu-kêrêti and Hadhânaêpata were the kinds of fragrant wood, with which it was sacredly fed.<sup>26</sup> Of these four, the first is generally taken to mean sandal-wood, the second

22. Vend V. 10.

23. This practice was observed in Parsee houses in Gujarât upto a few years ago. Though the floor was made of slabs of stone or chunam work, a corner of the house was kept unstoned or unpaved to permit being dug a little for placing there, when required, a dead body.

23a Bahman Yasht, S. B. E. Vol. V. p 205.

24. At present, in Bombay, when Parsees, live on flats of houses, at times occupied by non-Parsees also, no provision is made for a place to keep the body for the time. So, a kind of a large marg-zâd is provided on the Sir Jamshedji Road near the Tower of Silence. People take their dead there for the performance of the funeral ceremonies before the final disposal.

25. Up to a few years ago, the houses of many well-to-do Parsees in Bombay had such a place or apartment where the family priest performed religious ceremonies and the family met for prayers.

olibanum, the third *agar* (Arab. aghar allo-wood), and the fourth the wood of the pomegranate tree.

Germes of physical and mental diseases spoken of as invisible dark *daēvas* (daevanām mainyavanām temas-chithranām)<sup>27</sup> were believed to be destroyed by burning fragrant wood over the fire of the family hearth, which was, therefore kept burning, day and night. The fire of the house was belived to keep a watch over the house, and it called upon the house-owner to awake in the early morning and look after it and feed it with fuel.<sup>28</sup> The household fire, if well looked for and kept burning, was belived to bless the house-owner thus: "May there be herd of cattle in thy (house). May there be an increase of progeny. May thy mind be ever active. For all the nights that you live, may you live a life of joyful life."<sup>29</sup>

26. Vend. VIII, 79. The Old Testament (Exodus XXX, 34, like the Avesta, speaks of four kinds of fragrant wood with which the sacrificial fire was fed. They are stacte (nataph), onycha (shechšleth), galbanum (bed-benoh) and pure frankincense (lebonah Zaccab). Frankincense is referred to in Exodus (XXX, 7-8) as being burnt in the sanctum sanctorum. Leviticus (XVI, 12) refers to it when it speaks of "sweet incense beaten small." The Parsees also use it in a powdered state.

27. Vend. VIII, 80.

28. According to later views, it was, an ill omen if the fire of the house was ever extinguished. Even upto a few years ago, in Bombay, and, even now, in old orthodox Parsee centres in the mofussil, when a Parsee family went out of their town for a few days, they did not allow the fire in their hearth to be extinguished, but took it to the house of a friendly neighbour and let it be mixed with the fire of that house. Again, when the oil lamps which burnt during the night had to be extinguished in the morning, they were not blown out, the burning wicks were removed from the lamps and placed in the fire of the hearth. From this point of view, upto a few years ago, kerosene lamps were not burnt in the Fire-temples, as, in that case, the switch had to be turned and the lamp to be extinguished. But, now, when the cocoa-nut oil has become dearer, questions of economy and more powerful light have forced the old susceptibilities to give way. With the same view, upto five or six years ago, electric light was not admitted in the Fire-temples; but that prohibition also has now disappeared, and even the Fire-temples of the first grade, the Âtash Behrâms, have electric light. But still, in spite of these changes, in the sanctum sanctorum of the Fire-temples of the second grade, the Âtash Âdarâns, the lamp that burns is that of the cocoa nut oil. In the case of the Âtash Behrâms, the Fire-temples of the first grade, no other light than that of the sacred fire itself is permitted.

29. Upa-thwâ hakhshôit gêush vânthwa upa viranâm pourutâç upa-thwâ vérézvatacha manô vérézvaticha hakhshôit anghuha urvâksh anghuha gaya jigaêsha tâo kshapanô yâo jvâhi, (Vend.XVIII.27).

(b) Water, the next indispensable requisite of the house was required to be kept clean and pure, both for drinking purposes and ceremonial purposes. It was one's sacred duty to see, that not only his water supply was sufficient and pure, but also that of his neighbours and townspeople. In one of his articles of Zoroastrian faith, he declared: "I will protect with prayers the streets of Mâzdayaēnāns from scarcity of water" (uç-stuyô mâzdayaēnanām viçām zyânayaêchâ vivâpatchâ, Yaçna XII. 12). When the Iranian, while passing by a running stream of fresh water, saw that there was some dead refuse in the running water, which, when drunk, would endanger the life of the drinkers, it was his religious duty to stop on his journey, whether walking, or running, or going in a carriage or riding, to get into the stream, and remove the filth.<sup>30</sup>

(c) Barsam was the third important and indispensable requisite of an ancient Iranian house. The ritual of Barsam was as old in Iran as that of Haoma. They both are often spoken of together. Without the Barsam, no good Iranian could take his meals, because no meals were taken without saying grace (bâj), in the recital or which the twigs of Barsam were

30. Yat aētê yč̌ mazdayaçna pâdha ayantem vâ tachantem vâ baremneṃ vâ vazemneṃ vâ tacha aipyā naçāum frajaçān.....iristan frabarôit âpo (Vend. VI, 26-27). It is this practice of the ancient Iranians which Herodotus refers to, when he says: "They neither make water nor spit nor wash their hands in a river, nor defile the stream with urine, nor do they allow any one else to do so, but they pay extreme veneration to all rivers." (Bk. I. 138, Carey's Translation, 1889 p. 62). Strabo also says similarly: "The Persians never pollute a river with urine, nor wash nor bathe in it; they never throw a dead body, nor anything unclean into it." (Bk XV, Chap. III, 16, Hamilton and Falconer's Translation Vol. III p. 137). The above sacred regard of the Iranians for fire and water is spoken of by Goethe in his *Parsée-nameh* (*Buch des Parsen*), the 11th book of his *West-östlicher Divan*, as their "Dignity of all elements (*Würde der sämtlichen Elemente*)". Vide my Paper on Goethe's *Parsi-nameh* or *Buch des Parsen*. (*Journal B.B.R.A.S.* Vol. XXIV pp. 66-95). This regard for the purity of the elements, had led Dr. Rapp to say, as said above, that "the Iranians had a cultivated sense for purity and decency" and that "the Iranians had in a certain measure a distinct sixth sense for the pure."

required.<sup>31</sup> The Barsam ceremony seemed to correspond with one of the rites of the Hindu Soma sacrifice.<sup>32</sup>

Having spoken of the house, we will now speak of a few things of the house, the possessions of the householder. Among these, the cattle formed the principal possession. Besides the above mentioned accommodation, an ordinary Iranian house had to be provided with a place for the cattle and other domesticated animals. Among the domesticated animals, which almost all middle class families had, were the cow, the dog and the cock. We will speak at some length of these cattle and domesticated animals.

In early times, before the use of metal for coins, the cattle formed the wealth of the people and were used as money for large payments. We know that our English word 'pecuniary' comes from 'pecus' cattle.

31. We see from the writings of even later times, that the presence of *barsam* in the house was required to say grace for meals. According to the Shâh-nâmeh, Yazdazard, the last Sassanian monarch, when he concealed himself in the house of a miller to save himself from the pursuing army of his disloyal general Mâhui Suri, he asked for the Barsam to say grace for the meal, kindly offered to him by the miller. This led to his discovery. Again, according to Firdousi (Mohl VII. p. 183), the recital of grace at the court of Khushro Parviz (Chosroes II), where Nyâsus, the Roman ambassador, was the royal guest, was on the point of leading to some bloodshed between the Zoroastrian Iranians and the Christian Romans. A Persian minister, according to the Iranian custom, said grace at the royal table, holding the barsam in his hand. The Roman ambassador, being a Christian, objected, on the ground that the custom should not be observed when a Christian was the royal guest. Thereupon, the Persian minister gave him a slap. The ambassador left the court at once, and in the first heat of anger, was on the point of attacking the royal dinner party with the few Roman troops who had accompanied him as an escort. But the queen, the daughter of king Maurice of Rome, intervened and dissuaded the ambassador, who was her own brother, from resorting to this rash act and brought about a pacification. Now, it seems that the Christian ambassador had inherited his dislike against the Iranian Barsam from Hebrewism, because, we learn from the old Testament, that the Hebrews had a dislike for it. We read in Ezekiel (VIII 17) "Then he said unto me: Hast thou seen this, O son of man?...They put the branch to their nose." Here, the branch is a reference to the Barsam twigs, the ritual of which was adopted by some Hebrews who had come into religious contact with the Iranians during their captivity at Babylon.

32. Vide my "Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsees" pp. 281-282.

Lat. pecus is the same as Avesta paçu and Sans. पशु. Now we have some references in the Avesta to show that cattle were used as money, and therefore, it was necessary to have that form of money ready at hand and hence the necessity, to a certain extent, of providing a place in the yard or compound of the house for the cattle. The cattle included goats and sheep as those belonging to the smaller kind or class, and camels, horses, asses, and oxen, as belonging to the larger kind.<sup>33</sup>

While speaking of the cow as a medium of exchange, one must note, that the later Persian Achæmenian coin, *daric*, which is said to have derived its name from Darius, was like the Greek stater, and, possibly, like the Indian *surarṇa* (सुवर्ण) of the value of a full-grown cow in gold, calculated by weight.<sup>34</sup>

The Vendidad supplies us with two instances of the use of cattle as money. It is in the case of Doctors. Payment of their fees in cattle, the payment of fees to qualified doctors. We will somewhat anticipate here what we have to say later on, under the heading of professions, and, while speaking of the use of cattle as money, as illustrated in fees to doctors, say something about the qualifications and fees of doctors.

The Avesta speaks of five classes of baêshaza (Sans. भिषज्, pers. puzashk), physician. They are:<sup>35</sup>

1. Ashô-baêshaza
2. Dâtô-baêshaza
3. Karêtô-baêshaza
4. Urvarô-baêshaza
5. Mānthro-baêshaza

In latter Pahlavi books, these five classes of Doctors, are grouped into two large classes, viz. i. Tan-baêshaza (Sans. तनुभिषज्), i. e.

33. It seems, that even in later Achæmenian times, one's wealth was, as it were, estimated by cattle. We learn from Herodotus, that Cambyases, when on the point of death, charged his people to fight against the Pseudo-Smerdis. In his charge, he spoke of the cattle as one of the blessings that may accrue to them. He said: "If you do this, may the earth bring forth her increase; may your wives and your flocks be fruitful and you for ever remain free." (Herodotus Bk. III 65, Cary's Translation (1889), p. 199). Here Cambyases's blessing is in the spirit of the Avesta, wherein Fire is represented as blessing the worshipper in the following words: "May there be an increase of cattle (gôush) in your family. May there be an increase of brave progeny &c." (Âtash Nyâish, Yasna LXII 10).

24. "The Coins of India" by C. J. Brown (1922) p. 13.

35. Ardibehst Yasht 6.

Physicians of the body, and ii, Ravān-baêshaza (corresponding to Sans. आत्मभियञ्), i. e. physicians of the soul. This division corresponds to the present division, viz. Doctors of Medicine and Doctors of divinity.

Now, the first of the five classes of physicians, the Ashô-baêshaza, may be taken as being strictly the later Ravān-baêshaza, or the doctors of the soul, modern Doctors of Divinity. This class seems to include the priests who are spoken of as Yaozdâtar (yaozdâthra) who prescribed rituals of purification. The second class, Dâto-baêshaza are those who cure by law (dâta, justice). Thus judges who redress wrongs may be taken as Doctors of Law. As to the next two classes, Karêtô-baêshaza and Urvara baêshaza, the meaning is clear. The Karêtô-baeshaza are the surgeons, who cure by surgical operations (karent, sans. कर्त्तृ), Lat. *curt-are*, to cut). The Urvara-barêshaza are the Drug-physicians or the physicians proper in our modern use of the word. They cure by drugs (urvara, Sans. उर्वरा Lat. Arbor, Fr. Arbre, Pers. درو). The fifth class Mâthro-baeshaza are those who cure by Mâthra (sans. मन्त्र) i. e. religious incantations. They cured by faith. Of all these five classes, the physician of the last class, one who cured by the recital of the holy mâthra (mâthrem-spentem-baêshazyô) was considered to be the best of all physicians (baêshazanâm baeshazyotema.)<sup>35</sup> The reason for his superiority is, that he cures the righteous man from within (yo narsh ashaonô hacha uruthwân baêshazyât). We must note, that it is not every one and any one that was cured by the physician by the recital of the mâthra. It were only the ashavan (the अश्वन्), the righteous, the holy, the pure, who had faith, that were cured by *mâthra*. The faithful, those who were full of faith, who had faith, were cured by faith.

Now, the question of the examination or qualification and the remuneration of the karêto-baêshaza, the surgeon, is specially referred to in the Vendidad (VII, 36-44). It was required that a surgeon should, first of all, operate (karentat VII, 36) upon the Daeva-worshippers (Daêva-yacnâns). (If, by his operation, he killed the patient, he was given another chance, and then a third chance. But if all the three patients died, one after another, he was altogether rejected from the practice of surgery as unfit for ever (anâmâtô zî aêshô yavaêcha yavaêtâtâêcha, Vend. VII 37). If he was successful in all the three operations,

he was considered qualified (*amâtô*. Ibid 39) for ever. He was there-after permitted to practise.

Then, after the question of examination or qualification came the question of fees. It was fixed on a rising scale, according to the profession and position of the patient. If the patient was an *âthravan* (a priest), he was to be treated free without any fee. The *Âthravan's* good blessings (*dahma yât âfrinôit*) upon the physician, his prayers for him, served as his fee. Then, the fees for other patients were as follows: The fee for the head of the house (*nmānahê nmānô-paiti*) was a draught animal (*staora*, Sans. *स्युर*, Pers. *Satur*. Lat. *Taurus*, Eng. *Steer*), an ox or a horse of the smallest value (*nitemem arejo*). That for the head of the street (*viça-paiti*), the same class of animal of moderate (*madhema*) value; that for the head of a village (*zantô-paiti*), the same class of animal of the highest (*aghem*) value; that for the head (i. e. the ruler) of the country (*danghu-paiti*), four animals of the kind yoked to a carriage (*Vâshem chathru yuktem* s. 41). The rising scale for treating the wives of those personages was as follows (*Vend. VII. 42*): For the house-wife (*nmānahê nmāno-paiti nâirikām*), a she-ass (*kathwa-daēnu*); for the wife of the head of a street, a cow (*gavô-daēnu*); for the wife of the head of a village, a mare, (*aspa-daēnu*); for the wife of the ruler of the country, a she-camel (*ushtra-daēnu*)

We have a similar varying grade of fees for the *yaozdâtar*, i. e. one who purifies or disinfects a person who has been polluted or infected by having come into contact with a dead body. Here (*Vend. IX. 37*), the grade of fees is given in an inverse order. The fees are as follows: The

Payment of Fee  
in Cattle to *Yaoz-*  
*dathragars* or  
Purifiers.

*Âthravan* is to pay nothing. He is to be treated free of charge. The ruler or head of the country is to give a camel of the highest value; the head of the town, a horse of the highest value; the head of the street, an ox of the highest value; the head of the house, an ox of the ordinary value. In the case of the women who are purified, the fees are as follows: The house-wife to pay a ploughing ox; the wife of the head of the street or of one of moderate means, to pay a burden-carrying ox (a beast of burden). The fee for purifying a child was a sheep or goat (*paçu*) of moderate value.

We find from the above list of fees, that the male dignitaries paid their fees in male-cattle and the female dignitaries in female cattle.



Just as now-a-days persons are named after precious metals which are used <sup>37</sup> for money, so in ancient Irân, people were named after cattle which formed their money. Thus, we have a list of names from aspa, horse, e. g. Pourushaspa, Paitiraspa, Haêchataspa, Jâmâspa, Keresâspa, Erejataspa, Baêvaraspa, Vishtâspa, Aurvataspa, Dravâspa, Tumâspa, Frinaspa, Hishtâspa, Habaspa, Fraodhat-aspa, Asu-aspa, Hazangra-aspa, Vazâspâ, Dazgarâspa, Khshvoiwrâspa, Harêdhaspa, Huaspa, Chatwarêspa <sup>38</sup>. The following names are from ushtra, camel (ushtra) : Zarathushtra, Frashaostra.

Having spoken of the cattle generally, I will now speak of some of their kinds separately.

We find from the above-mentioned scale of fees, that among the cattle, the camel stood first in value. It was dearer than the horse. We learn this also from Vendidâd, Chap. XIV, where the camel stands to the horse as gold to silver. In the Gosh Yasht (Yt. IX 30), a rich person's wealth is measured by camels. He is spoken of as possessing seven hundred camels (hapta sata ushtranâm). This and other passages lead to show that the camel was held more valuable than the horse. But it seems, that, at some other time, or in some other part of Iran, the horse had the precedence. For example, we read in the Yasht of Ashi, the Iranian Lakshmi or the Goddess of Wealth (Yt. XVII, 13), that the horse takes precedence over the camel. Similar is the case in Vendidâd, Chap. XXII (3, 10, 16 and 20) <sup>39</sup>

37. I will give illustrations from my own community. Some Parsee ladies are named as Dhanbai (from dhan, wealth) Hirâbai (diamond), Jarbai (Pers. zar, gold), Manoekbai (ruby), Motibai (pearl), Ratanbai (jewel), Sunabai (gold), Rupabai (silver). Some similar names among males are Dhanji, Hirâji, Maneckji, Ratanji.

38. Rawlinson gives a list of some corresponding names as used by the Greeks (Rawlinson's Herodotus III Appendix).

39. In Arabia itself, which is the home of the camel, though more useful than the horse, it is generally held to be lower than the horse in popular estimation. Mr. W. Gifford Palgrave says of the camel in Arabia that "below the horse in popular estimation and market value, but far above him in general utility so far as Arabia is concerned, comes that eminently Arab animal, the Camel".—Encyclopædia Britannica 9th Ed. Vol. II (Arabia) p. 242. As to the Persian camel, Sir Frederick Goldsmid refers, on the authority of Col. Stewart, to "a splendid breed of camels" and says that the Khûrâsân camel is celebrated for its size and strength and carries a load of from 600 to 700 lbs (Ibid. XVIII, p. 6 25).

We find from the above scale of fees, that camels were rare and therefore dear in Iran. But the horse, though coming next to camel, from the point of view of its value as money, was much liked and was favourite with the Iranians. Iran is believed to be the home of horse-racing which spread from there to Europe. I will not dwell at any length on the subject of the horse in Iran, but will simply refer my readers to my paper on "Horse in Iran" read before the Anthropological Society of Bombay<sup>40</sup>

While speaking of the horse, we must note that a kind of carriage drawn by horses was used. We read of Sraosha being carried in a carriage by four white brilliant, showy, pure, good (docile), swift<sup>41</sup> horses (Chathwârô:-aurvantô aurusha raokhshna frâ-dêrêstra spenta Vîdhvâonghô, asaya.....vazenti'—Sraosh Yasht, Yaena LVII 27). Those who are favoured by Ashi, the Iranian Laksmî, possess horses who draw carriages very lightly (raum<sup>42</sup> vâshem vâshayantê, Yt. XVII 12). The good spirits of the holy departed blessed those who remembered them, with "strong carriages" (dêrêzarascha<sup>43</sup> vakhsho. Yt. XIII. 52).<sup>44</sup> Even warriors fought on a kind of chariot (ratha). The very word for a warrior in Avesta is rathaeshtâr, i. e. one who stands on a ratha (sans. रथ, Lat. Rota). The word *ratha* even gave their names to some Iranians e. g. Dârayat-ratha, Frâyat-ratha, Skârayat-ratha (Yt. XIII, 108), Aghraê-ratha (Yt. XIII, 131).

Among some other possessions of a house-holder, there were the domesticated animals, among which three were very useful and were held well-nigh sacred. They were (a) the cow (b) the dog and (c) the cock. They continued to be held sacred by the Parsees even after their advent in India. Anquetil du Perron refers to this fact about the Parsees of the 18th century in Surat.<sup>45</sup>

40. Vol. IV. pp. 1-14.

41. Reading *âsava* as read by Mills, from *âsu*, आसु, quick. Reading *a-saya* i.e. throwing no shadow (pers. sayeh, سایه) also, it would mean quick, lit. running so fast that it throws no shadow.

42. *Runa* (Westergaard). Better *raum*, from *rao*, रागु, रागु, light.

43. From *darez*, दृढ, durable, strong.

44. Canon Taylor has, in his "Origin of the Aryans", raised the question, whether mankind used horse first for riding or for drawing chariots and carriages. The Avesta seems to suggest, that it was first used for drawing chariots (ratha).

45. "Ces trois animaux sont les plus nécessaires au Parse; ils fournissent même à tous ses besoins" (Zend Avesta, tome II, p. 602).

The cow was one of the valued possessions of an Iranian house-holder. In the Vendidad, we find a list (a) The Cow. of objects to which an Iranian looked with respect and feelings of reverence. Among many good pure objects created by God (vispa vohû Mazda-dhâta asha-chithra, Chap. XI. 1), they were valued most. These objects are the following:

One's own house, Fire, Water, Earth, Cow, Tree, a righteous man, a righteous woman, the Stars, the Moon, the Sun and Boundless Light. They all required to be looked at with a pure worshipful eye. Certain religious formulæ are mentioned, the recital of which leads man to purify himself, if he had committed a wrong in connection with them. With the recital of these formulæ, he was, as it were, purifying these good objects which he may have defiled by his wrongful acts in connection with them. We find that the cow is one of these valued objects. Fresh milk was required by every family for a pious offering. Ahura Mazda himself is represented as offering plenty (pêrênâibiyô) fresh flowing (ghzârayatbyô)<sup>46</sup> (milk) " (Ram Yasht 22).

In the Avesta, in some places, the word gao (गौ, Germ. Kuh, cow) is used as representing all bovine creation. It is also used for mother Earth. Where we read of nemô gêush (i. e. Homage to the Kine), there, the homage is to the whole bovine creation. The word represents, as it were, the whole nature. In the Ahunavaiti Gatha (Ha XXIX. 9), where the Gêush-urvan prays to God for a good ruler and guide, it represents, as it were, the soul of the Universe. However, looking to the practical point of view, the cow, representing the bovine creation, which worked at the plough and in various other ways, was held to be a very useful and well-nigh sacred animal.

The Iranians were asked to look kindly after the domesticated animals. The cow or the ox is represented as blessing or cursing the land-lord or house-owner, as he treated them with care or treated them badly. If the animal was not given proper food, and if more work was exacted from it than it could do, it cursed its owner. The animals of the bovine class cursed such a owner thus: "You, who do not give me proper food and who exact more work from me for the sake of your wife and children and yourself, may you be childless and may you be ill-spoken of".<sup>46a</sup> The horse also similarly curses its owner who

46. Ghzar, kshar, क्षर, to flow.

46a Yaona XI 1.

does not treat him well. Its curse is somewhat like this: "May you not be in a position to possess good swift horses." In ancient Iran, where, as Herodotus<sup>47</sup> said, every child from the age of seven, was taught riding. To be without a horse or not to be in a position to afford to keep good horses, was a misfortune. Hence this curse by the ill-treated horse.

A master of the house (*nmāua-paiti*) cherished the possession of a cow for its milk. But there was one other purpose for which he could like to keep a cow. Cow's urine was held to possess some disinfecting or purifying qualities and so was believed to be a purifier. Even now, an orthodox Zoroastrian, on rising from his bed, before his ablution with water, applies *gao-miz* (i. e. cow's urine) to his body. The application is now made with the recital of a small prayer-formula, spoken of as a *nirang*. Cow's urine was believed in those times to be a disinfectant.<sup>48</sup> The ancient Iranians condemned for ever articles of furniture made of wood or clay if they ever came into contact with dead bodies or with decomposing matter of men and animals. But metallic things thus polluted were purified with cow's urine, clay and water.

Next to the cow, the dog was held to be an indispensable animal required to be kept by a master of the house. As said by Hovelacque,<sup>49</sup> the dog being "a good and faithful servant (*un bon et fidèle serviteur*), was liked by all and was held sacred. He was, as it were, a member of the family, so much so, that the disposal of his dead body was better attended to than that of other animals, and contact with his dead body was to be avoided somewhat like that with the dead body of a man. The names of the different species of dog point to the various uses of the animal: 1. The *Paçush-haurva* dog was the dog that guarded the cattle. 2. The *Vish-haurva* was the protector of the street (*Vic* विस् *Lat. Vic-us*). This was the watch-dog who looked after the house and the

47. Bk. I, 131.

48. Vide Dr. Eugène Wilhelm's paper "On the use of Beef's urine, according to the precepts of the Avesta and similar customs with other nations." According to Drs. Haug, Wilhelm and Darmesteter, the peasants of some parts of Europe, even now, use cow's urine as a kind of disinfectant. Prof. Rapp refers to this custom at some length, and asks the readers to look to it not from our present notions, but from an old point of view. (Vide K. R. Cama's Translation of the article on the Vendidad, pp. 15-16, 18).

49. Le chien dans l'Avesta, par A. Hovelacque, p. 13.

street. 3. The Drakhto-hunar dog, lit. one who had grasped (from draj to grasp) goodness or excellence (hunara), was a dog trained for various household purposes. 4. The Vohunazaga dog (from Vohuna, वस, Pers. khūn, blood and naz, नह, to connect) was somewhat like a blood-hound. It was the species that devoured the flesh of all animals. [It seems that in ancient Iran, as at Tibet even now, both birds and dogs devoured the flesh of dead bodies which were exposed in open places on the tops of mountains. All these dogs were useful in the household, and so, they were liked and loved, and people hurting them were held responsible in the eye of law and punished.]

Dogs play a prominent part in the funeral and in one of the purificatory ceremonies of the Parsis. This custom seems to have arisen from the fact, that, he, like the birds, devoured the decaying flesh of the dead body and thus led to cleanliness. The dog engaged for the purpose is one that is chathru-chashma (i. e. four-eyed), which, as pointed out by Monier Williams, corresponds to the four-eyed dogs of the 10th Mandala of the Rg-veda, which guarded the way to the abode of Yama, the god of death.

Next to the dog, the cock was held to be a useful and sacred animal. The reason was, that, with its cry in the early morning, the house-hold arose and the routine of daily life began. Ancient Iran is held to be the home of the cock. According to Athæneus (XIV, c, 20), cocks were taken to Europe from Persia. It is for this reason that the cock was spoken of as "the Persian bird" by Greek comedians.

The cock is spoken of in the Vendidad (XVIII 14-16) as *parô-darsh*, i. e. the fore-seer, because it foresees the rising of the sun. In his early morning cry, he is said to follow the commandment of Sraosha, the angel-messenger of God. His morning cry was understood to be as follows:

"Uçêhishtata mashyâka, staota ashem yat, vahishtem nista Daêva, aêsha vô dvaraitê Bushyâsta darego-gava. Ha vîspem ahum astvantem hakat raochanem fragrâto nikhabdayêiti khafsa darêgo mashâka noit te sachaiti" Translation:—O men! arise. Praise the best piety. Extirpate the demons. The long-handed Bushyâsta (i.e. the Demon of idleness who lulls men to sleep) comes down upon you. He lulls to sleep again the whole material world when it awakes at dawn. O men! it does not behoove you to sleep long."

Thus, we see that the cock was esteemed in an Iranian house as a useful bird, because it helped men to get up early and be prepared for their daily duty. According to the Vendidad, men, on arising from their bed at the crowing of the cock, should think of the precepts of following good thoughts, good words and good deeds, and avoiding evil thoughts, evil words and evil deeds. Next to the cock, it is the fire of the family hearth that is represented as if shouting to the members of the house, to change their sleeping suits, to wash and to feed the fire. It is said, that of any two persons, the one, who, attending to the cheering voices of the two, the cock and the fire, rose earlier than the other, went to paradise earlier than that other. The injunction pointed, as it were, to the homely proverb, "Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise" <sup>50</sup>

Having spoken of the cattle and the domesticated animals, Household Furniture. I will now say a few words on other articles of furniture.

We find that the eating vessels (tashta âonghuharena) were made of metal, stone, earth, wood and a kind of starchy substance (fravâkhshana, Vend. VII. 75). The above is the consecutive order of their purity. Vessels of metal and stone, if defiled by coming into contact with a dead body, can be purified with a certain number of rubbings and washings with gaomez (cow's urine), earth and water. Those of earth, wood and starchy substances were condemned as being impure for ever (yavaêtâtê ayaozhdyâ).<sup>51</sup> For this reason, even now, utensils of wood, clay or any such lower kind of material are never used in Parsee liturgical services. Even now, priests who officiate at the inner liturgical services, are prohibited from eating or drinking from wooden or earthen vessels. Even porcelain is prohibited as having been made from clay.

Coming to utensils of stone, we have two words for stone in the Avesta. One is asman (अस्मन्), (Visparad X 2) and the other is zarshtva (Vend. VII. 75). Among the stone utensils is mentioned a mortar (hâvana Yaena XXII 2), which is specially spoken of as a requisite for an agriculturist. A stone

50. For further references to the cock as a sacred bird, vide my paper on "The cock as a sacred bird" (Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay. Vol. V. pp. 342-62. Vide my Anthropological papers, Part I, p. 104-121).

51. Vend. VII, 75

mortar is also mentioned as a religious requisite for a priest to pound the Haoma twigs for its juice ( Visparad X. 2; XII 5).

Coming to metals, we have two words for it, one is Khshathra Vairya. (1) Khashathra Vairya was the fourth Ameshâspenta or arch-angel who presided over or guarded metal. So metal also was spoken of at times as Khshathra Vairya. (2) Ayangha, (अयस्, Pers âhan, iron) seems to be the generic word for all metals as well as the word for iron in special (Yaçna XXII 2, ayanghanacha hâvana). The denser the metal the purer it was considered to be and the lesser was the number of purifications required for its utensils. To speak in modern scientific language, the intensity of the purification of polluted metallic things depended upon the specific gravity of the metals. The following table gives a list of the purifications for different metals and stones as enjoined by the Vendidad (VII. 7).

<i>Metals</i>	<i>Specific Gravity.</i>	<i>No. of Purifications.</i>
Gold (Zarana, हिरण्य)	19.3	1
Silver (Erezata, रजत, argentum)	10.5	2
Iron (Ayangh, अयस्)	7.8	3
Copper <sup>52</sup> (Hoosafna)	8.9	4
Stone (Zarshtva)		6

We find a mention of the following uses of metals: Cooking utensils, eating utensils, mortars for pounding, chains,<sup>53</sup> spoons,<sup>54</sup> nail or some nail-like things:<sup>55</sup> and knives,<sup>56</sup> Metals were also used for implements of war.

Among the metals, gold was well-used for ornamental purposes and for religious utensils. A mention is made of a perforated plate of gold for straining the Haoma juice.<sup>57</sup> The veil (paiti-dân) on the face of Ardviçura is said to be of gold or gold embroidery.<sup>58</sup> Some kings are represented as sitting on golden seats.<sup>59</sup> Some implements of war for the warriors (rathaêstâr) are mentioned as being of gold, e. g. the hilts of

52. Scholars differ as to what this metal is. It is variously supposed to be copper, tin, zinc, steel or brass.

53. Yaçna XI, 8.

54. Vend IX, 14.

55. Ibid VI, 46.

56. Ibid IV, 50.

57. Yaçna X, 17.

58. Yasht V, 126.

59. Gâtavo Zaranaêrê, Yt. XV, 7 et seq. Vide also Vend. XIX 31, 32, Yashts XVII, 9; XIX, 41; V. 64, 128.

their swords,<sup>60</sup> their armours,<sup>61</sup> &c. Their hats were fringed with gold<sup>62</sup> and their maces were gilt with gold.<sup>63</sup> The Ram Yasht speaks of the following as made of gold: hat, crown, chain, chariot, wheel of the carriage, arms, parts of clothings, shoes and waist-bands. Chariots and even their wheels, the harness, and even the shoes of their horses, all had gold or gold fittings.<sup>64</sup> The horns of oxen were adorned with clips of Gold.<sup>65</sup>

We find a mention of silver also for ornamental purposes, but its use was not as common as that of gold.<sup>66</sup>

Gold seems to have abounded in some parts of Iran. Dr. Geiger, in one of his articles in *le Muséon*, has pointed to the rivers on the north and south of the Hindu Koosh as the sources whence the Iranians received their gold. The sand of these rivers supplied the metal in good quantity. The country of Haëtumant (modern Helmand, Gr. Etymander, Hermandra of other ancient writers) was spoken of as *raévantem*<sup>67</sup> i. e. rich, from the fact, that its river (Helmand) abounded in golden sands. The Pahlavi Bundelesh speaks of this Helmand as Zarinmand i. e. golden.<sup>68</sup> The mountain Hukairya a mountain in the long range of Hara-bêrêzaiti (the Elbruz) is<sup>69</sup> is for similar reasons spoken of as golden.<sup>70</sup> The Elburz is spoken of as having innumerable gold<sup>71</sup> in streams.<sup>71</sup> In the Ashisang Yasht, messengers are represented as bringing gold and silver from distant countries in abundance (*niberetha* निबेथ) for those on whom Ashi, the Iranian, Laksmî is propitious.<sup>72</sup> The very fact, that among other workshops, that of goldsmiths and silversmiths (*Zaranyô-saêpa. êrêzaetô-saêpa*) are mentioned, shows that there must be a brisk trade in gold-made and silver-made things.

60. Yasht XIV, 27.

61. Meher Yasht, 129.

62. Ram Yasht, 57.

63. Meher Yasht, 96.

64. Meher Yasht, 124, 125, 136; Tir Yt. 18; Srosha Yt. Sec. 11.3 Behram Yt. 9.

65. Tir Yt. 16; Behram Yt. 7.

66. Vend. VIII; Yac, na X 17; Meher Yasht 112; Abân Yasht, 129.

67. Vend. I. 14, Sans *रिच*, rich, wealthy from *रि* (Av. *raç*), wealth.

68. Chap. XX. 34. Vide my translation of the Bundelesh, p. 97.

69. The name was anciently applied to a very long range and not confined to the mountain which at present bears the name.

70. Zaranaçna from Zarana, *हिरण्य*, gold. Abân Yt. 96; Rashna Yt. 24

71. Nâvicha (Avesta *nâvaya*, *नाव्य*, navigable) Zarinkard.

72. Erêzatem zaranim nibôrôthi âbereta baraiti (Yt. XVII. 14)



Gold was used for various purposes of domestic or household use, such as for handles of daggers, (ashtra), hilts of swords (karêta zaranyô-saora), caparisons of horses (aspa zaranya-auvidhâna), cuirass (pusa), apparel (vastra), helmets (khaodha), necklace (minu, S. मणि), shoes (aothra), weapons (zaya), wheels (chakhra). Among other household things, we find a mention made of a stone or metal mortar (hâvana) for pounding, especially for pounding the Haoma plant.

As to the mode of sitting, we find that it was that of sitting on the ground on carpets (stairish). The seat of Ahuramazda himself is also on a golden carpet (zaranaênê païti upastêrêna, Ram Yt. 2), under a golden canopy (fraspaïti). So, all sat and slept on carpets. The Vendidad (V. 27) refers to the custom of sleeping on carpets spread on the ground.

( *To be continued.* )

# THE DOCTRINE OF PRATIBHĀ IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ.

(*Concluded from last number.*)

§ 4

THE ĀGAMAS: ŚAIVA-ŚĀKTA SCHOOLS.

In the Tāntrik Literature, however, the doctrine of pratibhā finds a brilliant and elaborate treatment. The whole of mantraśāstra is indeed full of interesting matter bearing upon this question. But as we cannot fully examine, within the narrow limits of this paper, the various currents and cross-currents of thought with which the history of the doctrine is closely interwoven, we consider it more expedient to attempt only a brief exposition of the salient features of the doctrine, avoiding the quicksands of controversy as far as possible. And this we shall do on the basis of Trika and Tripurā literatures. But as these two literatures are very intimately connected and present very few points of difference (except in rituals) we may take them together.

As in the Vyākaraṇa, so in Tantra proper, the doctrine of Vāk plays a very important part; and the study of pratibhā is really the study of this Vāk, so far as its place in this Literature is concerned. But we must bear in mind at the outset the fundamental distinction between the two rival systems of thought in order that no confusion may arise. The Supreme Reality is conceived in Vyākaraṇa in terms of Śabda or Vāk (cf. अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्) so that to the Vaiyākaraṇa the difference between Śabda Brahman and Parā Brahman is in reality a difference without any distinction. To him the two represent the two aspects of the same Supreme Śabda: accordingly, the so-called Śabda Brahman is synonymous with Paśyanti and Parā Brahma with the Parā. But in Āgama the Parā Vāk occupies a subordinate position, being conceived

as the Power of the Supreme Reality or Parama Śiva, and would thus seem to correspond to Śabda Brahman; while Parama Śiva and Parā Brahma would be identical. Though there is admittedly no essential difference between paśyantī and parā in Vyākaraṇa or between Parā Vāk and Parama Śiva in Āgama, there is no denying the fact that there is some slight difference between the two systems regarding the character of Vāk, in so far as one holds it to be independent and self-subsistent, while the other makes it a power subordinate to the substance with which it is identical.

In other words, Vāk, according to Āgama is the Supreme Power of Parama Śiva—the Power, ever in association with Him, of His eternal Self-contemplation and Self-revelation. Though identical in essence with the godhead and not separable from it, it is nevertheless distinguishable and is real. It is the Power whereby the Divine Self knows Itself and enjoys Itself eternally, without restraints and without limitations. It is the will of the Absolute and the Personality of the Impersonal, if we may use these expressions. The Āgamas speak of it under various aspects, viz. Vimarśa ( Word, Logos ), Sphurattā ( Self-illumination ), Aiśvarya ( Lordship ), Svātantrya ( Freedom ) and Parāhantā ( Supreme Personality )<sup>21</sup>.

This Vāk is said to be two-fold according as it relates to the Primary Object ( मुख्य अर्थ ), viz. the Pure Light of Cit or the Absolute Unity, free from all kinds of limitations or to the Contingent Object, viz. the Universe ( विश्व ), which is multiple and is limited by various conditions, such as Universal, Quality, Action, Name, &c. The first is called प्रत्यक्संश्लेष or Vimarśa proper and the second Vikalpa.<sup>22</sup>

The usual classification of Vāk as fourfold is also recognised. The Parā seems to me to stand really for that aspect of the Vāk when it is one with Parama Śiva and is transcendent. The paśyanti represents the Vimarśa, and the remaining two, viz. madhyamā and vaikhari are only cases of Vikalpa.

21. Cf. Virūpākṣapañcāśikā; ईश्वरता कर्तृत्वं स्वतन्त्रता चित्स्वरूपता चेति । एते चाहन्तायाः पर्यायाः शम्भुनोच्यन्ते ॥ See also the Nāgānandasūtra as cited by Bhāskaraśārya in the Guptāvatī.

22 See Rāmakaṇṭhācārya's Vivṛti on the Spanda Kārikās, p. 141.

\* As *vimarśa* means the Self-revelation of the Lord  
 (प्रकाशस्यात्मविभ्रान्तिः) it is intelligible that it is  
*Vimarśa-* another name of *pratibhā*, with which in the  
*paśyanti-* system of grammatical philosophy *paśyanti*  
*pratibhā.* has been shown to be synonymous. And this  
 is borne out by the description of *pratibhā* found in the  
 literature.

Thus in the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (p. 52) Kṣemarāja quotes  
 a verse<sup>22</sup> in which *pratibhā* is identified with  
*Pratibhā in* the Supreme Subject, whose nature is infinite  
*Trika.* intelligence (अन्तर्बोध), indivisible and void  
 of time-limitations (अकाल). It is unalterably and everywhere  
 One, being the one Light whose reflection shines through every  
 state of modal consciousness. The Yogin reaches this Plane of  
 Divine Vāk when he succeeds in shaking off the fetters of  
 bondage. Omniscience and Omnipotence, among other divine  
 attributes, are manifested in him as matters of course. His  
 Will becomes paramount and invincible. The *Spanda Kārikā*  
 (4.7) says that everything, nowever remote in time and  
 removed in space, presents itself to such a yogin in any aspect  
 in which he wants to see it present. During the period of  
 ekstasis, and even afterwards (if the yogin happens to have  
 reached perfection), the self loses its limitations and becomes  
 unified with the entire universe, so that the mere rise of the  
 Will with reference to a particular object suffices to bring it  
 into manifestation (Cf. *Rāmakaṇṭha*, pp. 107-8). The state of  
 the yogin, thus abiding in the Reality and pervading All, is  
 technically known as *rahasyamudrā*—a state, in which he  
 enjoys Rest, Freedom and Joy, with all his desires fulfilled;  
 and the solitude in which he lives is the Supreme Solitude of  
 Union with Reality.

The *Tripurā Rahasya*, the *Magnum Opus* of the *Tripurā*  
 system of philosophical thought, speaks exactly  
*Pratibhā in Tri-* in the same strain. It describes *Pratibhā* as the  
*purā Āgama.* Supreme Form of the Ultimate Reality (परा सा  
 प्रतिभा देव्याः परं रूपं ममोत्तमम्)<sup>23</sup> and says that it is on this, as on  
 a Mirror, that the Universe is shining like a reflection. It  
 appears to the ignorant as the objective world and to the

22 या चेषा प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमस्थिता ।

अकालानन्तविद्मः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ॥

23 *Tripurārahasya*, Jñāna Khaṇḍa, ch. XX, Verse 36.

yogin it reveals itself in the form of the eternal and indeterminate consciousness of the pure self. The Lover turns to it as to his Beloved and finds the inmost cravings of his heart satisfied.<sup>25</sup>

§ 5.

#### VEDĀNTA.

The word *Pratibhā* seldom occurs in Vedāntic literature, but the doctrine was certainly recognised. In the *Pratibhā* in 9th anuvāka of his *Vārtika* on the *Taittirīya* *Vedānta*. *Upaniṣad* (the only instance in which the term *pratibhā* is found in *Vedānta*), *Sureśvara* mentions it by name (*प्रातिभज्ञान*) and calls it *ārṣa*, thereby implying that this knowledge, by nature transcendent, is the characteristic of *ṛṣis* or seers;<sup>26</sup> and it is further stated there that it comes into manifestation only to that seeking Soul who, by means of constant repetition of mantra and of prolonged meditation, is able to throw off the veil of *Māyā* and enter into conscious communion with the Supreme Being.<sup>27</sup> By way of illustration it is pointed out that such an Intuition dawned upon *Trīṣaṅku* (*त्रिशङ्कोर्ब्रह्मभूतस्य ह्यार्षं संदर्शनं परम्*) to whom the mantra, viz. *अहं ब्रह्मस्य रेखा* (*Tait. Āraṇ., 7-10-1, p. 732 of the Bib. Ind. Edition*) was revealed. And in consequence of this manifestation of *Pratibhā* *Trīṣaṅku* was converted into a *ṛṣi*.

A proper understanding of this conversion is not possible without consideration of the general theory of Divine Omniscience in this system. It is asserted that human omniscience is accidental, being the result of a *rapport* with the Divine substance which is all knowing and all powerful. But what is the nature of this Divine Wisdom?

25 Ibid, ch. XX. 31—36.

26 *Acyutarāya Modaka*, in his commentary on the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (P. 52), explains the word *ārṣa* as meaning 'proceeding from Veda which is self-illuminated (*स्वयंप्रभात वेद*).' This meaning is derived from the equation *ṛṣi*=*Veda*.

27 cf. also *मुमुक्षोस्तत्त्वस्यैव श्रुतस्मार्तसु कर्मसु ।*

*आर्षं च प्रातिभं ज्ञानमाविर्भवति मोक्षदम् ॥* (*Vārtika, Verse 160, anuvāka IX*).

Here we are confronted with a wide divergence of views among scholars. Even in the system of Śaṅkara there is hardly any unanimity; and the exponents, of orthodox Vedānta who are presumed to represent Śaṅkara are very largely divided in their opinions. Thus in the Siddhāntaleśa Appayadiksita quotes no less than *five* different theories on the question of Divine Omniscience, viz. the theories associated with the names of the authors of Prakāśārtha, Tattva Śuddhi and Kaumudī and of Bhāratī-tīrtha and Vācaspati Miśra.

Among these the view of Tattva Śuddhi is opposed to the traditional teaching of all the mystics and may be dismissed as untenable. The Divine knowledge being everywhere recognised as immediate, the author of Tattva Śuddhi stands by himself when he asserts it to be of the nature of Memory in the case of the Past and of Ūha (as it is named in the Vedāntasiddhāntasūkti-mañjarī) in that of the Future. He fails to see that the knowledge of a Being which is *ex hypothesi* eternal<sup>28</sup> and omnipresent can hardly be characterised as anything but immediate. But the view of Prakāśārthavivaraṇa is more plausible in this respect. It states that God's immediate knowledge of the multiple phenomena of all times is explicable through the reflection of Pure consciousness received into the infinite modifications of Māyā. This Māyā, like the inner organ of Jīva, is the limiting condition of Īśvara; in other words it is through association with Māyā that Īśvara, himself identical with consciousness (ज्ञानात्मक), is capable of becoming the subject of consciousness (ज्ञाता). This view is all right, so far as immediacy is concerned. But it loses sight of the fact, as pointed out by the author of Vedānta Kaumudī, that God's omniscience is *not* a case of relative and adventitious consciousness which ceases

28 It is curious to find that even in scholastic Vedānta the eternity of Divine omniscience is sometimes impugned. Advaitānanda, for instance, in the Brahmavidyābhāraṇa (p. 148) explicitly affirms that during pralaya there is a total lapse of such omniscience, apparently for the reason that it is only a mode and therefore a product which is by nature occasional. But how are we to understand Śaṅkar's own line: यत्प्रसादाद्भि योगिनामप्यतीतानागतविषयं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमिच्छन्ति योगशास्त्रविदः किमु वक्तव्यं तस्य नित्यसिद्ध-स्थैर्यस्य सृष्टिस्थितिसंहतिविषयं नित्यज्ञानं भवतीति (under Ved. Sū. I. 1. 5)? If the 'नित्यज्ञान' be taken as स्वरूपज्ञान why should it be characterized as सविषयक? It is only a Vṛtti which can be सविषयक.

during pralaya. It is rather due to His Essence which is consciousness itself. He knows all, because, says the author of Kaumudī, He illumines all in relation with Himself. But does this All embrace the Past and the Future? To this it is replied that it does. The Past and the Future exist in Avidyā in the form of bare, immaterial saṃskāras and are knowable. This reply of the Kaumudī would remind one of the theory of satkārya of the Sāṅkhya Yoga school and especially of the sūtra by Patañjali, IV. 12. But in its general setting it seems to be somewhat of a graft upon the system. And one great defect from which this theory suffers is that it interprets omniscience as impersonal (सर्वज्ञत्वं = सर्वज्ञानात्मकत्वं) -- an interpretation, however plausible, is not supported by the tradition of Śāṅkara Vedānta. Vācaspati is right therefore when he says that omniscience must be personal and explains that even Absolute consciousness may be personal, when thought of under relation of causality. The theory of Bhāratīrtha, on the other hand, seeks to explain the omniscience of God on the assumption of His being the witness of the infinite Vāsanās of Jīvas as inhering in and modifying the Primitive Nescience (अज्ञान).

All these views are centred on the fundamental thesis of Śāṅkara's own View Śāṅkarācārya, viz. that omniscience, omnipotence, &c are not *really* predicable of the Supreme Being. It is after and through the operation of cosmic Nescience that these are attributed to Him. Since His Essence is knowledge itself, it is only by a metaphor that He may be called all-knowing. Omniscience and omnipotence are therefore pseudo-real concepts and not real. Śāṅkara plainly says: तदेवमपि त्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदोपेक्षेवेश्वरस्थैश्वर्यत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च, न परमार्थतो नित्यः ।ऽपाम्स्तसर्गोपाधिस्वरूप आत्मनः शिर्व शिवव्यवज्ञं वादिभ्यवहार उपपद्यते (under Ved., Sūtra 2. 1. 14). This is the central teaching of Śāṅkarācārya, viz., the denial of the reality of Śakti (Power) and with it of Personality and self-consciousness in the Absolute. The Saguna Brahman, of course, is admitted to be personal, and consequently omniscience and omnipotence belong to Him, but then it must be remembered that the Reality, in the highest sense of the word (परमार्थः), of the Saguna aspect is not conceded. In the system of Śāṅkara there appears to be an impassable chasm between the two aspects of Brahman. But in regard to the question whether human omniscience, viz. that of the Yogins, has its origin in the Divine omniscience Śāṅkara emphatically

answers in the affirmative (cf. यत्प्रसादाद्धि योनिनामप्यतीतानागतविषयं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमिच्छन्ति<sup>29</sup> &c. under Ved. Sūt. 1. 1. 5).

Śrīkantha and the subsequent host of commentators on Vedānta have not felt any such difficulty in interpreting the doctrine of divine (and human) omniscience. Their position is more clear on this point. They admit the existence of a *real* Śakti in Brahma and affirm that knowledge is as much the Essence (स्वरूप) of Brahma as its Power or Predicate (शक्ति, धर्म). Śrīkantha observes that the omniscience of Brahma consists in its eternal, immediate and fault-less awareness of everything independently of external sense organs<sup>30</sup> and notes that this is possible by virtue of the Supreme Jñāna Śakti, called Umā or Cidambara, associated with It. It is to this Jñānaśakti that the word *manas*, as used in the expression मन अनन्दं (an epithet of Brahma) is said to refer, so that it means the Faculty by which God as well as the liberated souls eternally enjoy the infinite (अनन्त) Joy of their Beatified Nature स्वरूपानन्दानुभव एव, and which is indeed no other than Sabda Brahma or prapñava.<sup>31</sup> From this it is obvious that in the opinion of Śrīkantha the divine omniscience is synonymous with the Eternal Self-illumination and Self-revelation of the Supreme Being, for the All (सर्वं, निखिलवस्तु) which such omniscience is stated to comprehend and illuminate is not external to, but forms an integral aspect of, this Being.

The theory of Rāmānuja and of his immediate predecessors in the field is not substantially very different from the above.<sup>32</sup> He employs the term Puruṣottama as a special name of Brahma, thereby implying personality and will in Him. He describes Brahma as the all-knowing subject whose Essence is Intelligence and whose Eternal Power of knowledge, known as Lakshmi, is intimately related to Him. This Power (शक्ति) or Attribute (धर्म)

29 This passage shows plainly that according to Śāṅkhya the Knowledge of God, like of that of the Yojin, is *immediate*, प्रत्यक्ष. The theory of Tattvaśūdrah therefore is not only erroneous, but positively opposed to the teaching of Śāṅkhya.

30 निष्ठापराधानभेदितावायव्यरूपनिष्कलङ्कानुभवनिश्चलवस्तुत्वमिदं सर्वज्ञधर्म (under Ved. Sūtr. 1. 1. 2)

31 Śrīkantha, in the plainest language, asserts the identity of Umā or the Supreme Power of Divine Knowledge with the mystic Omkāra : एणवयोवे-पोमात्रेण परब्रह्मरूपा पराशक्तिरुच्यते (Ved. Sūt. 4.4.22).

32 Cf. ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव तस्य ज्ञानाश्रयत्वं मण्डियमणिर्वादिवादिच युक्तमेव (p. 53 of Śrībhāṣya, Śrīraṅgam Edition).



of God is some times spoken of as His Mind by which everything is always revealed to Him immediately (धर्मभूतज्ञानेन सर्वं नदा साक्षात्कुर्वत ईश्वरस्य, etc.)<sup>33</sup> and some times as His Consort.

Like Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja all the subsequent commentators posit an Eternal real Śakti in the  
iii. Others. Supreme Being and explain the facts of omniscience and omnipotence by means of this Śakti.

## § 6.

## MĪMĀṂSĀ (PŪRVA).

From the foregoing summary of the orthodox views on Intuition and omniscience (human and divine) as well as from the Buddhist and Jain accounts of the same to which we shall advert in the following pages, it would seem that the doctrine of Prati-bhā, in some form or other, has ever been an article of universal acceptance in this country. It is an anomaly therefore that we find the Mīmāṃsakas alone maintaining an attitude of bitter opposition to this doctrine. They deny the possibility of omniscience of any kind, either eternal as of God or what is due to contemplation as in the case of the Yogins.<sup>34</sup> The arguments adduced by them in support of their denial<sup>35</sup> seem to be no more than

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33 Varavara's commentary on Tattvatraya, p. 44. This is Śuddha pure, Sattva and is to be distinguished for the natural sattva, which, even in its purest condition, is bound to have an admixture, however slight, of the two lower qualities. The Pure Sattva constitutes the Divine Mind just as the mixed Sattva forms the lower mind, with this difference that it is, unlike the latter, eternal and infinite. It is this which under God's will evolves into an infinite variety of forms.

34 See Ślokavārtika, pp. 79-82.

35 For Jayanta's refutation of some of these arguments, see Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 103-106. Kumārila is very hard upon those mystics who hold that in the gradual exaltation of consciousness there comes a moment when the restriction of senses to their corresponding objects (विषयनियम) is no longer applicable. He plainly denies, not only the power of a sense organ to apprehend an object which is not relevant to it (न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता), but even the possibility of there being a central faculty capable of cognising all objects (यकेन तु यमाणेन सर्वज्ञः &c., Ślokavārtika, p. 80). This is nothing but the common sense view. But it is not tenable for the mystic consciousness. Cf. the Śruti: ब्रह्मतः शब्दं शृण्वन्ति पृष्ठतो रूपाणि पश्यन्ति. With this Vedic passage may be compared the statement of Saint Martin: "I heard flowers that sounded and saw notes that shone". In regard to Kumārila's objection to the assumption of a central faculty one is reminded of Edward Carpenter's own experience of the mystic consciousness in which, as he says, "all the senses unite into one sense" (See Underhill's "Mysticism", p. 8).

the stale stock-in-trade arguments with which the common empirical sense of man seeks to overthrow the dictates of the Higher Mystic consciousness. There must be some deeper reason for the denial. The philosophical position of Mīmāṃsā in relation to the other systems must be determined in order to see if we can discover some rationale of this denial. It is evident that the doctrine of omniscience does not somehow fit in with the fundamental assumptions with which the system as a whole starts. But how?

It seems to me that the conception of Śabda or Veda as eternal and impersonal lies at the bottom of the Mīmāṃsakas' whole tenor of thought. From this may be deduced as corollaries many of the views which the system sets forth. The unbroken continuity of world-cycles, the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge, the theory of its causality &c.,—all these will be found, when closely analysed, to follow from this central conception. The rejection of omniscience may also have something to do with this very fact. According to Mīmāṃsā, it would appear, omniscience is not compatible with Personality which is held to be a limitation. The very fact of being a subject involves the inevitable relativity of consciousness, fatal to omniscience; and moreover, when Veda is already assumed to be the eternal source of all knowledge, impersonal and self-revealed, it would be superfluous to posit a Personal All-knowing Being, either human or divine (cf. आगमस्य न नित्यत्वे सिद्धे तत्कल्पना व्युत्पत्तिः, *Śloka-vārtika*, p. 82).

But what are we to understand by the first benedictory verse of *Śloka-vārtika*, where Kumārila speaks of the Supreme Being under the name of Mahādeva and describes Him as furnished with the Divine Eye (दिव्यचक्षुः) in the form of the three Vedas? The meaning of the verse is obvious, and even Pārthasārathī who suggested an explanation in consonance with the Mīmāṃsā position could not deny that it really referred to Mahādeva (विश्वेश्वरं महादेवं) and therefore to personal God. The identification of Divyacakṣus with Veda is quite in keeping with the mystical explanation of Veda which is in its essence equivalent to Pranava and therefore to Pratibhā which is the Divine Eye in the highest sense of the word. The Śloka therefore, as coming from an orthodox Mīmāṃsaka teacher, remains unintelligible.

## BUDDHISM.

In the Buddhist philosophical literature, so far as I am aware, the term *prajñā* is not generally found. But the word *prajñā* is most frequent, and it occurs there with many of the associations which attach to the word in Patañjali's system.

It is asserted that the Ultimate Truth (परमार्थसत्य), the realisation of which is an essential condition for freedom from pain, is not amenable to any of the human sources of knowledge—to the senses or even to Reason; but it reveals itself in the Light of Supreme Wisdom which arises from Contemplation and Quietude (समधि, शमथ). Contemplation is declared to be the only means for gaining *Prajñā*, i.e. knowledge of things as they are in themselves as distinguished from what they appear to us.<sup>36</sup> Though the world (लोक) has little concern with such knowledge, it is considered to be the only way to Deliverance. As in Yoga, so in Buddhism, *Prajñā* is supposed to consist of a series of successive stages, in the last of which it becomes absolutely spotless and calm.

This *Prajñā* is sometimes conceived as an Eye (प्रज्ञाचक्षुः), which is said to develop itself when the mind is purified by *samādhi*.<sup>37</sup> In the technical phraseology of the Buddhist Literature the term प्रज्ञाचक्षुः does not seem to represent *ज्ञान* in its entirety, but only in one of its aspects, and in this way the different stages of *प्रज्ञा* are found represented by corresponding Supernatural Eyes, viz., (i) *dharma-cakṣus*, (ii) *divya-cakṣus*, (iii) *prajñā-cakṣus* and (iv) *Buddha-cakṣus*.<sup>38</sup>

36 “ दशवर्धितप्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नवस्तुतत्त्वपरिचयलक्षणा प्रज्ञा ”—*Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañcikā*, p. 348.

37 “ शमथपरिशोधितचित्तसन्ताने प्रज्ञायाः प्रादुर्भावात् सुप्रशोधितक्षेत्रे शस्यनिष्पत्तिवत् ” loc. cit.; cf. the Yoga view which is similar (Yo. Sū. I. 20).

38 In the list of the five eyes as given by Childers (S. V. Pañcaccakṣu) we read *samantā cakṣu* in stead of *dhamma*, but the name *dhammacakṣu* is sometimes retained. It is there described as the power of knowing general things possessed by the Buddha. In the *Nyāyabhināṣa*, p. 80, Pārthasarathi Miśra refers to the view according to which *divya-cakṣus* is the Faculty of Buddha's omniscience बुद्धस्यैवं दिव्यचक्षुर्जगति सर्वविषयं भविष्यति).

\* In Pāli Literature the word dhammacakkhu (Spiritual Insight), also known as Vipassanā, is used for the dawning of the spiritual sense in man on conversion. When this is fully developed the convert is established in the fruit of 'sotāpatti' and the first stage comes to an end. This eye is characterised as a faculty of true knowledge, undisturbed by *rajas* (विरजं) and free from obscurity (वीतमलं). How this faculty is to be distinguished from the so-called divine eye—divvacakkhu—does not seem to be quite clear (cf. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, p. 95, foot note). That both are supernatural is of course plain. But it is sometimes asserted that divvacakkhu is able to see *visible* objects only, though such objects may not be ordinarily within the scope of our faculty of vision (cf. Kathāvatthu). In the Abhidhammāvatāra also it is said that divvacakkhu has rūpa for its object<sup>39</sup> as divvasota has sound (शब्द). The fit objects for the celestial sight are held to be of four kinds, viz., things present (पञ्चुपन्न) as well as absent (परित्त), external and internal (loc. cit., p. 110 verse 1153). This eye is defined as the knowledge (and its faculty) which rises on the citta when, in the fourth stage of jhāna, it is identified with the object<sup>40</sup>.

Besides these two faculties there is the paññācakkhu (= प्रज्ञाचक्षुः) which is held in the Itivuttaka (p. 52, § 61) to be higher than the divvacakkhu.

Buddhadatta, however, divides cakkhus first into two classes, viz, māṃsa° (physical) and prajñā° (supernatural), of which the latter is fivefold  
 classification: māṃsa-cakkhu and paññācakkhu. (i) Buddha, (ii) Dhamma, (iii) Samanta, (iv)

Nāna and (v) Divva. From what he says of these powers of supernatural knowledge it seems that (i) consists in the realisation of āśayas and anu-  
 Four-fold Paññā cakkhu. śayas which are supersensible, (ii) means knowledge of the three—fold path, (iv) stands for omniscience, (iv) indicates the Eye that is evolved (after conversion?) and divvacakkhu (v) is synonymous with the Supreme Wisdom or Prajñā which arises from abhiññācitta (p. 65, Chap. X, 635-639).

39 In this sense it corresponds to the avadhi-jñāna and darśana of Jaina philosophy.

40 अल्पसाधकचित्तं तं चतुर्थज्ज्ञानिकं मतं । तं चित्तसंयुतं ज्ञानं दिव्यचक्षुर्वृत्तिं बुद्धतिं ॥ (Abhidhammāvatāra, p. 107, verse 1100). For the manner how this Eye is developed see Ibid, pp. 106-107 and Shwe Zam Aung in his Introductory Essay to the Compendium of Philosophy, p. 63.

In the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature, also, the same five-fold division is to be met with<sup>41</sup>. And in the Mahāvastu it is pointed out that in vision by the physical eye (मांस) light is needed; but in the function of the other eyes it is not necessary.<sup>42</sup> Divyacaksus is said to be better than that of the gods &c. Dharmacaksus is characterised by the development of ten psychic powers (including the purity of the Divyacaksus). But all these powers pale before the Buddha Eye which is equivalent to Absolute and Unconditional Omniscience.

There is of course much confusion in the exact significance of the terms in Buddhist Literature, for in course of time and for various reasons imports have gradually changed. But one thing is certain, viz., that we find everywhere recognised the existence of a higher faculty than the physical sense and that it is resorted to for explaining facts otherwise inexplicable. The physical sense is often erroneous and subject to various limitations; its reports are unreliable. But this higher faculty, call it Prajñācaksus or by any other name, is infallible and sees things in their true light.

Here a curious parallelism presents itself between the Buddhist philosophy and the Yoga system of Patañjali. Thus it is said that Prajñā as a means (हेतुभूत), viz., the Realisation of the Noble Eight-fold Path, leads to Prajñā which may be considered as the End (फलभूत), viz., Nirvāṇa. The former is the result of continued practice of the preliminary prajñā consisting in श्रुत, चिन्ता and भावना.<sup>43</sup> This श्रुत, चिन्ता and भावना are really nothing but the Buddhist counterparts of श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यासन of the Upaniṣadic Literature and of आगम, अनुमान and

41 See Vajracchedikā XVIII; Dharmasaṅgraha LXVI, p. 14; Lalitavistara, Mitra's tran., p. 15; Mahāvastu, Vol. I.

42 Svāmī Hariharānanda Āraṇya, in his Śivādhyāna Brahmacārī apūva bhramaṇavṛttānta, p. 80, points out that there are two ways of having supernatural vision, viz., in the solar or in the lunar light. The former is the light of suṣumṇā and the latter the manifestation of sense power. In the first case alone physical light is not needed.

43 Cf. Bodhicaryāvatārapāṇcīkā, pp. 349-350; Takakusu, It—Sing, p. 163.

व्यनान्यास of Yogabhāṣya<sup>44</sup> and the Prajñā or Realisation of the Path (मार्गज्ञान) of Buddhism corresponds to the Realisation (साक्षात्कार, दर्शन) of Vedānta and to the Yoga of the Yogasystem. So far it is clear.

Now the question is: how is omniscience compatible in The doctrine of Buddhism with its doctrine of *flux* on one omniscience in hand (Realism and Idealism) and of Void explicable in Buddhism on the other (Nihilism)? The Yoga system Buddhist Philosophy advocates the satkārya-vāda and is consequently able to explain the rationale of its Intuitive Experience on the ground that in its view all the products, however widely separated by time and space, are eternally co-existing in the Primum Materia (मूल प्रकृति). They are manifested as soon as the barriers which stand in the way of their manifestation before consciousness are withdrawn. Patañjali, in most unequivocal terms, expresses his belief that the Past and the Future are essentially Existent.<sup>45</sup> That they are not usually *seen* is due to some defect in the seer (viz. आवरण) and not to their non-existence. But in the doctrine of Universal Flux, such as that of Buddhism, in which a permanent substrate of change is not admitted, there is logically no room for the past or for the future. And as a matter of fact we find that the advocates of the orthodox Theravāda School actually reject the theories of the seceders holding (e. g. Sarvāstivādins<sup>46</sup>) that the past and the future exist and (cf. Andhakas) that the future may be known.<sup>47</sup>

Still the fact has to be explained that the Buddha, if none else, was believed to be able to make predictions and to know anything however remote in time, if only he willed so.

Thus the Milinda pañho expressly declares in an interesting passage<sup>48</sup>, that the Buddha was verily omniscient, in the sense that nothing stood in the way of his knowledge, so that whenever

44 आगमेनानुमानेन ध्यानाभ्यासरसेन च ।

त्रिधा प्रकल्पयन् प्रज्ञां लभते योगमुत्तमम् ॥ (Under Yo. Sū. I. 48.)

45 अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्यैष्वभेदाद्भूतमणाम् IV. 12.

46 cf. Kathāvatthu, 1.6.

47 For the orthodox view cf. footnote 4 of the translation of the Kathāvatthu, p. 182—(V. 8).

48 आम महाराज, भगवा सव्वञ्च न च भगवतो सतनं समितं ज्ञाणदस्सनं पच्छुपट्ठितं, आवज्जनपरिबद्ध भगवतो सव्वञ्चुत्तज्जाणं, आवज्जिवा यदिच्छकं जानातीति (Trenckner's Edition of Milindapañho, p. 102). The two kinds of omniscience as implied in this passage correspond exactly to those of the Yukta and Yujjāna Yogins as described in the Bhāṣāpariccheda, Kārikā, 66.

he wanted to know any object he used to reflect upon it (आवजित्वा) and at once the object revealed itself to his mind. It is the mysterious power of the Buddha Eye that it can penetrate into any time.<sup>49</sup> Nothing can obscure its vision. In this connection one is also reminded of the interesting description (in Āśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*, Chap. XIV) of the Divine Eye (दिव्यचक्षुः) which the Buddha is said to have gained in course of contemplation during the second watch of the memorable night on his overthrow of Māra. By that wonderful faculty of vision, he saw the entire knowable world (universe), as if reflected in a clear mirror: ततस्तेन स दिव्येन परिशुद्धेन चक्षुषा । ददर्श निखिलं लोकमादर्श इव निर्मले ॥ (Verse 8). Emphasis is here upon the word निखिलं which implies freedom from all limitations, temporal as well as spatial, and indicates that the vision was simultaneous.

It is really a difficulty which Buddhism (at least its earlier schools) does not seem to have successfully solved. All attempted solutions are but make-shifts and show no way out of the contradictions involved.

## § 8

## JAINISM.

In the Jain philosophy, however, no such difficulty arises.

Omniscience explained by an appeal to the nature of Jīva and to the existence of the Past and the Future.

Here the fact of omniscience, including the lower faculties of bare clairvoyance, thought reading, &c., claimed for the Lord who possesses it eternally and for the Jīvas who gain it after a striving, lends itself to an easy explanation. For it is admitted that the Jīva is eternal, that the universe as such is eternal (though subject to change) and that the Jīva's knowledge of this universe is also eternal. Even the past and the future objects of knowledge are *existent*. (अतीतानागतानामर्थानां वर्तमानकालसंबन्धितयाऽभावेऽपि अतीता-

49 Knowledge of the past and the future is among the 18 things accruing to a sādhaṅga, according to Mahāvāṇsa, when the Buddha eye is opened for him. Even lower down, dhammacakkhu and divvacakkhu are capable of such vision into the past or into the future. The fact of Buddha's जातिस्मरता / memory of ante natal births), so frequently described in the Piṭakas and considered as one of the 8 fruits of dhyāna or of the 10 powers arising from the development of dhammacakkhu or as one of the 5 (or 6) abhijñāṣa, lends support to the supposition that the veil of Time did not exist for Buddha.

नागतकालसंबन्धितया भावात् ।<sup>50</sup> Absence of the object from the senses is not a barrier to its being known supernormally; it is the limitation of senses alone that they cannot cognise things not present to them, but in the case of higher perception or intuition, which is not sense-born, the assumption of such limitation is not justified by experience. At any rate it is admitted that whether present or absent, every object has an existence of its own.

This Intuitive experience is said to be two-fold : (i) relative and imperfect ( विकल ), and (ii) absolute and perfect ( सकल ). In the first case the Intuition is known as अवधिज्ञान ( or अवधिदर्शन ) when its object is a physical substance ( रूपि or सूक्ष्मद्रव्य )<sup>51</sup> and as मनःपर्याय when it discerns the thoughts of another mind, and in the second case it is exalted into the supreme level and is called केवलज्ञान ( or केवलदर्शन ) which is a characteristic of the Arhat. Leaving aside thought-reading for the present, we may observe that both अवधिज्ञान ( ओहिनाण in Prakrit ) and केवलज्ञान are free from the obstructions of time and space, but with this difference that whereas the former is able to cognise only the physical, the latter is directed to both the physical and the super—physical ( निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारिस्वरूप ) and is simultaneous ( मूर्तावृत्तसमस्तवस्तुगतसत्तासामान्यं + + + + सकलप्रत्यक्षरूपेणैकसमये पश्यति ).<sup>52</sup> It need hardly be added that this Kevalajñāna and Darśana are the synonyms of Pratibhā, Prajñā &c. of the other systems.

According to Jain philosophy Omniscience or the possession of the Faculty of Absolute Knowledge and Supreme Vision is an eternal property ( being also the Essence ) of the soul, which it has apparently lost or allowed to be obscured under the influence of a beginningless series of karmas, hence known as a veil of knowledge and vision ( ज्ञानावर-

50 Bhaṭṭa Ananta Kīrti, Laghusarvajñāsiddhi, p. 127.

51 Devasūri, in Pramāṇanayatatvālokālaṅkāra 2-21, says that avadhijñāna is natural to gods and hell-beings ( भवप्रत्यय ), but may be acquired by men and beasts ( गुणप्रत्यय ).

52 It may be noted that avadhijñāna may sometimes be falsified ( विभङ्गावधि ) and is always relative, but avadhidarśana, though equally relative, is ever truthful. It is Kevalajñāna and Kevaladarśana alone which are in every sense Absolute and Perfect, the distinction between jñāna and darśana is emphasised in both the Buddhist and Jain philosophical literature, and it seems that the former corresponds to सविकल्पक and the latter to the निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान of the orthodox systems.



णीय and दर्शनावरणीय).<sup>53</sup> By means of spiritual culture this veil may be withdrawn, and in proportion to its withdrawal the soul will regain its lost knowledge until at last, when all the *Karmas* are destroyed, it will become once more omniscient (and omnipotent), being established in its Pure and Eternal Essence.

But what is the nature of this culture which helps in lifting up the veil? To this no definite reply can be given. Different systems of course prescribe different methods, but all agree in asserting the paramount importance of Yoga and certain physical austerities. It is said that by these yogic practices a tremendous amount of energy, called तेजोलेझ्या: (akin to electricity or magnetism) is generated in the body.<sup>54</sup> This is of the nature of a fiery force which, when sufficiently purified by continued practice, burns up the cobwebs of the veiling karmas. In the Uvāsagadasāo, for instance, it is narrated that with the gradual purification and intensification of his personal magnetism by penances the आवरणकर्म were removed and clairvoyant sight dawned upon Ānanda.<sup>55</sup> This आवरणकर्म which conceals Reality is referred to in the the Yogasūtra (II 52) under the name of प्रकाशावरण, and we can understand that the dawning of the Intuitive Sense is consequent upon the clearing up of these veiling mists. Carried to its utmost extent, this process of purification naturally ends in the establishment of the power of all knowledge.

## § 9

## ITIHĀSA, PURĀṆA AND PROSE LITERATURE.

In the Mahābhārata the word pratibhā occurs several times; and the context shows that it conveyed the same sense in which we find it used in the yoga system of Patañjali. Thus in Śāntiparva (chap. 316.14)<sup>56</sup> it is contrasted with Apavarga, thereby implying that it was conceived as an impediment in the way of Final Release (cf. Yoga Sūtra 3.37). Elsewhere (ch.

53 See Brāhmadeva's commentary on Dravyasaṅgraha, p. 6.

54 Cf. Hoernle's translation of Uvāsaga°, p. 50, note 140.

55 आणन्दस्स × × × लेसाहिं विमुज्जमनिहिं तदावरणिज्जाणं कम्मणं सओवसमेण ओहिनाणे ससु पणे (Hoernle's Edition, p. 33.)

56 Bangabasi Edition (p. 1768). Nīlakaṇṭha's interpretation of the term by विक्षेप does not seem to be quite happy.

239. 24)<sup>57</sup> it is expressly enjoined that it is not an acquisition worth coveting, evidently in view of the possible distractions which it may occasion, so that as soon as this power of all-knowledge begins to manifest itself it has to be checked. But

**Pratibhā in Ma-** in some places we seem to hit upon passages  
**hābhārata: two** which tend to show that a slightly different  
**views.** view of pratibhā was also prevalent. For what  
can be the true meaning of that remarkable  
passage which teaches that pratibhā arises only when the guṇas  
have been surpassed?<sup>58</sup>

In the Sivapurāṇa<sup>59</sup> the term pratibhā is explained as to be the  
In Sivapurāṇa. faultless illumination of things subtle, hidden,  
remote, past and future. It is said to be one of  
the supernatural obstacles ( दिव्या उपमर्गाः ) in the path of Realisa-  
tion, but though an obstacle it is nevertheless supposed to be an  
indication of the proximity of this Realisation (सिद्धिमुचक) itself.

In the Kādambārī<sup>60</sup> we find the word Divyacakṣus, instead  
of Pratibhā, in use. The Sage Jābāli is des-  
In Kādambārī: cribed there as possessed of this faculty by  
description of the 'Divine Eye'. which he was able to see the entire universe  
(even the past and the future) as if verily present  
before his eyes. He acquired this power of omniscience through  
the gradual removal of impurities from his mind by means of  
constantly practised penances.

The 11th chapter of the Gītā contains the classical example  
of the working of this faculty. On the eve of  
'Divine Eye' in that memorable event, the battle of Kuruksetra,  
the Gītā. which was to decide the fortunes of India for  
milleniums to come, Lord Kṛṣṇa graciously awakened this  
Faculty in Arjuna ( दिव्यं ददामि ते चक्षुः पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम्, verse 8) for  
a short time and thus enabled him to have a glimpse of the  
Supreme Vision. Arjuna is said to have seen in Kṛṣṇa's body  
the whole universe with all its past and future states. It was

· 57 Ibid (p. 1640). In this passage Nilakanṭha explains the word as  
intuitive knowledge of the contents of all śāstras (सकलशास्त्रभानम्). Hopkins  
renders it by 'faultless illumination.'

58 See Hopkins's, "The Great Epic of India", p. 181; 'Yoga technique  
in the Great Epic' in J. A. O. S., Vol. XXII p. 355.

59 Vāyaviya Saṃhita, Chap. 29-78 (Bangabasi Edition, p. 964).

60 See (a) अनवरततपःक्षपितमलानां करतलामलकवदमिलं जगदालोक्यतां दिव्येन चक्षुषा  
भगवतां × × × (Parab's Edition of 1908, pp. 86-7).

(b) स (i. e. Jābāli) हि भगवान् कालत्रयदर्शी तपःप्रभावाद् दिव्येन चक्षुषा

the vision of Many in One (तत्रैकस्थं जगत् कृत्स्नं प्रविभक्तमनेकधा, verse 13) and in this way resembled a similar vision vouchsafed to the Buddha during the period of his contemplation on the bank of the Nairāñjanā—a fact to which we have already referred.

सर्वमेव करतलगतामिव जगदालोकयति । वेत्ति जन्मान्तराण्यतीतानि । कथयत्यागाामिनमप्यर्थम् , &c. (Ibid, p. 92 ).

### C.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF PRATIBHĀ:—

#### RESUMÉ AND RETROSPECT.

We have seen in the preceding pages that the development of the faculty of omniscience cannot be effected unless the mind is purified and freed from the obscuring influence of the dispositions clinging to it from time immemorial. What is known as the 'divine eye' is really the Mind in its purified condition, as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII. 12. 5.) expressly declares: मनोऽस्य देवं चक्षुः । And the Vājasaneyā Samhitā of the white Yajus (in the Sivasāṅkalpa mantra) also makes a similar statement, referring to the marvellous powers possessed by a purified mind. It is apparent therefore that every man, in so far as he is gifted with a mind, is gifted with the possibility of omniscience. As soon as the impurities are removed from it every thing is revealed to it, however distant in time or in space; and even supersensuous objects are rendered accessible to it. This is the process of Yoga by which *tamas* is eliminated by the active *rajas* from *sattva* (=mind, *citta*) which consequently becomes pure, steady and luminous. This is *citta śuddhi* (or *sattva śuddhi*) which is invariably followed by the rise of *Prajñā*.

But how are the impurities to be cleared away? The whole question turns upon the practical issues of mystic culture and we can do no more than briefly touch upon the matter in this place. It is intimately connected with what is technically known as the "rousing of the Kuṇḍalinī or the Serpentine Power" in man. This power represents the combined Jñāna Śakti and Kriyā Śakti of God and exists in a latent form in every individual man. In the ordinary state it is said to be lying asleep and has its centre, according to the usual opinion, at the base of the spinal column. The awakening of Kuṇḍalinī is the actualisation of this Infinite Latent Power. It is described as a very arduous process and is supposed to be practically impossible

without help from outside. This help comes from the guru, a spiritually awake Person, in the form of an influx of spiritual energy from him. And it is held that this "infusion of energy," usually called कृपा (grace) or शक्तिरात in Tantrik Literature, acts as a dynamic and releases, more or less quickly (according to the spiritual constitution of the subject), the infinite possibilities of the soul by burning up its veiling karinas. This is the process of purification and concentration of mind (चित्तशुद्धिः), known as 'purging of the soul' in mystical literature. As soon as the process comes to an end the Light of Prajñā (प्रज्ञाज्योतिः) or Pratiḥhā begins to shine forth in the manner of a Luminous Eye in the middle of the forehead, just between the two eye brows, and the man is then said to be converted or regenerated into a god-man. This is the so-called 'Divine Eye' (दिव्यचक्षुः) or the third eye of Śiva, otherwise known as the Eye of wisdom (प्रज्ञाचक्षुः) or the Eye of Rṣi (आर्षचक्षुः). Since this eye is opened by the grace of guru (चक्षुर्गुणोत्थितं येन, etc. in gurustava), the latter is usually called the 'giver of the Eye'. The Eye itself is sometimes spoken of as the guru.

The centre of this Faculty of vision is thus found to be the middle of the two eyebrows, above the root of the nose, where the so-called आज्ञाचक्र (the 6th member of the sixfold group of psychic centres within the Sesaumṇā) is located. And this squares with the fact that this is also the seat of the mind.

Concurrently with the opening of this vision to the Yogin he begins to hear the Eternal and Unbroken Sound of Nāda (i.e. Oṃkāra), the sweet and all-obliterating Divine Harmony. Like the sweeping current of a rushing flood this Might-Sound carries every thing before it and drowns all in its music, until at last it ceases itself to be heard and there is Absolute Silence of the Nirvikalpa Samādhi.

When this Light and Sound are fully realised, as being plunging into the Absolute, the Yogin is, as being ramārtha ed into the highest plane of cosmic l siddhas, ṛṣis and gods are seen and the collection of (which are all aspects of the "daivī vāk" or आर्ष of his 70th heard. There exists nothing between him and the universe. And indeed his whole life is then oncries, 1918, p. 70, Brahnavihāra,

Being himself saved, he now becomes, if he so desires it, the saviour of humanity; and he may also participate in the government of the world. Or else he may live in eternal and blissful communion with the Lord, forgetful of all besides Him. He may even merge forever (or for a definite time) his self-identity in the Absolute and obtain the Peace of Nirvāṇa. There are infinite possibilities of the Trans-natural Life, and no two souls need be exactly alike in their Destiny, though all may be said to have reached *in one sense* the same Beatific Goal. So long as he is in earthly life, either before the falling off of the body or on the voluntary resumption of such life subsequent to his physical death, the virtues of Love and Faith are exemplified in him in their noblest aspects. He is the Ideal of Perfect Humanity which is Divinity itself in a concrete shape, and is the source of light and life and joy to the world deep in darkness and sorrow. It is from him that the 'Scriptures' proceed and the world receives guidance and inspiration.

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# MĀTHARA-VRṬTI.

BY

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In a paper I contributed to the R. G. Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume in 1917, I announced the discovery of a new commentary on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikās by Māthara, and identified it with the lost Sanskrit original of the Chinese translation of Paramārtha (cir. 550 A. D.). As this identification has been recently called into question† I propose to go into the problem in detail. I intend in what follows to adduce evidence to prove that (i) there are large portions of text, present in Paramārtha but absent in Gaudapāda, which are to be found, practically word for word, in the Māthara-vṛtti; that (ii) between Māthara and Gaudapāda there is such an amount of agreement in thought and expression that one of them—most probably Gaudapāda—must have known and used the other; that (iii) Paramārtha has not been a literal and faithful translator: he has often omitted and amplified with a view to make his work intelligible to his Buddhist readers of China; that (iv) the variations in the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean versions of the commentary imply, if not divergent Sanskrit originals, at least conscious changes made by the authors of these versions for a similar purpose; that (v) the text-tradition of the Māthara-vṛtti itself has been most defective, having suffered inflation on account of the incorporation of a large mass of students' marginalia and contamination in the process of comparison with the text of the Gaudapāda; and that (vi) taking all the circumstances into consideration, the safest conclusion would be to regard the Māthara-vṛtti—divested of all accidental accretions—as being the original Sanskrit of the commentary which Paramārtha

\* This paper was originally written to form part of the collection of essays presented to Professor A. Hillebrandt on the occasion of his 70th birthday on March 15, 1923.

† See Keith, *Sāṅkhya System*, "Heritage of India" Series, 1918, p. 70, Note.

translated into Chinese, modifying it here and there at discretion. To assume a common original for Māthara and Gauḍapāda on the one hand and for this original and Paramārtha on the other would be a purposeless and unwarranted multiplication of categories. I shall now take up these points one after another.

(i) Māthara agrees with Paramārtha where Gauḍapāda is silent.

Paramārtha  
(BEFEO, iv, pp. 978-1064).

Māthara  
MS. No. 107 of 1871-72.

Page 979, Kārikā 1.

Songeant ainsi, il regarda par le monde et découvrit Āsuri, brahmane d'origine, qui sacrifiait régulièrement au ciel depuis mille ans. Se dissimulant, il s'approcha du brahmane et lui adressa ces paroles: "Ô Āsuri, tu t'amuses à mener la vie d'un maître de maison!" Ayant dit, il se retira sans recevoir de réponse. Après mille autres années, il revint et répéta les mêmes mots. En les entendant, le brahmane répondit: "Ô honoré du monde, en effet je jouis de la vie de maître de maison". L'ermite l'écouta, mais s'en retourna en silence. Quelque temps après, il revint, répétant les mêmes mots et reçut la même réponse. Kapila demanda: "Peux-tu te maintenir pur et vivre la vie d'un brahmacārin?"—"Je le puis", répondit Āsuri. Là-dessus il renonça à l'habitude de sa famille et commença les observances ascétiques comme disciple de Kapila.

Folio 2, b.

Sa evaṁ vicintayann Āsuri-sagotram brāhmaṇaviśeṣaṁ varṣasahasrayājīnam adhikāriṇam avagatya brahmopadeśavi-dyayā 'ntarhito bhūtvā vācam ityuvāca—Bho bho Āsure, ramase gr̥hasthadharmēti? Sa tam uvāca—Rame bho iti. Sa evam ukto Munir īśadanīṣpannavivekavairāgyo 'yam iti vya-vasya nirgamyā bhūyo 'pi dvitīye varṣasahasre pūrṇe pratyāgatya tathaivābhyuvāca—Bho bho Āsure, ramase gr̥hasthadharmēti? Sa tam uvāca—Rame bho iti. Athāsau mahāyogīndras tathaiva nirgamyā tṛtīye varṣasahasre sampūrṇe 'bhyetyovāca—Bho bho Āsure, ramase gr̥hasthadharmēti? Sa tam uvāca—Na rame bho iti. Atha sa Bhagavatoktaḥ—Katham iti kṛtvā? Punar āhāsuriḥ—"Duḥkhatrayābhīghātāt". Athāha Kapilaḥ, Tāta, utsahase brahmācaryavāsaṁ vastum yadi tadā-miśaṁ duḥkhatrayāṇāṁ pratīkāraṁ vāyam upadekṣyāmaḥ. So 'bravīt—Bhagavan, bādhaṁ

Paramārtha.  
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Page 988, Kārikā 7.

En dehors d'eux il y a encore quatre objets qui (maintenant) n'existent pas et qui pour cette raison ne peuvent pas être vus : 1) Invisibilité d'un objet avant sa production : ainsi, voyant un morceau de terre, on ne peut pas voir l'ustensile qui en sera fait. 2) Invisibilité parce que l'objet a été détruit : ainsi, quand une cruché a été cassée, on ne sait plus rien de sa forme. 3) Invisibilité à cause d'exclusion mutuelle : ainsi, dans un cheval on ne peut pas reconnaître une vache, et *vice versa*. 4) Invisibilité à cause d'absence absolue : par exemple la seconde tête ou le troisième bras de quelqu'un qui n'est pas Īśvara. Ces douze sortes d'existences ou de non-existences sont invisibles.\*

Page 989, Kārikā 9.

Quelqu'un pourra demander :  
"Si les disciples doivent suivre

Folio 14, b.

śakto 'ham Bhagavatām ādeśam  
anugantum iti. Sa evaṃ grha-  
sthadharmam apahāya putra-  
jārādikaṃ ca pravrajito Bhaga-  
vataḥ kila Kapilācāryasya yogi-  
naḥ prāpādyah śiṣyo babhūva.

Idāṃ asatām cāturvidho  
bhavati. Tatrocyate. Prākpra-  
dhvaṃsetaretarātyantābhāvān :  
"mahadādi tadapi kāyam pra-  
kṛtisarūpam virūpam ca." Tatra  
nṛtpiṇḍe ghaṭaḥ prāgutpatter  
nopalabhyata iti Prāgabhāvaḥ.  
Pradhvaṃsābhāvo yathā mud-  
garābhighātāt pradhvastō ghaṭo  
nopalabhyate. Itaretarābhāvo  
yathā 'śve gotvaṃ gavyaśvat-  
vam. Atyantābhāvo yathā dvi-  
tiyam aṇṣvaraśiras trtiyo bā-  
huḥ śaśaviṣṇāṇādayo vā. (Evaṃ  
iyam dvādaśadhā) hyanupalab-  
dhiḥ : satām aṣṭadhā hyasatām  
caturdhā.

Folio 15, b.

Tisthatu tāvad etat. Anyat  
prechāmaḥ. Kim etanmahadādi

\* In a note to this passage Takakusu observes that this explanation of the four non-existing objects is superfluous in this place, and that Gauḍapāda was well-advised in omitting it altogether. — But whether superfluous or not, we have the authority of the Mātharavṛtti for its authenticity.



Paramārtha  
(BEFEO, iv, pp. 978-1064).

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(une doctrine comme) leur principe, d'où vient que quelques uns affirment que les effets existent déjà dans la cause, tandis que d'autres affirment le contraire et que d'autres enfin prétendent que les effets sont ou existants ou non-existants dans la cause? Car les opinions des sages diffèrent ainsi. Il y a des sages qui affirment qu'un pot et d'autres ustensiles en terre existent déjà dans le morceau de terre glaise qui sert à les fabriquer. Les Vaiśeṣikas maintiennent que d'abord ils n'existent pas et qu'ensuite ils existent (c'est-à-dire l'effet n'est pas dans la cause). Selon (les disciples de) Śākyamuni, un pot n'est ni existant ni inexistant dans le morceau de terre glaise. Nous avons donc trois opinions et nous préférons la moyenne aux deux autres." Répondant à cela, nous réfuterons d'abord l'opinion de Śākyamuni, ensuite celle des Vaiśeṣikas. L'opinion de Śākyamuni "ni existant ni inexistant" est inadmissible, parce qu'elle est contradictoire avec elle-même. Dire inexistant, cela veut dire le néant, dire non-inexistant, c'est dire existant. Existence et non-existence ensemble font une contradiction: (c'est comme si vous disiez :) tel homme n'est ni mort ni vivant. Comme cette

prāg utpatteḥ pradhāne sa jāyate utāsat sambhavati? Atrācāryānām vipratipattir ataḥ saṁśayaḥ. Atrā Vaiśeṣikā vipratipannāḥ. Asatas sad bhavatīti manyante. Mr̥tipiṇḍe hi prāg utpatter ghaṭo nāstīti vyavasitās te. Asti-nāstīti varākā Jivakāḥ. Naivāsti na ca nāsti—eṣa Bauddhānām pakṣaḥ. Evam anyonyavirodha-vādiṣu darśanesu ko nāma niścayaḥ? Tad ucyate. Tatra tāvat sadasadvā-dino Jivakās svavacanavirodhenaiḥ nīrastāḥ. Yadi sat tadā'san na bhavati, utā'sat tadā sadabhāvaḥ, yatas sadasator ekatra virodhāt. Atrā dr̥ṣṭānto yathā Devadatto mr̥to jīvati ceti-vat. Bauddhānām tu nāsti naca nāstīti pakṣaparigrahābhāvāt taiḥ saha saṁjalpa eva na yujyate. Vaiśeṣikānām tu asatas sad bhavatīti matapratiśedhāyocyate—...(Stanza 9)...

Paramārtha  
(BEFEO, iv, pp. 978-1064)

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opinion est en contradiction avec elle-même, elle ne peut être maintenue. Ainsi en est-il de la doctrine de Sākyamuni. Maintenant nous allons réfuter la doctrine des Vaiśeṣikas.\*...

Page 1003, Kārikā 17.

Par les cinq raisons que nous venons de donner, la vérité de l'existence de l'Âme est établie. On pourra demander: "Quelle est la marque caractéristique de l'Âme? Y a-t-il une seule Âme pour tous les corps, ou chaque corps a-t-il son âme? Si vous voulez savoir pourquoi je vous pose cette question, je vous réponds que c'est parce que les opinions de plusieurs maîtres se contradisent sur ce point. Quelques-uns disent qu'une seule Âme remplit les corps de tous les êtres: ainsi dans un chapelet de perles enfilées, le fil est un, tandis que les perles sont nombreuses; ainsi, les seize mille femmes de Viṣṇu jouissent au même moment.† Il en est

Folio 29, a.

Atrāha: Gṛhṇīmas tāvad ebhiḥ pañcabhir adhitair hetubhiḥ śariravyatirikto 'sau puruṣo 'stīti. Sa kim sarvaśarīreṣv-ekāḥ puruṣaḥ āhosvit pratisarīraṁ bhinnāḥ puruṣa itī. Kutāḥ saṁśaya itī cec chodakāḥ, ācāryaviprapatteḥ saṁśayaḥ. Iha kecid ācāryā Vedavādina itī manyante: Ekoyam puruṣaḥ sarvaśarīreṣūpalabhyate maṇi-sūtravat. Iha raśanāyām yāvanto maṇayas tesu sarveṣv-ekam eva sūtram pravartate. Evam maṇibhūteṣu śarīreṣu kim ekasūtrabhūtaḥ paramātmā, āhosvij jalacandravat puruṣa itī eka eva bahuṣu nadikūpataḍgādisvivopalabhyate ityataḥ saṁśayḥ. Kim ekāḥ puruṣaḥ guṇasūtranyāyena āho-

\* It is worth noting, as characteristic of the nature of Paramārtha's work, that he finds it necessary to add here a few lines in defence of the Buddhist doctrine here attacked.—Mss. of the Māhara-vṛtti give one of the doctrines attacked as that of the Jīvakas. Are these no other than the Ajīvikas? Or are they Jains? That this passage preserved by Paramārtha and Māhara forms a genuine part of the Vṛtti is confirmed by a reference to it of a date not later than A. D. 600, as noted by Takakusu p. 989, note 6. There Rṣabha instead of Jīvakas are named. This makes it clear that the doctrine attacked by the Vṛtti resembled the Syādvāda of the Jains.

† This illustration is curious. What could have been Paramārtha's motive in introducing it here in place of the moon in the water of the original?

Paramārtha  
(BEFEO, iv, pp. 978-1064).

de même de l'Âme unique qui remplit les corps de tous les êtres. D'autres maîtres affirment que chaque corps a son âme pour lui. Voilà le doute qui se lève en moi."

Page 1018, Kārikā 31

Ainsi un chef de brigands donne une ordre et dit: "Pour aller ou pour venir, pour vous avancer ou pour vous arrêter, vous devez obéir à mon commandement;" et la troupe des brigands, obéit à ses ordres. Il en est de même des organes. L'Intellect ressemble au chef des brigands, et les autres organes, semblables à la bande des brigands, connaissent les intentions de l'Intellect et s'acquittent de leurs propres fonctions.

Page 1024-25, Kārikā 39.

"Dans les trois mondes le corps subtil est créé d'abord; il n'y a en lui que les cinq éléments subtils. Ce corps subtil entre dans la matrice, où il croît par le mélange du rouge et du blanc. Le corps grossier (produit par les parents) se développe, étant humecté et nourri par les aliments et les boissons de six goûts absorbés par la mère. Les voies alimentaires de la mère et de l'embryon se correspondent; c'est ainsi que ce dernier se nourrit. Ainsi

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svid bahavaḥ puruṣā iti ced ucyate—Stanza 18.

Folio 43, b.

Yathā kila caurasenā grāmaṁ hantum gacchati. Tatra caurapatīnā saṁketaḥ kṛto'sti: yadā 'haiṁ hā-heti bravīmi tadā sarvair saṁavāyena praveṣavyam, Yadā punar aham ahā-heti bravīmi tadā nirgantavyam. Etāṁ caurasenāpater ājñāṁ ākūtaṁ jñātvā caurāḥ praviśanti nirgacchanti. Tattheha caurasenāpatisthānīyā buddhiḥ caurasamsthānīndriyāṇi.

Folio 50, b.

Tatra Sūkṣmas tāvat pañcatanmātrāḥ; tair evādisarge sūkṣmaśarīrāṇi trayāṇāṁ api lokānāṁ prārabdhāni. Tat sūkṣmaśarīram ṛtukāle mātur udaram praviśati. Mātū rudhiram pituḥ śukram. Vedāntavādinopyevam āhuḥ. Prāṇināḥ svarganarakādiṣu svakarmabhogānantaram atrājigamiṣavaḥ Somamaṇḍale linā bhūtvā vṛstīr bhavanti, tato'nnam. Tat stripuṁsābhyāṁ upabhuktaṁ śukraśopitaṁ, tataḥ puruṣa iti—Vettha yathā pañcamyām

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que la racine d'un arbre a des ouvertures pour absorber l'eau qui humecte et nourrit l'arbre, ainsi le goût des aliments et des boissons venant par la mère humecte et nourrit le corps grossier. La forme et les dimensions du corps grossier sont identiques à celles du corps subtil. Le corps subtil est appelé "l'intérieur" le corps grossier "l'extérieur". Dans le corps subtil, toutes les caractéristiques et toutes les formes de l'homme, les mains, les pieds, la tête, la face, le dos, le ventre, sont au complet. Des Rsis s'expriment ainsi dans les quatre Védas: "Le corps grossier possède six substances, dont trois, le sang, la chair, et les nerfs, viennent de la mère, et trois, le sperme, les cheveux, et les os, du père. Le corps dans lequel ces six substances demeurent est le corps grossier et extérieur, qui développe le corps subtil et intérieur. Le corps subtil, ayant été développé par le corps grossier, a les cinq éléments extérieurs pour demeure, aussi bien au moment de la naissance qu'après. Ainsi on bâtit pour un prince royal un palais avec plusieurs salles et on lui dit: "Ici tu vivras, ici tu mangeras, ici tu dormiras." Il en est de même de la Nature qui produit les cinq grands

ānutāv āpaḥ puruṣavacasa ity-  
ārabhya iti tu pañcamyām āhu-  
tāv āpa ityāhuḥ. Purāṇesvapi  
"Somavṛṣṭyannaretāmsi puru-  
ṣastatra pañcamah; Sa jivatya-  
gnaye paścād dharantyaśmād  
yato bhavet"—iti. Tad evaṁ  
sūkṣmaśarīrasyopacayaṁ karo-  
ti. Māturaśītapitam annarasam  
mātrnādisambandhena praviśya  
sūkṣmaśarīrasya śoṇitamaya-  
syopacayaṁ kurute. Mātuśca  
nādyā bālasya ca nābhirandhre  
praviśati. Yathaikena mārgena  
śākavātasyāpyāyanam udakaṁ  
karoti, evaṁ annapānasya raso  
mātrnādigato bālasya nābhim  
praviśati. Praviśya bālaśarī-  
rasyāpyāyanam karoti. Tatra  
sūkṣmaśarīrasyākṛtir yādṛglak-  
ṣaṇā bahiḥ śarīrasya bhava-  
ti hastapādaśiraḥprsthodarajaṅ-  
ghāgulpham iti. Api ca śistā  
vadanti: Bahiḥśarīram sātka-  
śikam iti. Rudhiram māmśam  
tvaṁ mātrjāni; snāyavasthimajjā  
pitṛjāni. Evam etad bāhyaśarī-  
ram ābhyantarāsūkṣmaśarīra-  
syopacayaṁ kurute. Tasyaiva  
bahiḥśarīrasyopacitasya sūkṣ-  
maśarīrasya prasavakāle yonyā  
nirgatasya mātur udarād bā-  
hyāni pañcamahābhūtāni prthi-  
vyādini viharapasamsthāniyāni  
kṛtāni. Yathā kasyacid rāja-  
kumārasya mātāpitṛbhyām up-  
acitasya. Pañcabhūtāni kṛtāni;  
ākāśam avakāśadāne, bhūmir  
viharane, āpaḥ pindīkarane

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éléments pour donner une demeure au corps subtil et au corps grossier:—(1) L'élément éther est produit pour servir de lieu où aucun obstacle ne se rencontre; (2) l'élément terre, comme lieu de demeure; (3) l'élément eau, comme lieu de la pureté; (4) l'élément feu, comme lieu de la consommation; (5) l'élément air, comme lieu du mouvement et de la dispersion.\*

Page 1035, Kārikā 49.

Ainsi un homme sourd—et, si vous voulez, donnez-lui encore une autre maladie—consulte son bon ami: “Je suis misérable; que dois-je faire?” Le bon ami lui dit: Acquiers la connaissance que donne le Sāṃkhya et tu atteindras l'exhaustion de la douleur, le bord de la douleur: tu seras délivré.” L'homme répond: “Je suis incapable d'acquérir la connaissance que donne le Sāṃkhya, car je n'en-

śuddhau ca, agnir āhārapacane, vāyur vyūhane.

Folia 59, b.

Yatheha loke kaścid Devada-  
tto Yajñadattam āhūyābravit:  
Bho duḥkhito'smi; kiṃ karavā-  
niti. Sa tenoktaḥ, Sāṃkhya-  
jñānādhigamam kuruṣveti, duḥ-  
khāntam Mokṣam prāpsyasīti.  
Evam ukto 'sāv āha: Nāham  
etadabhyāsam kartum aham.  
Bādhiryād guruvacanam na  
śṛṇomi: śuśrūṣāyām asamartho-  
'smi āndhyakunitvapāṅgutvā-  
didoṣāśrayatvāt, kuto mama  
jñānādhigama iti. Evam evā-  
ndhyamūkatvonmādaḍaya in-

\* This passage occurs in a much altered form in Gauḍapāda. The form of it in the Māthara comes decidedly nearer the original of Paramārtha, who must have elaborated the simile of the Prince and whose rendering of Śiṣṭe by Sages versed in the four Vedas is more a paraphrase than a literal translation. It may be noted also how the inevitable Upaniṣadic quotation (perhaps at first a marginal gloss) finds a place in the Māthara Mss. What is more, in the course of the discussion on this very Kārikā, anent the winning of Moṣka after the birth of knowledge, two quotations introduced by “uktaṃ ca” are given in the Māthara Mss, one of them a well-known stanza from the Hastāmalaka (the supposed great-grand-pupil of Gauḍapāda)! For other examples of student's gloss finding a place in the text see § (v) below.

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tendrais pas la parole du maître; ne l'entendant pas parler, d'où me viendrait la connaissance? Le cas est le même pour les aveugles et les autres. A cause de la destruction des organes, ils ne sont pas capables d'acquérir la connaissance; par là, ils sont incapables d'atteindre la Délivrance.

Page 1045, Kārikā 54.

Nous avons donc minutieusement expliqué la création de la forme (subtile), la création des états d'être et la création des êtres doués de sentiment. La triple création est le produit de la Nature; c'est ainsi que le but de la Nature est rempli, c'est-à-dire qu'elle produit le monde et réalise la Délivrance. On pourra demander; "Dans les trois mondes, parmi les hommes, les dieux ou les animaux, qui est celui qui souffre, qui est celui qui jouit? Est-ce la Nature ou est-ce un de ses produits: l'Intellect, le Sentiment du moi, les cinq éléments subtils ou les onze organes etc.? Ou est-ce l'Âme?" Nous répondons dans cette stance:...55.....

Page 1046, Kārikā 55.

Dans les trois mondes il y a douleur causée par la vieillesse. (Elle se manifeste par) des rides, des cheveux gris et tombants, la respiration courte, le

driyopaghātā vidyāgrahaṇe asamarthā buddhavyāh.

Folio 65, a.

Atrāha· Bhūtasarga utpanno bhāvasargaḥ sampanno liṅga-sargaḥ sampanna iti trayāḥ sargāḥ prādhānikā iti pradhānakāryaṁ samāptam iti. Utpannās trayo lokāḥ pradhānaṁ coparatam utpādya lokān iti. Tesu devamanusyatiryag-yonigateṣu duḥkham ko 'nubhavati? Kiṁ caturviṁsatitamam pradhānam, āśosvin mahadādi trayoviṁsatikaṁ, utasvit puruṣa iti. Atrocyate ... St. 55...

Folio 65, b.

Atra triṣu lokeṣviti. Deva-loke, manusyaloke tiryagyonau ca jarāmaraṇakṛtāṁ duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ. Tatra jarākṛtāḥ Valipalitāḥ cābhi-

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fait de s'appuyer sur un bâton et d'être méprisé par son clan. Voilà les douleurs causées par la vieillesse. Quant aux douleurs causées par la mort, voici. Supposez un homme qui a acquis les huit pouvoirs ou les cinq éléments subtils ou les cinq grands éléments: à l'heure de sa mort cet homme est marqué par Yama. Les douleurs qu'il souffre en ce moment sont appelées les douleurs causées par la mort.

Page 1058-1061, last three

Kārikās.

On pourra demander: "De qui provient cette connaissance?" Nous répondons dans cette stance: .....

bhūtaḥ kāsaśvāsaiḥ parigrhīto  
yastiviṣṭambhagāmī putrasnu-  
sādyabhibhūto yadduḥkham a-  
nubhavati taj jarākṛtam. Mara-  
ṇakṛtam iti: Aṣṭavidham aiśva-  
ryam asti yat prāg abhihitam  
apimādi. Daśa viśayās santi.  
Devānām pañca viśeṣāḥ keva-  
lasukharūpāḥ. Manusyāṇām  
saviśeṣās traya eva śabdādayaḥ  
sukhaduḥkhamohasampannāḥ.  
Tan maraṇapātāvasthāyām yad  
duḥkham utpadyate tan mara-  
ṇakṛtam eva.

Folio 74, a to 76, a.

Atrāha: Yad etad Bhaga-  
vatā\* vyākhyātam pañcaviṃ-  
śatitattvajñānam tasya kuta  
āgamaḥ. Atrocitate: .....

### KĀRIKĀ 70.

*Etat pavitram agryam Munir Āsuraye 'mukampayū pradadau.  
Āsurir api Pañcaśikhāya tena bahudhā kṛtam tantram.*

"Cette connaissance excellente et bienfaisante": Cette connaissance fut établi pour la première fois avant que les quatre Védas eussent apparu. C'est par cette connaissance que les quatre Védas et toutes les écoles religieuses ont été établis; voilà pourquoi on l'appelle excellente (agrya). C'est par cette connaissance que l'Âme est dé-

Etat vijñānam adhikurute. Etat pavitram. Katham pavitram. Yasmān narakapretatir-yagyonipatanāt trāyate tasmāt pavitram.† Agryam śraīṣṭhyāt. Vedapurāṇabhārataman-vādidbhyo'pi dharmasāstrebbhya etat pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānam uttamam. Kasmāt. Ekāntika-tvād ātyantikavāc ca. Ato duḥkhābhāvāś ca. Munir Bha-

\* The appellation "Bhagavatā" is to be noted. It might be a slip for "Bhavatā", but we meet the title of reverence used over a dozen times in the Vṛtti.

† Paramārtha simply passes over most of the etymological explanations of the Vṛtti.

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livrée de la triple douleur, de la douleur principale causée par les vingt-quatre (produits), de même que du triple servage; par là est obtenu l'isolement de l'Âme ou sa Délivrance. C'est pourquoi on dit que cette connaissance est "bienfaisante".

"Elle a été communiquée par compassion par le Muni." Qui a le premier possédé cette connaissance? Le grand sage Kapila, comme il a déjà été dit. Le sage Kapila possédait à sa naissance les quatre qualités, à savoir: la vertu, la connaissance, l'absence de passion et le pouvoir. Ayant réalisé cette connaissance, il l'expliquait par compassion. Désirant que cette connaissance ne se perdit pas et qu'elle fût communiquée à un autre, il l'enseigne par charité à Āsuri qui l'expliqua à son tour à Pañcaśikha et à Vindhyavāsa; Pañcaśikha et Vindhyavāsa\* traitèrent de cette doctrine toute au long, en soixante mille vers en toute. Le sage Kapila l'expliquait à Āsuri brièvement comme suit. "Au premier commencement il n'y avait que de l'obscurité. Dans cette obscurité il y avait un 'champ de connaissance.' Ce 'champ de connaissance' était le *puruṣa*.

gavān Kapilaḥ. Āsurisagotrāya brāhmaṇāya varsasahasrayājine 'dhikāriṇam avagamyāsnai pradadau. (Tadanukampayā tadvimokṣārtham). Andhe tama-syajñāne 'yaṁ tapasvī vartata ityutpannayānukampayā. Munnir mananāt. Bhagavān bhūtānām gatim āgatim ca vidvān ana(ni)ti calatīti bhagavān. Kapilaḥ pratyupakārānapeksa-sarvopakārī suhṛd ityartham avalambhyovāca. Tadeva jñānam bhūya Āsurisagotro 'nukampayā Pañcaśikhāya provāca. Pañcaśikhena tena bahudhā kṛtaṁ tantram. Bahūnām śiṣyāṇāṁ pradattam. Tantram iti vyākhyāyate. Tama eva khalvidam agra āsit. Tasmiṁstamasī ksetrajñō 'bhivartate prathamāṁ tama ityucyate prakṛtiḥ, Puruṣaḥ ksetrajñāḥ. Śaṣṭipadārthā yasmiṁ śāstre tantryante tac chaṣṭitantram. Śaṣṭitantram jñātvā kuśalaḥ kila. Īśvaraḥ Kṛṣṇanāmā tena Kṛṣṇena vistaragranthagrahaṇābhīrupā hitārtham Śaṣṭitantram atisamkṣiptam. Tadāha:

\* Takakusu in a note explains that "le texte coréen ne parle donc pas de Vindhyavāsa."



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Le purusa existait, mais aucune connaissance n'existait. C'est pourquoi on appelait (le puruṣa) 'champ.' Après vinrent l'évolution et la modification; ainsi naquit la création primordiale par évolution, etc., jusqu'à la Délivrance finale." Le sage Āsuri à son tour expliqua brièvement et en des termes identiques cette connaissance à Pañcaśikha, qui l'expliqua tout au long en soixante mille stances: ainsi la doctrine fut transmise jusqu'à Īśvarakṛṣṇa, le brahmane, dont le nom de famille était Kauśika; celui-ci expliqua le système en soixantedix stances, comme il est dit dans cette stance :

#### KĀRIKĀ 71.

*Śiṣyaparamparayāgatam Īśvarakṛṣṇena caitat āryābhiḥ  
Sankṣiptam āryamatinā samyag vijñāya siddhāntam.*

"Des disciples, venant l'un après l'autre, transmirent la connaissance enseignée par le grand Maître." Cette connaissance vint de Kapila à Āsuri qui la transmit à Pañcaśikha; P. la donna à Ho-kia, Ho-kia à Ulūka, Ulūka à Po-p'o-li, Po-p'o-li à Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Par cette transmission Īśvarakṛṣṇa obtint la connaissance. Il vit que le grand traité (de Pañcaśikha) était difficile à garder dans la mémoire et par conséquent il le réduisit aux

Śiṣyaparamparayāgatam iti. Kapilād Āsuripā prāptam idam jñānam. Tataḥ Pañcaśikhena. Tasmād Bhārgavolūkavālmiki-hārītadevalaprabhrtīn āgatam. Tatas tebhya Īśvarakṛṣṇena prāptam. Tadevaṁ Śaṣṭitantram āryābhiḥ sankṣiptam āryamatinā vistṛṇamatinā. Samyag vijñāya siddhāntam: kāryakāraṇasiddhasya śarīrasyānte 'punarbhāvo mokṣas tasya tādātmyam ityarthah. Tat siddhasya śarīrasya sūksmasya tānmātrikasya sargādibhāvasyānte

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soixante-dix stances que nous venons de commenter et qui commencent par "En raison de la gêne causée par les trois sortes de douleurs la recherche des moyens de les détruire est nécessaire." Voilà pourquoi il est dit: "*Īśvarakṛtsya l'expesa brièvement, connaissant le fondement de la vérité.*"—Un homme intelligent de cette (école) a composé cette stance: \*

mārtināśa iti vaiśa Ṣaṣṭitantra  
iti tātparyam.

### KĀRIKĀ 72.

*Saptatyām kila ye 'rthās te 'rthāḥ kṛtsnasya Ṣaṣṭitantrasya  
Ākhyāgikācirohitāḥ paravādarivarjitās cāpi.*

Les sujets de ce traité-ci ne diffèrent pas de ceux de ce traité-là; un ve. précédent les explique ainsi (St. 46): "La création dérive dans sa nature de l'intellect; elle est de quatre sortes: doute (5), incapacité (28), contentement (9) et perfection (8). Considérant la disparité des guṇas, il y a cinquante divisions dans l'Intellect." En dehors de ces cinquante divisions il y a dix autres catégories comme il est dit dans la stance: "L'existence (de la Nature) [1], le fait qu'elle est unique [2], le but de

Ṣaṣṭitantra padārthā abhihi-  
tās te saptatyām vyākhyātāḥ  
kathitāḥ. Ṣaṣṭibhedāḥ prāḡ  
vyākhyātāḥ: Bhedas tamaso  
'ṣṭavidha iti āryāyām. Pañca  
viparyayabhedā ityatra cābhihi-  
tā ityete pañcāśat pratyaḡā ime  
cānye daśa mūlikāḥ: tathā hi—  
"Astitvam ekatvam athārtha-  
vatvam, parārtham anyatvam  
atho nivṛttiḥ; Yogo viyogo ba-  
havaḥ pumānsah, sthitiḥ śari-  
rasya viśeṣavṛttiḥ." Tatra "bhe-  
dānām parimāṇāt" ityetaiḥ pañ-  
cābhirhetubhiḥ pradhānasyāsti-  
tvam ekatvam athārthavatvam

\* Takakusu notes that for ilo-kia the Japanese text reads Kat'-kia, suggesting Gārgya as the probable Sanskrit equivalent. We see that the actual Sanskrit equivalent is Bhārgava.—For Po-p'o-li (Jap. Bat'-ba-li) Takakusu suggests the emendation Po-li-so (Jap. Bat'-li-sha) so as to equate it with Sanskrit Varṣa. It is more likely that the original corresponds with Sk. Devala.

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l'Âme [3], les cinq raisons (pour lesquelles on établit l'existence de l'Âme et de la Nature) [4-5], l'isolement (de l'Âme) [6], l'union [7], la séparation [8], la multiplicité des âmes [9], la durée du corps [10], voilà les dix catégories.

(1) "Existence" signifie l'existence de l'effet dans la cause (st. 9). (2) "Unicité"; la Nature est une et elle évolue pour le profit d'âmes nombreuses (st. 16). (3) "Le but de l'Âme" (accompli par la Nature): cela signifie que la Nature rend l'Âme capable de s'associer aux objets et de voir ensuite la distinction (entre l'Âme et la Nature); (cf. st. 42). (4-5) "les cinq raisons"; par cinq raisons on établit la réalité de la Nature (st. 15) et de même la réalité de l'Âme (st. 17). (6) "Isolement": par la connaissance parfaite l'Âme atteint l'isolement définitif et final (st. 67 et 68). (7) "L'union" (de l'Âme et de la Nature) a lieu parce que toutes deux sont omniprésentes (st. 68). (8) "La séparation" a lieu comme nous l'avons vu (st. 66). (9) "Multiplicité des âmes": parce que la vie et la mort ne sont pas les mêmes (dans chaque individu), comme nous l'avons expliqué (st. 17 et 18). (10) "La durée

ca siddham. Saṃghātaparārthatvād iti parārthatvam uktam. Tadviparītas tathā ca pumān iti puruṣabahutvaṃ siddham. Saṃghātaparārthatvāc cakrabhramavad dhṛtaśarīrasthitiḥ siddhā. Ete daśa. Pañca viparyayāḥ, aṣṭavimśatidhā śāktiḥ, navadhā tuṣṭiḥ, aṣṭadhā siddhiḥ: iti pañcāśat. Ubhaye śaṣṭipadārthāḥ Śaṣṭitantrē. Tantryante vyutpādyante padārthā iti tantram; śaṣṭipadārthānām tantram iti saṃgatīḥ. Ākhyāyikāvirahitāḥ paravādavivarjitāś ceti: Pareṇa saha vādaḥ paravādaḥ; tena varjitāś ceti.

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du corps"; elle se fait par le corps subtil, tant que la connaissance n'est pas acquise (st. 41).

Ces dix, avec les cinquante catégories, forment les sujets des soixante-mille stances (de Pañcasikha); le traité en soixante-dix stances est donc identique (quant aux sujets) au traité des soixante mille.

On pourra demander: "Quelle est la différence entre le grande traité et le petit en soixante-dix stances?" Réponse: "Les traditions des vieux Sages et la réfutation des opinions des autres se trouvent dans le grand, mais non dans celui-ci. Voilà la différence.\*

The large number of extracts given above in parallel columns should suffice to bring out the very close correspondence that there is between the Chinese of Paramārtha and the Sanskrit of Māthara in passages which are altogether lacking in Gaudapāda and which therefore could not have been derived from the latter. In passages which are common to the three Dr. Takakusu has already worked out the statistics of the parallelism between Paramārtha and Gaudapāda (Bulletin, pp. 5-25) and come to the conclusion that out of 1040 lines of

\* The Mātharavṛtti Ms. gives an extra stanza which seems to have been a very late addendum, viz.—

*Tasmāt samāsadr̥ṣṭam śāstram idam nārthataś ca parihinam |  
Tantrasya br̥hanmūrter darpaṇasaṁkrāntam iva bimbam ||*

Its colophon is as follows :—Ityācārya-Īśvarakṛṣṇapṛokṭāyāḥ Sāṁkhya-saptatyā vṛttir ācārya-Mātharakṛtīḥ samāptā. Svasti Śrīmad-Aṇahilapure .....Śrī-Kapilamuninā vyākṛtāṁ Sāṁkhyaśāstram.....Sāṁvat 1457 varṣe likhitaṁ idam.....

Sanskrit text given by Gauḍapāda (excluding the Kārikās), 504 (7514) lines practically coincide with the text of Paramārtha, 143 more are similar in substance but not identical in expression, while 383 are peculiar to Gauḍapāda alone. Further as to quotations, out of 34 quotations from other works (with or without the actual mention of the source) given by Paramārtha, 19 are contained in Gauḍapāda, who however cites 5 more texts absent in Paramārtha. A similar proportion of comparisons and ākhyāyikās are also common to Paramārtha and Gauḍapāda so that such a large degree of agreement, as Takakusu rightly holds, can hardly be accidental. To explain the situation Dr. Takakusu suggests the following hypothesis: "Le texte que le célèbre commentateur [Gauḍapāda] avait en main était peut-être incomplet et fragmentaire, et peut-être entreprit-il son œuvre pour le remettre en son état primitif. Ce faisant, il aurait, à certaines places, réarrangé ou récrit le commentaire original, tandis qu'à d'autres il aurait utilisé autant que possible des phrases mêmes de l'original."

What is true of the relation between Paramārtha and Gauḍapāda would be much more true of the relation between Paramārtha and Māṭhara in the common passages; while as to Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda a detailed comparison only strengthens the conviction that Gauḍapāda's work is no more than a simplified abridgment—with an occasional addition here and there which is implied in simplification—of the Māṭharavṛtti. By way of an illustration I give below the text of—

- (ii) Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda on Kārikās 4, 5, and 6, showing their close correspondence.

Māṭhara	Gauḍapāda
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#### KĀRIKĀ 4

Esām vyaktāvyaktajñānām  
prameyānām pramāṇāny āha,  
sādhanaṇya. Pramāṇaprameya-  
pramāṭṛpramitikramena hi sa-  
kalasya siddhir dr̥ṣṭā :

Evam eṣām vyaktāvyakta-  
jñānām trayānām padārthā-  
nām kaiḥ kiyadbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ  
kena kasya vā pramāṇena sid-  
dhir bhavati? Iha loke pra-  
meyavastu pramāṇena sādhya-  
te yathā prasthādibhir vṛ-  
hayas tulayā candanādi. Tas-  
māt pramāṇam abhidheyam :

*Drṣṭam anumānam ūptavacanam ca sarvapramāṇasiddhotvāt ।  
Trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi ॥*

## Māthara

Drṣṭam iti pratyakṣaparyā-  
yaḥ. Aksam indriyam pratitya  
yadutpadyate jñānam tat pra-  
tyakṣam drṣṭam ucyate. Ya-  
thā śrotrādinām śabdādayaḥ.  
Pañcendriyārthāḥ pañcānām  
drṣṭam pramāṇam. Pratha-  
mam idam mukhyam sakṣi-  
pramāṇānām. Yo 'rtho 'munā  
drṣṭena sādhayitum na pāryate  
tatrānumānasyāvakāśaḥ. Tac-  
ca trisāadhanam pañcasādha-  
nam tryavayavam pañcāvaya-  
vam ityapare, tacca trayastrin-  
śadābhāsarahitam pratyakṣā-  
bhāve pratanyate 'numānam  
kamapi hetum anvikṣya. Tasya  
hetoḥ paścān mīyate ity anu-  
mānam. Yathā dhūmam he-  
tum anvikṣya mahānasa iva  
pūrvam vahnidarśanād agner  
astitvam sādhyate ityanumā-  
nam. Pratyakṣānumānābhyām  
yo 'rthas sādhayitum na śakyas  
tatrāptavacanam. Yathā sva-  
rgo 'sti, apsarasas santi, nanda-  
nam vanam, tatrāviśeṣāḥ śabdā-  
dayo viśayā vimāne 'dhivāsa  
iti. Āptā rāga dveṣādirahitā Bra-  
hmasanat kumārādayaḥ śrutir  
vedas tābhyām upadiṣṭam ta-  
theti śraddheyam āptavacanam.  
—Nanv arthāpattis, sambhavo-  
'bhāvaḥ, pratibhā aitihiyam,  
āupamyam ceti prabhṛtīni  
santi bahūni pramāṇāntarāni.  
Katham atra trividham pramā-

## Gaudapāda

Drṣṭam yathā śrotram tvak  
caksur jihvā ghrāṇam iti pañca  
buddhindriyāṇi. Śabdasparśarū-  
parasagandhā eṣām pañcānām  
pañcaiva viśayā yathāsaṁ-  
khyam. Śabdām śrotram ghr-  
ṇāti, tvak sparśam caksūrūpam  
jihvā rasam ghrāṇam gandham  
iti. Etad drṣṭam ity ucyate pra-  
māṇam. Pratyakṣenānumānena  
vā yo 'rtho na grhyate sa āpta-  
vacanād grāhyah yathendro de-  
varāja Uttarāḥ Kuravaḥ svasge  
'psarasa ityādi. Pratyakṣānumā-  
nāgrāhyam athāptavacanād grh-  
yate. Api cōktam—“Āgamo hyā-  
ptavacanam āptam doṣakṣayād  
viduḥ. Kṣīṇadoṣo 'nṛtam vā-  
kyam na brūyād dhetvasambha-  
vāt. Svakarmanyabhiyukto yaḥ  
sangadveṣavivarjitah. Pūjitas  
tadvidhair nityam āpto jñeyas  
sa tādrśaḥ.” Etesu pramāṇesu  
sarvapramāṇāni siddhāni bha-  
vanti. Śaṭ pramāṇāni Jaiminiḥ.  
Atha kāni tāni pramāṇāni.  
Arthāpattiḥ sambhavaḥ, abhā-  
vaḥ, pratibhā, aitihiyam, upa-  
mānam ceti sat pramāṇāni.  
Tatrārthāpattir dvidividhā: drṣ-  
tā śrutā ca. Tatra drṣṭā. Eka-  
smin pakṣe ātmabhāvo grhītaḥ  
ced anyasminnapyātmabhāvo  
grhyata eva. Śrutā yathā: divā  
Devadatto na bhukte, atha ca  
pīno drīsyate, ato 'vagamyate  
rātrau bhukta iti. Sambhavo

Māthara	Gauḍapāda.
<p>nam iti saṁgatih. Atrocyate: sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt. Sarvāṇi pramāṇāni hi pramāṇatraye 'viruddhāni. Tatra pino Devadatto divā na bhukta ityukte rātrau bhukta ityarthah. Sā'rthāpattir anumānam eva. Prastha ityukte catvāraḥ kuḍavā iti bodhaḥ sambhavaḥ. So 'pyanumānam eva. Abhāvaś ca prāgitaretarapradhvamsātyantābhāvabhedāc caturdhā. Yathā vṛhiśoṣaṇadarsānān na vṛṣṭo deva iti vṛṣṭer abhāvaṁ sādhayati. So 'pyanumānabhedah. Pratibhā yathā: Dakṣiṇena tu Vindhya-sya Sahyasya tu yad uttaram. Ramaniyatamo deśo'sauv ityukte, tatra śobhanā guṇāḥ santiti pratibhotpadyate. Pratibhā mānasam jñānam. Sā'pyanumānam eva. Aitihiyam yathā: Asmin vate yakṣiṇi prativasatiti janā vadanti. Ityukte sā vighnam karoti, dhanādi yacchatiti jñānam. Tadapyanumānam eva. Kim ca trīṣṭa-syāñjalinaḥ kṣudhitasya pañcāṅguli-yogāt prthulākṣyāḥ prarṣṭidarśanāj jñānam ityādyanumānam eva. Tasmāt trīṣṭvevānyad antarbhavatiti yuktaṁ abhihitam trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam iti, abhipretam ityarthah. Tena pramāṇena kim sādhyam ityāha: prameya-siddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi. Yasmāt prameyam sakalam pra-</p>	<p>yathā: prastha ityukte catvāraḥ kuḍavāḥ sambhavyante. Abhāvo nāma prāgitaretarāntasavābhāvalakṣaṇah. Prāgabhāvo yathā: Devadattaḥ kaurayauvanādiṣu. Itaretarābhāvah pate ghaṭābhāvah. Atyantābhāvah kharaviṣāṇavandhyāsutakhapuṣpavad iti. Sarvābhāvah pradhvamsābhāvo' dagdhapaṭavaditi. Yathā śuṣka dhānyadarśanād vṛṣṭer abhāvo 'vagamyate. Evam abhāvo nekadhā. Pratibhā yathā: Dakṣiṇena Vindhya-sya Sahyasya ca yaduttaram. Prthivyāmāsa-mudrāyām sa pradeśo manoramaḥ. Evam ukte tasmin pradeśe śobhanā guṇāḥ santiti pratibhotpadyate. Pratijānvāsasamjñānam (sic. for Pratibhā mānasam jñānam) iti. Aitihiyam yathā: bravīti loko yathātra vate yakṣiṇi prativasatīti evam aitihiyam. Upamānam yathā gaur iva gavayaḥ samudra iva tadāgam. Etāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni trīṣu drṣṭādiṣvantarbhūtāni. Tatrānumāne tāvad arthāpattir antarbhūtā. Sambhavābhāvapratibhaiti hyo-pamāś cāptavacane. Tasmāt trīṣveva sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt triyidham pramāṇam iṣṭam. Tadāha. Tena trividhena pramāṇena pramāṇa (?) siddhir, bhavatiti vākyaśeṣah: Prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi. Prameyam pradhānam buddhir</p>

Māthara	Gaudapāda
<p>mānena pramiyate, yathā tula-yā candanādi karṣādīnā ghr-tādi prasthādīnā vrīhyādītyādivat pratyaksānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni prameyāni vyaktāvyaktajñāni. Pramātā ātīnā. Tatra treyovīmśatikam vyaktam; avyaktam pradhānam; jñāḥ ksetrajñāḥ. Tadamīśam madhye kimcit pratyakṣeṇānyad anumānenetarad āptanumānābhyām pramiyate. Tasmād ācāryeṇa Bhagavatā * yuktam abhihitam prameya-siddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi iti.</p>	<p>aḥamkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāni ekādāśendriyāni pañca mahābhūtāni puruṣa ityētāni pañcaviṃśatitattvāni vyaktāvyaktajñānyucyante. Tatra kimcit pratyakṣeṇa sādhyam kimcid anumānena kimcid āga-meneti trividham pramāṇam uktam.</p>
<p>Tatra trividhasya prthak prthak lakṣaṇam upanyasyate :</p>	<p>Trividham pramāṇam uktam Tasya kim lakṣaṇam etadāha :</p>
<p><i>Prativiśayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam trividham tathānumānākhyam</i>  </p>	<p>[v. 1. anumānam ākhyātam].</p>
<p><i>Tal liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam ūptaśrutir ūptavacanam tu   </i></p>	
<p>Viśayam viśayam prati yo 'dhyavasāyah, netrādīnām indriyāṇām pañcānām rūpādiṣu pañcasvādhyavasāyas tat pratyakṣam pratipattirūpaṁ dṛṣṭākhyam. Anumānam trividham trisāadhanam; tryavaya-vam; pañcāvayavam ityapare. Tad ākhyātam kathitam. Pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntā iti tryavaya-vam. Pakṣaḥ pratiññāpadaṁ, yathā vahnimān ayam pradeśaḥ. Sādhyavastūpanyāsaḥ pakṣaḥ; itare pakṣābhāsāḥ pratyakṣaviruddhādayo nava. Trirūpo hetuḥ; trairūpyam punaḥ pakṣadharmatvaṁ sapakṣe sattvaṁ vipakṣe cāsattvaṁ iti. Atrodāh-</p>	<p>Prativiśayेषु śrotrādīnām śab-dādiviśayेष्वdhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam pratyakṣam ityarthah. Trividham anumānam ākhyātam : śeṣavat pūrvavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ceti. Pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavad yathā meghonnatyā vrṣṭim sādhayati pūrvavrṣṭit-vāt. Śeṣavad yathā samudrāde-kam jalapalaṁ lavaṇam āsādyā śeṣasyāpyasti lavaṇabhāva iti. Sāmānyato dṛṣṭam, deśāntarād deśāntaram prāptam dṛṣṭam gatimaccandratāra-kam, Caitr-avat. Yathā Caitrānumānam deśāntarād deśāntaram prāptam avalokya gatimān ayam iti. Tadvaccandratāra-kam iti.</p>



## Māthara

## Gauḍapāda

araṇaṃ yathā dhūmavattvād iti. Anye hetvābhāsās caturdaśa; asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhāḥ. Sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ dvividhaṃ nidarśanam; yathā mahānasavat. Itare nidarśānbhāsā daśa. Evaṃ trayastrimśadābhāsavirahitaṃ tryavayavam anumānam; pañcāvayavam ityapare. Tadāha. Avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijñāpadeśanidarśanānusaṃdhānapratyāmnāyāḥ. Evaṃ pañcāvayavena vākyena svanīścitarthapratipādanam parārtham anumānam. Tacca trividham: pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam ca. Tatra viśiṣṭameghonnatipradarśanādbhavitrīm vṛṣṭim sambhāvayati, pūrvam iyaṃ dr̥ṣṭeti, pūrvavat. Nadīpūradarśanād upari vṛṣṭo deva iti vā pratitīḥ. Śeṣavad yathā samudrād eka-bindum prāśya śeṣasya lavaṇa-bhāvo 'numīyate iti śeṣavat. Sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam puṣpitaṃradarśanād anyatra puṣpitaṃrā iti. Punar yathā bahir uddyota iti kenāpyuktaṃ; tatrāpareṇāpyuktaṃ candra uditō bhaviṣyatītyarthasaṃgatiḥ. Talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam iti. Liṅgena tridaṇḍādīdarśanenādr̥ṣṭopiliṅgi sādhyate nūnam asau parivṛād yasyedaṃ tridaṇḍam itivat. Āptaśrutir āptavacanam tṛtīyaṃ pramāṇam. Āptā Brahmādaya ācāryāḥ śrutir vedas tad etad ubhayam āptavacanam. Āptiḥ sāksād arthapṛāptiḥ,

Tathā puṣpitaṃradarśanād anyatra puṣpitaṃrā iti sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭena sādhayati. Etat sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭam. Kiṃca talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam iti. Tad anumānaṃ liṅgapūrvakam: yatra liṅgena liṅgi anumīyate yathā daṇḍena yatiḥ. Liṅgipūrvakam ca yatra liṅginā liṅgam anumīyate yathā dr̥ṣṭvā yatim asyedaṃ tridaṇḍam iti. Āptaśrutir āptavacanam ca. Āptā ācāryā Brahmādayaḥ. Śrutir vedāḥ. Āptaś ca śrutiś ca Āptaśruti; taduktam āptavacanam iti. Evaṃ trividham pramāṇam uktam.

Māthara	Gauḍapāda
<p>yathārthopalambhas, tayā var- tata ityāptaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathārthāptyā śrutarthagrāhi. Taduktam āptavacanam. Tatṛ- pi prasiddhilakṣaṇaḥ prapavogāt tisraḥ śabdavṛttayaḥ. Tatra lakṣaṇātraividhyam : jahalla- kṣaṇā, 'jahallakṣaṇā, jahada- jahallakṣaṇā cetyādi pramāṇa- śāstreṣu bahutaraprapaṇca āste. Tatra prakrāntam eva tāvad abh- idhīyate. Bhagavataḥ Kapilasya matam, "Āgamo hyāptavac- anam āptiṃ doṣakṣayaṃ viduḥ. Kṣīṇadoṣo 'nṛtaṃ vākyaṃ na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt, Svak- armanyabhiyukto yo rāga-dveṣa- vivarjitaḥ. Pūjitas tadvidhair nityam āpto jñeyaḥ sa tādrśaḥ." Tad evam etat trividham eva pramāṇam.</p> <p>Tad evam vyaktāvyaktajñā- khyasya pratyakṣāditrividha- pramāṇena kena kasya siddhiḥ syād ityatrocyate :</p>	<p>Tatra kena pramāṇena kim sādhyaṃ ucyate :</p>

*Sāmānyatas tu dr̥ṣṭād atīndriyāṇām pratītir anumānāt ।*

*Tasmād api cāsiddham paroḥṣam ūptāgamāt sādhyam ॥*

[ v. l. siddham ]

Atra pradhānapuruṣāv atī-  
ndriyau ; tayos sāmānyatodr̥-  
ṣṭād anumānātsiddhiḥ. Yasmān  
mahadādilingam triguṇam  
dr̥ṣṭvā kāryam tatkāraṇam  
adr̥ṣṭam apyasti triguṇam ceti  
sādhyate pradhānam. Na  
hyasataḥ sadutpattir̥ syād iti.  
Na ca kāraṇasadr̥śam kā-  
ryam syād iti. Vyaktam tu

Sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭād anumānād  
atīndriyāṇām indriyāṇyatītya  
vartamānām siddhiḥ. Pra-  
dhānapuruṣāv atīndriyau sāmā-  
nyato dr̥ṣṭenānumānena sādhy-  
yete. Yasmān mahadādilingam  
triguṇam yasyedam triguṇam  
kāryam tat pradhānam iti.  
Yatas cācetanam cetanam  
ivābhāti, ato 'nyo 'dhiṣṭhātā

Māṭhara	Gauḍapāda
<p>pratyakṣeṇaiva sādhitam iti tadarthe na prayatnaḥ. Yasmāj jaḍam api pradhānam prasūti-kriyāyām pravartate tasmād asti lohasya calanakriyāśakti- hetubhramakavad avaśyam puruṣa iti jñāsiddhiḥ.</p> <p>Nanu pratyakṣeṇa yo'rtho nopalabhyate sa sarvathā nāstīti manas saṁgacchate yathā dvitīyam anīśvaraśīras tṛtīyo bāhuḥ śaśaviśāṇādayo vā. Evam pradhānapuruṣau nopalabhyete tasmāt tāvapi na staḥ, ityāśaṁkānirāsāyāha : iha loka satām apyarthānām aṣṭadhā nopalabdhiḥ. Tathā hi darśa-yati—.....Stanza 7.....</p>	<p>puruṣa iti. Vyaktam pratyakṣa-sādhyam. Tasmād api cāsiddham parokṣamāptāgamāt siddham. Yathendro devarājaḥ, Uttarāḥ Kuravaḥ svarge'-psarasa iti. Parokṣam āptava-canāt siddham.</p> <p>Atra kaścid āha: Pradhānam puruṣo vā nopalabhyate. Yac-ca nopalabhyate loka tannāsti. Tasmāt tāvapi na staḥ. Yathā dvitīyam śīras tṛtīyo bāhur iti. Taducyate. Atra satām apyarthānām aṣṭadhā nopalabdhir na bhavati. Tad yathā—..... Stanza 7.....</p>

In spite of occasional variations of phrase, additions and omissions of a minor character and (accidental) transpositions, it is impossible to imagine that two texts so closely agreeing with one another can be independent of each other. The actual verbal coincidences are too many to render probable the hypothesis of a derivation from a common source. Speaking broadly, the agreement between the two commentaries covers as much as 75 per cent. of the text. Now seeing that just in those passages that are not present in Gauḍapāda, Māṭhara agrees, as we have seen, with Paramārtha, we cannot conclude that Māṭhara has elaborated Gauḍapāda. It is far more likely that Gauḍapāda (whosoever he might be) has abridged and simplified the work of Māṭhara. Māṭhara is an ancient name known and referred to by Maladhāri-Rājaśekharasūri (A. D. 1350), who actually quotes a stanza from the Māṭharavṛtti under Kārikā 37:

*Hasa piba lala moda nityam*

*viśayān upabhuñja kuru ca mā śaṅkāṁ ।*

*Yadi viditaṁ te Kāpilamataṁ*

*tat prāpsyase mokṣasaṁkhyāṁ ca ॥*

which is unknown to Gauḍapāda, while Paramārtha seems to

give in the same place what appears to be a translation of the more familiar verse—

*Pañcaviṁsatitattvajñō yatratatrūśrame rataḥ ।*

*Jaṭi muṇḍi śikhī vāpi mucyate nūtra saṁśayaḥ ॥*

References to Māthara also occur in Guṇaratnasūri's commentary on the Śaddarśanasamuccaya, where Māthara's commentary is said to be "Śaṭtitanthroddhārarūpam bhāṣyam"; while others have discovered references to Māthara or Mādharma in the Nandisūtra and the Anuyogadvārasūtra of the Jainas, which belong to a time not later than about A. D. 450.

( iii ) Nature of Paramārtha's translation.

If then the present Mātharavṛtti is the original of Paramārtha's Chinese, why do not the two agree word for word from beginning to end? The reason is not far to seek: it must have even suggested itself to an attentive reader of Paramārtha's text side by side with the Sanskrit text we exhibited a few pages previously. The Sanskrit commentary contains derivations and paraphrases of words, dissolutions of compounds, etc., which would be meaningless if reproduced in a translation not meant to be studied with the original. But this is not all. For the benefit of his Buddhist readers in China who might be unfamiliar with certain terms, allusions, and ways of thinking contained in the original, Paramārtha had to give several annotations and make certain changes and additions which Dr. Takakusu has only in a few cases ( cp. pages 990\*, 1041, 1042 ( thrice ), 1043, etc. ) been able to separate from the original and enclose within square brackets as a " sous-commentaire " which " semble être de Paramārtha lui-même ". But naturally there must have been a large number of incidental modifications and elaborations in argument that must have escaped Dr. Takakusu. As a case in point we might cite the explanation of " adṛṣṭe " in Kārikā 31, in connection with which Paramārtha quotes an ancient stanza mentioning " the Buddha, the Law, and the Saṁgha ", on which Dr. Takakusu adds the note: " La mention du Ratnatrayam est curieuse; les commentateurs japonais disent que ce vers n'est pas bouddhique ". Or take the fact that under

\* This case is most illuminating. Paramārtha takes upon himself here the special task of defending a Buddhist position attacked in the original Vṛtti; with the words: " Cette refutation est fautive " etc.

Kārikā 33, the Mātharavṛtti, while illustrating the activity of the Buddhi in regard to objects in the past, cites Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira as past perceptions, "there will be Kalki" being given as an instance of a perception concerning a future event; whereas Paramārtha substitutes Māndhātṛ for Bhīṣma-Yudhiṣṭhirau, and the characteristically Buddhistic reflection, "tous les hommes périront" as a future perception. As other instances the following renderings of Paramārtha for the original Sanskrit in the opposite column might be usefully compared :

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Under Kārikā 50.

Kāścit tridaṇḍakunḍikākṣa-  
mālākṛṣṇājīnopādānamātrena-  
vāham mukta ityabhimāni  
brūte tena mama mokṣo bhā-  
vīti. Etāvanmātrena tuṣṭo  
jñānādhigame na pravartate.  
Tasyāpi na mokṣa ityeṣā  
"Upādānatuṣṭih."

Les "nécessaires" sont les  
objets dont ont besoin les ascètes  
quand ils s'acquittent des  
devoirs religieux. Ils sont au  
nombre de quatre : (1) le triple  
bâton ; (2) le pot à eau pour se  
laver ; (3) le kāṣāya ; (4) les  
cinq objets bienfaisants ; (a)  
le sac à cendres ; (b) le cristal  
solaire ; (c) la corde sacrée (d)  
les charmes ; (e) une long tige  
d'herbe placée sur le toupet  
des cheveux et appelée l'herbe  
bienfaisante. Voilà les cinq  
(objets) nécessaires pour l'é-  
tude de la voie. Ils sont  
appelés les objets bienfaisants,  
parce qu'ils chassent l'impurité.  
Avec les trois autres objets  
ils forment les huit (objets)  
nécessaires. Ils nous font  
atteindre la Délivrance, et  
c'est pourquoi j'ai quitté ma  
famille. Voilà pourquoi le  
second contentement est appelé  
"le contentement du néces-  
saire."

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## KĀRIKĀ 9.

Iha loka sad eva sad bhavati. Asataḥ karaṇam nāsti. Yadi syāt tadā sikatabhyas tailaṁ, kūrma-romabhyas paṭaprāvāṇaṁ, vandhyāduhitṛbhrūvilāsaḥ, śa-śaviśāṇaṁ khapuspaṁ ca syāt. Na cāṣṭi. Tasmād anumiyate pradhāne prōgutpatter mahadādīkam astyevopādānakāraṇam. *Upādānagrahaṇāt*. Iha loka yo yenārthi sa tadupādānagrahaṇam karoti, tannimittam upādatte. Tadyathā, dadhyarthi kṣīrasyopādānam kurute. Yadi cāsat kāryaṁ syāt tadā dadhyarthi hyudakasyāpyupādānam kuryāt : na ca kurute. Tasmāt Pradhāne mahadādi kāryam astīti. Kim ca *sarvasambhavābhāvāt*. Iha loka yad yasmin vidyate tasmād eva tad utpadyate ; yathā tilebhyas tailaṁ dadhni ghṛtam. Yadi vāsat kāryaṁ syāt tat sarvaṁ sarvatra sambhavet. Tatas ca tṛṇapāmsuvālukādibhyo rajata-suvarṇamaṇimuktāpravālādāyo jāyeraṇ : na ca jāyante. Tasmāt paśyāmaḥ sarvasambhavābhāvād api mahadādi kāryam pradhāne sadeva sad bhavati. Atāś cāṣṭi : *Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt*. Iha loka śaktaḥ śilpi khalu karaṇādīkāraṇopādānakāloṇāpāyasampannaḥ śakyādeva śakyam karmārabhate ; nāśakyam aśakyāt. Tad yathā śaktaḥ kumbhakāraḥ śakyādeva

(1) “ *De rien rien ne peut être fait*”. Dans le monde, là où rien n'existe, aucun effort pour produire n'aboutit. Anisi l'huile ne peut pas être produite du sable. Mais si les matériaux existent, une chose peut être produite. Anisi en pressant le sésame on obtient de l'huile. Le produit ne peut pas être obtenu s'il n'existe pas dans la chose. Maintenant nous observons que le Mahat (l'Intellect) et les autres principes sont des produits de la Nature ; nous savons donc que ces principes sont contenus dans la Nature elle-même.

(2) “ *Il est nécessaire de prendre (des matériaux qui serviront de) cause*.” Si un homme a besoin de faire un objet, il prend nécessairement la cause de cet objet : ainsi un homme qui pense que demain un brahmane viendra diner dans sa maison se procure du lait pour faire du lait caillé. Pourquoi ne prend-il pas de l'eau ? Parce que pour faire un objet on doit prendre la cause de cet objet. Nous voyons donc que le Mahat préexiste dans la Nature.

(3) “ *Toutes les choses ne sont pas le produit (d'une cause quelconque)*”. Si les effets n'existaient pas dans la cause,

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<p>mṛtipiṇḍāc chakyadaṇḍacakra-sūtroḍakavidalatalādibhiḥ sampanno ghaṭaśarāvodañcanādīnyārabhamāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ; na ca maṇikādi; aśakyatvāt tāvatā piṇḍena tasya. Yadi punaḥ karaṇaniyamo na syād aśakyādapyasakyam ārabhyeta. Tasmāt sat kāryaṁ syāt, nāsat. Kim ca kṛaṇabhāvāt ca kāryaṁ sad eva syād yathā kodra-vebhyaḥ kodravāḥ, vṛihibhyo vṛihayaḥ syuḥ. Yadi vāsāt kāryaṁ syāt tadā kodravebhyaḥ śālīnām api nispattiḥ syāt; na ca bhavati. Tasmāt karaṇa-bhāvād api prapaśyāmaḥ, pra-dhāne mahadādi kāryam astīti sādhitam evamebhiḥ pañcabhir hetubhiḥ. "Sadeva saumyedaṁ agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam. Taddheka āhur" ityārabhya "sadeva saumyedaṁ agra āsīd" iti śruteḥ.</p>	<p>n'importe quoi pourrait être produit de n'importe quelle cause. De l'herbe, du gravier ou des pierres pourraient donc produire de l'or et de l'argent. Mais de tel phénomènes n'existent pas. Nous voyons donc que les effets sont contenus dans la cause.</p> <p>(4) "<i>L'agent capable seul peut accomplir une action donnée</i>". Par exemple, un potier avec ses instrument fabrique des cruches et des plats d'un morceau de terre glaise, mais il n'est pas capable de fabriquer ces ustensiles en se servant de plantes ou d'arbres. Nous savons donc que la Nature implique ses dérivés.</p> <p>(5) "<i>Telle la cause, tel l'effet</i>." L'effet est de la même espèce que la cause. Ainsi les pousses de l'orge viennent de la semence d'orge. Si l'effet existait pas dans la cause, les fruits pourraient ne pas être de la même espèce que la semence. En ce cas, de la semence d'orge pourrait produire des pousses de fève ou d'autre chose. Comme nous ne connaissons pas de pareils phénomènes, nous voyons que les effets sont existants dans la cause. Les Vaiśeṣikas prétendent que les effets n'existent pas dans la cause; mais leur opinion est inadmissible. Nous</p>

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	savons que les effets existent nécessairement dans la cause.*

By way of a further illustration of the point and also for the sake of another critical question connected with the passage we will reproduce in opposite columns the texts of Māthara and Paramārtha on—

## KĀRIKĀ 61.

*Prakṛteḥ sukumāratarām na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati |  
Yā dr̥ṣṭāsmīti punar na darśanam upaiti puruṣasya ||*

[Prakṛtir api, Pradhānam  
api kurute †]. Prakṛteḥ su-  
kumāratarām na kiñcid astīti  
me matir bhavati. Evam buddhir  
utpannā. Yā dr̥ṣṭā'smīti punar  
na darśanam upaiti puruṣasya.  
Yatheha snuṣā'ham dr̥ṣṭā'smīti  
vṛdayā svagrāntaḥ praviśati.  
Ato bravīti iyaṁ viśistatāretī.  
Evam iyaṁ prakṛtiḥ sukumāra-  
tarā. Tasmāt prakṛteḥ suku-  
māratarām nānyad astīti.  
Evam puruṣasya matir  
utpannā; nastīti me matir  
bhavati, mameti puruṣa  
ātmanā bravīti. Tatra suku-  
mārataratvaṁ varṇayati: Īśva-  
rah kāraṇam iti kecid ācāryā  
bruvate. Uktam ca: Ajñō  
jantur anīśo'yam ātmanāḥ

" Extrêmement délicate est la  
Nature ; je pense que rien n'est  
( délicat ) comme elle. " Ainsi  
dans le monde un homme voit  
une femme douée d'excellentes  
qualités ; puis il voit une autre  
femme qui est la plus excellente  
de toutes ; il pense : " C'est la  
plus excellente et celle qui est  
sans rivale. " De même la Nature  
est le ( plus délicat des vingt-  
quatre principes. Comment le  
savez-vous ? Parce qu'elle ne  
supporte pas le regard ( est in-  
visible ).

On pourra dire : " Cette opinion  
n'est pas correcte, parce que  
l'isolement de l' Âme ne vient  
pas de ce qu'elle voit la Nature.  
Car le maître qui considère

\* Dr. Takakusu gives a note to say that Paramārtha's commentary agrees with that of Gauḍapāda almost word for word. It is possible that the arguments might have been traditional in the Sāṅkhya school, but so close a coincidence cannot nevertheless be a mere chance.—It is worth noting how Paramārtha turns the Śruti quotation into a statement of the Vaiśeṣika view and its refutation.

† This is a part of the com. on the last Kārikā here given by mistake.



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sukhaduḥkḥayoḥ । Īśvarapreṣito  
gacchet svargaṁ narakam eva  
vā ॥ Vedavādinah punar ittham  
kāraṇam āhuḥ : Puruṣa evedaṁ  
sarvam. Ityataḥ puruṣaṁ kāra-  
ṇam āhuḥ. Apara svabhāvam  
āhuḥ : svabhāvaḥ kāraṇam iti.  
Tathā hi : Kena śuklikṛtā  
haṁsāḥ śukās ca haritikṛtāḥ ।  
Mayūrās citritā yena sa no  
vṛttim vidhāsyati ॥ Atra  
Sāṁkhyo vadati : Īśvaraḥ kāra-  
ṇam na bhavati : Kasmāt ? Nir-  
guṇatvāt. Imāḥ saguṇāḥ prajāḥ ;  
sattvarajastamāṁsi trayo gu-  
ṇāḥ. Te ca prajāsu santi. Tāṁs  
ca guṇān dṛṣtvā sādhayāmaḥ :  
prakṛter imāḥ samutpannāḥ  
prajāḥ. Yadīśvaraḥ kāraṇam  
syāt tato nirguṇād Īśvarān  
nirguṇā eva prajāḥ syuḥ. Na  
caivam. Tasmād Īśvaraḥ kāra-  
ṇam na bhavati. Evam puruṣo'pi  
draṣṭavyaḥ. Svabhāvo nāma  
na kaścit padārtho 'sti yataḥ  
prajānām utpattisaṁgatiḥ syāt.  
Tasmād yo brūte svabhāvaḥ  
kāraṇam iti tan mithyā. Keci  
kālaṁ kāraṇatayā varṇayanti.  
Kālaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṁ-  
harate prajāḥ । Kālaḥ suptesu jā-  
garti tasmāt kālas tu kāraṇam ॥  
Tad api Sāṁkhyo nirākurute :  
Kālo nāma na kaścit padārtho  
'sti ; vyaktam avyaktam puruṣa  
iti traya eva padārthāḥ. Tatra  
kālo'ntarbhūtaḥ ; avyaktatva-  
svagatatvāt kālasya'pi. Evam  
pradhānam hitvā nāstyanyat

Īśvara comme la cause du  
monde dit : " L'Âme, ignorant  
et séparée de la Nature, se  
contente des douleurs et des  
joies ; " Īśvara peut l'envoyer  
dans le ciel ou dans l'enfer." A  
cause de cela la Nature ne peut  
être libérée, même quand l'Âme  
a vu la Nature. La délicatesse  
de la Nature ne peut donc pas  
être prouvée. Ensuite le maître  
qui considère la spontanéité  
comme la cause ( du monde )  
dit : " L'opinion qui prétend  
qu'en voyant la Nature on  
obtient la Délivrance n'est pas  
correcte, car la Délivrance est  
obtenue spontanément ; il a été  
dit plus haut ( st. 27 ) " De ce  
qui produit la couleur blanche  
des haṁsas, la couleur verte des  
perroquets et la couleur bario-  
lée des paons, c'est de cela que  
moi aussi je suis créé." Ainsi  
la spontanéité est la cause du  
monde entier ; la Délivrance  
s'effectue donc spontanément  
et non pas par la Nature. Ensuite  
un maître ( qui adhère à la  
théorie de l'Âme ) dit : " Il  
n'est pas correct de dire qu'en  
voyant la Nature on obtient la  
Délivrance, car la Délivrance  
s'effectue au moyen de l'Âme  
comme il est dit dans ces vers :  
" Les hymnes des quatre védas  
exaltent les âmes du passé et  
du futur qui ont pouvoir sur la  
vie et la mort, dont les actes  
ont été accomplis et ne se

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kāraṇam. Tatra pradhānāvagamam prati yadā puruṣasya samyag jñānam utpadyate tadā tena jñānena dr̥ṣṭā prakṛtiḥ puruṣasaṃgān nīvartate. Svair-  
inīva puruṣenopalakṣitā —Aye  
iyam asādhvī mām mohayati. Tasmān na mamānayā kāryam na itareṇa Īśvarādikāraṇen-  
etivat. Tasyām ca nivṛttāyām mokṣaṃ gacchati. Evam Īśvarā-  
dīni akāraṇāni. Sukumā-  
rataram ityetadvākyaśeṣaḥ kṛ-  
taḥ. Yasnāt sukumārataram  
pradhānam tasmād ucyate :  
Prakṛteḥ sukumārataram na  
kimcid asti me matir bhavati  
puruṣasya. Atrāha : Sā dr̥ṣṭā  
puruṣena katham nīvartate  
prakṛtiḥ. Atrocyaṭe : Yā dr̥ṣṭā-  
mīti punar na darśanam upaiti  
puruṣasya. Yathā kācit kulastrī  
sādhvī svagrādhvārī sthitā  
puruṣeṇa sahasaivāgatena dr̥ṣṭā  
sahasaiva vṛḍamānā tvaṛitam  
gr̥ham pravistā. Sā evam matvā,  
dr̥ṣṭā'ham aneneti, na punar  
darśanam upaiti puruṣasya.  
Evam prakṛtiḥ paramātmānā  
puruṣeṇa jñānacakṣuṣā dr̥ṣṭā.  
Sā savṛḍā kulastrīva na punar  
darśanam upaiti puruṣasya.  
Tasyām ca nivṛttāyām puruṣo  
mokṣaṃ gacchati.\*

répètent plus ” C'est pour cette  
cause que la Délivrance s'ef-  
fectue et non pas par le fait de  
voir la Nature.”

Répondant à tous nous disons :  
“Vous considérez Īśvara comme  
la cause, mais votre opinion  
n'est pas correcte. Pourquoi ?  
Parce qu'il n'a pas de guṇas.  
Īśvara ne possède pas les trois  
guṇas, tandis que le monde les  
possède : la cause et l'effet  
seraient donc dissemblables ;  
pour cette raison Īśvara ne peut  
pas être la cause. La Nature  
seule est douée des trois guṇas :  
comme le monde en est doué  
aussi, nous savons que la  
Nature est la cause. Pour la  
même raison l'Âme non plus  
ne doit pas être considérée  
comme étant la cause, car elle  
n'a pas de guṇas.

Il n'est pas correct non plus  
de considérer la spontanéité  
comme la cause du monde, car  
elle est au-delà du domaine de  
la perception et de l'inférence.  
Par la perception nous voyons  
d'abord la cause et puis l'effet.  
Par l'inférence nous servons de  
ce qui a été vu par la perception  
pour calculer le passé et le

*Kāraṇam Īśvaram eke Puruṣam Kālam pare Svabhāvam vā ।*

*Prajāḥ katham nīvartayato vyaktaḥ Kālaḥ Svabhāvas ca ॥*

\* The commentary on this Kārikā, both in the original Sanskrit and in its Chinese version, introduces an “ Utsūtra ” discussion as to Īśvara, Puruṣa, Svabhāva, and Kāla as first principles. The words introducing these discussions, with a little readjustment, form the following Kārikā—

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	<p>futuŕ, que nous connaissons par ce moyen.</p> <p>Si vous dites que nous pouvons le savoir par <i>āplavacana</i> ( c'est-à-dire par les vers cités plus haut ), c'est encore incorrect, car l'opinion qui y est exprimée est complètement erronée ; ce n'est donc pas un <i>āplavacana</i>.</p> <p>On pourra dire : " Il y a encore quelques autres opinions. Il y a des hommes qui considèrent le temps comme la cause ; ainsi il est dit dans une stance : " Le temps mûrit tout ce qui existe, il détruit tout ce qui existe ; quand le monde dort, le temps veille ; qui peut tromper le temps ? " Toute chose dérive du temps ; c'est pourquoi on atteint la Délivrance sans la vue de la Nature. "</p> <p>Nous répondons : " L'opinion qui considère le temps comme étant la cause est erronée, car le temps ne se trouve pas parmi les trois catégories, la Nature, ses produits et l'Âme, qui renferment toute chose qui existe. En</p>

This has been put forward as the missing Kārikā in the traditional seventy composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, excluding the last three which detail the " Sampradāya. " The late Bal Gangadharā Tilak who suggested this ingenious reconstruction was doubtless aware of certain difficulties and inconsistencies of interpretation presented by the present text of the Mātharavṛtti and not absent even in the Chinese version of it by Paramārtha. We allude to this topic here merely to show that the text of Māthara as well as of Paramārtha has suffered considerable corruption and interpolation.

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	<p>           dehors des trois catégories il n'y a rien ; elles ne renferment pas le temps ; nous savons donc que le temps n'existe pas. Ce qu'on appelle temps est une modalité d'un produit ; le temps passé, c'est un produit passé, et le présent et le futur sont de même des produits présents et futurs. Nous savons donc que " temps " n'est qu'une épithète des produits. Pour cette raison nous considérons la Nature comme étant la vraie cause. " Un homme qui a acquis cette vraie connaissance, arrive à voir bien et pleinement la Nature, après quoi celle-ci se cache et se sépare de l'Âme opérant ainsi la Délivrance de l'Âme. C'est pourquoi il a été dit : " Excessivement délicate est la Nature ; je pense qu'il n'y a rien ( délicat ) comme elle. "         </p> <p>           On pourra demander : " Quand la Nature a été vue, pourquoi se retire-t-elle ? " Nous répondons :         </p> <p> <i>" J'ai maintenant été vue " : alors elle se cache et ne se montre plus. " De même qu'une femme de bonne famille, vertueuse par nature, est couverte de confusion et se cache quand un homme vient à la voir à l'improviste, de même la Nature, quand l'Âme vient à la voir bien et pleinement, se retire et se cache, et l'Âme reste complètement isolée.</i> </p>

## (iv) The Chinese, Japanese, and Corean versions of the Vṛtti.

Dr. Takakusu has not given sufficient data on the point: but such variants as he has occasionally noted at times go to confirm the authenticity of the Sanskrit of Māṭhara as against the Chinese of Paramārtha in places where the two differ. For instance :—

Page 980, Note (i): Takakusu's emendation against the concurrent testimony of his sources is not substantiated by the Sanskrit original, where also we read: "Nanu duḥkhebhya eva jīñāsā samutpannā katham teṣām evābhāvāyā kāraṇatvaṃ upayāti." The discussion is perfectly intelligible in Sanskrit but might have been misunderstood by one or the other of the translators. That Paramārtha is not above occasionally misunderstanding even the words of the Kārikā follows from his rendering of the word "parasparākūtahetukām" in Kārikā 31 by "sans être mis en action par autre chose"—assuming that Takakusu has rendered his Chinese properly. As the learned Doctor truly says: "Il dit juste le contraire." Compare also page 1049 Note (i), where also Dr. Takakusu asserts: "le traducteur a mal compris."

Page 986, Note (1): The instance of smoke and fire absent in the Chinese but given by the Japanese commentator is also given by Māṭhara.

Page 989, Note (6). The reading Rṣabha or Nirgranthika possibly corresponds to the Jivakas of the original. Māṭhara quotes in the passage the views of the Buddhists as well as the Jains, although a Buddhist translator might have felt somewhat uncomfortable in translating them literally. Hence perhaps the confusion in Paramārtha.

Page 1022, Note (1): The wrong number 13 is warranted by the Sanskrit of Māṭhara. The Corean text is evidently improving upon what might have been an original oversight.

Page 1053, Note (1): Kārikā 63 together with its commentary is absent in the Chinese. Takakusu concludes from the circumstance that the Kārikā might have been an interpolation subsequent to the date of Paramārtha (A. D. 546). But the motive for the interpolation is not obvious. Māṭhara does contain the Kārikā and gives a brief Vṛtti on it. It is therefore probably an accidental omission.

\* Page 1059, Note (1): Dr. Takakusu notes that the first two stages of the "Śisyaparamparā" in Kārikā 70 are given by three of the four texts used by him as :

Kaṭila.....Āsuri.....Pañcaśikha and Vindhya-vāsa

It is the Corean text alone that refuses to bracket Vindhya-vāsa with Pañcaśikha, herein agreeing with the Sanskrit original. Clearly therefore Paramārtha ( who has much to tell us about Vindhya-vāsa in his "Life of Vasubandhu") must have been responsible for introducing that name in his translation. That he is wrong in this follows from the singular "tena" of the original Kārikā.

These few cases, which might be typical of many more would go to prove the authenticity and the antiquity of the Sanskrit of Māthara.

( v ) The text-tradition of the Mātharavṛtti.

In section ( iii ) we gave one probable reason to account for the absence of complete agreement between Paramārtha's Chinese version and its Sanskrit original. There is another reason also at work. The present form of the Mātharavṛtti exhibits many accretions and alterations made in the course of the transcriptional tradition. The oldest extant Ms. of the Vṛtti is dated Samvat 1457. The text is here written in fine old Devanāgarī characters with Prṣṭhamātrās, generally correct, with occasional marginal notes and additions, some of them in a different handwriting. The other known Mss. of the Vṛtti give more or less the same text, copying even its error and introducing once in a while extra errors and additions. Now, the text of the Vṛtti, even in its oldest Ms. seems to have been evidently increased by incorporation of the students' marginalia, consisting mainly of elucidations of difficult points, definitions and derivations of specific words, and additions of confirmatory quotations from texts more familiar to the student or to his teacher. Thus after the very first sentence of the Vṛtti on Kārikā 1—*Asyā āryāyā upodghātaḥ kriyate*—the Mss. give a definition of Upodghāta :

*Sthānam nimittam raktā ca śrotā śrotaprayojanam ।  
Sambandhādhyabhidhānam ca upodghātaḥ sa ucyate ॥*

And further on, in connection with the explanation of "Ekāntātyantato'bhāvāt" we are treated with a rather elaborate proof of the futility of medicines and the greed of medical men,

in which context occur the following familiar lines introduced with " Bhavanti cātra ślokaḥ " :—

*Punar dūhaḥ samutpannaḥ punar jūtaś ca vepathuḥ ।  
 Bādhate ca punar hikkā jvaraś ca punar āgataḥ ॥  
 Puspitākṣaḥ śalākī ca kuṣṭhī kāyacikitsakaḥ ।  
 Pr̥cchanti bālabhīṣajam katham te dūrakā mṛtāḥ ॥  
 Yānikāni ca mūlāni yenakena ca peṣayet ।  
 Yasmaikasmai ca dātavyam yadvātadvā bhaviṣyati ॥  
 Vaidya Vaidya namas tubhyaṁ kṣapitāśeṣamānava ।  
 Tvayi vinyastabhāro'yaṁ Kṛtāntaḥ sukham edhate ॥*

These lines are absent not only in Paramārtha but also in Gaudapāda. Another elaboration of which the responsibility can safely be thrown upon the student-copyist occurs under Kārikā 23, where the Mātharavṛtti gives us a whole string of definitions directly taken from the Yogasūtras of Patañjali, Gaudapāda being merely content with the general statement : " Tatra Yamā Niyamāś ca Pātañjale 'bhihitāḥ." And a like explanation has to be offered for the several quotations from Upaniṣads, Gitā, Purāṇas, and stotras like the " Hastāmalaka " ( under st. 39 ). It is also quite in the manner of a student anxious to display his wares that under Kārikā 16 the analogy— " Yathā salilam ekaṁ himavad dhimabhāvena pariṇamati " is supplemented by two other analogies absent alike in Paramārtha and Gaudapāda : " Yathā ca iksuraso rasikā-khaṇḍa-matsarikā-śarkarā-phāṇita-guḍa-bhāvena pariṇamati, yathā vā kṣīraṁ drapsya-dadhi-mastu-navanita-ghṛtāriṣṭa-kilāta-kūrcikādi-bhāvena pariṇamati "—Paramārtha himself for his part elaborating the first analogy as follows : " L'eau qui vient de l'atmosphère est au commencement d'un seul goût. Elle se transforme dès qu'elle arrive sur la terre. Elle devient d'un goût varié selon les différents réceptacles. Si elle est dans un vase d'or, son goût est très doux ; si elle est dans la terre, son goût diffère selon la qualité de la terre." A somewhat similar motive underlies the elaborate description, under Kārikā 38, of the way in which not only the Akāśa ( which is what Paramārtha treats of ) but each one of the five elements can be, under specific conditions, alternately śānta, ghora, and mūḍha. And of a slightly different nature is the circumstance that while under Kārikā 51 Paramārtha details an Ākhyāyikā to illustrate " Dānasiddhi " Māthara in the same place gives an Ākhyāyikā for " ūhasiddhi ", Gaudapāda of course giving neither the one nor the other. The ultimate source for all such Ākhyāyikās was probably the

Śāstītantra, and there probably were separate ākhyāyikās current in connection with each one of these siddhis. The following very curious derivations of "Ahaṁkāra" and "Bhagavān" probably emanate from some Pandit teacher of the student-copyist: "Catuḥśaṣṭivarṇaiḥ\* parādīvaikhanṇaparyantābhi-  
dheyair yat kimapy abhidhiyate buddhyā samarthya tat sakalam  
ādyanta-akārahakāra-varṇadvayagrahaṇenoparisthitapindikṛtā-  
nukāriṇā bindunā bhūṣiṭaḥ Pratyāhāraṇyāyena "Ahaṁkāra"  
ityabhidhiyate." And also. "Ata eva bhūtānām utpattipralayā-  
vabodhanād "bha" iti; āgatigatiparijñānād "ga" iti; vidan  
yogī iti "va"; anati, calatīti "an". Sakalavarṇasampradāyād  
"Bhagavan" ity abhimānasiddhiḥ."

Besides such elaborations our Māthara MSS. seem to have been compared with certain Gaudapāda MSS. and even contaminated with them. One very clear case in point I shall here single out. Under Kārikā 18 the Mātharavṛtti gives two explanations of the phrase "Janmamaraṇakaraṇānām pratiniyamāt"—Iha kecin nicajanmānaḥ kecin madhyamajanmānaḥ kecid utkrṣṭajanmānaḥ. Yadi punar ekaḥ puruṣaḥ syāt sa eva nicakulotpannaḥ syāt sa eva utkrṣṭakulotpannaḥ syāt ... etc.... Apare punar itthaṁkāraṁ varṇayanti: Iha kaścit kadācīn mriyate tadaiva paro jayate. Yadyekaḥ puruṣaḥ syāt tarhi ekasmin jāyamāne sarvepi jāyeraṇ...etc.... This last explanation is exactly that of Gaudapāda. If a contamination with Gaudapāda Ms be not assumed we will have to assume as an alternative the existence of commentaries on the Kārikās earlier than that of Māthara—an assumption that would be fatal to any theory which would regard the author of the Kārikās as identical with that of the Vṛtti translated into Chinese by Paramārtha. This process of contamination we can observe taking place under our very eyes. Thus our oldest Māthara MS. gives on fol. 24 *b* a marginal note directly taken from Gaudapāda; and the same is true of the explanation of "prati-prati" on fol. 29 *a*.

#### (vi) The Conclusion.

While for a question of this nature we can always imagine a large number of possibilities, the only safe and probable con-

\* A marginalia on folio 34 *a* explains how the number 64 is arrived at. That the marginalia of one Ms. can in time become part of the text in another is a process familiar enough to all who have to deal critically with Mss. We find more than one illustration of the process in our Māthara Mss.



clusion that all the facts above presented seem to warrant is somewhat categorically to be expressed as follows:—

1. Original Māṭhara = The original of Paramārtha;
2. Present Māṭhara = Original Māṭhara, *minus* accidental omissions (2 per cent), *plus* students' interpolations (20 per cent), *plus* contamination with Gauḍapāda (3 per cent) *plus* the extra Kārikā at the end together with its commentary to make the total, of 70 + 3.
3. Paramārtha = Original Māṭhara *minus* intentional omissions and abridgements (20 per cent) *plus* intentional elaborations and additions (25 per cent).
4. Gauḍapāda = Original Māṭhara *minus* intentional omissions due to condensing (25 per cent), *plus* intentional additions (8 per cent).

If the above can be taken as a fair account of what actually took place we will have to conclude, as against Dr. Takakusu's theory, that Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself could not possibly have been the author of the *Viṭṭi* that was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha cir. 450 A. D. When an old MS. actually gives the name of the *Viṭṭikāra* as Māṭhara there seems to be no reason why one should disbelieve the statement. As to Paramārtha, as he had not been a rigorously faithful translator we can perhaps understand why he omitted the name of the commentator. Now, Māṭhara more than a dozen times, addresses Īśvarakṛṣṇa as "Bhagavān" and if A. D. 400 be taken as the lower limit of Māṭhara the lower limit for Īśvarakṛṣṇa cannot reasonably be placed later than A. D. 200. He probably belong to the first century or the first half of the second century after Christ.\*

\* This date is arrived at independently of the question of the identity of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Vindhyavāsa and the whole problem connected therewith. As Vārṣaganya's claim to the authorship of the *Śaṣṭitantra* is not above suspicion, and as the reference to his name in Vyāsa's *Pātañjalasūtrabhāṣya* might be due to his having been, if anything, a famous authority on Yoga, the non-mention of Vārṣaganya's name by Māṭhara, or by Paramārtha's Chinese version for the matter of that, seems to be void of the literary and chronological importance that Professor Keith seems to be inclined to attribute to it in page 69, note, of his book referred to by us at the outset.

## A NEW INSCRIPTION OF APARĀDITYA OF V. S. 1176.

BY

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The inscription which I edit here for the first time was discovered many years back in Somanātha Pātana in Kathiawad. It was taken to Bombay,—when and how it is not known—and was lying there for many years in the Town Hall. It has been now removed to the Archaeological section of the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay.

It is inscribed on a slab of stone which bears above the inscribed portion the representations of the sun and the moon and of a Śivaliṅga between these two, as we find in another inscription of another Aparāditya of Śaka 1109, published in *Ehi. Ind.* XII p. 332. The inscribed portion measures 1', 4" in length and 1', 1" in breadth. It contains 12 lines of writing, the last three or four of which cannot be clearly read, as that portion of the inscription is too much worn out.

It seems to record, as is seen from the portion which can be clearly read, a gift of land in a garden at Sthānakiya Pātana by Lakṣamaṇa Nāyaka, who was the minister of Aparāditya. The grant was made by the minister at Somanātha Pātana after bathing in the sea and worshipping the god Śiva. Further details of the property granted and the name of the grantee are lost in the worn out portion.

The Sthānakiya Pātana is no doubt the old name of modern Thānā near Bombay, over which the Śilāhāra Aparāditya reigned. The wording of the present inscription is in many places identical with that of another copperplate inscription of the same king, published by Prof. K. B. Pathak in Vol. XXI p. 505 of *J. B. B. R. A. S.* Our inscription coming from the province of Kathiawad, where Vikrama Samvat had been commonly used, is naturally dated in the year 1176 of that era, which is equal to 1041 of the Śaka era. It is thus eight years earlier than Prof. Pathak's inscription. The minister Lakṣamaṇa Nāyaka and the king Aparāditya are the same in

The *language* is Sanskrit, highly rhetorical, containing 44 full verses and an incomplete verse at the end. As regards the *orthographical* peculiarities very few remarks are necessary : A conjunct consonant following *r* is sometimes doubled. e. g. in कौर्त्ति (1. 7), धर्मराज (1. 10), निर्माय (1. 12), स्वर्द्धेक (1. 26), °कुर्व्वीण (1. 36) etc. *Prīṣṭhamātrās* are used throughout the record. Many letters show archaic forms : The loop of *y* is stretched much to the left hand, thus giving it an older form than that of the other letters. Similarly the older forms of the letters *Kṣa*, *j*, etc. are found used. The initial vowel *i* is used in a curious way, showing the form midway between the old one of three dots and the modern one, (1. 25 first letter; 1. 14 first letter). The initial vowel *e* (1. 18) is expressed by a big elongated zero.

As regards *vocabulary*, attention may be drawn to the word घनासु (1. 25) meaning 'many' used with the noun कान्तासु. The poet wanted here probably to Sanskritise the Gujarati word घणा meaning 'many'. For in Gujarati they do speak घणी स्त्रियो—'many women'. The use of the word नरायण for नारायण (1. 30) for the convenience of metre, also the use of सत्या for सत्यभामा, (1. 25), speak against the poetical abilities of the composer, though by the use of alliterations (e. g. in verses 1 and 35) and of *Śleṣa* (e. g. in verses 12 and 29) he has tried to make his *prāsa* as attractive as possible. On the whole the result is that it does not rise above the level of the mediocre. The expression नागह्मेदेवी (11. 24, 29, and 31) for the true form नागलदेवी (1. 21 and 32) is obviously for the sake of metre.

The record begins with an obeisance to the god Śiva and his wife Pārvatī (verse 1) and to the god Viṣṇu sleeping in the Kṣīrasāgara. (v. 2). Then the description of a family beginning with the name of JAGATSIMHA is given. He defeated MANDALĪKA in a battle, (v. 3). He built a temple of (Śiva named) Viñjhaleśvara in VĀMANASTHALĪ (which is modern Vanthali, where the inscription was found), (v. 5). His younger brother was ARISIMHA (v. 6). His son was KṢEMĀNANDA, who was the best of the feudatory kings, (v. 8). The CAULUKYA king VĪRA' HAVALA'S daughter PRĪMALADEVĪ was married to him, (v. 9). They got a son named VIJAYĀNANDA,\* who is extravagantly praised by the poet (vv. 10-14). He made some additions to the temple of Viñjhaleśvara in Vāmanasthalī

\* His name is spelt as Vidyānanda in the 10th and 30th lines.

by making a canopy, a *torana* and other constructions and in (the compound of) that very temple he built another Śīva temple facing the west ( v. 17 ). He also made a number of pious gifts ( v. 18 ).

After this, the poet turns to give, from the fifteenth line onwards, an account of a RĀSTRAKŪṬA family in which a great warrior named UDDĀLA was born (vv. 19 and 20). The Caulukya sovereign, LAVANAPRASĀDA, seeing his bravery made him his viceroy ( v. 21 ). He had a son named JAITRASIMHA ( v. 23 ). His son was BHĪMASIMHA who fought many battles against the enemies of the sovereign VĪSALADEVĀ ( vv. 25-26 ). Bhīmasimha's wife was MĪNALADEVĪ, from whom he had a beautiful and virtuous daughter named NĀGALADEVĪ who is described in high flown language ( vv. 28-30 ).

This Nāgaladevī was married to Vijayānanda, the son of Kṣemānand (above referred to) ( vv. 31-32 ). Though Vijayānanda had many wives he loved Nāgaladevī most, as Mukunda did Śatyabhāmā ( v. 33 ). To them two sons named SĀMANTASIMHA and TEJAHSIMHA and two daughters named HĪRĀDEVĪ and TĀRĀDEVĪ were born ( v. 34 ). Then a poetical description is given of Sāmantsimha, the descendant of Arisimha ( v. 35 ) and of Tejahsimha ( v. 36 ). Hirādevī was married to a prince named LĀVAṆYADHAVALA of the Caulukya family ( vv. 37-38 ). After a time Hirādevī died. Her mother Nāgaladevī placed her statue facing the east in the inside of the temple of Viñjhaśvara ( v. 39 ).

The inscription, then, inserts an account of a learned Brāhmaṇa family of Maunasa *gotra*, in which Lāvaṇyaśarmā was born. He was the preceptor of Vijayānanda. His younger brother was Nārāyaṇa and his younger brother, again, was Dhandha. To him a son named Śrīdhara was born ( v. 41 ). Without telling anything more of this Śrīdhara the poet again speaks in high terms of Nāgaladevī ( vv. 42-43 ).

The inscription lastly begins to give an account of a learned Brāhmaṇa family from Ānandapur, of Kapisthala *gotra* in which one Govind was born. Just when the name of his son was to be engraved the work was abruptly stopped !

From the summary of the inscription given above it will be seen that it gives us much interesting information of the history of Kathiawar of the period when the peninsula was

under the power of the Caulukya (Vāghelā) sovereigns of Gujarat. As the opening portion of the first line of the inscription, which often contains the date, and its concluding portion, which sometimes contains the date if it is not given at the beginning, are left incomplete, we cannot know the date of our record. But it is possible for us to suppose that it was inscribed sometime about V. S. 1346, since the first half of the verse 31 of our inscription is identical with the first half of the verse 3 of another unpublished inscription\* of V. S. 1346. Both the inscriptions were discovered in the same place and refer to the time of the same feudatory King Vijayānanda. Our inscription does not give the name of the Vāghelā sovereign of Gujarat whom Vijayānanda was serving but the other inscription gives clearly his name as Sāraṅga-deva. We have no proof to say from which of the two inscriptions the first half of the verse was copied in the other. But this much is clear that we can assign our inscription to about V. S. 1346.

Our inscription gives us some account of two feudatory families of the Caulukya sovereign—one named Rāṣtrakūṭa;† the name of the other is unfortunately not given in both the inscriptions. These two families were connected with each other by the

\* The inscription is given below :—

ओं नमः श्रीरेवंताय । संवत् १३४६ वर्षे वैशाख वदि ६ सोमे महाराजाधिराजसारंगदेव-  
कल्याणविजयिराज्ये श्रीवामनस्थल्यां महामंडलेश्वरश्रीविजयानंदद्वयप्रतिपत्तौ ॥

श्रीराष्ट्रकूटान्वयमीलितं श्रीमल्लनामाजनि शौर्यसिंधुः ॥

तस्यात्मजः श्रीहरिपालनामा धन्यो महासाधनिको बभूव ॥ १ ॥

शृंगारभंगिसुभगाः शुभगानवीचिवाचालकंठकुहरा मुहुरान्तवीणाः ॥

गायन्ति... गिरा नगराजशृंगमारुह्य गुह्यकचकोरदृशो यशोस्य ॥ २ ॥

वीरः श्रीविजयानंदः क्षेमानंदस्य नंदनः ॥

विप्रहीतुमना भातुं भूभृत्पल्लीमगात्किल ॥ ३ ॥

नृपकार्याहतस्तत्र हरिपालः कृपालयः ॥

कदारपुत्रं पिशुनेहैन्यमानमुदैक्षत ॥ ४ ॥

तैः समं तन्वतस्तस्य समीकमसथो ययुः ॥

तन्मुर्तियुक्तं तद्भ्राता रणस्तंभमिदं व्यधात् ॥ ५ ॥

सहस्रधाग्नस्तनुजन्मनः श्रीरेवंतनाम्नः पुरतो नवीनः ॥

अचीकरन्मंडपमद्वितीयमहो महासाधनिकः स एषः ॥ ६ ॥


श्रीमुंजिगमुनः श्रीमच्चमत्कारपुरद्विजः ॥

सप्तश्लोकीमिमां चक्रे माधवो विश्वमाधुषः ॥ ७ ॥

लिखितमिदं मंह० अरिसिंहसुत मंह० राउलेन । उत्कीर्णं सूत्र० सांतलसुतसूत्र० वीराकेन ।

† Another Rāṣtrakūṭa family was feudatory to the family of Vijāyananda as is seen from the other inscription.

marriage of Vijayānanda with Nāgaladevī. The more important item which our inscription tells us is that Arisimha's family, in which Vijayānanda was born, was connected by marriage bonds with the imperial family of the Vāghelās of Gujarat, as the Vāghelā sovereign Viradhavala had given his daughter Primaladevī in marriage to Kṣemānanda from whom Vijayānanda was born. The family relation of these three families may then be shown thus—



सामंतसिंह तेजःसिंह हीरादेवी॥ तारादेवी

Jagatsimha, the elder brother of Arisimha is said in our inscription to have defeated Maṇḍalika in battle (v. 3). This Maṇḍalika is no doubt the ruler of the Cūḍāsamā family that was ruling at Vanthali (Vāmanasthali). He is said to have defeated Mahammedans and adorned the temple of Neminātha on the Gīrnār with gold plates.† From the statement of the inscription it seems that he was defeated and driven away from Vanthali, where Jagatsimha's family ruled at least upto the time of Vijayānanda. For Rā Mahāpāla, a descendant of Maṇḍalika reconquered it from Amarasimha and Tejasimha.¶

We are elsewhere told that the Caulukya (Vāghelā) sovereign Viradhavala soon after his accession undertook an invasion against Vanthali, accompanied by his minister, and defeated and slew the two brothers of his wife, Sāṅgaṇa and Chāmuṇḍa, who were ruling at Vanthali, but who refused to pay

\* Favoured by Lavanaprasāda.

§ Favoured by Viśāladeva.

‡ Feudatory of Śāraṅgdeva.

¶ Married to Caulukya Lāvanyadhavala, of whom nothing more is known.

† Kathiawad Gezetteer p. 496.

¶ ibid p. 681.

§ Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I, part I, History of Gñjarat p. 200.

tribute to Viradhavala. From the present inscription and another of V. S. 1346, noted above, we find that Vanthali was ruled over by Jagatsimha's family. All this puts before us a difficult problem of the history of Vanthali of the period. That the Cūdāsamās were ruling at Vanthali before Jagatsimha, on behalf of his Caulukya sovereign, defeated Mandalika, is shown above. We can, therefore, suppose that after Mandalika was defeated and driven away, Viradhavala appointed the brothers of his wife—Sāngaṇa and Cāmuṇḍa, to rule at Vanthali, but upon their refusal to pay tribute to him they were slain and; he appointed Kṣhemānanda (or perhaps his father Arisimha) to rule at Vanthali and also gave his daughter in marriage to him.

The inscription does not tell us why the two Brāhmaṇa families have been mentioned in it; but it seems that Shṛīdhara was the poet who composed the inscription and he was probably related to the other family of Kapiṣṭhala *gotra* by his maternal side. If this is true both families were Nāgara Brāhmaṇa families, as it is distinctly mentioned that the other belonged to Ānandapur which is no doubt modern Vadanagar, the home of the famous class of Nāgara Brāhmaṇas. It is moreover seen that the other inscription copied above was composed by another poet named Mādhava, also a Nāgar Brāhmaṇa (of Vicitrapura i. e. Vadanagara).

### TEXT.\*

- १ .. .....[ १ \* ]..... [दे]वनारातिदून त्रिभुवनवनराजी[नी]रदो  
नीलकंठ [ : । ज ]यति तदनु तस्य प्रेयसी पीतपीतच्छविरविरत
- २ .....[ ॥ १ \* ]..... तपांडुरपुंडरीकसौख्यप्रसुप्तिकविर[च]नचिंचि-  
रीकः । देवः पयोमयपयोधपयोधिशायी पातु प्रियाकशय
- ३ .....[ ॥ २ \* ]..... ण[स्तेज]स्विनामघणीरघामीणगुणार्णवे-  
जनिजगत्सिंहो जगद्धाधवः । जित्वा संयति मंडलीकनिवहं स्थाने  
हयानां ततो ।
- ४ ..... ॥ ३ दुःसामंत यवासकावनिरुहव्यूहव्यथाविस्तर-  
व्यापारापरिभूतभूतलपतिप्रौढप्रतापानलः । उन्मीलत्तरपुंकरव्यतिकरः  
संयामसीमा
- ५ ... .....राधरः ॥ ४ मातुर्विश्वलदेव्या यः श्रेयसे विश्वेश्वर ।  
श्रीवामनपुरस्याति विश्वकान्तमचीकरत् ॥ ५ अरिसिंह इति श्रीमा-  
न्वीरस्तस्यानुभूभूत् [ १ \* ]-

\* From the original stone and a rubbing in the museum.

- ६ ..... ॥ ६ व्योमांतःशशिदंभतः शशिकलालंकारमौलौ  
सुरभोतः पूतः यस्तरंगपटलीलीलायितभ्याजतः । नाभीपांडुरपुंडरीकमिष-  
[तः पाथो ? ] धिपुत्रीपति
- ७ .....कीर्त्तयः ॥ ७ सा[मंतमु]कुटः श्रीमान्क्षेमानंद-  
स्तदंगभूः । बभूव भुवनानंदकंदकंदलनांबुदः ॥ ८ चौलुष्यनृपतेः पुत्री  
श्रीवीरधवलप्रभोः । श्रीमत्प्रमिलदे
- ८ .....[ ॥ ९ \* ] ..... [ वि ] जयानंदस्तयोरजने नंदनः । आप  
वाचस्पतिमूकः केवयं<sup>३</sup> तद्रुणस्तवे ॥ १० कल्पानारभटीपतिषुपुराभिद्वा-  
लाक्षिकालानलज्वालाजालानेभप्रभा ।<sup>४</sup>
- ९ .....[ १ ] ..... त्रयलक्ष भक्षणकलाविल्यातकौक्षेयकः क्षोणा  
चक्रमलंचकार विजयानंदो मुकुंदोपमः ॥ ११ सर्वज्ञः शक्तिपाणिर्धन-  
पतिरमृतज्योतिर्भोजनेत्रः सौ
- १० .....[ पा ] वको धर्मराजः विद्यानंदो विरेजे सकलसुरमयः  
किंतु लंबोदरत्वं वक्रत्वं मंदतां च क्वचिदपि कलयामास नासौ चिराय  
॥ १२ यस्योच्चैः कीर्त्तिपूरे परि
- ११ .....चत्वारश्चंद्रलोकप्रतिभटरुचयः सप्तलोका बभूवुः । शैलाः  
केलासलीलायितमसमशरारातिशोभाममर्त्या नद्यो गंगाविलासंसुरगज-  
ललितं कुंभिनः किं
- १२ .....[ ॥ १३ \* ] ...दशमुखो दनुजारिणा समं निर्माय [ वैरम]चलेपि  
ततान तानवं । सेवोपि शैर्षसमतामयतामनेन लोकं वृण्णेन हारभक्तिसमृद्ध-  
बंधुना ॥ १४ श्रीवामनपुरे ब्रह्मपुत्री
- १३ .....[ ॥ \* ] .....ब्रह्मपुरीं कृत्वा ब्राह्मणेभ्यः सुधीरदात् ॥ १५  
श्रीविंशलेशानलयाभरणं चकार यस्तोरणद्वितयमंबर[चुंबिश्रृंगं]आदोलकं  
च महनीयमहो वितानमुत्तालपट्टमपि बंधुर
- १४ .....॥ १६ ॥ इहैव देवनिलये निजकीर्त्तिनिभप्रभं । पश्चिमाभिमुखं  
शंभुसौधमुद्धरति स्म यः ॥ १७ अवदानानि दानानि [धर्म]स्थानानि  
यानि यः । चकार गणितं नैषां विधिनापि विधीयते ॥ १८
- १५ लोकानंदकरः प्रतापनिकरप्रत्युषवीरोत्करः कल्याणाकरकौमुदीहिमकरः  
प्रावीण्यरत्नाकरः । चंचत्कीर्त्तिचयप्रपंचसिचयप्रच्छादिनाशोद्ययः श्री-  
लीलानिलयभिराय ज

2 Read सौख्य.

3 पुत्रः श्री may be the letters wanting. 4 Read केवलं 5. This line is unnecessary 6 Read शेष



- १६ [यति] श्रीराष्ट्रकूटान्वयः ॥ १९ वीरचूडामणिस्त[त्र].....डलः । उडलः  
सदलंकारः कारुण्यरसभूरभूत् ॥ २० चौलुक्यवंशकमलानलिनीमराल-  
स्तादृग्यशीलवणिमा लवणप्र
- १७ सादः । वीरेषु वीरमवलोक्यमहःसमेतमेतं चिराय निजचि[म्ह]ध[रं] चकार  
॥ २१ यदीयकीर्त्तैरधरोत्तरीयवासोयुगं दुग्धपयोधिगंगे । शशी शिक्षा रत्न-  
मुङ्गानि हारस्तद्विमिश्रं दनचंद्रलेपः
- १८ ॥ २२ तदंगभूमंगल[भू]र्मनोभूमनोज्ञरूपोजनि जैत्रसिंहः । यशोभरोभूद-  
निरुद्ध एव यस्याधिकप्रीणितचित्रलेखः ॥ २३ तदनु मदनतुल्यस्तस्य  
कंसारिशक्तेरजनि तनुजरत्नं रत्नगर्भावतंसः । गु
- १९ णगरिमगभीरो वीरकोटीरहीरः समरविजयलक्ष्मीभा[जनं] भीमसिंहः  
[॥ २४ हंतुं] वीसलभूपते रिपुगजस्तोमं रणप्रांग[णे सिं]हो मेवततार  
तस्य भगवन्सान्निध्यमास्तां तव । पार्वत्येति निशम्य सम्यगुदितं
- २० भीमस्तथैवाकरोत्तेनासौ वसुधातलेष्वभिधया श्रीभीमसिंहोभवत् ॥ २५  
कुलेन शौर्येण नयेन कीर्त्या [श्रि]याभिरामो भुवि भीमसिंहः । तद्वीसल-  
क्षोणिधवेन तेने परिच्छदो[स्वेव नि]देशवर्ती ॥ २६ तस्य
- २१ मीणलदेवीति कलत्रमनुलारुतिः । रतिः प्रीतिश्च गौरी च यया जिग्ये  
तनुश्रिया ॥ २७ रावणारिरमणी रमणीया तत्सुता जयति नागलदेवी  
कीर्त्तयस्ति लकयंति यदीया नागनाकनखांति जगंति ॥ २८ स ।
- २२ त्या वाचां विभूति[र्वि]लसति वदने चित्रलेखा पदेभ्या गौरीकान्तिः  
[श]रीरे हृदि रतिरलकश्रेणिका मूर्ध्नि रुष्णा । पाणौ लक्ष्मीरनंता मनसि  
गुणतार्ताः किं वदामोतिरेकादेका निःशेषलोकोत्तरयुव
- २३ तिमयी भाति नागलदेवी ॥ २९ लालित्यं दधती मनोहरपदन्यासाभि-  
रामारुतिर्बिधाणा रसपद्धतिं मधुरतामाविधत्ता संततां । आहारैरमृतोप-  
भैरहरहः संमोदयंती सतामंतः सत्कवितेव कस्य न मुदे
- २४ नागलदेवी भुवि ॥ ३० वीरः श्रीविजयानंदः क्षेमानंदस्य नंदनः ।  
ताममंदगुणोदारान्दाम्नाप्य मुदं दधे ॥ ३१ मंडलेश्वरकोटीरमणेभ्य  
महीयसः । श्रीमन्नागलदेवीयं पट्टराज्ञीपदेभवत् ॥ ३२ मुकुट ।
- २५ इव कान्तासु वियानंदो घनास्वपि । सत्यायामिव सत्याब्धिर्यस्यामाधि-  
कनिर्वृतिः ॥ ३३ [श्रीमासामंतसिंह]ः श्रीतेजसिंहस्तयोः सुतौ ॥  
हीरादेवी तथा तारादेवी देवीनिभे सुते ॥ ३४ भस्मोद्भूतलशूल-  
मौलिमिलित
- २६ स्वर्लोकेकलोलिनी कलोलप्रतिमल्लकीर्त्तिसलिलप्रक्षालितक्ष्मातलः । आचं-  
द्रार्क[मसा]वुदेतु विजयी राजा न को जानकी जानिश्चरिसिंह  
वंशमुकुटः सामंतसिंहः सुधीः ॥ ३५ यः शत्रूणां समिति शमयत्य

- २७ द्रुतं बाहुतेजस्तेजःसिंहः स जयाति जगन्मानसोत्तसहस्रः । धिकुर्वाणः  
स्मरमपि वपुःशोभया चित्रमेतं भेजे लक्ष्मी रतिरपि तथा कीर्त्तिपूरो निरुद्धः  
॥ ३६ हीरादेवी गभीरासौ लावण्यधनला
- २८ कृतिः तदस्यै विधाना दत्तो लावण्यधवलो धवः ॥ ३७ लावण्यध-  
वलो वीरश्चौलुक्यकुलदीपकः । स्नेहवत्या सुदशया दिदीपे दीमया यया  
॥ ३८ हीरादेव्यामथ विधवशान्नाकलोकं गतायां ।<sup>१०</sup>
- २९ तस्या माता मङ्गितहरीधामनागल्लदेवी । अस्या मूर्त्तिं त्रिभुवनगुरो-  
र्विश्लेशस्य गर्भागारे गौरामिव शशिमूर्त्तीं प्राङ्मुखीं निर्ममेसौ ॥ ३९  
अचंडचंडयुतिभंडलाभ्यां योः कुंडलाभ्यामिव भा ।<sup>११</sup>
- ३० ति यावत् । नागल्लदेवीदुहितुः पवित्रा मूर्त्तिः क्षितौ नंदतु तावदेषा  
॥ ४० विद्वान्मौन्यवंशरत्नमवनीसीमंतमुदतामणेर्विद्यानंदविभोर्विभाति  
। भुवने लावण्यशर्म्मा गुरुः । धीमानस्ति नरायण ।<sup>१२</sup>
- ३१ स्तदनुजस्तस्यानुजन्माजानि श्रीधंघस्तनुजोस्य राजविरुती श्रीमानयं  
श्रीधरः ॥ ४१ सती च सीता च सरस्वती च गंगा च गोदा च कलिं-  
दजा च । नागल्लदेवी च नितातमेता जयंतु सप्तापि यश
- ३२ स्समेताः ॥ ४२ रहस्यामव शोचस्य सौभाग्यस्येव भाग्यभूः पुण्यस्येव परी-  
पाकः श्रीमन्नागलदेव्यसौ ॥ ४३ वंशे कपिश्लमुनैरवनीवतंसरत्नं वनी-  
पकवनीनवनीरवाहः । भूजानिपूजि
- ३३ तपद्ः पदमिंदराया गोविंद इत्यजनि कोविदसार्वभौमः ॥ ४४ धी  
सिंधुरानेन्द्रपुरद्विजस्य तस्यांगजन्मा

**THE HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE PALLAVAS,\*** by C. S. SRINIVASACHARI, M. A., Junior Professor of History, Pachaiyappa's College, Madras.

The late Dr. V. A. Smith used to speak of the Pallavas as one of "the mysteries of Indian history." Thanks to the industry of modern archæologists, the mystery may now be said to have been more or less cleared up, and the history of this brilliant and gifted race, to whom Southern India owes so much, is no longer one of the dark spots in the history of India. It is a remarkable fact that previous to 1840, the very existence of this great nation had been completely forgotten. Inscriptions then began to come to light, and at first people were inclined to connect them with the Pahlavas or Indo-Parthians of the Punjab, though how they were supposed to have found their way from the banks of the Indus to the Godavari was a problem which no one attempted to explain ! It is now fairly certain that the Pallavas were an indigenous Nāga race, whose chieftains were viceroys of the Āndhrabhṛtyas, and intermarried with them. On the break-up of the Āndhra power, they set up as independent rulers. Their capital was Kāñci, one of the seven sacred cities of India, and a famous University town. It was to Kāñci that young Mayūraśarman came with his tutor for his education, and thus conceived the idea of founding the Kadamba dynasty. Hiuen Tsiang stayed a considerable time at Kāñci, and was greatly struck with it. The Pallavas were the hereditary enemies of the Cālukyas, with whom they waged a perennial war. In 642 A. C. they took Vātāpi (Badāmi), the Cālukya capital, and probably slew the great Pulikeśin II. Both nations were themselves out in this mutual war of extermination and vanished from the page of history in the middle of the 8th century A. C. The greatest claim of the Pallavas upon our attention is their contributions to Indian art and architecture. By their connections with the Viṣṇukunḍins and the Vākāṭakas, they were the channel through which the culture of the Guptas filtered through to Dravidian India. Their chief remains are the wonderful Rathas, known as the

**Sêven Pagodas at Mahābalipuram, and the great relief-sculpture, the Penance of Arjuna.**

Professor Śrinivāsachārī's little pamphlet does not claim to be an original contribution, or to contain any independent research upon his subject. But it is a lucid, scholarly and up-to-date summary of all that has hitherto been discovered about it. It is well-written and put together, and excellently printed. It might, perhaps, be more elaborately documented.

H. G. RAWLINSON

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**The Sanskrit Drama in its Origin, Development, Theory and Practice** by  
A. Berriedale Keith, D.C.L., D. Litt., Oxford, at the Clarendon Press,  
1924 ( 21s. ) ;

Of the series of books in which Prof. Keith has given to the world in such quick succession the outcome of the prolonged and conscientious labours of a massive intellect, endowed with inexhaustible and almost insatiable powers of application, his latest is probably his most characteristic work. A part of the ground has been already covered by such standard works as Lévi's "Théâtre Indien", Konow's "das Indische Drama," and Winternitz's "Geschichte der Indischen Literatur" and the contributions of Jacobi and Lindenau; and yet Prof. Keith has made his own all that he has touched; he receives nothing on trust; his judgment penetrates and re-forms the whole, while his industry has added new material everywhere. We have thus for the first time in English a comprehensive treatise on the Sanskrit Drama, richly documented and lucidly arranged.

Prof. Keith's book is divided into four parts. In the first he deals with the origin of the Sanskrit Drama. After a brief reference to the dramatic elements in the R̥gveda and in the Vedic ritual and a discussion of the famous Mahābhāṣya passage ( III. 2. 111 ), he points out the close connection between the Indian Drama and Religion and disposes of the theories of Hillebrandt, Konow and Pischel. Prof. Keith hesitates,—and it is creditable to him that he hesitates—to endorse the theories of Windisch about the Greek influence on Sanskrit Drama; but he has given all the pros and cons of the problem, in which his learnings lie obviously on the side of the pros. In Part II

he deals with the chief dramatic writers and their works, devoting special attention to the dramatic style and art, to the language and metre. He has given an analysis of the most important plays and has illustrated his remarks with plenty of quotations. A chapter on the characteristics and the achievements of the Sanskrit drama brings this part to a close. In the third part he expounds and criticises the Indian Dramatic Theory. In the last he gives an idea of the ancient Indian theatre, the actors, the *mis-en-scène* and the audience. For the two Indexes at the end, all students of Sanskrit literature ought to feel grateful, as also for the rich mine of bibliographical information contained in the footnotes.

The value of Prof. Keith's book is obvious. It would be ungracious, and also impossible within the space at our disposal, to discuss all the issues raised in it. Our main complaint against Prof. Keith is that as a critic of Sanskrit drama he is lacking in imaginative sympathy. The poets can never be free from the conventions of their art and the trammels of their social environment. To condemn Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti and the Indian Drama because they accepted a Brahmanical view of life and did not conform themselves to the Greek canons of the dramatic art is to show an incapacity to rise superior to one's own immediate environment. The critic, or rather the lover of poetry ought to have the Yogi's power of entering into other minds, forgetting his own for the time being. And if a universal canon of literary criticism is possible, it ought to make a plentiful allowance for the genius of each literature.

Nowhere does Prof. Keith show a greater insensibility than in the way he speaks of the *Uttararāmacarita*. All that he can say of the third act is: 'The scene in Act III when Sita sees and forgives her spouse, is admirable in its delicacy of the portrayal of her gradual but generous surrender to the proof that, though harsh, he deeply loved her.' On the contrary, according to him, 'the last act, however, reveals Bhavabhūti at his best.'

We cannot also agree with Prof. Keith in the ideas that he holds about the Trivendrum dramas. We intend publishing in the next issue of the *Annals* a detailed examination of the *Bhāsa* problem by a colleague and shall therefore reserve our comments.

• The book needs a list of corrections. We note a few important ones :—

- p. 27, l. 15, *than* ? ( probably, *when* )  
 80, l. 16, for *Tibetan* read *Chinese*  
 85, l. 21, *Pāripārśvaka*  
 149, l. 10, Irāvati does not beg *her* pardon  
 152, Sq., for *Duḥsanta* read *Dusyanta*  
 186, Note 1, l. 1, *Padā*<sup>o</sup>  
 191, l. 6, *slay*  
 197, l. 2 of the 3k. St., *jalpatorakrameṇa*  
 201, l. 4 of Sk. St. 3, omit *ca*.

V. G. P.

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A PRACTICAL SANSKRIT DICTIONARY with Transliteration, Accentuation and Etymological Analysis throughout, by A. A. MACDONNELL, Oxford University Press, 1924 (30 S.)

We have to thank the Publishers for their having presented to the Institute the valuable reprint of Prof. Macdonell's Dictionary. It is a photographic reproduction of the original edition of 1892 and as such marks the triumph of the photo-mechanical art. It is historical and etymological and at the same time practical and handy, although on accounts of its being very compactly printed, it is more copious than other European lexicons.

It is a pity that the publishers have decided to give a re-impression, when obviously a revised edition was necessary. A very long list of words, from the very works, to which the Dictionary claims to a vocabulary, could be quoted which either do not appear in the Dictionary or are insufficiently or incorrectly explained. Sanskrit lexicography has certainly made vast strides with the publication of the St. Petersburg Lexicon, and yet much remains to be done in the field of lexicography. Prof. Macdonell has not sufficiently utilised Prin. Apte's Dictionary and has treated only with scant courtesy the 'native' lexicographers. It was worth while having removed some of these short-comings when a new edition was contemplated.

V. G. P.

**THE SUTTANIPĀTĀ**, one of the oldest canonical books of the Buddhists for the first time edited in Devanāgarī characters by P. V. BAPAT, M.A., the Aryabhushan Press, Poona 1924 (Rs. 4.)

Prof. Bapat has laid the Indian student of Pāli under a distinct obligation by having published an edition of a *chef-d'œuvre* of the worlds' literature in Devanāgarī characters. Prof. Bapat does, however, an injustice to his edition when he styles it modestly as a Devanāgarī edition. It is in fact an ideal edition of the work, containing as it does various readings, extracts from the commentary, footnotes indicating parallel passages based on Franke's articles in the ZDMG and in part due to the labours of Prof. Bapat himself, a very comprehensive introduction and three indexes. We wish that now that there is no excuse for it, the Indian Universities will treat the Pāli literature with less narrow-mindedness and admit it in their curricula as a part of the great Sanskrit literature, which it actually is. We also hope that it would be possible for Prof. Bapat to give similar editions of the Pāli Nikāyas. They would not only be an inestimable boon for the Sanskrit student; they would wipe out an old blot on the Indian culture.

V. G. P.

The Written statement and Oral Evidence of S. N. Haji, Esq, Manager Scindia S. N. Co., Rangoon, before the Indian Mercantile Marine Committee, 1924.

Mr. Haji has done us the compliment of sending the pamphlet for review to us. He evidently gives us credit for serving the India of to-day by serving the India of old. If it be true that in searching the past we very often build for the future, we surely deserve the compliment. Mr. Haji has valiently defended the right of India to develop a merchant fleet and we wish we could have, on our side, replied effectively to the arguments of his critics that Indians at no epoch had been adventurous mariners. While confessing an inability to deal with the question in detail, we may just point out that Prof. Sylvain Lévi's article on the Rāmāyaṇa (Journal Asiatique, 1918) conclusively shows that the Indians had an intimate knowledge of the Indian ocean, that the Divyāvadāna and the Brhatkāthā (1st century A.D. or B. C.) are full of sea-stories, and that a good many sea-stories in the Arabian nights are derived from Indian sources. The only question that remains to be answered is: can a nation regain its old instincts after a lapse of ten or twelve centuries? It is for the young men of India to render the answer.

V. G. P.







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# ANNALS

## OF THE

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PART I.

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#### A BRIEF SKETCH

#### OF

#### THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀNSĀ SYSTEM.

*(An address delivered by P. V. Kane, M. A., LL. M.,  
Vakil, High Court, Bombay, on the opening of  
the Mīmāṃsā Vidyālaya at Poona on  
10th August 1924).*

I deem it a great honour to have been invited to address this assembly on the auspicious occasion of the opening of the Mīmāṃsā Vidyālaya in Poona. My feelings are somewhat mixed on this occasion. I feel great diffidence in undertaking the task entrusted to me. The proper person to deliver an address on the opening of a school for Mīmāṃsā is one who has made a lifelong and profound study of that Śāstra. It would have been a most fortunate thing if the authorities of this new institution had been able to secure the services of an eminent Mīmāṃsist and Sanskrit scholar like the Hon'ble Mahāmahopādnyāya Dr. Ganganath Jha. But I was told that owing to ill-health that eminent scholar could not grace this occasion. I have great admiration for the Śikṣhaṇa-prasaraka-mandali of Poona that has been rendering yeoman service for over thirty years in the cause of education in all its stages in the Bombay Presidency. The Mīmāṃsā Vidyālaya is to be maintained under the auspices of such a worthy body. I have been for some years a student of the Mīmāṃsā, though a very indifferent one. When, therefore, the authorities of this institution asked me to preside on the occasion of the opening of the Mīmāṃsā Vidyālaya I could not refuse. I, however, hope that you will pardon me if I do not fulfil what you have a right to expect

from one who ventures to preside on such an occasion as this. My only excuse is my inability to say 'no' to the authorities of this institution on account of my regard for the good work they have been doing and my great love for the *Mīmāṃsā*.

I propose on this occasion to give a brief outline of the history of the *Mīmāṃsā*, of the contents of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, of the Sanskrit literature on the *Mīmāṃsā*, of the contribution of the *Mīmāṃsa* to the thought and philosophy of India, of its rules of textual interpretation and their application to the *Dharmaśāstra*, of the necessity of codifying the Hindu Law and last, though not the least, of the utility and advisability of starting a special school for *Mīmāṃsā* in these days.

The word *Mīmāṃsa* goes very far into antiquity. In the *Taittirīya Samhitā* (VII. 5. 7. 1)<sup>1</sup> it is said 'the expounders of *Brahma* discuss (the question) whether (a day) should be omitted or not; on this (they) say that it must be left out.' Here the word '*Mīmāṃsante*' is used in the sense of investigating a doubtful point and arriving at a conclusion thereon. In numerous other places similar doubtful points introduced by the words 'the expounders of *brahma* say' are put forward without employing the word '*mīmāṃsante*' (e.g. *Tai. S.* II. 5. 3. 7). In the *Tāṇḍya-mahābrāhmaṇa* (6. 5. 9) we read 'one should not discuss the merits of a *Brāhmaṇa*.'<sup>2</sup> In another passage of the same *Brāhmaṇa*, the form '*mīmāṃseran*' occurs (23. 4. 2).<sup>3</sup> In the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, the form '*mīmāṃsante*' occurs very frequently. For example, in one place (II. 9) it is said 'they investigate (the question) whether oblation should be offered to fire when the sun rises or before the sun rises' and, after making remarks on each of the two alternatives, the conclusion is established that the oblation is to be offered before sunrise.<sup>4</sup> In another place, the word '*mīmāṃsante*' is used and the opinions of *Paingya* and *Kauṣītaki* are opposed to each other (*Kauṣītaki Br.* 26. 3). The word '*mīmāṃsā*' occurs in the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* (18. 4) 'now begins the discussion of the *paridhāna* (conclusion) itself.' In the *Kāṇva* recension of the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* we have the word *Mīmāṃsā* (*S. B. E.* Vol. 26 p. 25, note 1). In the *Upa-*

1 उत्सृज्यां नोत्सृज्या इति मीमांसन्ते ब्रह्मवादिनस्तद्वाहुकस्यमेवेति ।

2 ब्राह्मणं पापे न मीमांसते ।

3 वास्तव्ये वोदके वा विवाहे वा मीमांसेरन्त एता उपेयुः ।

4 उचिते होतव्याः सञ्जादित इति मीमांसन्ते । .....तस्मादनुचिते होतव्यम् ।

nishads we frequently meet with the verb. In the Chāndogya (5.11.1) it is said that several learned students like Prācīnaśāla Aupamaṇyava came together and discussed the question 'who is the self, what is *brahma*.' In the Taittirīya Upanishad (II.8.1) occur the words 'this is the (result or fruit of) discussion over Bliss.' From all these quotations it is clear that the verb 'mīmāṃsante' and the word 'mīmāṃsā' had from the remotest times to the times of the Upanishads been employed to designate discussions of doubtful points in ritual or philosophy.

In the Nirukta (chap. VII) we have a very interesting discussion about the form of the deities invoked at sacrifices and in *mantras* and various views are put forward viz. that they have an anthropomorphic aspect or that they have no such aspect and so on. This very subject is discussed in the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra (IX. 1. 6-10), where the authoritative conclusion seems to be that the deity in a sacrifice has no corporeal form. Pāṇini (III. 1. 6) has a special sūtra to explain such forms as 'mīmāṃsate,' 'bibhatsate' &c. In the Baudhāyana (I. 4. 10) and Vasiṣṭha (22. 2) Dharmasūtras we meet with the verb 'mīmāṃsante.' Some of the Dharmasūtras contain purely Mīmāṃsā rules and doctrines. The Gautama Dharmasūtra says (I. 5) 'when there is a conflict of two texts of equal potency, there is an option.' Āpastamba says (Dharmasūtra I. 1. 4. 8) 'a positive Vedic text is more cogent than usage that leads to the inference (of the existence of a Vedic text).'<sup>7</sup> This resembles Jaimini's dictum (I. 3. 3).<sup>8</sup> In another place Āpastamba (I. 4. 12. 11) says 'where an action is due to the finding of pleasure therefrom, there is no (inference of) Śāstra.'<sup>9</sup> This is the same as Jaimini's teaching (in IV. 1. 2).<sup>10</sup> Āpastamba seems to apply the word 'nyāya' to the maxims of Mīmāṃsā (e.g. II. 4. 8. 13 and II. 6. 14. 13).<sup>11</sup> Āpas-

5 प्राचीनशाल औपमन्यवः ..... महाश्रोत्रियाः समेत्य मीमांसां चक्रुः को तु आत्मा किं ब्रूतेति छान्दोग्य ; सेवानन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति । ते. उ.

6 मान्-बन्-दान्-शान्-स्योर्ध्वेष्वाभ्यासस्य ।

A Vārtika on this says 'मानैर्जिज्ञासायाम्.'

7 क्षतिर्हि बलीयस्यानुमानिकादाचारात् ।

8 विरोधे त्वनपेक्ष्यं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् ।

9 यत्र तु प्रीत्युपलब्धितः प्रवृत्तिर्न तत्र शास्त्रमस्ति ।

10 यस्मिन् प्रीतिः पुरुषस्य तस्य लिप्सायैलक्षणाविभक्तत्वात् ।

11 The two sūtras are 'अङ्गानां तु प्रधानैरव्यपदेश इति न्यायवित्समयः and अद्यापि नित्यानुवादमर्थविमर्शान्यायविद्ः. For the first, compare Jaimini I. 3. 11-14 and VI. 7. 30 'अर्थवादो वा विविशेषत्वात्तस्मादित्यानुवादः' for the second.



tamba (II. 6. 13. 11) bears a close resemblance to Pūrvamīmāṃsā (VI. 1. 15). The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali speaks of Mīmāṃsakas (Kielhorn, Vol. I. page 239). Patañjali instances a Brāhmaṇi, who studied Kāśakṛtsnī i.e. the Mīmāṃsā propounded by Kāśakṛtsnī (Vol. II. pp. 206, 249, 325).<sup>12</sup> A Kāśakṛtsna is referred to as a teacher of Vedānta in the Brahmasūtras (I. 4. 22). It is possible that the word Mīmāṃsā here does not stand for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, but for the Vedāntasāstra. Patañjali gives the well-known example of Parisaṅkhyā, 'the five five-nailed animals may be eaten' and remarks that this sentence implies that other animals are forbidden as food<sup>13</sup> (Vol. I. p. 5). These considerations enable us to assert that centuries before the Christian era the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā had been well developed and that they had been embodied in the form of works before the time of Patañjali (140 B. C.). This conclusion is further corroborated by the Śrautasūtras. Many of the Śrautasūtras were composed several centuries before Christ and presuppose most of the general principles of interpretation that are embodied in Jaimini's work.

It is very difficult to arrive even at an approximate conclusion as to the age of Jaimini. His sūtras do not contain any express reference to Buddhist dogma and philosophy. The Mīmāṃsāsūtra speaks of Dharmaśāstra (VI. 7.5) and Smṛti (XII. 4.42). If we rely upon the interpretations of Śābara, the sūtras of Jaimini presuppose the existence of the Kalpasūtras (I. 3.11) and of certain words borrowed from the Mlecchas (I. 3.10). All these facts naturally render it highly probable that the sūtras of Jaimini are not amongst the earliest products of the sūtra period. The sūtras of Jaimini stand in a peculiar relation to the Vedāntasūtras. It is to be noted that Jaimini refers to Bādarāyaṇa as an authority in several places (I. 1. 5, V. 2. 19, VI. 1. 18, X. 8. 44, XI. 1. 64). In all these cases except one (in X. 8. 44) the views of Bādarāyaṇa do not appear to be different from those of Jaimini. Except in one case all the points on which Bādarāyaṇa is cited are concerned with matters of ritual and there is nothing in the extant Vedāntasūtras corresponding to the views of Bādarāyaṇa quoted in the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra. The only exception is the

12 काशकृत्स्निना प्रोक्ता मीमांसा काशकृत्स्नी काशकृत्स्नीमपि काशकृत्स्ना ब्राह्मणी ।

13 पञ्च पञ्चनखा मक्ष्या इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतदतो न्येऽमक्ष्या इति ।

view of Bādarāyaṇa that the connection between word and sense is eternal (Pūrva M. I. 1. 5), which may be said to correspond to the views underlying Brahmasūtra (I.3.28-29). On the other hand in the Brahmasūtras Jaimini's views are cited at least ten times (I. 2. 23, I. 2. 31, I. 3. 31, III. 2. 40, III. 4. 2, III. 4. 13, III. 4. 40, IV. 3. 12, IV. 4. 5, IV. 4. 11). It is only in two cases out of these that it is possible to select sūtras from the extant Pūrvamīmāṃsā that seem to adumbrate the views attributed to Jaimini, viz. Brahmasūtra I. 3. 31 is parallel to Pūrvamīmāṃsā VI. 1. 5. and Brahmasūtra III. 2. 40 to Pūrvamīmāṃsā II. 1. 5.<sup>14</sup> Besides in five out of these ten places, the views of Bādarāyaṇa are expressly cited in the Brahmasūtras as opposed to those of Jaimini (I. 3. 33, III. 2. 41, III. 4. 1, III. 4. 19, IV. 4. 11) and in one place as somewhat different (IV. 4. 7). It has further to be borne in mind that in several sūtras of the Brahmasūtra some Mīmāṃsā work dealing with similar topics is expressly referred to e. g. Brahmasūtra III. 3. 33 and 50 contain the words 'taduktam' and refer to some such sūtras as Pūrvamīmāṃsā III. 3. 9. and II. 3. 3. respectively. Similarly Brahmasūtra III. 3. 41 and 49 have in view the well-known Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 'Śruti-linga &c.' III. 3. 13. This state of things suggests several probable conclusions. From the fact that Jaimini's views are cited on topics of *brahmaridyā* and Bādarāyaṇa's on topics of Vedic sacrifices and *minutiae* of ritual, it may be urged with good reason that both had composed works on Vedic ritualistic interpretation as well as on the interpretation of the Upanishads. It is also probable that, without there being actual compositions of the two ācāryas on both the branches of Śruti texts, there was an oral tradition handed down in their respective schools about the views held by the founders of the two systems on several moot points in the Vedic texts. The former seems to be a more likely hypothesis. There is another hypothesis that there were several Jaiminis and several Bādarāyaṇas, all writing on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā and that they were promiscuously quoted without giving any hint as to their difference. But this seems to me quite unlikely at so early a date. The extant sūtras going under the names of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are the final redactions of the teachings of the schools founded

14 मध्वादिष्वसंभवाद्वाचिकार् जैमिनिः । ब्रह्मसूत्र 1. 3. 31=कर्मणां श्रुतिसंयोगाद्विधिः कार्यस्यैव गम्यते । पूर्वमी. VI. 1. 5; धर्म जैमिनिरत एव । ब्रह्मसूत्र III. 2. 40=बोद्धा पुनरा रम्भः । पूर्वमी. II. 1. 5.

by the two great ācāryas. But as the extant Brahmasūtra contains words like 'taduktam' and the extant Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra does not contain any allusion to the existence of a work dealing with the interpretation of the Upanishads it seems highly probable that the extant Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras are anterior to the extant Brahmasūtras.

The other authorities quoted in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsāsūtra are Jaimini himself (III. 1. 4, VI. 3. 4, VIII. 3. 7, IX. 2. 39, XII. 1. 7), Ātreya (IV. 3. 18, V. 2. 18, VI. 1. 25), Aitiśāyana (III. 2. 43, VI. 1. 6), Kāmukāyana (XI. 1. 57), Kārṣṇājini (IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35), Bādari (III. 1. 3, VI. 1. 27, VIII. 8. 6, IX. 2. 33), Lābukāyana (VI. 7. 37). Of these the Brahmasūtras also quote Ātreya (III. 4. 44), Bādari (IV. 3. 7, IV. 4. 10, III. 1. 11, I. 2. 30) and Kārṣṇājini (III. 1. 9.).

As Śabara<sup>15</sup> wrote his Bhāṣya at least before 500 A. D. and as he was preceded by the Vṛttikāra and also by other commentators on the sūtras, the lowest limit to which the extant Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras can be brought down is about 100 A. D., the highest limit being about 300 B. C. Yājñavalkya, who is comparatively an early writer and not later than 200 A. D., mentions Mīmāṃsā as one of the fourteen *vidyās* (I. 3.). If Āpastamba's references are made to a sūtra on the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, then the antiquity of the Jaiminiya sūtra will be pushed back a few centuries even beyond 300 B. C.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra is divided into 12 books, each book containing four *pādas*, except the 3rd, 6th and 10th, which contain eight *pādas* each. **The contents of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra.** Each *pāda* contains several Adhikaraṇas (or topics for discussion). Popularly there are supposed to be about 1000 adhikaraṇas. The Mīmāṃsāsāra-saṅgraha of Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa attempts to make out this total, but other authorities like Mādhava calculate a smaller number than 1000. The conclusion established in each Adhikaraṇa is called a Nyāya. There are roughly speaking about 2700 sūtras. It would be impossible to convey in the space at my disposal an accurate idea of the contents of this vast work. The following is a very brief resumé of the contents:—

I. The purpose of the work is the inquiry into what is dharma; dharma is defined as a desirable object indicated by

a (Vedic) injunctive passage; the connection between word and senses is eternal; the relation of *vidhi* and *arthavāda*, the latter forming part of a connected whole and therefore being authoritative only as expatiating upon the injunctive passages; the meaning of the *mantras* employed in the ritual is intended to be conveyed; the *Smṛti* rules like those on *Aṣṭakāśrāddha* are authoritative; in a conflict between *śruti* and *smṛti*, the latter is to be discarded, but if there is no conflict then *smṛti* may be inferred to be based on a lost *śruti*; meaning of certain words borrowed from *Mlecchas* is the same as is conventional among the latter; usages like the *Holākā* festival are authoritative; grammatically correct words are to be employed and not *upahrañikas* like *gāvi* for a cow; identity of words used in the *Vedas* and in popular language; the primary meaning of a word is *ākṛti* or class notion; certain words like 'udbhid', 'citrā', 'agnihotra', 'śyena' are names (*nāmadheya*) of certain rites and not subsidiary *vidhis*; such sentences as 'the sacrificer is the *prastara* or *yūpa*' are *arthavādas* and not *guṇavidhis*; when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a word, the rest of the context should be employed for determining the meaning.

II. The principal word in an injunctive passage is the verb, which declares the result to be brought about; the performance of the acts enjoined in the *Veda* gives rise to an unseen potency (*Apūrva*); actions are either principal or subordinate; definition of principal and subordinate actions; illustrations of subordinate and principal acts; the verbs occurring in *mantras* do not lay down *vidhis* as those in the *Brāhmaṇas* do; definition of *mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa*; definition of *Rk*, *Sāma*, *Yajus*; *Nigadas* are *Yajus*; how to determine what portion of a *Yajus* constitutes one sentence; each different verb (like, *juhōti*, *yajeta*, *dadāti*) denotes a distinct act, having a separate unseen potency; illustrations of this; difference of acts on the ground of number, appellation (*Saṅjñā*), difference in deity; *agnihotra* is prescribed as a life-long duty; *agnihotra* and other rites prescribed in the several *Sākhās* of the *Veda* are not so many distinct rites in each *Sākhā*.

III. The meaning of *Śeṣa*; *Śeṣa* is that which subserves the purpose of another; not only are substances, *guṇa* and *saṃskāras śeṣa*, but even rites are also *śeṣa* to the result, the result to the agent and the agent to certain acts; in such sentences as 'he cleanses the cup' the singular stands for the

plural ; illustrations of śeṣa and śeṣin (subordinate and principal) ; the primary meaning of a word is to be taken ; means of determining the application (vinīyoga) of texts viz. śruti, līṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna, samākhyā ; rule of decision in case of conflict between two of these principles ; the prohibition of speaking falsehood in Darśa-Pūrṇa-māsa is a *vidhi* and not an *anuvāda* ; the prohibitions against killing or injuring a Brāhmaṇa are genereal and not restricted to the time of Darśapūrṇamāsa ; several examples of Vedic rules that are addressed to the agent and have no relation to the sacrificial act (such as wearing gold) ; the procedure to be followed as regards the principal is to be followed for the substitute also ; the hiring of *ṛitviks* is to be done by the sacrificer and not by the adhvaryu and the saṃskāras such as shaving, paring the nails are also to be performed on him ; only he who is learned in the Vedas is authorised to perform sacrifices.

IV. Inquiry into what is *Kratvartha* (what is enjoined for the sacrificial act, is therefore obligatory and if unperformed or badly performed will cause defect in the sacrificial act) and *puruṣārtha* (what is addressed only to the agent, is therefore not such as to cause defect in the sacrifice, if not obeyed) ; definition of puruṣārtha ; illustrations of both ; the Prajāpati vow 'one should not see the sun rising or setting' is *puruṣārtha* ; discussion of which out of two substances or actions is the *prayojaka* ; illustrations of *arthakarma* and *pratipattikarma* ; the Śruti texts declaring the time, place and agent of certain actions are not *arthavādas*, but *Niyamas* (restrictive injunctions) ; what is the principal as opposed to the śeṣa so far described ; the description of rewards with reference to substances, saṃskāras and subsidiary acts are merely *arthavādas* ; the maxim of Viśvajit, viz. that all such rites as Viśvajit for which no reward is proclaimed by the texts have heaven as their reward : *Kāmya* rites have as their reward the object desired and not *svarga* ; Vaiśvānareṣṭi performed on the birth of a son is for the benefit of the son and not for the father and is to be performed after jātakarma on the full moon or new moon ; the pinḍapitryajña is not an aṅga of the new moon ritual.

V. This deals with *krama* ; whether the order of the things mentioned in the texts as regards a rite is to be followed or there is a choice ; the rule is that the order of the text is to be followed ; various determining elements as to the order of doing things,

such as Śruti, artha, pāṭha, pravṛtti, &c.; decision in case of the conflict of these.

VI. This deals with *Adhikāra*. *Śvarga* is not a *dravya* but is a state of bliss and is principal, while sacrifice is subsidiary to it and is a means of attaining it; he is authorised to perform sacrifice who desires *śvarga*; only men (not deities nor lower animals) are authorised to perform sacrifice: both males and females can perform *yāga*; husband and wife are together authorised to perform *yāga*; but the wife has only a limited part in the *yāga*; *Sūdra* is not capable of performing *yāga*; persons devoid of a limb or suffering from incurable disease cannot perform *yāga*; the *rathakāra*, though not of the three castes, can consecrate fire on account of a special text and so the *Niśāda* can perform the *Raudra yāga*; in a sacrificial session (extending over a long period) each person engaged in the *sattra* secures the reward; the rules about following and saluting the teacher apply only after *upanayana* and not before; the paying of the three debts is obligatory on the three castes; as regards obligatory duties they are to be performed by all but according to ability; there is no substitute in the case of the deity, the fire, the subsidiary acts, the *mantras*, nor for the sacrificer; in the case of *sattras* a substitute for a sacrificer is allowed; *prāyścittas* in case of total or partial breaking or spilling out or burning of substances; *sattras* can be performed only by *Brāhmanas*; in the *Viśvajit* one cannot give away one's parents, wife &c., but only that over which one has absolute ownership; a sovereign cannot give away the land, as it is common to all, nor horses, nor *sūdra* who serves as a duty; the word 'sainvatsara' means a day in the case of sacrifices prescribed for a thousand sainvatsaras; the oblations to be offered by the *brahmacārin* are offered in domestic fire and not in consecrated fire; the same is the case with the sacrifice of the chief who is a *niśāda*; *Daiva* rites are to be performed in *udagayana*, bright fortnight and on auspicious days.

VII. This deals with the principle of *Atideśa* (extension by analogy of the procedure and details of *darsapurnamāsa* to other sacrifices). The details of the *darsapurnamāsa* are to be extended to all sacrifices such as *Aindrāgna* according to requirements; *Atideśa* may be brought into play by express words or by implication and inference; examples of the first, such as the extension of the procedure and details of *Syena yāga* to *Iśu yāga*; *Atideśa* is indicated by the employment of the same

technical term ( *nāma* ) in other sacrifices, such as the employment of the word *agnihotra* in *Kuṇḍapāyinām-ayana*.

VIII. This book deals with the application of the principle of *Atideśa* to individual cases. The rule of guidance is that those details and that part of the primary ( *prakṛti* ) sacrifices such as *Darśapūrṇamāsa* are to be extended, of which an indication (by words or sense) is conveyed by the injunctive passage of the modificatory ( *vikṛti* ) sacrifices and by other passages subsidiary to them; but the reward, the agent (desiring heaven), the restrictive rules (such as *agnihotra* for life) and the definite collocation of actions (such as *Darśa-pūrṇamāsa*) are not extended by *Atideśa*; if there is doubt on account of the *havis* and the *devatā* pointing to the *atideśa* of different items, then it is the identity of *havis* that decides the matter; *Darvihoma* is an appellation and not a *guṇavidhi* and is an appellation of both *smārta* rites like the *Aṣṭakas* and of Vedic rites.

IX. This book deals with the subject of *Ūha*; when applying the principle of *Atideśa*, certain alterations and adaptations are necessary in the case of *mantras*, *sāmans* and *samskāras*; the various details of the *Agnihotra* have *Apūrva* as the motive of their performance; it is the result ( *apūrva* ) of the sacrificial act that is principal and not the deity and therefore it is not the deity that is the moving spring of the details of a *yāga*; examples of *ūha*; examples of the non-application of *ūha*, for instance in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* the *Subrahmaṇyā nigada* has the words ' *Hariva āgaccha*,' which should not be modified by *ūha*, when the same *nigada* is repeated in the *Agnistut*.

X. This book deals with *bādha* and *abhyuccaya* everything pertaining to the model ( *prakṛti* ) *yāga* is not to be done in the modifications of it ( *vikṛiti* ), but the technical appellations, the purificatory acts and materials (of the model *yāga*) may have to be omitted in the modifications if there is no purpose to be served by employing them; examples; the *Arambhaṇīya iṣṭi* is not to be performed in the *Dikṣaṇīya* rites, though performed in the model *yāga*; in the *sattras* such as *Dvādaśāha* there is no choosing the *ṛtviks* as in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, nor is there engagement of services for a reward; the word ' *śveta* ' in the passage ' *vāyavyam śvetamālabheta* ' conveys a white goat and not any other white animal; the cows that are the *dakṣiṇā* in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* should be divided among the priests by the sacrificer himself; instances of ad-

dition (samuccaya); the deity must be addressed in the yāga by the appellation contained in the injunctive passage and not by a synonym (such as *pūraka* for *agni*); of several items mentioned in order, if only some are to be employed then those in the beginning are to be taken and not those mentioned last; in *sattras* (such as *dvādaśāha*) there are many *yajamānas* and not one: the *yajamānas* themselves are the priests (*ṛitviks*) in *sattras*; difference between *sattra* and *ahina*, the former being enjoined in such words as 'āsate' 'upayanti' and having many *yajamānas*, while in the latter the injunction is in the form 'yajeta' and the sacrificers are not many; it is not the whole animal that is one offering (*navis*), but its various limbs are the *havis*; discussion of *pratishedha* and *pariyudāsa*; meaning of the negative 'nañ'; it is either *pariyudāsa*, or it may be mere *arthavāda* (as in 'na tau paśau karoti' with reference to the two ājyabhāgas), or it may be a *pratishedha* (as in 'nātirātre Śodaśīnam' &c.).

XI. This book deals with *tantra* ad *āvāpa*. That which is useful to many, though itself performed once, is called *tantra*, that which is useful to many only when repeated many times is called *āvāpa*; the principal items such as *Āgneya* &c. in the *darsapurnamāsa* have *svarga* as the fruit in their entirety and there is no separate reward for each; the different *aṅgas* of a sacrifice serve a single purpose (viz. helping on the principal act) and hence have a single fruit; *Kāmya* rites may be repeated as often as desired; those actions that are prescribed (such as pressing or beating the grains of rice) and have a seen result are to be repeated and continued until the result is accomplished, while those actions that have only an unseen result are not to be repeated; such *aṅgas* as *prayājas* are to be performed only once; the *Kapiñjala* maxim viz. the plural stands for three in the absence of anything to the contrary; the time, place and the priests are to be the same in the case of the principal rites, *Āgneya* and others; examples of *arthakarma* and *pratipattikarma*; *ādhāna* (consecration of fires in spring, summer, autumn according to caste) is to be done only once and not repeated with each *istī*, *paśuyāga*, *somayāga* &c.; the utensils of sacrifice are to be kept till the death of the sacrificer, as the sacrificer is to be cremated with them (so this is a *pratipattikarma* of the utensils).

XII. This book deals with the topic of *prasaṅga*, which means (the undesirable) possibility of certain items belonging



to one act having to be employed or performed in another act. In the chapter about Agniṣomiya paśu, a paśupuroḍāśa is laid down, with reference to which a doubt arises whether the several aṅgas of the paśuyāga are to be repeated with the puroḍāśa also; the answer is no; when there is an aggregate of several contradictory dharmas, the majority is to be followed; if there are several things, each serving the same purpose (as rice and yava), then there is an option; there is an option as to the prāyaścittas to be performed for doing something through mistake or heedlessness, but all prāyaścittas prescribed on an occasion other than the above are to be performed together; the rules about not reciting the Vedas (anadhyāya) apply to the study of the Vedas and not to the repeating of Vedic texts in sacrifices; actions are to be performed after the mantras appropriate to them are repeated (as in 'ise tvā' iti chinatti); there is no option as to *hautra* mantras; mere *japa* mantras not connected with any rite, mantras containing praises, blessings and appellations or invocations are to be added up (there is samuccaya and not vikalpa); in a sattra such purificatory acts as *añjana* are to be done by all sacrificers; only Brāhmaṇas can officiate as priests.

Hardly anything is known about Jaimini. There is a Brāhmaṇa, a Śrauta sūtra and a Gṛhyasūtra ascribed to Jaimini. But it is hardly likely that they are the works of the founder of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. In the *tarpana* in the Āśvalāyanagrhya ( III. 4. 4 )<sup>16</sup> Jaimini occurs along with Sumantu, Vaiśampāyana &c. In the Bhāgavatapurāṇa ( XII. 6. 75 ) Jaimini is said to be the teacher of Sumantu and a promulgator of the Sāmaveda. The Pañchatantra tells us that an elephant crushed to death Jaimini, the author of the mīmāṃsā. Jaimini seems to have been a writer of northern India. He is familiar with Mleccha words according to Śabara and speaks of an inhabitant of Mathurā ( I 3 21 ). His sūtras do not possess the compactness of even the Brahmasūtras, much less of Pāṇini's. By the time of Śabara not only were there several commentaries on the sūtras, but there had arisen various readings in the sūtras<sup>17</sup>. The Tantravārtika points out that Śabara omits some sūtras of

16 सुमन्तुजेमिनिवेशम्यायनपेलसूत्रभाष्यभारतमहाभारतधर्मशास्त्राः ।

17 'वे तु ऐककर्मात् इति सूत्रं पठन्ति' शबर on XI. 1. 14-15.

Jaimini<sup>18</sup>. One of these six sūtras not commented upon by Śabara occurs in Śaṅkara's bhāṣhya on Brahmasūtra (III. 4. 20). The Tantravārtika remarks that Jaimini composed a few sūtras that do not contain much substance and so the bhāṣyakāra might have passed them over (p. 915)<sup>19</sup>.

A few words must be said about the commentators of the sūtras and about some of the important works on the Mīmāṃsā. This is not the place to attempt a complete list of such works. The earliest commentator seems to be the Vṛttikāra, who is frequently quoted by Śabara with reverence (atra bhavān or bhagavān, II. 3. 16, III. 1. 6, VII. 1. 2.), though Śabara frequently differs from him (I. 1. 3-5, VII. 2. 7.) and criticizes him (II. 1. 33.). It is not possible to give the name of the Vṛttikāra. Many Sanskrit writers like Anandagiri identify Upavarsa with the author of the vṛtti. M. M. Dr. Gangānāth Jha also does the same. But this does not seem likely. Śabara himself quotes Upavarsa in the long summary of Vṛttikāra's views on sūtras I. 1. 3-5. Śaṅkara in his bhāṣhya on Brahmasūtra (I. 3. 28) quotes the same view of Upavarsa and tells us that he commented upon both the Pūrva and Uttara mīmāṃsā (II. 3. 53). The Tantravārtika (p. 390 on II. 1. 12) uses the word Mahābhāṣyakāra for Upavarsa (according to the Nyāyasudhā of Someśvara). The Tantravārtika speaks of the Vṛttikāra and bhagavān Upavarsa in the same breath and appears to distinguish them both (p. 607 Tantravārtika on II. 3. 16). Hence it seems very likely that the Vṛttikāra was a different person from Upavarsa. Śabara frequently proposes several interpretations of the same sūtras (IV. 1. 2, IV. 3. 27-28, VIII. 1. 34, 39; VIII. 3. 14-15, IX. 1. 1 and 34-35 &c.). Therefore it follows that he had several predecessors. Several other commentators of the sūtras are mentioned by other writers. Kumārila mentions Bhavadāsa (in Śloka-vārtika I. 93), Bhartrmītra is said by Nyāyaratnākara (on Śloka-vārtika I. 10) to have made Mīmāṃsā atheistic and to have composed an ancient (cīrantana) commentary on the Mīmāṃsā sūtra, and Hari is quoted by the Śāstradīpikā (on X.2.59-60). The exact relationship of

18 तन्त्रवार्तिके p. 646 'अत्रान्न. भाष्यकारस्य सूत्रं प्रप्रष्टुं वाक्यान्ममयादिभिः' p. 915 'अनन्तरं षट्सूत्राणि भाष्यकारेण न लिखितानि न च व्याख्यानाणि विवदन्ते ।' This occurs after II. 4. 9.

19 अस्ति च जैमिनेरेवंप्रकाराण्यन्यन्यन्तमारभूतानि सूत्राणि ।

these to each other and to Śabara cannot be ascertained at present. They are no more than mere names to us. The information to be gathered from Śabara's bhāṣya has been collected by me elsewhere ( JBBRAS for 1923, vol. 26 No. LXXIV, Art. V ). Śabara knew Kātyāyana and also Patañjali, the metrical work of Piṅgala, the Pāṇiniya Śikshā, the Baudhāyana and Āpastamba dharma-sūtras, the Manusmṛti, the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas, the Bauddha Śūnya-vāda. He is frequently referred to and criticized by Kumārila and is mentioned also by Śaṅkara ( in his Bhāṣya on III. 3. 53 ). He is therefore certainly later than about 100 A. D. and is earlier than 500 A. D. as the following discussion will show. About his home nothing can be said beyond this that he seems to be an inhabitant of north India. He speaks of the *Mlecchas* being clever in catching and rearing birds ( on I. 3. 10 ) and speaks of the employment of the word 'rājan' by the Āndhras to a kshatriya who does not live by protecting a country or a city ( on II. 3. 3 ). Tradition says that Varāhamihira, Bhartṛhari, Vikrama, Haricandra, Śaṅku and Amara were his sons.<sup>20</sup> According to tradition his real name was Ādityadeva, the name Śabara being due to his having protected himself from Jain persecution by passing off as a forester. The Dattakamīmāṃsā refers to the comment of Śabara on the sūtra of Satyāśāḍha Hiranyakeśin. He is probably the same as the bhāṣyakāra of the Mimāṃsā. Śabaravāmin, son of Diptasvāmin, wrote a commentary called Sarvārthalakṣaṇī on the Līṅgānuśāsana; whether he is identical with the bhāṣyakāra is doubtful.

Between Kumārila and Śabara several centuries must have intervened. The former is the most illustrious writer on the Mimāṃsā. He wrote the Śloka-vārtika ( on I. 1. ) and the Tantravārtika ( on I. 2-III. ) and the Up-tikā on selected sūtras of the last nine books. He is a thorough-going Mīmāṃsaka and his views are often diametrically opposed to those of Prabhākara. He frequently criticizes Śabara ( Tantravārtika pp. 728, 817, 997, 1127, 1150 ). His remarks on the omission by the bhāṣyakāra of six sūtras establish that numerous commentaries on the sūtras and on Śabara's bhāṣya intervened between Śabara and himself ( p. 915 Tantravārtika ). He re-

20 ब्राह्मण्यमभवद्राहमिहिरो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणी राजा भर्तृहरिश्च विक्रमनृपः क्षत्रात्मजायामभूत्।  
वेद्यायां हरिचन्द्रवेद्यतिलको जातश्च शङ्कुः कृती शूद्रायाममरः षडेव शबरस्वामि-  
द्विजस्यात्मजाः ॥

fers to a bhāṣyakāra on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā other than Śabara (and therefore spoken of as bhāṣyāntarakāra), who was later than Śabara (Tantravārtika pp. 616, 625, 1008 and Nyāyasudhā p. 480). Kumārila criticizes the Vākyapadīya (which according to the current interpretation of Hsing's words was composed about 650 A. D.) and Vācaspatimiśra, who commented upon the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍanamiśra, pupil of Kumārila, wrote one of his works in 898 of the Vikrama era i. e. 841 A. D. Therefore Kumārila must have flourished about 750 A. D. He is according to tradition an *avatāra* of Kumāra or Kārtikeya (probably his name suggested the idea). He seems to have been an inhabitant of the Tamil or Malayalam country in south India, as he mentions many words (p. 157 Tantravārtika) in these dialects, though he seems to have been familiar with the popular dialect of Tāta (district round modern Surat, p. 200, p. 989). Kumārila is often referred to as Bhaṭṭapāda (as done by Medhātithi) or simply Bhaṭṭa by later writers and his followers are styled Bhāṭṭas.

Prabhākara (also called *Guru*) wrote two commentaries on the Bhāṣya, of Śabara, one a large one called 'Brhati' and the other a more concise one called 'Laghvi' (vide *Trantrarahasya* of Ramānujācārya published in Gaikwad's Oriental Series). A ms. of the Brhati is in the possession of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and in the colophons in that ms. only the name Prabhākara occurs and not Guru. M. M. Dr. Jha (Prabhākara School p. 9) suggests that the epithet 'guru' was applied to him by way of deprecating his elaborated or complicated views. It is not unlikely that the name stuck to him on account of his pupil Śālikanātha having frequently referred to him as simply 'guru' in his works<sup>1</sup> (vide *Prakarana-pañchikā* p. 12, 44, 126, 201), although he generally styles him Prabhākara-guru (pp. 1, 13, 32, 170, 171, 196, 202) and sometimes as Prabhākara (p. 17, 197). Śālikanātha speaks of his master's followers as 'Prabhākaraḥ' (Prakarana—p. p. 74, 141, 188). He was called Nibandhanakāra by later writers (vide *Sāstradīpikā* on II. 1. 1 and the Candrikā comment on Prabodhacandrodaya II. 3). The relation of Prabhākara to Kumārila is a controversial matter. According to tradition Prabhākara was a pupil of Kumārila. This tradition is supported by the Sarvasiddhānta-

The number of works composed by the followers of Kumārila is very large. The Śloka-vārtika was commented upon by Pārthasārathimiśra, the commentary being called Nyāyaratnākara (published in the Chaukhamba Series) and by Sucaritamīśra in his Kāśikā. Pārthasārathimiśra is earlier than Mādhava. Pārthasārathi also wrote three other works, the Śāstradīpikā (commentary on the sūtras of Jaimini, published by the Nirṇayasāgar Press), the Tantraratna (explanation of important points occurring in the sūtra and bhāṣya) and the Nyāyaratnamālā (published at Benares), an independent work on the Mīmāṃsā commented upon by Rāmānuja (not the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school) in his Nāyakarātna. The Śloka-vārtika seems also to have been commented upon by Bhaṭṭombeka, a pupil of Kumārila. The Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī, a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā (Nirn. Ed.), quotes a few words of Bhaṭṭombeka on the first verse of the Śloka-vārtika.<sup>26</sup> A ms. of the Mālātī-Mādhava attributes the drama to Umbekācārya, the pupil of Kumārila (Pandit's Intro. to Gaudavaho p. 206). Vide also Chitsukhī (p. 265 Nirn. Ed.) for the identification of Umbeka with Bhavabhūti made by the commentator (who flourished in the 14th century).<sup>27</sup> Umbeka's work has recently been unearthed. The Tantravārtika has been commented upon by Someśvara, son of Mahādeva, in his Nyāyasudhā also styled Rāṇaka (published at Benares). Someśvara is at least earlier than 1500 A. D., as he is quoted in the Dvaitanirṇaya of Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa and as a ms. is dated 1440 (Samvat or Śaka?). The Tup-tikā of Kumārila was commented upon by Someśvara in his Tārīkākābharaṇa and by Venkaṭeśvaradīkṣita in his Vārtikākābharaṇa. Maṇḍanamiśra a pupil of Kumārila wrote the Vidhiviveka (an independent work) and the Mīmāṃsānukramaṇī (a summary of Śābarabhāṣya). The Vidhiviveka was explained by Vācaspatimiśra in his Nyāyakanikā (published in the Benares Pandit), who wrote also Tattvabindu. Jayantabhaṭṭa's

26 उक्तं च भट्टोज्जेकेन 'ग्रन्थारम्भेभिमतदेवतानमस्कारं करोति वार्तिककारः' इति । p. 2.

27 The original passage of the चित्खली on which this identification is made is very interesting "आमोदीरिति वाक्येषु मालतीमाधवादिषु । व्यभिचारान्न तद्युक्तमातृत्वस्यानिरुक्तिः ॥ स्वकपोलकल्पितमालतीमाधवादिवाक्येषु ग्रामाण्याभावादित्यादिभिः । नहि पुरात एव सन्नटाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचनमात्रेणानातो भवति भवद्भूतः । उक्तं चैतदुज्जेकेन 'यदासोपि कस्मैचिदुपदिशति न त्वयानुसृतार्थविषयं वाक्यं प्रयोक्तव्यं यथाङ्गुल्यर्थे हस्तिदूयशतमास्ते इति तत्रार्थव्यभिचारः स्फुटः' इति । " This shows that even चित्खली identified them.

Nyāyamāñjarī (850-900 A.D.) is an important work. The commentary Candrikā on the Prabodhacandrodaya (II. 3) speaks of Mahāvratā as a follower of Bhaṭṭa and of Bhavadeva's work as the most popular one in its day. Bhavadeva was eulogised for his profound knowledge of Mīmāṃsā and Jyotiṣa in an inscription from Rādhā in Bengal (Epi. Ind. Vol. VI. p. 203 ff). Bhavadeva (about the second half of 11th century) wrote a work called Tautātītamatatilaka and also a commentary on the Tantravārtika.<sup>7a</sup> The Jaiminiyanyāyanālāvistāra of Mādhava (Ānandāśrama, Poona) gives the contents of the several adhikāraṇas of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra in kārīkās and brief prose explanations. Appayyādikṣita wrote the Vidhīrasāyaṇa (published at Benares). Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa finished a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā begun by his father Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, also wrote the Mīmāṃsāsārasaṅgraha (Chaukhamba Series), the Mīmāṃsābālāprakāśa (Chaukhamba Series) and the Vidhīrasāyaṇādūṣaṇa refuting the work of Appayya. The Mānameyodaya (Trivandrum Series) gives Kumārila's views on the nature of proof and quotes the Brhāti, Śālikanātha and several other authors. Khaṇḍadeva (who died in 1665 A.D.) wrote the Bhāṭṭadīpikā (published in the B. I. Series) and the Mīmāṃsā-kaustubha. The Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi of the famous Gāgābhaṭṭa who officiated at the coronation of the great Sivaji is a very learned work. Two more works dealing with the technical terms of the Mīmāṃsā and important points of dogma are the Arthasaṅgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara (printed in the Benares Series and translated by Dr. Thibaut) and the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā is one of the six orthodox *darśanas* (or systems of philosophy), the other five being Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta. **The important doctrines of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā.** It has to be seen what contribution the Pūrvamīmāṃsā makes to the philosophy of India and how far its claim to be called a system of philosophy may be justified. It is not possible to enter here into all the numerous ramifications of the Mīmāṃsā down to the latest times. An attempt will be made to collect together the most striking of the dogmas of the system, as gathered from the Sūtra itself, the bhāṣya of Śābara, the works of Kumārila and of Prabhākara

<sup>7a</sup> Vide M. M. Chakravarti in JASB 1912 pp. 332-348 for Bhavadeva and JASB, 1915 p. 312.

and his direct followers, without setting out in detail the processes of reasoning by which those dogmas were established.

The purpose of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is the inquiry into *dharma* as opposed to the purpose of the *Vedānta*, which is to investigate into the nature of *brahma*. The *Mīmāṃsā* defines *dharma* to be those duties that are prescribed by injunctive passages which urge men to action.<sup>28</sup> The next question is what is the source of these injunctions. The answer is that it is the eternal, infallible and self-existent Veda and not *pratyaksha*. It is this theory that the Veda has existed from all eternity, was not created by any person, human or divine, that is the point of the whole system. According to the *Vedānta* the Veda proceeds from the omniscient *Brahma*.<sup>29</sup> According to Patañjalī the order of the letters of the Veda is not eternal, though the meaning is so. The Veda being infallible and eternal, it is the final authority as Śābara says.<sup>29a</sup> Jaimini enters into elaborate arguments to establish the *nityatva* of Veda. As a corollary he has also to argue that the relation between word and sense is eternal. But the mass of the Veda is vast and so Jaimini divides it into five heads, *Vidhi*, *Pratiṣedha* (prohibition), *Arthavāda* (expatiatory or commendatory texts), *Nāmadheya* (mere appellations like *Śyena* &c.) and *mantras* (that do not lay down *vidhis*, but are recited at the time of performing the several parts of a *yāga*). It is therefore *Vidhis* alone that lay down *dharma*. *Vidhis* are classified from various standpoints, such as *vidhis* proper, *Niyama* and *Parisāṅkhyā*; again into *Nitya*, *Naimittika* and *Kāmya*; into *Utpatti-vidhi* (as in *agnihotraṁ juhoti*), *Viniyoga-vidhi* (as in *dadhnā juhoti*), *prayoga-vidhi*, *adhikāra-vidhi* (as in *Rājā rājasūyena yajeta*); then again into *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*. Incidentally Jaimini recognises the binding force of *Smrtis* and usages like the *Holākā*, provided they are not opposed to the Veda. The reward for carrying out the injunctions is often declared in the injunctive passages and where it is not so declared, the reward of the performance of all duties is *svarga*<sup>30</sup> (*Viśvajin-nyāya*, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* IV. 3. 15). One of the most important questions in any system of philosophy is who regulates the world and the rewards and punishments of the

28 बोद्धव्यलक्षणार्थो धर्मः । पूर्वमी. I. 1. 2.

29 शास्त्रयोनित्वात् । ब्रह्मसूत्र I. 1. 3.

29a शब्दप्रमाणका वयं यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । शबर on III. 2. 35.

30 स स्वर्गः स्यात्सर्वान्निवृत्तिविशिष्टत्वात् ।

good and evil deeds of men. The answer of the Mīmāṃsā on the latter point is that it is not God or the deity of a sacrifice that gives the reward, but that it is the *Apūrva* (an invisible potency) produced by the acts performed that gives the reward<sup>31</sup>. The views of Jaimini and his followers as regards the deity are startling in the extreme. Jaimini's position is that the deity in a sacrifice is only secondary ( it is *guṇa* ), that *havis* is more important than the *devatā* in case of a conflict between the two<sup>32</sup>. The Veda connects a deity with the sacrificial act and the offering is directed to be made to a deity. Therefore the agent has to do all that. But the deity does not enjoy the *havis*, the deity has no body, the sacrifice is not intended to please the deity, the deity is not lord of all things, it does not bestow favours and the fruit of the sacrifice does not proceed from the deity. These are the conclusions that follow from Jaimini's sūtras ( IX. 1. 1-10 ) and the bhāṣya of Śābara thereon. In another place it is said by Śābara that the *devatās* connected with sacrificial acts are not those described in *itihāsa* and *purāṇas* as the denizens of heaven, but are those that have *sūktas* ( Vedic hymns ) addressed to them and those to whom *havis* is ordained to be offered<sup>33</sup>, that the *Devatā* is a mere means ( *sādhana* ) in a sacrifice, that the *devatā* of a sacrifice is really a matter of words, and that where the *havis* is prescribed for Agni, a synonym for Agni such as *Pāvaka* or *Śuchi* cannot be employed. The views of Prabhākara and Kumārila are the same. Their remarks about the nature of the deity are more or less destructive of the popular views on the sub-

31 चादना पुनरात्मः । पूर्वमी. II. 1. 5. शबर says चादनेति अपूर्वं ब्रूमः । अपूर्वं पुनरास्ति यत् आरम्भः शिष्यते स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति । इतरथा हि विधानमनर्थकं स्याद्वाङ्मत्यायागस्य । यदि अन्यदुत्पत्त्या यागो विनश्येत्, फलमसति निमित्तं न स्यात् । तस्मादुत्पादयतीति । The *Brahmasūtra* ( III. 2. 40 चर्मं जमिनिवत् एव ) refers to this view of Jaimini. Vide *Jaiminiya-nyāyamālā-vistāra* on II. 1.5 for a brief but clear exposition of *Apūrva* and for the various *Apūrvas*, such as *phalāpūrva*, *samudāyāp.*, *utpattiyap.* *aṅgāpūrva*.

32 विप्रतिपत्तो हविषा नियम्येत कर्मणस्तदुपाख्यत्वान् । पूर्वमी. VIII. 1. 32 ; 'अपि वा शब्द-पूर्वेत्याद् यज्ञकर्म प्रधानं स्याद्व्युत्पत्त्यै देवताश्रुतिः ।' पूर्वमी. IX. 1. 9.

33 Vide शबर on X. 4. 23 'तस्मात् सूक्तभाजो हविर्भाजश्च देवताः । ..... यस्या वाचकं शब्दमुद्दिश्य स्मृत्या वा हविस्त्वयक्ष्यामीति संकल्पः क्रियेत सा देवता भवति तत्र । ..... देवतायाश्च यज्ञसाधनभावो न स्थेण भवति तेन तर्हि मवधिना शब्देन । ..... ननु एवं शब्द एव देवता प्राप्नोति । अत्रोच्यते । नेनदस्माभिः परिहृतव्यं न हीदुमुच्यमानमस्मत्पक्षे बाधते सुतरां शुच्यादीनामप्रसङ्ग इति ।'



jeot, but there is much vagueness left about their positive attitude about the deity.<sup>34</sup>

Another important question which all philosophy has to tackle is that of the creation of the world. Here also the attitude of the Mīmāṃsā borders more or less on atheism. Both Prabhākara and Kumārila deny the existence of a personal God who created the world or that by God's will movement was produced in the atoms and the world was produced (as the Vaiśeṣikas think).<sup>35</sup> Their position is that the world is without beginning and not created and that the Veda is not created by God but is self-existent. They practically deny the existence of an intelligent and omniscient creator and the periodic production and dissolution of the world.

It is this attitude towards the creator, towards the creation of the world and the self-existence of the Veda independently of any author, human or divine, that earned for the Mīmāṃsakas the notoriety of their being atheists.<sup>36</sup> Kumārila himself admits that the Mīmāṃsā was brought to the level of the lokāyata view (rank atheism that denied God and soul, that denied that any actions were morally good or evil or yielded good or evil results and so forth) by some of his predecessors and that his endeavour would be directed to bring it on to the path of belief (in moral good or evil).

This topic of God and the creation of the world naturally introduces the topic of the existence of the individual self (*ātman*). It is worthy of note that Jaimini's system contains no sūtra or sūtras establishing the existence of a soul. But it appears that he took for granted the existence of the self (as indicated by such Vedic sentences as 'svargakāmo yajeta') and he suggests this in his sūtra<sup>37</sup> (III. 7. 18, though it is a pūrva-

34 Vide प्रकरणपञ्चिका p. 185 'ननु...देवता फलदानसमर्था कर्मभिराध्यते साराधिता प्रसन्ना भवति प्रसन्ना च कर्तृकालान्तरेपि फलनं योजयत्येवेति । नैतदेवम् । यागादीनां देवताराधनहेतुत्वं प्रमाणाभावात् । .....अतो देवतेश्चेशेन द्रव्यत्यागो याग इति गोणं देवतापूजात्मकत्वमवगमयितव्यम् ।'

35 Vide प्रकरणपञ्चिका pp. 137-140. 'न चेश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञानमपि सिध्यति ज्ञानहेत्वभावेन ज्ञानाभावनिश्चयात् । तेनानादिरेव वृद्धपरम्परा शब्दार्थावगमे हेतुर्न सृष्ट्यादार्थीश्वरकृतः संकेतः ।' (p. 139). Vide श्लोकवार्तिक (संबन्धाक्षेपपरिहार verses 43-117. 'तस्माद्यवदेवाव संगेप्रलयकल्पना । समस्तक्षयजन्मभ्यां न सिध्यत्यप्रमाणिका ॥ सर्वज्ञवक्षिषेध्या च स्रष्टुः सद्भावकल्पना । ..... तस्मात्त्यागपि सर्वमी स्रष्टुरासन् पदादयः ॥ ..... अन्वेष्टो व्यवहारोयमनादिर्वेदवादिभिः ॥ 113-117

36 प्रायेणेव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता । तामास्तिक्यपि कर्तुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया ॥ श्लोकवार्तिक I. 10.

37 शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरी तदुक्षणत्वात् तस्मात्स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यात् ।

paksha on another point). Though Jaimini is silent, Śābara enters into an elaborate argument about the existence of the soul independent of the body, the senses and the cognitions of pleasure and pain &c. (pp. 18-24 of the B. I. edition). The position of Prabhākara and also of Kumārila is that the souls are many (in the several bodies), they are different from the body, the senses and *Indriya*, but they are all-pervading and eternal.<sup>38</sup> It is this tenet of the existence of individual souls that refutes according to Kumārila the charge of atheism brought against the Mīmāṃsā.<sup>39</sup> It is in this connection worthy of note how emphasis is differently laid on different parts of the Veda by the ritualists and the Vedāntins. According to the former, the purpose of the Veda is to ordain the performance of actions or works and therefore the only utility<sup>40</sup> of the Upaniṣads (that speak of the knowledge of the self and its relation to Brahma) is to give information about the agent of the actions enjoined by the Veda and the knowledge contained in the Upaniṣads has no independent purpose of its own. The Vedāntin on the other hand says that the Veda which lays down works (Karmamārga) is only *aparā vidyā*, that the path of works is only a preparation for the path of higher knowledge and that the knowledge of *brahma* has an independent purpose of its own (as expressed in the words 'brahma vidāpnoti param' or 'brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati').

Both Prabhākara and Kumārila speak of *moksha*, but their idea of it is entirely different from that of the Vedāntin, who says *moksha* follows when *avidyā* vanishes. According to Prabhākara<sup>41</sup> *moksha* is the absolute cessation of body due to

38 Vide प्रकरणपञ्चिका pp. 141 ff for आत्मतत्त्व. 'बुद्ध्यान्दिन्द्रियार्थिभ्यो भिन्न आत्मविभूतयः । नानाधृतः प्रतिक्षेपमर्थविशिष्टो भामते ॥' प्रकरणप. p. 141 ; अन्तर्ह्यवार्तिक pp 689-724 (आत्मवाद) 'ज्ञानशक्तिस्वभावो नित्यः सर्वगतिः पुनरत्र । दृष्टान्तरक्षमः कल्प्यः सोऽगच्छत्येव बोध्यते ॥' (आत्मवाद verse 73).

39 इत्याह नास्तिव्यतिराकिण्णरात्मास्तिता आत्मकृदत्र युक्त्या । दृढत्वमेतद्विषयश्च बाधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥ आत्मवाद 148.

40 एतेन कत्वर्थकर्तृप्रतिपादकप्रतिपादनद्वयिणोपनिषदां निराकाक्ष्य व्याख्यातम् । तन्त्रवार्तिक p. 13.

41 Vide प्रकरणपञ्चिका pp. 154-160. 'अतो नाविद्यासमयो मोक्षः । आत्यन्तिकस्तु द्रष्टव्येन्द्रो निःशेषधर्माधर्मपरिश्रयान्वयनो मोक्ष इति सिद्धम् । धर्माधर्मवशीकृतस्तु जीवस्तावतास्तु योनिषु ससराति । ..... यः खलु सांसारिकेभ्यो दुःखेभ्य उद्विग्नस्तदनुपशङ्कशब्देभ्यश्च सुखेभ्योपि गतसृष्टौ मोक्षायोतिष्ठते स तावद्वन्धनहेतुभूतेभ्यो निषिद्धेभ्यः प्रत्यवायहेतुभूतेभ्योभ्युदयसाधनेभ्यश्च निवर्तमानः सन्तुल्यज्ञात्वा धर्माधर्मो भोगेन कृतावपि ह्ययं नयन् शमदमनहास्यार्थादिकाङ्क्षोपशृङ्खितनात्मज्ञानेन न च पुनरावर्तत इत्यपुनरावर्तये बोधितेन निःशेषकर्मज्ञायै नाशाय न मुच्यते ।' प्रकरणप. pp. 156-157.

the disappearance of all *dharma* and *adharma* and the process is described as follows :—a person becomes disgusted with the troubles of *saṃsāra* and has no craving left even for the pleasures of the world as they are always intermixed with pain and wants to make an effort for *moksha*; then he turns away from forbidden acts as they give rise to bondage and also from those that give rise to benefit in the next world; he reduces the sum of his already accumulated *dharma* and *adharma* by undergoing their effects; then with the help of the knowledge of the self reinforced by *śama*, *dama*, *brahmacarya*, which (knowledge) is enjoined by the (Upaniṣad) passage 'he does not return,' he destroys the sum of his entire *karma* and then becomes released (*mukta*). Practically the same view is held by Kumārila who says that such Upaniṣad passages as 'the soul must be known' (Bṛhadāraṇya II. 4. 5) are not enjoined for securing the reward of *moksha*, but the knowledge of the self is the means of inducing men to engage in sacrificial rites and that the reward which is pronounced in the Śruti (the Upaniṣad) from the knowledge of the self is a mere *arthavāda*<sup>42</sup> and is not an independent reward distinct from *svarga* (vide also *rātrisattranyāya*, IV. 3. 17-19).

Certain other important tenets of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā may be briefly noticed here. According to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā all cognitions are *prima facie* valid (*svataḥpramāṇa*) and their invalidity has to be established by other means. This view is opposed to that of the Sāṅkhyas who hold that both validity and invalidity do not require other means to establish them, to that of the Naiyāyikas who hold both as dependent on other means and to that of the Bauddhas who hold that invalidity is self-evident (i. e. all cognitions are *prima facie* invalid), while validity has to be established.<sup>43</sup>

Another tenet of the Mīmāṃsā is that the principal part of a sentence is the verb (II. 1. 1-4).

42 Vide श्लोकवार्तिक (सबन्धाक्षेपपरिहार verses 102-111). आत्मा ज्ञातव्य इत्येतन्मोक्षार्थं न च चोदितम् । कर्माप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वमात्मज्ञानस्य लक्ष्यते ॥ विज्ञाते चास्य पारार्थ्यं यापि नाम फलक्षति । सार्थवादी भवेदेव न स्वर्गादिः फलान्तरम् । verses 103-104 ; तस्मात्कर्मक्षयादेव हेत्यभावेन मुच्यते । न ह्यभावात्मकं मुक्त्वा मोक्षनित्यत्वकारणम् । ..... मोक्षार्थो न प्रवर्तते तत्र काम्यानिषिद्धयोः । नित्यनैमित्तिके कुर्यात्तत्प्रायश्चित्तजिहासया ॥ प्रार्थ्यमानं फलं ज्ञातं न चानिच्छोर्भविष्यति ।

43 Vide श्लोकवार्तिक on sūtra 2 verses 33-61 and प्रकरणपरिभाषा pp. 32-38.

Interminable controversies have raged on the import of words. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā declares that *jāti* (class) is the primary meaning of words (I. 3. 33),<sup>44</sup> as opposed to the grammarians who held *jāti*, *dravya*, *guṇa* or *kriyā* to be the import or to the older Naiyāyikas who held the individual as characterised by the *jāti* as the import.

Jaimini nowhere enters upon an investigation of the means of proof (*pramāṇa*), though he defines *pratyakṣa* and here and there speaks of *anumāna*. The Vṛttikāra (p. 10 of Śābara's *bhāṣya*) refers to the six *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthapatti* and *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā elaborated a special method of investigation, the results of which were embodied in *adhikaraṇas* (i. e. heads of investigation). The constituent parts of an *adhikaraṇa* are five, viz. the *viśaya* (i. e. the text or subject for discussion and investigation), the doubt (*viśaya* or *saṁśaya*), the *pūrvapakṣa* (the plausible view of the matter), the refutation (*uttara*) of the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhānta* (the authoritative conclusion). Some omit *uttara* as a constituent part and put *saṅgati* (the relation of the topic to what precedes and follows and to the whole *śāstra*) instead after the doubt. This method is a very convenient one and well adapted for the display of logical acumen and clarity of reasoning. This method has been adopted in the Brahmasūtras also.

Although there is a general agreement between the two great writers, Prabhākara and Kumārila, they differ on several matters of detail which are too numerous to mention. A few of the more important items of divergence are stated below

(1) As regards the first sūtra Kumārila says that the *vidhi* in the sentence 'svādhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ' urges one on to investigate the meaning and interpretation of Vedic texts; Prabhākara<sup>45</sup> says that it is not the text laying down the study of Veda that is the moving spring of the Mīmāṃsāśāstra, but it is the injunction about teaching (*aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam-upanayīta tamadhyāpaysta*) that urges one towards the Mīmāṃsāśāstra. The teacher requires a pupil and hence studying

44 आकृतिस्तु क्रियार्थत्वात् । Vide श्लोकवार्तिक (आकृतिषाद्) p. 545 ff.

45 Vide प्रकरणपञ्चिका pp. 5-12 ; श्लोकवार्तिक on sūtra 1 verses 76-110.

is implied in the act of teaching and the words 'svādhyāyo'-  
dhyetavyaḥ' are a mere *anuvāda* of what is well-known.

(2) According to Kumārila, the second sūtra meets the position that *dharma* cannot be defined and expressly declares a good definition of *dharma* and also implies that in the Veda we have the valid means of the knowledge of *dharma*; Prabhākara says that the first sūtra having declared that the investigation of *dharma* should follow the study of the Veda, that the meaning of the whole Veda is intended to be expressed, and that therefore the word *dharma* might comprehend the whole Veda, this sūtra declares that the Veda meant here is not the whole of it (including mere arthavādas and mantras) but only the Injunctive parts of it that speak of something to be done (*kāryarūpa* as opposed to *siddharūpa*).<sup>46</sup>

(3) Prabhākara holds the view of Anvitābhidhāna *i. e.* words convey a sense only when joined together in a sentence; while Kumārila holds the view of Abhihitānvaya *i. e.* words have each an independent meaning of their own and then are joined in a sentence and convey the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

(4) Prabhākara<sup>47</sup> recognises only five *pramāṇas*, omitting *abhāva*, while Kumārila takes the *pramāṇas* to be six.

(5) They differ on the question of Arthāpatti. Kumārila<sup>48</sup> gives 'fat Devadatta does not eat by day' as an example of Śrutārthāpatti, but the Prabhākaras do not accept that it is Śrutārthāpatti.<sup>49</sup>

(6) The views of Prabhākara and Kumārila on many individual *adhikaraṇas* differ considerably; vide for example the Jaiminīya-nyāya-mālā-vistāra on I. 2. 19-25 (*vidhivannigadādhikaraṇa*), I. 3. 24-29 (*Sādhu-śabda-prayukty-adhikaraṇa*), I. 3. 31-35 (*Ākrtyadhikaraṇa*), I. 4. 2 (*Udbhidā-*

46 Vide Jaiminīya-nyāyamālāvistāra pp. 14-17 (Ānandāśrama ed.).

47 Vide प्रकरणपञ्चिका pp. 13-16.

48 Vide श्लोकवार्तिक pp. 473-492; प्रकरणपञ्चिका p. 44 and pp. 118-124, pp. 129-132.

49 Vide श्लोकवार्तिक on अर्थापत्ति verses 51-60, प्रकरणपञ्चिका pp. 116-118. It has escaped the notice of scholars that, according to the Nyāyaratnākara on तन्त्रवार्तिक (अर्थापत्ति verse 9 पक्षदोषेषु चान्यासासुदाहरण-विस्तरः), Kumārila makes an express reference to Prabhākara's बृहद्दीक्षा.

dīnām nāmadheyatādhikaraṇa ), I. 4. 9 ( Āgneyādīnām anāmadheyatā ), I. 4. 10 ( Barhiraḍisabdānām jātivāchitā ), I. 4. 13-16 ( Vaiśvadevādisabdānām nāmadheyatā ), II. 1. 5 ( apūrvādhi-karaṇa ), II. 1. 6-8 ( karmanām guṇapradhānabhāva ), II. 2. 1 ( Aṅgāpūrva ) &c.

Although the Pūrvamīmāṃsā has not much to teach and does not rise to any high level on the burning  
**Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation.** questions of philosophy such as the creation of the world, a personal god, the moral government of the world, on the soul, yet it has considerable claims to be regarded a system on account of its peculiar doctrines about the eternity of the Veda, its doctrine of works, its theory about the import of words and sentences and its peculiar method of argumentation. There is besides another matter which entitles the mīmāṃsā system to respect. It has elaborated rules of the interpretation of texts that are of permanent value. These rules were not confined to the interpretation of Vedic texts only. They were transferred to the sphere of *dharmaśāstra* and became the guide in determining the every day religious observances of the people and their civil rights and duties in various matters such as inheritance, adoption, partition &c.

It is therefore advisable here to say a few words about the rules of the interpretation of Vedic texts. Broadly speaking, the rules of interpretation fall under two heads, general and special. The rule that only *vidhis* have special authority and that arthavādas are authoritative only in so far as they form one syntactical whole with the vidhis is an example of the former. The distinction between a pure vidhi, a niyama and a pariśaṅkhyā is another general rule. The rule that in determining the question as to what is principal and subsidiary ( śeṣa and śeṣin ) the six principles of *śruti* ( express declaration ), *līnga* ( implication from words ), *vākya* ( syntactical connection ), *prakaraṇa* ( subject matter or context ), *sthāna* ( order or position ), *samākhyā* ( name ) come into play and in case of conflict between any two of these, each succeeding one is less powerful than each preceding one ( III. 3. 14 ), is a general one. The maxim that the text ' in the viśvajit ( the sacrificer ) gives everything ' prescribe the bestowal of such objects only over which one has absolute ownership ( VI. 7. 1-2 ) is an example of a special rule. So are the maxims of *rātrisattra* ( IV. 3. 17-19 ), of *Śyena* being merely the name of a sacrifice ( I. 4. 5 ).

Many of the rules of interpretation arrived at by Jaimini compare most favourably with the rules of the interpretation of statutes laid down in modern times by standard authors like Maxwell and correspond to some of the provisions of the Indian Acts. The first rule of the interpretation of statutes is that words and sentences must be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning i. e. the plain, literal meaning of words and sentences. This is the same as the principle of śruti. Another rule is that a construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute should be rejected, unless justified by adequate grounds, such as the history or causes of the enactment or the context (Maxwell, 6th ed. p. 33). Practically the same rule is conveyed by the doctrine that looks upon all arthavādas as expatiating upon or recommending the vidhis after which they occur in order to avoid the consequence of looking upon them as useless (Pūrvam. I. 2. 1 and 7). Another rule of interpretation is that all the parts of a statute are to be construed together and each part is not to be construed separately and that where there is a doubt about the meaning of the words of a statute they are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment (Maxwell p. 95). The same rule is evolved by Jaimini (in I. 4. 29).<sup>50</sup> Maxwell (p. 296) lays down that conflict between statutes is not to be too readily assumed and that examples of conflict may be apparent only as the objects of the statutes may be different and the language of each is therefore restricted to its own object or subject. The same rule is laid down in the Mīmāṃsā that an option is to be declared only in the last resort (as in the sentences 'one should sacrifice with rice or *yavas*' or the sentences 'he takes the Ṣoḍaśin cup,' 'he does not take the Ṣoḍaśin cup), and that in other cases allotting particular texts to particulars topics (viśaya-vyavasthā) is to be resorted to.<sup>51</sup> In the Indian General Clauses Act (No. X of 1897) it is enacted (in Sec. 13) that words in the singular shall include the plural. The same conclusion is established by Jaimini (III. 1. 13-15, grahaikatvanyāya). In the sentence 'he cleanses the graha' (sacrificial vessel), although the singular number is used, all vessels are to be cleansed. This illustration and the conclusion deduced therefrom are also

50) सन्दिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात् ।

51) Vide तन्त्रवार्तिक p. 90 'एवमेवोद्देशोपि यद् व्रीहियववाक्ययोः ॥ विकल्प आश्रितस्तत्र गतिरन्या न विद्यते ।'

used in the Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra for other purposes. It has been said above that, according to the Mīmāṃsā, the principal word in a sentence is the verb and that the purpose of a sentence is to lay down something to be done or brought about. Therefore the subject of which something is predicated is subordinate and hence the attributes (viśeṣanas) of the subject are not to be supposed to be intended as a necessary part of what is laid down as a rule or proposition in the sentence. For example, when Nārada says that 'the religious observances of brothers undivided are common,' the word 'brothers' being an attribute of the subject 'undivided persons' is to be disregarded and the rule applies to all undivided persons whether brothers or uncles and nephews &c.<sup>52</sup>

The Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini shows, as compared with other works of ancient and mediæval India, a liberal disposition in several special rules. In these days of agitation for the emancipation of women, it is worthy of note that Jaimini emphatically says that both males and females are authorised to offer sacrifices (VI. 1. 8), that women could not be objects of purchase and sale and that the words of sale employed in the Vedic texts (as in 'that woman who being bought by her husband consorts with other males &c.') are used merely symbolically and figuratively (VI. 1. 15), that in spite of passages like Manu IX. 416 denying wealth to wife, son and slave, women are entitled to some special wealth according to the Vedic texts (VI. 1. 16), that husband and wife are together to offer sacrifices (VI. 1. 17). Jaimini, it is true, does not allow Śūdras to perform Vedic sacrifices (VI. 1. 25-38), but he places it on the ground of there being no Vedic text authorising them to do so (and not on the ground of inferiority or any other similar ground). Still even in those days Bādari pleaded that Śūdras were authorised even for Vedic sacrifices (VI. 1. 27). It is further interesting to observe that the *rathakūra* (who did not belong to the higher three castes) was authorised to consecrate sacred fires (VI. 1. 44-50) and that the chief who was a *Niṣāda*,<sup>53</sup> though of a mixed caste, was entitled to offer Raudrayāga (VI. 1. 51). This maxim of the chief who is a *niṣāda* has been used by the Vyavahāramayūkha to lay down that even a Śūdra

52 Vide व्यवहारमयूक (Mandlik's edition, p. 50).

53 नीषायनधर्मसूत्र I. 9. 2 (ब्राह्मणात् ..... शूद्राया निषादः) and II. 2. 29 द्विजा-  
तिष्वप्यशूद्रायां जातो निषादः.



can adopt and have the *homa* with Vedic *mantras* performed through a Brāhmaṇa, as against the views of some very orthodox purists like the author of the Śuddhiviveka that the Śūdra cannot adopt because he cannot offer a *homa* with Vedic *mantra*: that is necessary for adoption. The Bhaṭṭa family of Benares to which Nilakaṇṭha belonged had made Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra its special study and members of it held liberal views in allowing female heirs like sisters to take a high place as heirs, in allowing even a married man to be adopted, and in crowning Sivaji and so on.

The Mīmāṃsā (VI. 7. 3) lays down a very important principle that even a sovereign ruler is not an absolute owner of his kingdom and cannot make a gift of it, as others have rights in land.<sup>54</sup> This compares most favourably with the assumption of absolute ownership in all lands and water contained in section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The Mīmāṃsā rule is used by the Vyavahāramayūkha for laying down that ordinarily the king is entitled only to the tax on land and not to the land itself.<sup>55</sup> The Vyavahāra-mayūkha, relying upon another rule of the Mīmāṃsā that a man could not make a gift of his kith and kin in the Viśvajit sacrifice (where everything was to be given away) as he has no ownership in them, says that there is no ownership over one's wife and children.<sup>56</sup>

When Smṛti texts multiplied and it was found difficult to interpret them, the writers of *nibandhas* on *Mīmāṃsā rules and their application to Dharmaśāstra* naturally turned to the Mīmāṃsā, which had already evolved elaborate rules of the interpretation and application of texts and the logic of the Mīmāṃsā became the logic of the Dharmaśāstra. The words *vidhi*, *niyama*, *parisaṅkhyā*, *arthavāda* are employed at every step by the commentators of works on *Dharma*, such as Medhātithi, Vijñāneśvara and others. For example, the Mitāksharā enters into an elaborate discussion on Yājñavalkya I. 81, whether it is a *vidhi*, *niyama*, or *parisaṅkhyā*. Similarly the Mitāksharā and other works use the term *Arthavāda* and one of its varieties *anuvāda* very frequently. For example on

54 न भूमिः स्यात् सर्वां प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।

55 संपूर्णपृथ्वीमण्डलस्य तत्तद्व्याप्त्येवादौ स्वत्वं तु तत्तद्भौमिकादीनामेव राज्ञां तु करग्रहणमात्रम् । (Maudlik p. 32 ).

56 गवाक्षाविष भार्यायां स्वत्वाभावेन तस्यामुत्पत्तेः सत्ये तदभावात् । (Mandlik p. 32 ). This view seems to be opposed to the Mitāksharā on Yaj. II. 174,

Yāj. II. 21 the Mitāksharā says that the verse 'one should kill without deliberating (whether one should do so or not), even a guru, a child, an old man or a learned Brāhmaṇa, if he comes as an ātatāyin' is merely an *arthavāda* (and not a positive command, *vidhi*) employed to expatiate upon or recommend the rule contained in the words 'arms should be resorted to by a *dehātā* where *dharma* is obstructed, in self-protection, in protecting cows, and in battle &c.' Śāṅkha says 'while the father is alive, the sons must not divide the inheritance, even what they acquired after (their birth); the sons are incompetent (to divide in their father's life-time) as they have no independence in matters of wealth and *dharma*.' The Vyavahārayūkha explains that the latter part of this text about the son's lack of independence is only an *arthavāda* put in for the purpose of extolling the prohibition (against division in the father's life-time) contained in the first part.<sup>57</sup> Therefore Prof. Keith is not quite accurate when he asserts<sup>58</sup> 'the term *Arthavāda*, which plays so important a part in the Mīmāṃsā discussion, is dropped in legal terminology.' It has been explained above that *kratvartha vidhis* are those which are of absolute obligation, the non-observance of which makes the sacrifice itself defective, while *puruṣārtha vidhis* are those that are addressed rather to the conscience of the agent and if not observed do not affect the sacrifice, but simply invite censure or blame on the agent. This important distinction is taken over in the Dharmaśāstra. Yājñavalkya (I. 53) says that one should marry a girl who is free from disease, who has a brother and who is not of the same *gotra* or *pravara* (as the bridegroom). The latter portion is *kratvartha*, while the first two are *puruṣārtha*, as the Mitāksharā says that there is no relation of husband and wife established in the case of a *sapinda*, *sapitra* or *sapravara* girl i.e. the marriage itself is invalid and null and void, while in marrying a girl who is diseased the marriage is valid, but the man incurs blame.<sup>59</sup> Manu says (IX. 168) 'that is to be known as the son adopted whom the mother or father might give with water in distress &c.' The Mitāksharā says (on Yāj. II. 128-132) that as the word 'distress' is specifically mentioned, a son is not to be

57 पूर्वनिषेधार्थवादाद्यानिस्तरास्वातन्त्र्योक्तिः (Mandlik p. 31 ).

58 Karma Mīmāṃsā p. 99.

59 सपिण्डाश्च समानगोत्राश्च सप्रवरास्तु भार्यात्वमेव नोत्पद्यते । सेविण्यादिषु तु भार्यात्वे उत्पद्येति तद्विरोध एव ; compare व्यवहारमयूख (Mandlik p. 39 ).

given when there is no distress and that this prohibition affects the giver (but not the act of adoption) i. e. it is *purusārtha* and not *kratvartha*.<sup>60</sup> Similarly the *Mitāksharā* says that the words of *Yājñavalkya* (II. 118) 'whatever else is acquired by a man himself without detriment to the paternal estate' are *śeṣa* (are to go with or are subsidiary) to each of the four following clauses. In this he uses the language of the third book of *Jaimini* (about *śeṣa* and *śeṣin*). The *Mīmāṃsā* relies upon *krama* as a means of determining the relation of principal and subordinate and the application of texts. It lays down that in some cases the mere order of words (*pāṭhakrama*) has to be followed (V. 1. 4.) and sometimes the natural sequence of objects or actions has to be followed and not the mere order of the words (V. 1. 2), which has in such cases to be reversed. Both principles are followed in the legal literature. For example, in laying down the principle of preference among *bandhus* who are of three sorts mentioned one after another (viz. *Ātma-bandhus*, *Pitṛbandhus* and *Mātṛbandhus*), *Nilakaṇṭha* says that the order depends upon the order of the text i. e. *Ātma-bandhus* succeed before *Pitṛbandhus*. But in construing the verse of *Yājñavalkya* (II. 137) that the heirs of the forest hermit, the *śannyāsīn* and the *brahmacūrin* are the teacher, good pupil, and a fellow student in order, the *Mitāksharā* says that the order is the reverse order as common sense requires. The *Mīmāṃsā* has taken great pains to lay down rules about the meaning of the negative particle ('na'). Sometimes it is a pure prohibition, sometimes it is an exception and sometimes it is merely an *arthavāda*. Where there is a text laying down one thing and another equally powerful text laying down the opposite, then the text negating what is positively laid down is a *pratiśedha* (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā* X. 8. 6). An example is the text 'he does not take the *Ṣoḍaśīn* cup in the *Atirātra*'. But such texts lead to option and option is a most improper procedure as both texts are thereby nullified. Hence if possible the endeavour should be to explain the negative proposition as an exception (*paryudāsa*) or as an *arthavāda*. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* (X. 8. 1-4) lays down the rule on this point of *paryudāsa* and gives several illustrations.<sup>61</sup> When it is said that 'he does not employ the words *ye yajūmahe* in the *anuyājas*' this

60 Vide व्यवहारमयूख (Mandlik p. 39) अयं निषेधो दातुरेव पुरुषार्थो न कर्तव्य इति विज्ञानेश्वरः । तत्र &c.

61 X. 8. 4. 'अपि तु वाक्यशेषः स्यादयमप्यल्पादिकल्पस्य विधीनामेकदेशः स्यात्.

is not a prohibition, but the meaning is that 'ye *yajāmahe*' are to be uttered in all cases except in *anuyājas* (the negative particle being connected with *anuyājesu* and not with the predicate 'karoti'). In some cases a negative sentence is a mere *anuvāda* (a variety of *Arthavāda*) of what is well known and is put in simply to praise a *vidhi* or to condemn something other than a *vidhi*. For example, there is a Vedic sentence 'fire should not be consecrated on the bare ground, nor in the sky nor in heaven'. Every one knows that no one can consecrate fire in the sky and therefore this sentence is a mere *anuvāda* for praising the *vidhi* that fire must be consecrated after placing gold on the ground. This is explained in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā I. 2. 5 and 18 and X. 8. 7 &c. The Vyavahāramayūkha makes use of these doctrines about *paryudāsa* and *anuvāda* in explaining the verse of Nārada that 'a deposit, a pledge,...son and wife &c. are not to be given away &c.' and the verse of Yājñavalkya (II 175) that a man may give without causing detriment to his family anything except wife and child.<sup>62</sup> A man can properly donate what he owns, but there is no ownership, as is well-known, in a deposit or in wife and children and so the prohibition only repeats what is well-known (it is a *nityānuvāda*). Manu allows *niyoga* (XI. 52 ff.) and then condemns it (IX. 64-68). The Mitāksharā (on Yāj. II. 127) raises the question whether there is an option as Manu apparently both allows it and condemns it and answers it by saying that there is no option, but that *niyoga* is condemned and the verses allowing it are to be understood in a somewhat limited sense (as referring to the case of a maiden, who has the misfortune to lose the intended husband before actual marriage and who is then to be married to the deceased's brother). The Mayūkha makes use of the maxim 'those that are mentioned or come without connection or invitation are to be placed at the end' in determining the order of succession.<sup>63</sup> Manu says 'after the mother's death, the father's mother takes the inheritance' (IX. 217), while Yājñavalkya gives a compact series of heirs, the widow, daughter (daughter's son), mother,

62 Vide Mandlik p. 77 'निक्षेपं पुत्रदारांश्च सर्वस्वं चाग्नये मतिः । अदेयान्याहुः सारथी यच्चान्यस्मै प्रतिश्रुतम् ॥ अत्र पुत्रदारान्तेषु स्वस्वामायास्तद्विषये नान्तरिक्षं न दिव्यीतिवन्निवेधानुवादमात्रम् । एतेन स्वकुटुम्बाविरोधेन देयं दाग्न्युतादत्ते इति याज्ञवल्क्यीयः पर्युदासीषि व्याख्यातः'

63 Vide पूर्वमी. V. 2.19 and VI. 3. 9 and शबर on X. 5.4 'युक्तं यद्वास्तथैराकान्ते देशे आगन्तुर्जनोंसंभवादन्ते निदिक्षते.'

father, brothers, brother's son. Therefore the grandmother is to be placed after this compact series i. e. after brother's son. The same maxim is relied upon by the Vivāda-tāṇḍava also in the same connection.

I shall now turn to the development of Hindu Law under the British regime. According to various Acts and Regulations (such as the Govt. of India Act of 1915, 5 and 6 Geo. V ch. 61, sec. 112 and Bombay Regulation 4 of 1827, sec. 26) which need not be specified in detail here, several matters are to be decided by the courts according to the personal law of the parties and therefore Hindu Law has to be applied to Hindus in matters of inheritance and succession, marriage, religious institutions, adoption, partition, gifts and wills &c. Large encroachments have been made on the old Hindu Law of the times of the *Nibandha* writers by legislative enactments such as Act 21 of 1850 (Freedom of Religion Act), Hindu Wills Act (Act 21 of 1870), Transfer of Property Act (Act IV of 1882), Indian Majority Act (IX of 1875), Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Hindu Disposition of Property Act (XV of 1916). But this is not all. By judicial decisions professing to apply old Hindu Law to modern Hindus very large inroads have been made and some very strange results have followed. It may at once be most emphatically asserted that the courts have made very strenuous and very honest efforts within the limitations imposed upon them by several circumstances to find out the Hindu Law and apply it to the cases before them. But from the outset they were handicapped by several drawbacks. Most of the judges even in superior courts barring a few eminent exceptions like Colebrooke and Sir George Knox were totally ignorant of the language in which the authoritative works on Hindu Law were composed. Naturally the judges had to rely upon translations. It was rather too readily assumed that a judge could correctly lay down and administer the law by reading the translations of portions of a few Sanskrit works. In the early days of the British administration of justice only three such translations existed, viz. Halhed's *Gentoo code*, Sir William Jones' translation of the *Manusmṛiti* and Colebrooke's translation of the Sanskrit digest (1796 AD.) compiled by Jagan-nātha. Besides these about half a dozen works were translated wholly or in part during the first half of the 19th century such as the *Dāyabhāga*, the *Vyavahāramayūkha*, the *Mitāk-*

sharā (1810 A.D. ), the Dattaka-Mīmāṃsā and the Dattaka-candrikā ( in 1821 ) by Colebrooke, Borradaile, Sutherland and others. It was after 1865 that a few more works were translated such as the Dharmasūtras in the Sacred Books of the East series, a portion of the Smṛticandrikā by Kristnaswamy Iyer, the Vivādacintāmaṇi by P. C. Tagore, a small portion of the Viramitrodaya by Sarkar. As only a few works were translated and as the judges and the legal profession were totally in the dark as to the bare outlines of the chronology of the Hindu legal Literature and also of the Sanskrit language, strange things happened. For example, in *Beni Prasad v. Hardai Bihl* ( I. L. R. 14 All. p. 67 ) counsel gravely assured the court ( p. 70 ) that Jaimini, the founder of the Mīmāṃsā, lived in the thirteenth century of the Christian era. As the Shastris in Guzerat frequently referred in the early British days to the Vyavahāramayūkha that was probably introduced into Guzerat during the Maratha regime and as the work was early translated into English and thus made easily accessible to the bench and the bar it was thought that that work was of paramount authority in Guzerat. As a matter of fact Nilakantha's family migrated from Mahārāṣṭra, settled in Benares and he wrote his work under the patronage of a Bundella chieftain. In *Chandika Baksh v. Muna Kunwar* ( I. L. R. 24 All. p. 273 ) the Privy Council relying upon a wrong translation of the Vyavahāramayūkha given by Borradaile (Stoke's Hindu Law, chap. IV, see 18, placitum 17 ) remarks that according to the Mayūkha ' sons of a brother, who is dead, share along with surviving brothers ' and their Lordships proceed to say that on that point the Mayūkha only embodied and defined a pre-existing custom<sup>64</sup> ( of Guzerat ). For this latter statement there is, it is submitted with great respect, absolutely no basis, as the original itself has been wrongly translated. Even when the Vyavahāramayūkha was recognised as of paramount authority in Guzerat, it was not consistently followed in several respects such as the rule of the Mayūkha allowing the brothers of the half blood to succeed along with the father's father or the rule allowing the adoption of a daughter's son, a sister's son or a mother's sister's son even to the three higher castes. The departure in the latter case was due to the opinion that the two works on adoption, viz: the Dattaka-mīmāṃsā and the Dat-

64 Vide Mandlik's translation of the Mayūkha ( p. 81 ) for a correct rendering of the passage

taka-candrikā, are works of the highest authority in matters of adoption and that where they differ the latter is adhered to in Bengal and by the southern jurists while the Dattakamīmāṃsā was an infallible guide in Mithilā and Benares (*Bhagvan Singh v. Bhagvan Singh* I. L. R. 21 All. at p. 419; vide also I. L. R. 22 Mad. 398 at p. 411-12). As regards the Dattakacandrikā, it is well-known that it was wrongly supposed to be the work of the author of the Smṛticandrikā, which is authoritative in Madras and that it is suspected to have been a fabrication passed as genuine by a pandit of Colebrooke. The Mitāksharā is regarded as of the highest authority throughout India except in Bengal where the Dāyabhāga prevails. In spite of this, the highest tribunals have departed from its doctrines in allowing a coparcener to sell his share in joint family property for value without family necessity, in allowing females like the son's daughter or son's widow to succeed, in interpreting the word *strīdhana* whereby property inherited by a female even from a female is excluded from the incidents of being *strīdhana* (*Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai* I. L. R. 25 All. p. 468 P. C.).

The foregoing remarks are not made in a carping spirit. They have only one object in view. The present state of the Hindu Law is far from satisfactory. On the one hand the courts have, during a century or more of British rule, introduced fundamental changes in the law as laid down in the books regarded by the courts themselves to be of paramount authority. They thereby displeased the orthodox section of the community. On the other hand the courts, being bound to administer Hindu Law as laid down in the Sanskrit works of mediæval India, have their hands tied down in several respects and cannot introduce modern tendencies into the teachings of ancient books that were written from an entirely different point of view. This halting process does not satisfy those who having imbibed western jurisprudence hanker after the freedom of the 20th century in matters of marriage, succession, joint family &c. The Hindu Law laid down by the courts for a century or so is imbedded in ponderous volumes of reports or in the numerous works on Hindu Law written by eminent lawyers. This is a very cumbrous method. Much of the substantive law applicable to India is codified. Whatever might have been said against the codification of Hindu Law some sixty years ago, it is certainly high time that the codification of Hindu Law should

be taken in hand as early as possible. In the absence of codification, there is great waste of the money of the litigants, there is immense loss of time and there are years of anxiety and suspense before the litigant ultimately knows his position under the Hindu Law. Codification will reduce all these evils. No one will ever say that codification is an unmixed blessing. It has always a tendency to become rigid and inelastic, it often shuts out the introduction of fresh principles and cannot provide completely for the ever changing needs of a rapidly progressing society. But it is the lesser of two evils and its defects can be remedied by resorting to amendments through the legislature. In the absence of codification, great uncertainty often prevails in matters of every day importance to the people. Even after a current of decisions has been established by decisions of the High Court for years, cases are not rare where the Privy Council makes certain observations which are supposed to overrule the long current of decisions and a crop of litigation at once springs up. This is well illustrated in two recent cases. It had long been thought that for a father's antecedent debt not incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose the whole family property (including the son's interest) was liable to be sold even if the father was alive. Then came the case of *Sahuram v. Bhup Singh* (I. L. R. 39 All. p. 437) in which the Privy Council made certain observations which were supposed to have overruled the above-mentioned long current of decisions. But recently the Privy Council restored the authority of the old rulings in the case of *Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad* (26 Bombay Law Reporter p. 500). In the Maratha country it had been long established that a widow could not adopt, if her husband died while in a state of union and if he had not expressly authorised her to adopt. But the Privy Council in *Yadav v. Namdeo* (I. L. R. 49 Cal. p. 1.) held that in the Maratha country a widow can adopt without the consent of her husband's kinsmen, whether the estate had vested in her or not and whether her husband was joint or separate at his death, provided he had not expressly forbidden her to adopt. Their Lordships left the question open whether, when a widow adopted without her deceased husband's kinsmen's consent in a joint family, the adopted son would be entitled to an interest in the family property. This decision has become a fruitful source of litigation. Another source of speculation in litigation is due to varying interpretations of the same Sanskrit text by the courts, though there may be no varying interpretations of commentators



thereon. Manu says (IX. 142) 'the son given away (in adoption) shall never take the family (name) and the wealth of his natural father.' In a case in I. L. R. 29 Mad. 437, it was decided, following this text, that, where in a Hindu family a person was the sole survivor and was subsequently given in adoption in another family, he did not lose by the subsequent adoption the property he had already taken in the family of his birth. But in *Dattatraya v. Govind* (I. L. R. 40 Bom. p. 429) it was held on a construction of the same verse of Manu that, where property had become solely and exclusively vested in a person who was subsequently adopted into another family, he became divested of that property by his subsequent adoption. With the greatest respect it is submitted that the verse of Manu cannot support the decision arrived at, on whatever other grounds the decision may be supported. The construction put on Manu's verse is obnoxious to the fault called *Vākyaabheda* (split of sentence) in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. That fault occurs where one and the same sentence is construed as laying down two distinct rules<sup>65</sup> (*vidhis*). If the verse of Manu were construed as done in the Bombay case it must be held as laying down two rules, firstly, that a person, who has already taken an estate absolutely, will, on being adopted subsequently into another family, lose what he has already taken, and secondly that a person, who is adopted into another family, will not subsequently to the adoption take the wealth of any one in his natural family, if succession opens after the adoption. The construction put upon Manu's verse is further opposed to another *Mīmāṃsā* maxim that when an accomplished fact and something to be accomplished or brought about are mentioned together in a sentence, the fact accomplished is put in simply for the purpose of what is to be accomplished or brought about.<sup>66</sup> In Manu's verse the fact accomplished is adoption and it must be supposed to have been mentioned with reference to something to follow in future and not with reference to something (*viz.* the wealth already taken) that was even prior to the

65 Vide तन्त्रवार्तिक p. 555 'बह्व्यो ह्यर्थो युगपदेकेन संबध्यन्ते न च तावता वाक्यं भिद्यते । अनेकविधितो हि वाक्यभेद उक्तः स चात्र नामस्य फलस्याविधेयत्वाद् ।' Vide Sabara's भाष्य p. 1 and p. 44 for examples of वाक्यभेद.

66 Vide Sabara's भाष्य on पूर्वमीमांसा IX. 1. 9. 'भूतभव्यसमुच्चारणे च भूतं भव्यायोप दिश्यते.' The same words occur frequently in the Sābara bhāṣya (e. g. on XII. 4. 6). Vide also तन्त्रवार्तिक (pp. 389 392) for the same न्याय.

accomplished fact, viz. adoption. Therefore the rule has in view only the state of things after adoption.

This is not the place to make any detailed remarks on the manner in which the codification of Hindu Law is to be brought about. It is certain that owing to serious divergences between the different schools, a comprehensive code for the whole of India is out of question. But it is possible to codify Hindu Law by provinces. When codification of Hindu Law is determined upon in order that the measure may be satisfactory to all sections, a committee must be formed, on which not only lawyers but eminent Sanskritists and students of Mīmāṃsā possessing a knowledge of English ( like the Hon'ble D. Jha ) must be nominated.

We are all deeply interested in preserving and propagating what is best in the literature and culture of ancient India. The Mīmāṃsā represents a part of the valuable literature of India. The foundation of such a *vidyālaya* as the one declared open to-day will serve to foster the study of the Mīmāṃsā which has been languishing in this part of the country for lack of opportunities of study. But then some whose views are advanced might object that, granting that a study of the Mīmāṃsā may be embarked upon in an institution affiliated to the New Poona College, there is no necessity for making provision for an *agnihotra* hall in these days of progress and enlightenment. It is very easy to answer this objection. No one in these days would think of studying practical chemistry without a well-equipped laboratory or surgery without an operation room. The *agnihotra* hall is the laboratory of the Mīmāṃsā. A considerable portion of the ancient works on the Mīmāṃsā would not properly be understood and grasped without some living knowledge of the performance of the *darsa-pūṇamāsa* and other elementary rites. There is a further and more weighty reason. It is well-known that according to our ancient philosophy and religion there are three paths, the path of works, the path of devotion and faith and the path of knowledge. There are still millions in India who cherish the path of works and who regard the keeping of an *agnihotra* a sacred duty. As long as we do not want to abjure all our ancient philosophies and religions and to cut ourselves entirely adrift from the past, no Indian institution, claiming to teach Indian students all that is best in the East as well as in the West and to tolerate differences of opinion on religious dogma,

can afford to spurn an endowment simply on the ground that it does not appeal to a few advanced minds.

In conclusion I earnestly hope that this *Mīmāṃsā Vidyālaya* will, under the fostering care of the *Śikṣha-prasāraka-mandali*, supply a long-felt want, will revive the study of the *Mīmāṃsā* and will help in the solution of knotty religious, social and legal problems in the near future.<sup>67</sup>

67 The followidg works, besides the original texts referred to above, will be helpful to all students of the *Mīmāṃsā* as they are in English :—Colebrooke's *Essays*, Vol. I; Cowell and Gough's translation of the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* (Trubner's Series); *Arthasaṅgraha* translated by Dr. Thibaut; Sarkar's *Mīmāṃsā* rules of interpretation (Tagore Law Lectures); the *Prābhākara* School, the translations of the '*Slokavārtika* and of the *Tantravārtika*, by M. M. Dr. Ganganath Jha; Prof. Keith's *Karmamīmāṃsā* (Heritage of India Series).

## A CENTURY OF ORIENTAL RESEARCH.\*

I have chosen this subject for my address, as I think it is the most appropriate tribute I can offer to the memory of that great scholar whose eighty-seventh birth-day we have assembled here to-day to commemorate, and who was himself one of the foremost among the pioneers of oriental studies upon western lines in this country.

People often talk about the wonderful developments of physical science during the past century. No less wonderful, if less striking to the outsider, has been the progress in Oriental learning, by which whole new realms of knowledge have been opened up, and our entire outlook upon the early history of the human race profoundly changed and modified. From the conquest of the Panjab by Alexander to the sack of Alexandria by the Mahomedans, intercourse between East and West had been continuous, each reacting upon the other. But after this the curtain descended for nearly a thousand years, only to be raised when Vasco da Gama sailed into the roadstead of Calicut in 1498. But Da Gama and his companions had come, not for learning, but on a purely practical mission. "*Vimos buscar Christãos e espicaria.*" "We have come to seek Christians and spices." Most of the early visitors to India were missionaries and merchants, with little taste for scholarship. From time to time travellers like Pietro della Valle brought back bricks inscribed with cuneiform characters or MSS. written in unknown scripts, but an age whose conception of civilization was bounded by classical Greece and Rome regarded them as mere curiosities. An exception must be made of a few devoted Jesuits and other missionaries, like the great Robert de Nobili (c. 1620), who lived in South India as a Brahmin, and is regarded by Benfey and Max Müller as the first European Sanskrit Scholar; Abraham Rogers, who translated Bhartṛhari into Dutch, c. 1651; Ernest Hanxleden (c. 1699) who compiled the first Sanskrit grammar; or Gaston Cœurdoux (c. 1767), who

\* Address delivered by Principal H. G. Rawlinson, on the Anniversary Day (6th July 1924) of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

first suspected the affinity of the Indo-European languages, and actually put a question on the subject to the Académie Française. But the work of these pioneers excited little or no general interest among scholars. The first real impetus was given by that picturesque adventurer, Anaquetil du Perron, who had seen some Old Persian MSS. in the Royal Library at Paris, and was inspired to go to the East and get to the root of the whole matter. Oriental study has had its heroes no less than physical science, and among them Anaquetil du Perron may be numbered. Being destitute of money, he braved the horrors of a voyage before the mast to Bombay. When he reached India, his thirst for knowledge was checked, but not quenched, by the war between England and France which prevented him from going to Benares and studying Sanskrit at its fountain-head. But he reached Surat, and having overcome the prejudices of the Dastur Dārāb, he persuaded him to teach him Avesta and Pehlevi. In 1761 he returned to Paris, with 180 MSS. and copious notes. From these materials he published his Epoch-making *Zend Avesta* (1771). The work created a profound impression, and a furious controversy raged about its genuineness. This scepticism, it must be added, was partly justified, when we remember that Voltaire had been deceived by a seventeenth century forgery which purported to be the Yajur Veda, when he wrote his famous *Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Nations*. Dugald Stewart even went so far as to declare that the whole Sanskrit literature was an invention of the Brahmins!

Meanwhile, the study of Sanskrit had been begun by the English in Bengal. Charles Wilkins had taken up the subject at Benares, and in 1785 he published a translation of the *Gītā*, and two years later, of the *Hitopadeśa*. Wilkins was succeeded by a far greater scholar, the celebrated Sir William Jones (1746-94). Jones was a born linguist. At College he had acquired thirteen languages perfectly, with a smattering of twenty-eight more! He was particularly proficient in Persian, and had published a metrical translation of Hafiz of some merit. Among Du Perron's papers was a translation of some Persian renderings of portions of the Upaniṣads, and this gave Jones his first glimpse of the treasures of Sanskrit literature awaiting the explorer in that vast hitherto untrodden field of learning. Accordingly, he applied for and received an appointment as Judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta in 1783. On his arrival he threw himself with avidity into the pursuit of

Oriental learning. In 1784 he founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal, with himself as First President. He soon caught the eagle eye of Warren Hastings, who was, as James Mill somewhere says "the first of the servants of the Company who attempted to acquire any language of the natives, and who set on foot those liberal inquiries into the language and literature of the Hindus, which have led to the satisfactory knowledge of the present day." As a practical statesman, Hastings's first object was the translation of the Hindu law-books, in order to compile a digest of Hindu and Mahomedan law. Jones, however, never lived to see the completion of this great work, which he left to his friend and disciple Colebrooke. He died at the early age of 48, worn out by his superhuman exertions. His chief translations from the Sanskrit were Kālidāsa's *Śākuntala* and *Rtusamhita*, the *Hitopadeśa*, Jayadeva's *Gita-govinda*, some Vedic hymns, and *The Institutes of Manu*. Of the Sanskrit language, Jones remarked that it is "more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either: yet bearing to both of them a strong affinity both in the roots of verbs, and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident: so strong, indeed, that no philologer could examine them all without believing them to have sprung from some common source which perhaps no longer exists. There is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the Gothic and the Celtic, though blended with a different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanskrit; and the old Persian might be added to the same family." These prophetic works contained the germs of a new Science. In 1802, an English Orientalist, Alexander Hamilton (1765-1824), was detained in France as a prisoner by Napoleon. He whiled away the dreary hours of captivity by teaching Sanskrit to the German poet and scholar Friedrich Schlegel. The result was Schlegel's Epoch-making work *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians* (1808). This created the greatest enthusiasm in Germany for the new language and literature, and in particular, started Franz Bopp upon the study of comparative Philology. In 1816, Bopp published a treatise comparing the conjugational system of Sanskrit with that of Greek and Latin. This science particularly appealed to the methodical German mind, and Bopp found worthy successors in Rask, Grimm and Brugmann. The mantle of Jones fell upon the shoulders of

H. T. Colebrooke (1765-1837) whom Lord Wellesley appointed as Professor of Hindu Law and Sanskrit at Fort William in 1805. Colebrooke finished his predecessor's *Digest of Hindu Law* and wrote numerous papers upon almost every branch of Sanskrit studies, of which the most important was his *Essay on the Vedas*, which broke new ground. The study of Vedic, as opposed to classical Sanskrit, was carried on in Europe by Rosen, who published a text of part of the Rigveda in 1838, and Roth, whose essay on *The Literature and History of the Vedas*, (1846), is a landmark. Roth was succeeded by Max Müller, an indefatigable worker in Vedic studies and comparative Mythology.

The last of the great trio of pioneers was Horace Hayman Wilson (1786-1860). Wilson completed the first Sanskrit dictionary, which was only superseded by Roth and Böhtlingk's *Sanskrit wörterbuch* of 1853-76. He also made the first systematic survey of the Sanskrit drama in his *Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus* (1827.) Of his *Ariana Antiqua*, one of the earliest contributions to the study of Indian Archaeology, I shall speak later. Perhaps, however, his memory will above all be revered by Orientalists for the doughty fight which he put up against Macaulay in 1835 on the question of English versus Sanskrit and Arabic as the subject of higher education. Macaulay's vulgar and offensive minute, with its cheap gibes about "seas of treacle and seas of butter, kings thirty feet high and reigns 30,000 years long" may have convinced Lord Bentinck's Government, but those who have read Wilson's reply know with whom the victory really lay. Here for the present I conclude my survey of the discovery of Sanskrit literature. Space forbids me to do more than refer to the rediscovery of the Pāli literature of Hinayāna Buddhism, with the flood of light which it throws upon Indian Social life in the fourth and fifth centuries B. C., and the work done upon it by Oldenberg, Rhys David and others. The ramifications of Sanskrit and Prakrit Literature are too vast and too complicated to be indicated even in outline. One of the many branches of activity stimulated by this Renaissance was the search for Sanskrit MSS., which has led to many startling discoveries, the most striking of later years being the lost plays of Bhāsa, the Marlowe of India, by Ganapati Śāstri, and the *Artha Śāstra*, attributed to Candragupta's Minister Kauṭalya, by Śāma Śāstri in the Mysore Palace Library.

I now turn to the sister-sciences of epigraphy and numismatics. Their value cannot be overestimated. They have opened to our gaze what had been a sealed book for centuries—the whole vast pageant of Hindu history in pre-Mahomedan times. It was nothing less than the recovery of a lost civilization, and those who wish to appreciate what modern scholarship has done in this direction should compare, for instance, the recent volume of the *Cambridge History of India* with Elphinstone's earlier work, edited by Professor Cowell. The various rock and pillar inscriptions had excited the curiosity of Jones and Colebrooke, but nothing could be made of them, as the very scripts in which they were written had been forgotten since the overthrow of Buddhism. The honour of finding the key belongs to James Prinsep (1799-1840), Assay Master at the Calcutta Mint, and a man of many parts. Examining some short inscriptions from Sāñchi Stūpa, he noticed that they all ended with a word of the same two letters. Conjecturing that these were votive offerings, by one of those happy inspirations which belong to genius, he came to the conclusion that this word must be *dānam*. Furthermore, the word preceding this word invariably be a genitive, and as such would normally end in *sa*. Hence a start was made with *sa*, *da*, *na*, and by working on this as a basis, a provisional reading for a whole short inscription was reached in the space of one month. Further light was thrown on the subject by the bilingual coins of the Greek, Śaka, and other dynasties of the North-West Frontier, which were sent in large numbers to Prinsep in his capacity as Mint Master. From these, in conjunction with H. H. Wilson, whose *Ariana Antiqua: Antiquities and Coins of Ancient Afghanistan* (London 1841) was a land-mark in this branch of studies, the two scripts subsequently known as Brāhmī and Kharoṣṭhī were established, and the clue obtained to ancient Indian inscriptions. One of the first results of this was to establish Indian Chronology on a satisfactory basis. Jones and Colebrooke had already arrived at the "sheet anchor" of Indian chronology, when they identified the Sandracottus of the Greek writers with the Emperor Candragupta Maurya of the *Mudrārākṣasa* and the Purāṇas. Candragupta's accession must have taken place between 325 B. C., when Alexander left India, and 305 B. C., when Sandracottus made his famous treaty with Seleucus Nicator. Similarly in his thirteenth Rock Edict, Piyadāsi mentions five Greek kings as his contemporaries, Antiochus Theos, Ptolemy II, Antigonus of Macedon, Magas of Cyrene, and



Alexander of Epirus. The only years when these five kings were all reigning simultaneously were between 261 and 239 B. C. It was only a step now to identify Piyadāsi with the Aśoka Vardhana, grandson of Candragupta, of the Purāṇas. Other important dates have been determined from time to time one of the most brilliant being Fleet's determination of year one of the Gupta Era as 319/20 A. C., and on this foundation the whole gigantic edifice of India chronology has been laboriously erected. Those who wish to appreciate the vast work done in the last hundred years in Indian Epigraphy need only glance at the *Epigraphia Indica*, the *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, the *Indian Antiquary* and similar works. As regards western India the earlier results of these researches were embodied in those three monumental essays in the *Bombay Gazetteer*,—Bhandarkar's *Early History of the Deccan*, Bhagwānlāl Indrāji's *Early History of Gujarat*, and Fleet's *Dynasties of the Kanarese Districts*. As far as purely archæological work is concerned, the pioneer was General Sir Alexander Cunningham, whose life work is embodied in his *Archæological Survey of India*. Many of Lord Curzon's actions have been sharply criticized: there is however, complete unanimity of opinion about his legislation for the preservation of ancient Monuments, and the enormous development of historical and archæological study in this century is chiefly due to his encouragement. The mantle of Cunningham has descended upon the shoulders of Sir John Marshall and his assistants. Every year adds to the number of fascinating discoveries unearthed by these workers: the ancient cities of Takṣaśilā and Nālanda have been unearthed; the Maurya capital at Pāṭaliputra has been uncovered: and ancient monuments like the Sāñchi Stūpa cleared of jungle and reverently restored; and it is satisfactory to note that many of the Indian States, notably Hyderabad and Mysore, have followed suit. Archæology has, however, done more than this. It is due to the work of the archæologist that we have been brought to realize that the culture of ancient Hindu India spread far beyond the shores of this country. Great Buddhist and Hindu cities and temples have been unearthed at Anuradhapura in Ceylon, at Borobodur in Java and at Angkhor in Cambodia. Sir Aurel Stein has traced Indian settlements and caravan routes through what is now the Lop or Desert of Central Asia, right up to the Great Wall of China. And here I should like to touch upon another branch of studies which has thrown much light upon the history, literature and

culture of ancient India, and this is Sinology. Buddhism apparently found its way across the Indian borderland into the Mongolian countries about the 2nd century B. C., and for six hundred years, from the reign of Kaniska to the reign of Harsa, the intercourse was almost uninterrupted. The Chinese Pilgrims who visited the Holy Places of India have left valuable records of their journeys, and many Buddhist works, of which the originals have been lost, survive in Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan translations. All this forms a fruitful and still imperfectly explored field of research, which urgently calls for workers to take it in hand.

I must now go further afield, and sketch in outline what epigraphists and archæologists have done in ancient Persia and Mesopotamia. We are now beginning to realize that Hindu India did not stand alone, but her culture and literature were deeply affected by intercourse with her western neighbours, the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Achaemenian Persians and the Greeks. A century and a half ago, we knew nothing at all about these nations. Their script, used all over western Asia, and known as cuneiform or wedge-shaped, was invented by the Sumerians at a period so remote that it can only be guessed at. It was used by the Babylonians from 4500 B. C. and by the Assyrians from 1500 B. C., and hence we have in it records beside which the Vedas appear comparatively modern. The clue to cuneiform was first found by Grötefend in 1815. He conjectured that a certain word, occurring frequently at the beginning of a line, was *Darheush* (Daryavush) or Darius. Assuming that this hypothesis was correct, three consonants, D, R, SH, were deciphered. From this beginning, by a series of bold conjectures, Lassen had arrived by 1836 at the whole alphabet. This was a stepping-stone to a far greater feat. In 1835, Sir Henry Rawlinson scaled at great peril the precipitous Behistun rock near Karmanshah, and transcribed the huge inscription engraved there by Darius the Great. This was written in three languages. The first was old Persian. The second was in the language of Elam or Susa. The third proved to be a new tongue, that of ancient Babylonia, a Semitic language akin to Arabic and Hebrew. Hence, by proceeding from the known to the unknown, Babylonian was step by step interpreted. To these discoveries were added the researches of Layard and a host of workers on the sites of the ancient Babylon and Nineveh, and the discovery of an incredible number of inscribed clay tablets. We are now enabled to reconstruct with

accuracy the history of the great Semitic empires of Iraq in pre-Aryan days. The influence of Babylonian and Assyrian culture upon the early civilization of India was evidently considerable, though its precise bearings have not yet been determined. An attempt in this direction was made by the late Mr. B. G. Tilak in his article on the *Chaldean and Indian Vedas*, contributed to the Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume. One of the most startling discoveries of recent years was Hugo Winckler's list of Mitanni Kings, bearing Aryan names and worshipping Aryan gods, at Boghaz Keni. And we now know, thanks to Professor Bühler, that India borrowed both her earliest scripts from Mesopotamia.

Here I must close a brief and imperfect survey, with the hope that it may perhaps serve to stimulate some who hear or read it to take up the study of this most fascinating subject. And this brings me to the question which is being asked in Europe and will, no doubt, be asked in India. What is the use of it all? people say. Well, every great branch of learning is an end in itself, and ought to be studied for its own sake. Apart from this, we must remember that the roots of the present lie deep buried in the past, and we can never successfully understand, much less legislate for, India of to-day without a real understanding of the fundamental ideas upon which her culture and civilization are built up. The rediscovery of the East was of the utmost importance to Europe, and was one of the leading forces in the Romantic Revival. Kālidāsa's *Śākuntala* made the deepest and most lasting impression upon Goethe. He first read Forster's translation of this masterpiece in 1792, when he composed his famous epigram. Five years later, we find him modelling the prologue on earth to *Faust*, where the poet, the stage-manager and the Merry Andrew converse on the merits of the play, upon the prelude to *Śākuntala*. As late as 1830, he was still thinking of adapting *Śākuntala* for the Weimar stage. No less profound was the influence of the Vedānta upon German philosophy. "From every sentence," says Schopenhauer, "deep, original and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit. In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upanisads. It has been the solace of my life—it will be the solace of my death." A similar spirit pervades Schlegel, in his fine apostrophe to the unknown author of the *Gītā*. *Magistrorum reverentia a Brachmanis inter sanctissima pietatis officia refertur.*

*Ergo tu primum, vates sanctissime, numinisque hypopheta quisquis tandem inter mortales dictus tu fueris, carminis hujus auctor, cujus oraculis mens ad excelsa quaeque, aeterna atque divina, cum enarrabili quadam delectatione rapitur,—te primum, inquam, salvere jubeo, et vestigia tua semper adoro.* Carlyle, Emerson, perhaps Wordsworth, exhibit unconscious reflections of Oriental thought in almost every page. To orthodox Christianity, the science of comparative philology, the discovery of the Vedas, and above all, the decipherment of the Babylonian tablets administered an electric shock as intense as that supplied in another direction by Darwin, Wallace and Huxley. Moreover, the world cannot but be the richer and wiser for having added to its stock of noble thoughts the profound reflections of the *Gītā*, the beautiful and affecting teachings of Gautama and the gentle wisdom of Aśoka's inscriptions. The Sacred books of India surpass the Hebrew Scriptures in the highest qualities of imagination and profound thought. It is only of late years that Europe, through the labours of Sanskrit and Pali Scholars, has become acquainted with the astonishing beauty of thought enshrined in scriptures more voluminous than the Hebrew Bible; and it is not impossible that this far-off literature will one day influence European thought quite as much as the Jewish Bible has done in the past.

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# माला तु पूर्ववत् MĀLĀ TU PŪRVAVAT

BY

H. R. DIVEKAR.

Readers of Sanskrit Poetics need not be told that the heading given above, forms the last portion of Kārikā No. 94 of Kāvya prakāśa (काव्यप्रकाश). It is interpreted by all commentators, to refer to मालोपमा, which is nowhere mentioned in the Kārikās but is only incidentally described in the Vṛtti. Hence it is admitted by most scholars as decisive proof of the fact that the Kārikās and the Vṛtti of the Kāvya prakāśa must have been written by one and the same author. Without entering into this controversy, it is attempted in this small note to show that the word पूर्ववत् cannot refer to मालोपमा and hence cannot be accepted as a conclusive proof of the identity of the कारिकाकार and वृत्तिकार.

In order to show the ludicrousness of the interpretation, let us read the Kārikās together as given below :—

साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे पूर्णा लुप्ता च साग्रिमा ।  
श्रौत्यार्था च भवेद्वाक्ये समासे तद्धिते तथा ॥ ८७ ॥  
तद्दर्शयत्यलोपे स्यान्न श्रौती तद्धिते पुनः ।  
उपमानानुपादाने वाक्यगाऽथ समासगा ॥ ८८ ॥  
वादेऽलोपे समासे सा कर्माधारक्यचि क्यङि ।  
कर्मकर्त्रोर्गोमुल्येतद्विलोपे क्तिप्समासगा ॥ ८९ ॥  
धर्मोपमानयोऽलोपे वृत्तौ वाक्ये च दृश्यते ।  
क्यचि वाद्युपमेयासे त्रिलोपे च समासगा ॥ ९० ॥  
उपमानोपमेयस्यैकस्थैवेकवाक्यगे ।  
अनन्वयो विपर्यास उपमेयोपमा तयोः ॥ ९१ ॥  
संभावनमथोत्प्रेक्षा प्रकृतस्य समेन यत् ।  
संसंदेहस्तु भेदोक्तौ तदनुक्तौ च संशयः ॥ ९२ ॥  
तद्रूपकमभेदे य उपमानोपमेययोः ।  
समस्तवस्तुविषयं श्रौता आरोपिता यदा ॥ ९३ ॥  
श्रौता आर्याश्च ते यस्मिन्नेकदेशविवर्ति तत् ।  
साङ्गमेतन्निरङ्गं तु शुद्धं माला तु पूर्ववत् ॥ ९४ ॥

From these we shall see that the Kārikākāra commenced his treatment of उपमा in Kārikā No. 87 and described its divisions and subdivisions in the succeeding three Kārikās. In Kārikā No. 91, he treated of अनन्वय and उपमेयोपमा and after giving his views on उत्प्रेक्षा and संसर्ग, he came to रूपक. After defining रूपक and giving its two divisions as समस्तवस्तुविषय and एकदेशविवर्ति, he wrote :

साङ्गमेतन्निरङ्गं तु शुद्धं माला तु पूर्ववत् ।

Now if we are here to interpret पूर्ववत् as मालोपमावत् let us see how many suppositions we are required to make. First, that the writer forgot to include मालोपमा in his subdivisions; secondly that he forgot this very fact in the brief interval of writing seven lines and a half; thirdly that he was so engrossed in the treatment of मालोपमा that without being aware of it he thought that he had described it and hence wrote that मालारूपक is similar to मालोपमा which he had described earlier. To make all these suppositions in case of a scrupulously exact writer like सम्मत requires too much to be imagined.

To be freed from all these absurdities, it is required to be supposed that the writer of the Kārikās and the Vṛtti must have been the same, that he must have simultaneously written the both and that he must have forgotten whether he described मालोपमा in Kārikās or in Vṛtti and consequently wrote पूर्ववत् meaning मालोपमावत्. But this is going waistdeep from kneedeep. For now we shall be required to suppose that the writer wrote साधुर्ग्येमुपमाभेदे and directly went off to write the Vṛtti on it. After finishing this Vṛtti he then composed पूर्णं लुमा च, wrote its Vṛtti and then finished the Kārikā साग्रिमा । श्रीहयार्थी च भवद्वाक्ये समासे तद्धिते तथा and explained it by its Vṛtti. He thus must have composed his Kārikās not as a whole but in parts and after he had written every part of it, must have written the Vṛtti on it. Thus he did not compose the whole of the line साङ्गमेतन्निरङ्गं तु शुद्धं माला तु पूर्ववत् । but first framed साङ्गमेतत्, then wrote उक्तद्विभेदं सावयवम् and thereafter he wrote निरङ्गं तु शुद्धम्, gave an example of it and then finished the line by filling up the words माला तु पूर्ववत्. I now appeal to the readers to think whether this supposition is not anything but ridiculous? Is it possible for any writer to write such detached parts of verses? It puts an incredible strain on one's imagination to conceive this process. There is no precedent for it and hence it is very difficult to accept it. From this it will follow that the writer of the Kārikās could not mean मालोपमा when he wrote माला तु पूर्ववत्.

It may then be asked how all the interpreters representing this view came to think that way. A suggestion may be thrown to account for it. The Vṛttikāra while writing his Vṛtti has written the words—मालोपमायामिवैकस्मिन्बह्व आरोपिताः १, out of which it is understood that मालोपमायामिव explains पूर्ववत्. This appears to be a clear misunderstanding. The Vṛttikāra whether he was the Kārikākāra himself or another man must have all the Kārikās put together in front of him before he set about to write his Vṛtti and on the grounds which are already mentioned above, the fact that मालोपमा is omitted by the Kārikākāra in his Kārikās could not have escaped his notice. Nay, he already mentions the omission of मालोपमा and रशनोपमा by the Kārikākāra in the following words:—

एवमेकोनविंशतिलुप्ताः पूर्णाभिः सह पञ्चविंशतिः ॥ अनयनेव.....इत्यभिने साधारणे धर्मे, ज्योत्स्नेव नयनानन्दः.....इति भिन्ने च तस्मिन्, एकस्यैव बहुपमानोपादाने मालोपमा, यथोत्तरं.....इत्यादिका रशनोपमा च न लक्षिता, एवंविधवैचित्र्यसहस्रसंभवात्, उक्तभेदानतिक्रमाच्च ॥

It is quite clear from this that the Vṛttikāra knows two varieties of मालोपमा, which he mentions but which he states to have been omitted in the Kārikās. Is it then possible for the Vṛttikāra to forget what he himself wrote in clear unmistakable terms and to say that पूर्ववत् meant मालोपमायामिव. To explain मालारूपक, the Vṛttikāra can unhesitatingly say that it is like the मालोपमा which he had explained before, but he could not have possibly meant to write those words as the meaning of पूर्ववत्. Generally the Vṛttikāra quotes the words of Kārikās, if he gives their meaning in his vṛtti as अग्निमा पूर्णा, वादेरुपमाप्रतिपादकस्य, एतयोः धर्मेवायोः, आसे निरासे, तयोरुपमानोपमेययोः, समेन उपमानेन etc. Similarly had he written पूर्ववत् मालोपमावत्, I should have ungrudgingly accepted the view that the Vṛttikāra meant मालोपमावत् by पूर्ववत्. I think, therefore, that he might have omitted to explain the word पूर्ववत् and written मालोपमायामिव etc. as an additional explanation.

But then there remains the question as to what does पूर्ववत् mean? If we read the Kārikā text without the Vṛtti, the Kārikā will read

साङ्गमेतन्निरङ्गं तु शुद्धं माला तु पूर्ववत्

which will mean 'This is साङ्ग, an unmixed ( रूपक ) is, however, निरङ्ग, but मालारूपका is similar to the former.' From this it is quite easy to deduce that the word पूर्व or former refers to the division of साङ्ग and निरङ्ग. Whether मालारूपक is साङ्ग or निरङ्ग will depend on whether we take पूर्व to mean, former or before ; and

to mean but or and. If we translate as is given above, मालारूपक will have to be considered as साङ्ग. Pradīpakāra appears to take this view when he says अथ साङ्गस्यैव वैचित्र्यान्तरमाह माला तु पूर्ववत्. If we, however, translate 'This is साङ्ग.....and मालारूपक is as before,' मालारूपक will be निरङ्ग. Without entering into this discussion, I wish to maintain, that whatever the case, the word पूर्ववत् refers to साङ्गनिरङ्गभेद and not to मालोपमा. The word पूर्व may mean former or before, but it cannot be connected with what the कृत्तिकार could not have had before his mind.

A similar instance of पूर्ववत् may be incidentally mentioned from these very Kārikās. While describing the divisions of ध्वनि, the Kārikākāra writes :—

रसादीनामनन्तत्वाद्भेद एको हि गण्यते ।  
 वाक्ये द्वयुत्थः पदेऽप्यन्ये प्रबन्धेऽप्यर्थशक्तिभूः ॥ ४२ ॥  
 पदैकदेशरचनावर्णेष्वपि रसादयः ।  
 भेदास्तदेकपञ्चाशत्तेषां चान्योन्ययोजने ॥ ४३ ॥  
 संकरेण निरूपेण संसृष्टया चैकरूपया ।  
 वेदस्वाब्धिवियच्चन्द्राः शरेषुयुगखेन्दवः ॥ ४४ ॥  
 अगूढमपरस्याङ्गं वाच्यसिद्धयङ्गमस्फुटम् ।  
 संदिग्धतुल्यप्राधान्ये काक्ताऽऽक्षिप्तमसुन्दरम् ॥ ४५ ॥  
 व्यङ्ग्यमेवैव गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यस्याष्टौ भिदाः स्मृताः ।  
 एषां भेदा यथायोगं वेदितव्याश्च पूर्ववत् ॥ ४६ ॥

Here the same word पूर्ववत् is used and it means like the former (ध्वनि). It is used to refer to something noted before and not to something not mentioned.

Lastly, supposing माला तु पूर्ववत् refers to मालोपमा, I cannot understand what additional fact has been mentioned by saying that it is like मालोपमा. The only similarity is एकस्मिन्बहव and it is already understood by the word माला where many flowers are strung on one thread. The fact which the Kārikākāra wished to mention is whether it is साङ्ग or निरङ्ग. That मालोपमा is not mentioned in the text by the Kārikākāra who omits some subdivisions which he does not think वैचित्र्यवत्, is also reminded by the Vṛtti at the end of रूपक, where the Vṛttikāra writes

रशनारूपकं न वैचित्र्यवदिति न लक्षितम् ।

The Vṛttikāra here appears to mean that मालोपमा and रशानोपमा were not both mentioned in the treatment of उपमा by the Kārikākāra, but in his treatment of रूपक, even when he men-



tioned मालारूपक, he did not note रश्नारूपक. While remembering, therefore, and noting what the Kārikākāra writes and what he does not, it is not possible either for the writer of the Vṛtti or for that of the Kārikās to forget that मालोपमा is omitted by the writer of the Kārikās. Much more impossible than this, is it, therefore, to suppose that पूर्ववत् refers, to something which is अपूर्व. The least that can be said of it is that the supposition is by itself अपूर्व.

It is on these grounds, that I affirm, that पूर्ववत् cannot refer to मालोपमा and hence it cannot be accepted as is generally done to be the decisive proof of the identity of the Kārikākāra and the Vṛttikāra of काव्यप्रकाश.

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## THE SVAPNAVĀSAVADATTA OF BHĀSA.

In the October number of the Royal Asiatic Society's journal, M. M. Gaṇapati Śāstri of Trivendrum gives in a note two citations, one from the Bhāvaprakāśa of Śāradātanaya and the other from the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhoja. In the former the author, "who is dealing with the features of the ten kinds of Rūpakas after describing the five Jātis mentioned by Subandhu viz.—Pūrṇa, Praśānta, Bhāsvara, Lalita, and Samagra, says—

प्रशान्तरसभूयिष्ठं प्रशान्तं नाम नाटकम् ।  
न्यासो न्याससमुद्देशो बीजोक्तिर्बीजदर्शनम् ॥  
ततोऽनुदिष्टसंहारः प्रशान्ते पञ्चसंघयः ।  
.....  
स्वप्रवासवदत्ताख्यमुदाहरणमत्र तु ॥

The author further points out several stages in the action of the play which correspond with these five Saṁdhis; thus Vāsavadattā was separated from Vatsarāja and entrusted to Padmāvatī (as in the first act), that Vatsarāja believed that Vāsavadattā was alive (*vide* fifth act), that the king feelingly called for Vāsavadattā and so on (as in the V act) and that the king, having obtained the Viṇā Ghoṣavatī, searched for Vāsavadattā, its possessor, all as in the Svapnavāsavadatta." The Mahāmahopādhyāya further asks "what greater authority is required than what is furnished by these two writings?" These citations, therefore, establish beyond question the authenticity of the anonymous work as the work of Bhāsa.

Śāradātanaya does not mention the name of the author of the Svapnavāsavadattā to which he referred; but it is reasonable to assume that he is alluding to a work which unquestionably is the work of the celebrated poet Bhāsa.

And if the identity of the anonymous work and that cited by Śāradātanaya be established—there will be no difficulty in accepting that work as the creation of the great poet. But this is exactly a point which we are not prepared to concede. The evidence of the citation clearly goes against such identity. For there is nothing in the Trivendrum work corresponding to the second Saṁdhi—the Nyāsa-samudbheda. Śāradātanaya points out that the king comes to know that Āvantikā (Vāsavadattā)

was alive on seeing that the face of Padmāvati was adorned with a peculiar saffron mark. Now we know that Vāsavadattā attended to the toilet of Padmāvati and therefore it is conceivable that in adorning her she might have drawn those saffron designs on her face with which she usually adorned herself. And so the king feels a vague presentiment that Vāsavadattā was alive. Here is a reference to a definite incident which gives rise to that presentiment. Gaṇapati Śāstrī refers to the fifth act as showing that Vatsarāja believed that Vāsavadattā was alive. But that is not enough. Nowhere in the anonymous work is there a situation like the one referred to by Śāradātānaya.

There is also another point to be considered. The third Saṁdhi is the Bijokti and this is illustrated by that portion of the play where the king feelingly calls for Vāsavadattā “एहि वासवदत्तेति क यासीत्येवमुच्यते.” Now the word “*iti*” shows that the author is quoting the very words used by Vatsarāja. But in the fifth act, though we find words like “हा वासवदत्ते” “हा अवन्तिराजपुत्रि” “हा प्रिये, हा प्रियशिष्ये देहि मे प्रतिवचनम्” and so on, we never find Vatsarāja saying ‘एहि वासवदत्ते’ or ‘क यासि.’

The five technical joints again are fixed by a definite time sequence; thus the Nyāsa will be the first stage, the Nyāsa-samudbheda the next and so on. According to the explanation of Gaṇapati Śāstrī this ordered sequence will be violated by the second and third stage. For we find that in the fifth act Vatsarāja in a dream addresses his queen in the manner described, and afterwards when awakened by the quasi-reality of his experience expresses to his friend Vasantaka his belief that Vāsavadattā was alive (वयस्य ! प्रियमावेदये, धरते खलु वासवदत्ता !). If the assumption that the five stages of the action are timed by an ordered sequence be correct—and there is no reason why it should not be correct—then clearly enough in the anonymous work the third stage Bijokti is reached before the second (Nyāsa-samudbheda).

Here is, therefore, additional evidence to prove that the anonymous work is different from the work alluded to by these writers and is probably a version of the original work written by Bhāsa.

It is also remarkable that this conclusion is now established beyond the possibility of any reasonable doubt by the new evidence brought to light by Prof. Sylvain Levi in his article entitled “Deux Nouveaux Traites De Dramaturgie Indienne” (J. A. Oct.-Dec. 1923 P. 193 ff.) In one of these two treatises

on dramaturgy—The Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, two disciples of the famous Jain teacher Hemacandra—we get a quotation from the Svapnavāsavadatta which is expressly mentioned as the work of Bhāsa ( Bhāsa-kṛta ). Prof. Levi points out that when it is a question of classical and celebrated works of Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Harṣa etc. the writers do not mention the names of their authors; the departure from their usual practice in the present instance undoubtedly indicates that the writers want to distinguish the authentic work of Bhāsa from another work known under the same title. The following is given from the work of Bhāsa as an illustration of anumāna:—

यथा भासकृतं स्वप्नवासवदत्ते शेफालिकाशिलातलमवलोक्य वत्सराजः—  
पादाक्रान्तानि पुष्पाणि सोष्म चेदं शिलातलम् ।  
नूनं काचिदिहासीना मां दृष्ट्वा सहसा नता ( गता ? ) ॥

cf. act IV Sc. i. after the Prologue.

This Stanza which is not found in the Trivendrum work establishes the fact that the anonymous work is a later version of the Svapnavāsavadatta of Bhāsa. Here (act IV. Sc. i after the prologue), however, in the work of the anonymous writer is preserved to us in a dislocated form a passage which belonged to the original work.

The other quotation is from the Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kosa of Sāgaranandin; while discussing the manner of transition from the Prologue to the main scene, Sāgaranandin after citing Śākuntala, Ratnāvali etc. finally cites the Svapnavāsavadatta

यथा स्वप्नवासवदत्ते । नेपथ्ये सूत्रधारः ( उत्सारणां श्रुत्वा पठति । ) अये कथं तपो-  
वनेऽप्युत्सारणा । ( विलोक्य ) कथं मन्त्री यौगन्धरायणो वत्सराजस्य राज्यप्रत्यानयनं कर्तु-  
कामः पद्मावतीपरिजनेनेत्सार्यते ।

A closely allied scene is to be met with in the anonymous work; but it only shows how much the author of the Trivendrum work was indebted to Bhāsa.

C. R. DEVADHAR.

## EDITORIAL NOTES

The Triennial elections of the Institute took place in June last and the new Regulating Council took charge of the administration of the Institute in July. The new Executive Board elected by the Council immediately appointed sub-committees for the different Departments of the Institute for 1924-25. The personnel of these committees will be found elsewhere.

\* \* \* \*

The Anniversary of the Institute was celebrated as usual on the 6th of July. Some members from the mofussil were also present on the occasion. The General Body of the Institute elected His Excellency Sir Leslie Wilson P. C., G. C. I. E., C. M. G., D. S. O., as their President for the next triennium (1924-27). This was but meet in view of the keen interest taken by His Excellency in the work of the Institute which was further evinced by his informal visit to the Institute on the 16th of July. His Excellency was received on the occasion by Mr. B. S. Kamat, one of the Vice-Presidents of the Institute and by Principal H. G. Rawlinson, the Vice-Chairman of the Regulating Council and other members. This visit enabled His Excellency to know more closely the work of the Institute and we hope this visit will not be the last as His Excellency remarked on the occasion. The Institute hopes to prosper under such encouraging auspices.

\* \* \* \*

Another noteworthy event of the Anniversary day was the election of two Oriental scholars as Honorary members of the Institute. Dr. J. J. Modi and Prof. K. B. Pathak have done valuable service to the cause of oriental learning, each in his own line of study, and in honouring these veteran scholars the Institute has really honoured itself. In this connection we may recall the names of other Honorary members viz. Muni Jina Vijayaji and M. M. Vasudeoshastri Abhyankar. It will thus be seen that the Institute has recognised not only modern critical

scholarship but also Śāstric learning, not only Sanskrit studies but also Jain and Iranian studies.

\* \* \* \*

A message of good wishes was conveyed to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar on behalf of the Institute by Sardar K. C. Mehendale, Dr. V. G. Paranjpe and Mr. N. C. Kelkar on the day of the Anniversary of the Institute, which was the 88th birth-day of Dr. Bhandarkar.

\* \* \* \*

Dr. J. M. Unwalla, Ph. D. of Navasari delivered under the auspices of the Institute two valuable lectures on the 25th and 26th August 1924. The subjects of these lectures were: (1) Observations on the Religion of the Parthians and (2) the Synthetic traits of the Indian Iconography. The latter lecture was illustrated by lantern slides and was largely attended. Dr. Belvalkar was the president for both the lectures, and the lectures were arranged at the Fergusson College. The Institute is thankful to the authorities of the Fergusson College for the facilities given by them in this connection.

\* \* \* \*

Prof. Sten Konow of the Christiania University, the renowned Orientalist who has come to India to give a course of lectures at the Viśva-Bhāratī University of Dr. Tagore, was invited to pay a visit to the Institute during his short stay in Poona. He visited the Institute on 4th November 1924, and delivered a lecture on "Indo European religious ideas in ancient India". A conversazione was arranged in his honour, which was attended by local scholars and other members of the Institute.

\* \* \* \*

The Third session of the All-India Oriental Conference was held at Madras on 22nd December 1924 and the following days. It was largely attended by scholars from different parts of India and the number of papers submitted was also very large. The next session would be held at Allahabad in 1927. The Institute notes with pleasure that the activity started under its auspices has met with the approval of the world of scholars and its continuance well-nigh guaranteed in view of the fact that the Universities of Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad have taken a lead in this matter.

*16th January 1925.*

# BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POONA.

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FOR

**1924-25**

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-





## PRIZE COMPETITIVE ESSAY.

The K. R. Cama Oriental Institute ( Sukhadvala Building 172, Hornby Road, Fort, Bombay ) invites a competitive essay for the Sarosh K. R. Cama Prize of the value of Rs. 225 on the following subject :—

“ A lucid and thoroughly intelligible translation in English of the 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st and 53rd chapters of the Yasna, the chapters of the Spenta Mainyu, Vohu Khshathra and Vahishta Ishti Gathas, in due accordance with grammar and philology, with notes and comments, wherever necessary, and with the substance of the whole at the end.”

The essay should be designated by a motto and should be accompanied by a sealed cover containing the name of the competitor and his post-office address, and should reach the Honorary Secretaries of the Institute on or before the 5th July 1925.

The competition is open to all.



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# ANNALS

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### INDO-EUROPEAN RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN ANCIENT INDIA.

BY

DR. STEN KONOW.

The history of Indo-Aryan religions is not simply an Indian phenomenon, starting from fundamental conceptions which have been developed on Indian soil. The Vedic Aryans had brought with them notions and ideas from their old home, where they had lived together with their Iranian brothers, who also called themselves Aryans, and these pre-historic Aryans had, in their turn, inherited religious thoughts and customs from their Indo-European ancestors.

In order to fully understand the later development it would, therefore, be necessary to know what was inherited both from the Aryan and from the Indo-European period, and it is even probable that such knowledge is absolutely essential, because the later structures are built up on the old foundation, without which they would perhaps be liable to decay as an uprooted tree.

For obvious reasons it is, however, impossible to give a full account of the details in the ancient Indo-European and Aryan sub-strata in Indian religion. We can only hope to be able to grasp some general features. In the days of Max Müller, it was customary to reconstruct Indo-European religion from the *Rgveda*, drawing some names and designations found in the ancient literature of other Indo-European peoples into the



enquiry for the sake of comparison, the common opinion being to the effect that the R̥gveda had preserved the leading features of the Indo-European period with remarkable fidelity.

In the first place attention was drawn to the fact that the Indian word *deva*, a god, was indential with Latin *deus* and with the word *tívar*, which is used to denote the gods in the religious songs of the ancient Norwegians: the word itself was clearly derived from the root, *div*, to shine, which is also found in the word *dyaus*, the sky, day. The gods were accordingly conceived as shining, resplendent in brightness, and residing in the skies, in heaven. It was pointed out that this explanation was further strengthened by the use of the term *homo* to denote man in the ancient Latin language, for *homo* was clearly connected with *humus*, earth. The old Indo-Europeans accordingly spoke of their gods as celestial luminous beings, residing in heaven, high above man, the son of dust.

It was even considered possible to reconstruct parts of the ancient pantheon. Behind the host of 'devas' it seemed possible to discern a divine father, the one great God. The Indian *Dyaus-pitā* was evidently the same god as the Greek *Zeus-pater*, the Roman Jupiter, both names being etymologically identical with *Dyaus-pitā*.

Other common Indo-European gods were traced in addition to him. *Uṣas*, the dawn, was the same word as Greek *Eōs*, Latin *Aurora*, divine dawn; *Sūrya*, the sun, was the same god as the Greek *Helios*, a word which is etymologically identical; *Agni* was Latin *ignis*, fire, and so forth.

There was accordingly quite a number of common names, and there also seemed to be a series of common myths and tales connected with these names: we had before us quite an Indo-European mythology.

The nature of these Indo-European gods also seemed to be evident, from the etymology of their names. They were personifications of light and the phenomena of light, of the celestial bodies and of the powers and phenomena of nature. Much has been written about this ancient light and nature-worship. It was thought to be of a much higher description than the belief in ghosts and spirits. The fixed rules observable in nature were apt to give rise to moral notions of a high order, and at the same time a conception of *Dyaus*, the highest god, as the Great-Father, was an anticipation of the later Christian idea of god as the good and merciful father of men.

The picture was filled up with numerous details, most of them derived from the *Rigveda*, but some also from the ancient religions of the Greeks and other Indo-European peoples. To the latter class belonged the conception of *Dyaus-pitā*, as the highest god, the celestial father, which played a prominent role in the discussion.

The whole structure was imposing and beautiful and remarkably modern in many respects. The ancient Indo-Europeans seemed to have been highly civilized people, in some respects even more so than their descendants at the present day, and there was some satisfaction in this thought, that our race had ceased to be barbarians uncounted ages ago. It seems to be a common idea among Indo-European nations, this, that it is more dignified and exalted to have inherited high civilization and noble thought than to have acquired them in energetic self-assertion.

The picture, however, has subsequently proved to have been wrongly drawn. The only thing which we really know is that there existed some religious designations and names in Indo-European times, which have been preserved by several Indo-European peoples. But we do not know much about the ideas and conceptions covered by these words. From the fact that *Sūrya* was invoked by the Aryans, *Helios* by the Greek, we cannot draw the conclusion that the Indo-Europeans really worshipped the sun as a great god. And from the existence of the word *deva* in India, *deus* in Rome and *tívar* in Old Norwegian, we cannot infer that the idea of light was the chief feature in the Indo-European conception of divinity. We have other designations which may be just as old and which lead to different conclusions. I shall only remind you of the common Germanic word "god". In ancient Norwegian the word is of the neuter gender, and etymologically it is identical with Sanskrit *hutam*, what is poured out, the sacrificial libation. We seem to discern, behind this word, a much more primitive idea, that of the magic offering as embodying mystic power, just as the *Brahma*, the magic formula, came to be considered in a similar light in India. We here apparently have before us a way of thinking similar to that of the Melanesians and Polynesians, who bow down before *mana*, mystic and uncontrollable power.

And an examination of such traditional tales and myths about the gods and their facts which have apparently been

handed down from the Indo-European period seems to lead to similar results. We have such tales about the conquering of the dragon, about the winning of the cows, and so forth. But it is curious that the divine names mentioned in connexion with such valorous deeds are different in the different parts of the Indo-European world.

In Greece it is Herakles, in Iran Mithra, in India Indra, who brings the cows; in Greece and Italy it is Zeus, and Jupiter who wields the thunderbolt, the weapon of the Indian Indra, and so forth. We necessarily get the impression that the Indo-European myth dealt with the powerful deed and not so much with the divine powers who performed it. It is of especial interest in this connexion to examine the ideas connected with Dyaus-pitṛ, Zeus-pater and Jupiter, because these names have played so great a role in the formation of the whole Indo-European theory. As a matter of fact we do not at all know that the Indo-European ancestor of these gods was considered as a supreme god, the father of all the devas, the Ruler of the Universe. It is only in the Greek and subsequently in Roman mythology that such a position is assigned to the Sky-Father. The ancient Germanic peoples seem to have known Dyaus, whom they called Tyr, German Ziu, as the god of war, and he is not with them, no more than in India, the powerful master of thundering and lightning. That is the business of another god, Thor. German Donar, whose name simply designates him as the Thunderer. It is of interest to make a note of this feature. When we find such a state of things with different Indo-European peoples, which are all descended from one common stock, that one of them knows a god Thunderer, while another assigns the thundering to Indra and a third to the ancient Sky-Father, it seems to be the only natural inference that the common ancestors viewed the mystical force manifest in lightning with awe as a definite entity. Behind it there might perhaps be found some vague personality, so that the possibility was there for the development of a separate god Thunderer. But else, the force existed by itself and might be manifested in the deeds of different gods. It was, therefore, natural that the different Indo-European peoples ascribed it to that individual god who in the opinion of each of them was in possession of the greatest strength, to Indra in India and to Zeus in Greece. In both cases, however, we are faced with a later development.

We have not, accordingly, any right to consider the Indo-Germanic Dyaus-pitā, as the god of lightning, at the hand of the Greek conceptions connected with his name, or of ascribing to him qualities and features which we only know from one source. We can only use such characteristics as are found in more than one place, in the traditions of more than one Indo-European people. And when such is the case, we must confess that we do not know anything more about the Indo-European Sky-Father than his name, and we cannot accordingly fill up the picture with other lines than such as are immediately derivable from the name.

Now everything which is said about Dyaus-pitā in R̥gveda seems to be of that kind. He does not play a prominent role and not a single hymn is devoted to him alone. The word *dyaus* itself is used to denote Heaven or the sky, but also means "day", just as Latin *dies*, which is the same word. He has no personal features. He is *deva*, it is true, but that word does not add anything to the idea. He is also *asura*, but we are not acquainted with the original meaning of that word. In India the Asuras seem to be considered as being in possession of the power to work wonders, and it is just possible that Dyaus is called Asura because the shining sky is wondrous like the display of magic power, of *māyā*. Other gods are described as his children. Thus Uṣas is his daughter, the Aśvins, the Ādityas, the Maruts, Sūrya and others are his sons or descendants. But then it should be remembered that *putra*, son, does not always mean a son generated by the being who is designated as the father. A *deva-putra* is almost the same thing as *deva*, i. e. is somebody belonging to the deva-class, and a son of Dyaus is therefore, essentially the same thing as a *deva*.

The only thing which can, perhaps, help us to fill up the picture is the frequent collocation of *Dyaus-pitā* and *Prthivīmātā* in the R̥gveda. We here have a mother in addition to the father, and these two ideas of fatherhood and motherhood, as manifested in the Sky and in the Earth, seem to be Indo-European.

The existence of the former idea is attested by the use of the designation Sky-Father both in India, in Greece and in Rome. The corresponding notion of an Earth-Mother can be assigned to the Indo-European period with almost absolute certainty. The Roman author Tacitus tells us that some Germanic tribes worshipped the goddess Nerthus, that is, he

says, Mother Earth, *terra mater*. An essential feature in this worship was a big procession, in which the goddess was taken out from her arcanum in a carriage, which was drawn about under great rejoicing and merry-making. At last the goddess was brought back, and everything connected with her procession, including the goddess herself, was subsequently bathed in a sacred tank.

There are, in Tacitus' short note, several details which strongly remind us of similar occurrences in the worship of Siva's consort, the great mother, and in my opinion there can be no doubt that the Kālī-procession terminating with a ceremonial bath of the image and the Nerthus celebration are two branches which have run from the same root, the Indo-European worship of the Earth-Mother, the more so because we have traces of a similar worship in other parts of the Indo-European world. The names Nerthus and Kālī cannot, of course, have anything to do with each other. All of you, however, know that Śiva's consort has many names, and that she has probably absorbed more than one different deity. The name Nerthus, on the other hand, is probably no proper name at all, but related to Sanskrit *nṛtā* and denotes the goddess in the role which her image or symbol plays at the procession. It is in reality Earth, as a manifestation of the forces of generation and fertility, which is worshipped. And in India as in the Teutonic world we have distinct traces of a male deity playing a role at these celebrations in addition to the goddess, a divine couple, the symbol of the two sides of generation and fertilization.

And here it is possible to go one step further in our analysis: *Dyaus-pitā*; the Sky-Father, has another counter part: *Manus-pitā*, the man-father. *Manu* or *Manus* is not, from the beginning, a definite person, but just as the corresponding Teutonic Manuus, man himself, the personified idea of man, the typical man, and that meant to the ancient Aryans the typical Aryan, to the Germanic tribes, the Germanic man. Other people were not real human beings, real man. They were foreigners, as the American school-boy thought, when he declared that George Washington was the first man, Adam, the first man according to the Bible, being a foreigner.

Prthivī and Dyaus were not in their quality as Earth and Sky definite divine persons. We never hear about *devānām pitā dyauh* or *manuṣyāṇām mātā prthivī*, not even about *pitā-dyauh* or *mātā prthivī*. The words *pitar* and *mātar* are always

placed last as the most important ones. *Dyaus-pitā* is not, therefore, Dyaus the father but the Sky-Father, the idea of fatherhood as manifest in the sky.

And here we are. I think, at the leading feature in Indo-European religions and religious worship. The so-called gods were not personifications of light or the celestial bodies, but primeval forces and potencies. *Sūrya*, the sun, was the force of light and warmth, *Agni* was fire itself, and *Dyaus-pitā* was the idea of fatherhood, the active generating force, as seen in the sky, from which the rain came and fertilised the eternal force of generation hidden in Earth.

A short time ago I had the privilege of listening to a paper read before the Norwegian Academy by the famous French scholar, Professor Meillet. He showed that the ancient Indo-Europeans did not conceive abstract ideas as we are accustomed to do. We do not consider them as realities, but simply as products of human thought. To us, purity, truth simply mean qualities which our mind attributes to various beings and things, but which do not exist outside of them. The Indo-Europeans saw the matter in a different light. Abstract ideas had their own independent existence. They were just as real as trees and animals and stones. When the Vedic Aryans said *vācni, vakṣi, vakti*, they did not only mean that I, thou, or he performed the activity of speaking, but that *vāk*, an eternal reality, appeared in the speaking person, and so it is quite intelligible when *vāk* is occasionally praised and hymned as if we had to do with a living person or an eternal fluid.

It is the same mentality which we are met with in the few features which we can recognize in the Indo-European conception of divinity. The Universe is not restricted to the persons and things which we can perceive with our senses. It comprises innumerable entities of a different kind just as real and just as important, or even more so, because they are eternal and imperishable. Such are the different powers, forces, and potencies, whose activity we can discern without seeing themselves.

The belief in such forces is at the bottom of the religious mind of the ancient Indo-European. He bowed down before them, and for the sake of worship he probably made use of symbols, but scarcely of images. For images might be dangerous. They do not only signify, but they actually are the person or the thing imagined, and an enemy might use them to harm

us. Otherwise with the symbol, for it can be made to contain power, or it may be separated from power by means of magic rites.

So far as I can see, such is the religious framework of the Indo-European period; not a worship of light or of celestial bodies or of the phenomena of nature, but a belief in power and energies. In the course of time this belief can assume different shapes. When the social organization becomes stronger and man becomes accustomed to see high power exercised by mighty rulers and kings, the Divine forces are apt to be viewed in the likeness of the powerful ones on earth. And this development had certainly begun in Indo-European times and contributed to the formation of the idea of the devas. And in Europe, with the hard struggle for life and power, it became the leading feature. The organized worship with most European members of the common family is chiefly directed towards heavenly rulers, mighty kings. But even in Europe popular ceremonies and customs have preserved numerous traces of the primeval belief in self-existing forces. There is such a force in the strong sword or the sharp battle axe, and the owner takes care that it passes into the proper hands at his decease. There is such a mystical force connected with the individual family, and the old Norwegian who was asked about his religious conceptions and answered that he believed in his own force and strength, was still filled with the ancient Indo-European spirit. In India the development has followed the common European line to a certain extent. We hear about powerful personal gods, and we hear how they were and still are worshipped with sacrifice and hymns. In the higher forms of Indian religiosity, however, we more frequently come across a different current, which still bears the stamp of the primeval Indo-European mentality. The eternal forces become the firm ground on which man takes his stand. They are spiritualized and raised into a higher plane. But the leading principle remains the old one. And nowhere in the world is it possible to follow human thought in the same way from a primitive beginning and to the most exalted heights of spiritual realization.

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# WERE JÑĀNEŚVARA AND NĀMADEVA CONTEMPORARIES ?

BY

P. D. KULKARNI.

If we wish to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with Jñāneśvara and to understand him *through* and *through* it is necessary that we study his mind as it is conveyed in his own words and acts, and further that we realise the circumstances in which he lived, the friends he had, his outlook upon life and many similar matters affecting him closely. For such facts we must turn to the life of Jñāneśvara which was composed in *abhaṅgas* by Nāmadeva and which is in our hands. But before we draw any conclusions from this narrative we have to make sure that it is historically trustworthy. Thus the first question that we have to ask is whether the information contained in this life is that of a contemporary who states what he personally knew or whether it was obtained by him at second hand. The value of this document depends mainly on whether Nāmadeva was a contemporary witness of the facts which he narrates or, at least, obtained his information from those who were directly concerned. What were the mutual relations of Nāmadeva, Jñāneśvara and Nivṛtti and how far is their story historically trustworthy ? Let us look first at some of the views on this subject expressed by Orientalists. The late Prof. W. B. Patwardhan of the Fergusson College, Poona, in his *Wilson Philological Lectures* places Nāmadeva a century after Jñāneśvara. This view has also been adopted by Dr. Macnicol in his "Psalms of Marāṭhā Saints". In holding this position Prof. Patwardhan and those who agree with him have the venerable scholar Dr. Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar on their side. He says as follows :—

"The vocabulary, the grammar, the language of Nāmā's work is far too modern to admit of Nāmā's being a contemporary of Jñāneśvara". That is to say, according to this view, the difference in language and in the grammatical forms between these two poets is so great that it is impossible to suppose them to have been contemporaries. It appears that the credit for this opinion must be given to Dr. Bhandarkar and that he is the source from which it has been derived by other scholars



He lays great stress upon the importance of questions of language in determining the date of any document and goes on, "Similarly another young man not fully acquainted with the critical method said that Nāmadeva and Jñānadeva were contemporaries but that the difference between their languages was due to mistakes of successive scribes. He thus believed that the scribes could reconstitute the grammar and lexicon of a language, forgetting to ask himself why the marvels effected by the scribes in the case of Nāmadeva should not have been effected by them in the case of Jñānadeva himself, whose language they had not altered". The observations made here are of great importance and must not be overlooked. It would be entirely improper on our part to shut our eyes to such facts as are here indicated and to adhere blindly to the view that the two poets were contemporaries.

When, accordingly, we take this question into serious consideration the first thought that must occur to us is that all the well-known biographers of our Marāṭhā saints upto the present time are unanimous in placing Jñāneśvara and Nāmadeva in the same period. That is to say, from Parisā Bhāgavata who is said to have been a contemporary of Jñāneśvara, continuously for six hundred years this view has been accepted without question. There are no strong reasons forthcoming such as would justify the abandonment of a tradition so universally held. Dr. Macnicol and others have drawn attention to the work called *Līlācarita* as supporting a different view. It is not, however, yet settled how far this Mānabhāu document is to be treated as authoritative. Until this is determined it would not be right to reject on its authority the well established belief as to Nāmadeva's history which has been so widely accepted as true. Apart from this very doubtful evidence there is nothing but the evidence of the language and grammar to support the view of Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar and those who agree with him. There is, it is true, an *abhaṅga* attributed to Nāmadeva which professes to give an autobiography of the poet and which seems to confirm the story in the *Līlācarita*. This *abhaṅga*, however, judged by the tests of language that these critics apply, cannot be accepted as the work of that Nāmadeva who was a contemporary of Jñāneśvara. Its language undoubtedly belongs to a later age and for that reason its evidence is inadmissible. It is now universally agreed to by Marāṭhī scholars that there must have been several Nāmadevas. Which of these Nāmadevas

is the author of this *abhaṅga*, which makes use of modern language and of words not peculiar to Nāmadeva in question, cannot now be determined. This, however, we can affirm with confidence that its author was not the Nāmadeva who lived in Jñāneśvara's time. If we can be sure from other considerations that there was a Nāmadeva who was a contemporary of Jñāneśvara then we can be confident that this *abhaṅga* does not give his story.

When we come to consider the question of the difference in language between the works of the original Nāmadeva and Jñāneśvara the first thing that strikes us is the uncertainty of this criterion. Prof. Patwardhan himself confesses this. He says, "My remarks here are by no means offered as impregnable conclusions based upon the solid rock of unimpeachable evidence". If he himself is uncertain, how, we must ask, can we accept his conclusion with confidence? As a matter of fact the works on the authority of which the allegation of the change of language is based are not, in the form in which we have them today, as faithful to the original as they should be. We cannot be sure that the words we have are those that came originally from the lips of Nāmadeva. Everything in regard to this poet, as a result of the poems of the different authors of the same name having been confused together, is in a state of complete chaos. The poems of Keśirāja Nāmā and of other Nāmās as well have yet to be distinguished. Many of the poems of these poets have been attributed to the first Nāmadeva and inserted in published editions of this work. Prof. Patwardhan has himself stated this. "All the available editions of Nāmadeva's works," he says "are bewilderingly inaccurate". If that is the case how can we draw any definite conclusions or establish any theory on the basis of the language and the grammatical forms to be found in editions of a poet that are admitted to be so unreliable?

These critics on the one hand agree that the language of the *abhaṅgas* attributed to Nāmadeva has been thoroughly modernised and that they can not be said, in the form in which we have them, to be the work of Nāmadeva, and then on the other hand they argue from the character of the language and the grammar of these corrupt poems that their author flourished a century later than Jñāneśvara. They cannot have it in both ways. As a matter of fact such an inference as to the date of an author is always precarious unless a trust-

worthy edition of his writings is available. It is wiser in the case of this poet to set aside the argument from language and grammar, and to seek for other evidence of his date. How superficial Prof. Patwardhan's investigation of Nāmadeva's work is, may be indicated by a single example. He has attributed one of Nāmadeva's poems to Nivṛtti, namely the 689th *abhaṅga* in Avate's edition. It occurs among the *abhaṅgas* that give the life of Jñāneśvara. But here as a matter of fact the *abhaṅga* in question is not Nivṛtti's but Nāmadeva is quoting Nivṛtti's words. This example shows how careful we must be about accepting Prof. Patwardhan's conclusions. Thus no value can be attached to the inferences drawn by Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar, Prof. Patwardhan and others unless they are based upon a very careful examination of the facts and unless they are supported by evidence other than that of language and grammar.

Again another argument urged by these critics is to the following effect :—"Why should Nāmadeva's writings alone have been modernised while no change of a corresponding character has taken place in the writings of Jñāneśvara who is alleged to belong to the same period". As a matter of fact good reasons can be given for this difference between the two poets. Thus it is evident that the majority of the works of Jñāneśvara, being full of philosophical thoughts and written in an aphoristical style can only be appreciated by the learned. The poems of Nāmadeva, on the other hand, are cries of the heart such as appeal to, and can be appreciated by, the ordinary man. They have been in consequence familiar to all, old and young, and have been constantly on the lips of simple people, who have always been repeating them and singing them. This could not be the case with philosophical poetry. In the case of Jñāneśvara's non-philosophical poetry, such as the Haripāṭha, we see that the same modernisation has taken place as in Nāmadeva's poems. The consequence in the case of Jñāneśvara's works from this difference between the language of the Jñāneśvarī and the language of the Haripāṭha is that some scholars have decided that there must have been two Jñāneśvaras. This is quite a gratuitous conclusion. The reason for the difference in the language of these two works is due to the difference of their subjects and of their appeal. The Jñāneśvarī is a philosophical work which was studied by very few and those were people of learning and culture. The Haripāṭha on the other hand, like the poems of Nāmadeva was familiar to multitudes of people of very limited

culture who were constantly repeating these verses. For three hundred years, between the time when the Jñāneśvari was written and the time when it was edited and published by Ekanātha it is doubtful if it was known to five persons in a thousand. It is not surprising then in these circumstances that the Jñāneśvari has changed very little compared with Nāmadeva's *abhaṅgas*. The poems of Nāmadeva have been read and repeated continuously for six hundred years and during all that time no one has attempted to edit or correct them. On the other hand the Jñāneśvari was corrected and brought to its original purity by Ekanātha, a scholar of established fame. That was done three hundred years ago and thus the only opportunity for the corruption of the text of this poem was during that time. That some corruption has taken place is evident if we compare such an old version of the text as that published by Mr. Rajwade with the version published by Mr. Kunte. Thus even in the case of a poem like the Jñāneśvari, which is of such a character that it is not liable to corruption, some considerable changes have taken place. Is it then surprising that popular poems like the *Haripāṭha* and Nāmadeva's *abhaṅgas* should have undergone very great changes and modifications? It would be a most interesting and instructive study to set down side by side manuscripts of the Jñāneśvari belonging to successive centuries and to note the changes that have taken place in the language of the poem. When we have made such a careful examination and comparison we shall be in a position to judge how much importance should be attached to the arguments of those, like Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar who lay so much stress on the changes in the Jñāneśvari as compared with those that, in our opinion have probably taken place in the language of Jñāneśvara's other poems and in the poems of Nāmadeva. We may then take for granted that the changes of the character of modernisations have taken place in these poems at the hand of their transcribers. There is, however, another question to be considered namely, that, of the evident differences that we observe between the vocabulary and the forms of grammar to be found in the poems of Jñāneśvara on the one hand and of Nāmadeva on the other. How can these differences be reconciled with the view that the two poets were contemporaries? In deciding this question it is important that we should keep in view such matters as the native place of the authors concerned, and the vocabulary there current, the culture and education of each, the subjects treated of and the terminology required in that

connection. Let us see what conclusions we would draw from such considerations as these. Nāmadeva lived in the District of Sholapur; Jñāneśvara spent his life in the Poona District, or if not there, then in the Ahmednagar District. There were thus hundreds of miles between their homes. Further Jñāneśvara was born in the family of a village officer, and belonged to a twice-born caste in which Vedic education had been carried on for centuries. His father was a man of some education and culture. Nāmadeva, on the other hand, was born in the family of a tailor and peddler of small wares. Naturally the society to which he belonged was not as cultured as that of Jñāneśvara. These differences would naturally reveal themselves in the works of the two poets. Mr. Rajwade tells us that the spoken language of the people differs at every interval of 24 miles. We can perceive such variations in phraseology if we compare, the language spoken today by the people of Pandharpur and by the people of Poona. It is quite natural that there should have been marked difference between the language of an educated man, resident in Poona, inheriting a high culture, and that of an uncultured tailor, belonging to Sholapur, whose family had for generations followed the occupation of tailors. Another consideration that must not be overlooked is that Jñāneśvara was a pioneer in the presentation through the Marāṭhi language of ideas that had hitherto been rendered only in Sanskrit. He had to make use of words suited to his great theme and for that reason he had to coin new words for the purpose of conveying the ideas he wished to express. The poems of Nāmadeva, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten, are simply the expressions of his natural feelings. His words are those that come instinctively to his lips to convey the feelings of his heart. Consequently his language is much more colloquial than that of Jñāneśvara, there is thus an inevitable difference between the two, the one dignified and classical, the other with a natural and unartificial beauty. Differences are due much more to personal characteristics than to separation in time. We see a similar contrast in the language and grammar of such a writer as Mr. R. G. Pavgi on the one hand and Moulvi Mir Muhammad Yakub in his translation of the Koran on the other, though they are contemporaries. There are differences of district and of caste to be taken into account in considering the variations in style and language. Thus Mr. Rajwade points out that "The local dialect is limited to one district only and that of the

caste to the caste only. But classical style and language is common to the whole region of Mahārāṣṭra".

Thus we can maintain that the evidence upon which students of the language of the two poets base this conclusion that a century separates them from each other is wholly insufficient. We must also remember that Nāmadeva lived for fifty years after Jñāneśvara's mundane existence. Can this period of half a century not be held responsible to some extent for the modernisation of his language? Have the critics considered all these aspects of the question with unbiased and judicial minds?

If these arguments from the language of the writers which we have adduced be supported by external evidence seconding the view we have maintained, then our position will be greatly strengthened. In the province of Kathiawar hundreds of miles from Mahārāṣṭra the poet Narasimha Mehetā who was born in the Samvat year 1470 wrote a poem of great beauty called 'Haramālā'. Scholars are agreed that the poem, which is well-known throughout Gujarat, is by this poet who belonged to Junagadh. It is to be noted that the poem was written by Narasimha Mehetā in that town in which he spent his whole life. In those days there was little intercourse between parts of the country so widely separated as Kathiawar and Mahārāṣṭra, and in addition there was the difference of language. Yet in his poem Narasimha Mehetā refers in many places with great respect to Nāmadeva. He speaks of him as a saint of established fame, in direct relation with God. The references to Nāmadeva make it quite plain that it is the Nāmadeva of the Vārakari sect to whom he is referring. He refers to well-known incidents in the ancient saint's life, such as his raising to life a dead cow and having his house thatched by the God. The former of these miracles is said to have happened "Long ago at Pandharpur." The fact that Nāmadeva was known as a great saint in Kathiawar by the time Mehetā wrote and the fact also that he is referred to as having lived long ago make it evident that Nāmadeva was not a contemporary of Narasimha Mehetā. Taking these facts into account we must allow for a period of three generations between the time of Narasimha Mehetā and the time of Nāmadeva. If we place 60 years between these two poets and add 80 years, as representing the life of Nāmadeva then there will be 140 years between their births. Five hundred and eight years have elapsed since the birth of

**Mehetā** in Samvat 1470, and therefore by this calculation 648 years since the birth of Nāmadeva. Now if Jñāneśvara was born in Śaka 1197 then 647 years have passed since his birth. Thus we see that this calculation makes Nāmadeva and Jñāneśvara contemporaries. Thus our view of the date of these two poets is further confirmed. This view is likewise held by Mr. V. L. Bhave in his famous *Mahārāṣṭra Sārasvata*.

It seems to us that if these considerations are weighed without prejudice the conclusion is inevitable that these two great Marāṭhī poets were contemporaries, that the whole life of Jñāneśvara was passed, as it were, in the presence of Nāmadeva, that they were brought into close contact and were friends. Thus many of the incidents in Jñāneśvara's life may well have been witnessed by Nāmadeva personally and others he may have heard described by Jñāneśvara, his brothers and his intimate friends. Thus only the strongest of evidence should suffice to make us contradict the testimony of Nāmadeva. Mere inferences are of no value. They cannot be accepted in the face of the directness of the narrative told by him.

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# REFLECTIONS ON THE AMARAKOSA.

BY

V. K. RAJWADE.

## I.

Dr. Johnson in his Dictionary defined "excise" as a hateful tax levied upon commodities, and adjusted not by the common judges of property but wretches hired by those, to whom excise is paid ; "patron" as one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in water and when he has reached ground encumbers him with help ; a "Tory" as one who adheres to the ancient constitution of the state and the apostolical hierarchy of the Church of England ; according to him "Whig" is the name of a faction *i. e.* of something subversive of all true government and "Whiggism" a negation of all principles.

Thus the lexicographer has imported a personal element *i. e.* his personal prejudices and pre-posessions into his definitions which strictly speaking ought to be free from such personal bias. One may, however, easily conceive how even an impersonal subject like Mathematics may be made personal. Amara has not introduced such personal views but the arrangement of his compilation shows what his views were about cosmogony, Hindu deities and the social order of his time. Though he is said to have been a Buddhist and certain verses seem to bear out this opinion, his mind is completely saturated with Hinduism. His cosmogony and his geography are those of the Purāṇas: (i) Heaven, (ii) Space, in which are located the stars and the planets, (iii) the nether region or पतल and (iv) Hell—that is the order of the Purāṇic universe. His Gods are the Purāṇic Gods and not those of the Vedas or even the Brāhmanas. Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Varuṇa and the Sun have been dislodged from the supremacy which they enjoyed in the Vedas ; the Trinity of Brahman, Viṣṇu and Mahēśa is now in the ascendant. Viṣṇu alone belongs to the Vedic pantheon. Brahman and Śiva are almost upstarts and it is to this trinity that the Gods of the older Pantheon become subordinate. Indra, Agni etc. become the guardians of the eight directions. Kubera



is altogether a new deity. Pātāla is the region of the serpent-folk and their kings Vāsuki and Śesa. Hell has four subordinate divisions, viz. that in which there are no waves, another which always burns, third महारोरव, fourth रोरव, which last two seem to be the exaggeration of all conceivable pains and torments. The Geography also is Purāṇic. There are the legendary and actual mountains and prominence is given to Bhāratavarṣa.

## II.

The social order is that of the four castes. As expected Brāhmaṇas occupy the first place, then follow the Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras. The highest class has no association whatever with the profession of arms or with lucrative trades. The Brāhmaṇa is one whose life falls into four stages: in the first, he acquires learning, in the second he performs sacrifices and discharges all the duties of the householder, in the third, he partially segregates himself from the world, which segregation becomes complete in the fourth. Learning, teaching, sacrificing and helping others in their sacrifices, receiving and making gifts, these are the duties of his life. His daily routine consists of the recitation of the Vedas, making offering to the domestic fire, hospitality to chance-guests, making libations to the manes of ancestors and to the elements. Thus he tries to please the Gods, the Fire, the Ancestors, the elements and the guests. His glory consists in reciting the Vedas. If during the Vedic recitation any particles of the saliva are accidentally ejected out of his mouth they ought not to be considered as an insult or even as a nuisance. Their technical name is Brahmabindu (ब्रह्मबिन्दु) particles of the sacred saliva; so exalted is the position of the Brāhmaṇa. The one main function of his life is that of wiping off sin; the least possible departure from duty must be atoned for. The Brāhmaṇa must aim at freedom from passion and ignorance. Sattva (सत्त्व) *i. e.* moral and spiritual goodness should be the sole business of his life.

The Kṣatriya or the warrior is born from the arm of Brahman. The civil and military administration of the State belongs to him. As guardian of the State he must secure and maintain internal peace and guard the State from external enemies. He must have good councillors, officers, judges and an efficient police. In Plato's Republic the guardians and auxiliaries are the highest classes. In Amara the Kṣatriyas

are both guardians and auxiliaries. As we have said above the Brāhmaṇa has nothing to do with affairs of State, which are entirely devolved upon the warrior caste.

The Vaiśyas born of the thigh of Brāhmaṇa were called Arya (अर्य) and Bhūmispṛk (भूमिस्पृक्), which means that originally they were tillers of the soil. Agriculture is the very foundation of trade, commerce and wealth. It, therefore, leads the way. The professions which the Vaiśyas followed were mainly agriculture, herdsman'ship and trade. The word Vṛtti or livelihood is first mentioned in connection with this class. Agriculture is called Anṛta (अनृत), pure falsehood. Picking grains in fields from which corn has been harvested is called (ऋत) or Righteousness or Truth. Food obtained by begging is mṛta (मृत) i. e. death itself; that obtained without begging is Amṛta (अमृत) or Immortality or Eternal life. Service is the life of a dog. All pecuniary affairs, money lending, metals, groceries, in fact every article that is sold and purchased, all give and take, all these are associated with the name Vaiśya. The treatment of the two orders of the Kṣatriyas and Vaisyas shows that Hindu civilization had once reached a high water mark. Civil administration, military and foreign policy had become complex. Trade had gone far beyond the limits of barter. Coinage and credit had come into play; the names of the various kinds of diamonds, ornaments, palatial dwellings, show high trading activity and great constructive skill.

The Śūdras are Jaghanyaja (जघन्यज) i. e. born of the lowest part of Brahmadeva's body and also Avarṇa (अवर्ण) that is outside the three castes. Black is no colour. The only recognizable colour or complexion is white, so there was already a colour bar there, but in a different sense. The coloured race was the white race. The colourless were the blacks. They are held in such utter contempt that they are called Itara (इतर) i. e. others than the recognised castes. No epithet is too low for them. They are lazy, nerveless, cold-blooded creatures. Not only were low craftsmen such as potters, masons, tailors, dyers, knife-grinders, shoe-makers, dealers in liquor, washermen, snake-charmers, strolling actors, drummers and porters included among the Śūdras, not only criminals such as thieves, highway-men, dicers and hunters but even weavers, carriage-builders, carpenters, copper-smiths and, wonder of all wonders, even gold-smiths were condemned to be Śūdras. What sort of society must it have been when high crafts as well as low were thus

assigned the lowest position. Non-Aryan tribes such as Kirāta, Śabara, Pulinda were Śūdras. Even domesticated animals were distributed on the basis of the castes. One would have expected from the common expression Gobrahmaṇa-pratipālaka (गोब्राह्मण-प्रतिपालक) that the cow at least would be associated with Brāhmaṇa but no! The Brāhmaṇa must be above all earthly cares and even the cow would disturb the peace of his mind. So no domestic animal is found in the Brahma-Varga. The Kings, commanding armies of four sorts required elephants and horses. These, therefore, are mentioned in the Kṣatriya-Varga. To the Vaiśya are assigned the bovine kind, sheep, rams, asses, and camels. One would have expected the last in the company of elephants and horses, because no animal can be faster than the camel, which animal was often used for the work of communication. However as carriers of load, the camels are mentioned in the Vaiśya-Varga. But the dog and the swine (village-sweepers) are alone included in the Śūdra-Varga. The Śūdras in the eyes of the higher classes of those days did not deserve higher company than that of dogs and hogs. The goat (बक) is also mentioned perhaps because the animal was so serviceable to the butcher.

From all this, we see clearly, that the compiler was primed to the full with the social prejudices and pre-posessions of his day. Could he have been a Buddhist? Amara is said to have been a Buddhist on account of (i) the introductory colourless prayer, (ii) the names of the Buddha, (iii) and thirdly Dharma-rājau-yamajinau. (धर्मराजौयमजिनौ) But what are these compared with the overwhelming evidence on the other side? In my opinion the author must have been a Brāhmaṇa of Brāhmaṇas and not a Buddhist, who would never have been such a stern believer in the fourfold social order, however well inclined he might be towards the Brāhmaṇas.

### III.

Amara calls his work Nāmaṅgānuśāsanam (नामलिङ्गानुशासनम्) in which he assigns genders to nouns. But this would be a meagre description of the contents. Had that been his only intention the last Varga, Liṅgādisaṅgraha Varga, (लिङ्गादिसंग्रहवर्ग) would have answered the purpose quite well. He lays down certain instructions whereby genders may be known. But, besides, assigning genders he gives us synonyms and at times even antonyms. In the first Kāṇḍa and in some sections of the

second he does follow his own instructions as to genders but in the subsequent portions they prove unmanageable and he throws them overboard. In his introductory declaration he says he has drawn upon old lexicons of the Nāmalingānuśāsana type but finding the words misarranged and the classes unnecessarily multitudinous he has shortened their number and redistributed the words according to certain principles.

He seems to have arranged the classes (Vargas) of the first Kāṇḍa in a certain connected order. Heaven, Sky, Dik (i. e. parts of the sky), Kāla i. e. the time which is measured by the movements of the luminaries of the sky, these four have some internal connection. What should have followed is the second Kāṇḍa as it deals with the earth, but then the author wanted to make it a separate Kāṇḍa by itself and therefore, by introducing at the end of the Kālavarga, the soul and the mind which have no connection with the Kālavarga he brings in the Dhī (धी) Varga and others. Really the Dhī (धी) Varga, Śabdādi (शब्दादि) Varga and Nāṭya (नाट्य) Varga are associated with man and should have been dealt with after man. Pātāla (पाताल) and Naraka (नरक) would have come in as a matter of course, logically after the Bhū (भू) Varga. Vāri (वारी) Varga the last has nothing to do with the Naraka (नरक) Varga. As a meteorological phenomenon its natural place is after the sky. There is at least a show of a logical chain in the first Kāṇḍa, in the second, however, the author makes no claim to such a chain.

The first Varga of the second Kāṇḍa (काण्ड) namely the Bhūmi (भूमि) Varga is followed by the Pura Varga, but it ought to have been followed by Sailādi (शैलादि) Varga and then Pura Varga, as the last is connected with (मनुष्य) Manusya Varga. The four castes, as constituting humanity follow naturally.

The third Kāṇḍa is miscellaneous and there is a serious doubt as to its having been compiled by Amara. The Nānārtha (नानार्थ) Varga goes clean against the name of the work viz. Nāmalingānuśāsana. How can indeclinables i. e. अव्ययवर्ग be included among nouns and the Līṅgādisaṅgraha Varga is certainly an excrescence. It is too technical i. e. altogether Pāṇinian in its nomenclature and therefore a hard nut for the ordinary student. Genders were assigned to nouns and substantives in the previous portions. There was no necessity of laying down general rules about genders. Many words in this last Varga are obscure. They are not mentioned anywhere in

the preceding part of the work. This Varga has no business to form part of such a lexicon.

#### IV.

In the arrangement of words there are so many surprises. In the Manusya (मनुष्य) Varga, for instance, we have names for man and woman, then different kinds of women according to personal charms and temperaments, marriage, children, womanhood, mode of life, chastity and self-abandonment; then various kinds of sons, legitimate and illegitimate, relatives, then stages of life such as childhood youth etc. then physical defects, then diseases, then human anatomy, then external man, hair and hair-toilet and painting the body, ornaments, cosmetics, ways of wearing garments, materials of which cloth is made, fashionable beds and bed furniture. Here is a veritable hotch-potch. One would like to know what older lexicons Amara drew upon and what arrangement of classes and words they followed, but unfortunately such lexicons are unavailable. Perhaps they have been lost for good. Most probably the order which these old lexicons followed was natural. Whatever order that might be, Amara cannot have improved upon it. His method is too artificial. Does Amara's work include all words that were in use at his time, one very much doubts it. We expect such words as Pramāṇa (प्रमाण), Anumāna (अनुमान), Vyāpti (व्याप्ति), Pakṣa, (पक्ष) Pakṣa Dharma (पक्षधर्म), Dvyaṇuka (द्व्यणुक), Tryaṇuka (त्र्यणुक), Āraṇyaka (आरण्यक) and Brāhmaṇa (ब्राह्मण) in a Koṣa like this. Their absence is inexplicable. Does it mean that they came into existence after Amara? A number of words might be found which are equally conspicuous by their absence. Again we have Vāḍavā वडवा = a Brāhmaṇa woman, Kōḷaṭiney = the son of a vagrant beggar woman, Sōbhaginēy = the son of Subhagā, dḍuṇ = one suffering from scabies, vātakī = one suffering from Rheumatism, atisārakī one suffering from diarrhoea; but where are the words of which these are derivatives?

These are names of common ailments and as such must have existed in Amara's time. Why did not Amara mention them? Was it an oversight? Or has this Koṣa undergone mutilation at the hands of ignorant editors? Vāḍavā (वडवा) a Brāhmaṇa woman, Kulāṭā (कुलटा) an itinerant beggar woman, Subhagā (सुभगा), these might have gone out of use. But that cannot be said of the three others.

We see no advantage in forcing different classes of words into one heterogeneous class. One's gorge rises at reading ornaments, fine dress, cosmetics etc. in the same breath with ugliness and physical defects, disease and its cure. Good women should not have been brought in contact with foul women. This portentous Varga might very well be split into short logical Vargas. e. g. there might be a class devoted to women, their dress, ornaments and other personal decorations. Another class might be devoted to human anatomy, and a third to diseases and their treatment. Physical peculiarities and defects may be described in another.

We expect the inclusion of all animals, domesticated and wild in the *Simhādī* (सिंहादि) Varga but certain animals are specially reserved for the *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya* and *Sūdra* Vargas as we have seen above.

All these remarks hold true in the case of the *Vaiśya* Varga also.

## V.

Certain words had lost their original meanings and assumed others. *Pañcajana* (पञ्चजन), for instance, originally meant five particular Āryan tribes but in the *Amarakoṣa* it denotes only 'man'. *Vāmā* (वामा) and *Pratīpa-darśinī* (प्रतीपदर्शिनी) must have once meant as they do in the *Śākuntala* 'quarrelsome women' or women given to contradiction. In *Amara* they mean woman in general. *Lalanā* (ललना), *Kāntā* (कान्ता), *Sundarī* (सुन्दरी), *Āṅganā* (अङ्गना) used now for fair woman in general denoted special kinds of women.

Hundreds of words mentioned in the *Amarakoṣa* have gone out of use. As for instance *Koṭavī* (कोटवी) a naked woman, *Śradhālu* (श्रद्धालु) i. e. a woman having longings due to pregnancy, *Niskalā* (निष्कला) a woman who is past child bearing age, *Daśamī* (दशमी) one who is in the last stage of his life, *Sōsa* (शोष) Tuberculosis, *Pauruṣa* (पौरुष) full human height with the hands raised up, *Caṇḍātaka* (चण्डातक) pinafore, *Upādhi* (उपाधि) religious contemplation, *Kiṣku* (किष्कु) a hand, *Sthānīya* (स्थानीय), *Nigama* (निगम) and *Putābhedana* (पुटभेदन) all three denoting a city, *Prācīna* (प्राचीन) an enclosure round a city, *Avarodhanam* (अवरोधनम्) (and not *Avarodha* अवरोध) a harem, *Pracchanna* (प्रच्छन्न) a trap door, *Viśkambha* (विष्कम्भ) a door bar, *Vānam* (वानम्) dry fruit, *Uddhāra* (उद्धार) borrowing, *Kharjura* (खर्जुर) and *Durvarṇa* (दुर्वर्ण)

both meaning silver, Saṅkhyāvaṇ<sup>3</sup> (संख्यावान्) learned-what has become of the literature in which these words were used ?

## VI.

Amara seems to have been a devoted student of Pāṇini. Not only are many तद्धित words common to him and Pāṇini, he sometimes quotes actual Sūtras of Pāṇini. In आघूनस्त्रादौदिकीविजिगीषा विवर्जिते he combines दिवो विजिगीषायां and उदरादगाद्युने (पा० ५।२।६७); he has altered उपसर्गकाल्याप्रजने (Pāṇini 3-1-104) to काल्योपसर्गाप्रजने (A. 2-9-70). Though many words in Pāṇini are found in this Koṣa some are strangely absent, such as Keśaka (केशक) one proud of his hair, given as an illustration of the Sūtra खाङ्गेभ्यः प्रसिन्ने (P. 5-2-66). Similarly आकर्षकः (P. 5-2-64), Dhanakah (धनकः), Hiranyakah (हिरण्यकः) (P. 5-2-65), सस्यकः (P. 5-2-68), अंशकः (P. 5-2-69). This shows that Sanskrit was a spoken language down to the time of Amara and that words used in Pāṇini's days had gone out of use by the time of Amara. Otherwise Amara would be chargeable with neglect. Could Amara have omitted so many words by mere oversight or does it not stand to reason that many words had ceased to be used in his day ?

In conclusion I may state that a critical study of the Amarakoṣa would yield very interesting and instructive results. It would show us that Sanskrit was once a living language, that many old words had gone out of use and new words were being coined. If older lexicons than his could be discovered it would certainly be a gain because these lexicons would reveal different principles of arrangement. A modern lexicon is necessarily alphabetical in its arrangement. Sanskrit lexicons had to be versified. An alphabetical order of words would, therefore, have been most inconvenient for versification. The lexicographers had, therefore, to classify words and one desires to know what principles guided them in their classification. A critical edition of the Amarakoṣa would show similarity between Pāṇini and Amara, the literature that was available to Amara, the words that were current in Pāṇini's time, but which had fallen into disuse by the time of Amara and words which have gone out of use since the days of Amara. It would also give us an insight with regard to the universe, Hinduism and the social order of his day. At present the Amarakoṣa is studied mechanically. A critical edition will make that Koṣa a living one. It would bring out the life that, at present, lies hidden in it.

# KING AKBAR AND THE PERSIAN TRANSLATIONS OF SANSKRIT BOOKS.<sup>1</sup>

BY

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

## I

There were several occurrences that suggested to me the subject of this paper. (a) Sometime ago, I had the pleasure of reading with interest the excellent prospectus of a new and critical edition of the Mahābhārata undertaken by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, from the learned pen of Mr. N. B. Utgikar. Finding it interesting, and greatly admiring the zeal of the new Institute, I had the pleasure of taking a short notice of the undertaking in the columns of the Jam-i-Jamshed. (b) Then my attention was drawn again to the same subject by a letter from the Editorial Committee to the Secretary of the B. B. R. A. Society, asking that the prospectus may be reviewed in the Society's Journal. (c) Then, on being appointed a member of a small sub-committee to select some rare manuscripts from the Moola Feroze Library, accommodated in the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, to be sent to this Conference to be exhibited, in reply to a requisition from the Secretaries of the Conference, I thought that some manuscripts which may interest Sanskritists who were likely to form a large number of the members of the Conference, will be much welcome. Looking from that point of view, I found that we had two manuscripts; one containing the Persian translation of the first five *paravans* of the Mahābhārata and the second that of Yoga-vāsistha. I produce these here for inspection. All these circumstances and especially the find of the Persian translation of the Mahābhārata, have suggested to me the subject of this paper. Latterly, when I was at the end of my study for the paper, I found, on inquiry, that the B. B. R. A. Society Library also had a copy of the Persian translation of the Mahābhārata. I produce here that manuscript also for inspection.

1. Paper originally read before the First Oriental Conference at Poona in November 1919. The final proofs could not be revised by Dr. Modi owing to his being away from India.



The manuscript of the Persian Mahābhārata, which I produce from the Moola Feroze Library, is thus described by the late Prof. Rehatzek, in his "Catalogue raisonné" of the Arabic, Hindustani, Persian and Turkish Mss. in the Library in 1873.

"مہابھارت پنج پر" Five chapters of the Mahābhārata, Shekastāh writing, worm-eaten; L. 8.2 in., br. 4.9 in., th. 0.7 in. This appears to be one of the many works produced by order of the emperor Akbar, but the translator's name is not mentioned. No date."<sup>1</sup> Rehatzek was mistaken in saying that the Ms. has no date. It bears a date, not of the translation but of the writing of the Ms, but unfortunately the year, owing to careless binding, cannot be deciphered. We read at the end تمام شد پر پنجم از کتاب مہابھارت کہ انرا... گویند بتاریخ ۲۸۴۰ ۲ بہر ذی القعدة سنہ ۱۸

The B. B. R. A. Society manuscript is a large manuscript containing the translation of all the eighteen parvans (پر). It is a well-written copy with illustrations in painting here and there. We know that the art of painting also was patronized well by Akbar. Some of the Parvans end with the words :

تمام شد پر... بفضل شری کرشن جی

i. e. finished parvan (here is given the number of the parvan) with the gracious help of Shri Krishnaji." The manuscript, though well-bound, has begun to be worm-eaten. It bears no colophon.

The object of this paper is to place before students, a concise account of the attempts of King Akbar to get some important Sanskrit books translated into Persian.

Mr. Vincent Smith, in the Chapter on "Literature and Art" (Chap. XV), in his excellent life of Akbar ("Akbar, the great Mogul 1542-1605") says: "Probably nobody now-a-days reads the translations from Sanskrit books so laboriously made by Badâoni and other people at the command of Akbar. It would be difficult to obtain a competent opinion on their literary merit, and it does not seem worth while to obtain it" (p. 415).

1. P. 232 of the Catalogue. No. 52 of Chap. IX.

2. It may be read ششم

3. The next two figures are missing.

This seems to be so. It seems that many Sanskritists perhaps do not even know anything of the existence of these translations. The learned author of the recent prospectus of the *Mahābhārata*, does not allude to them. But, I think, that these Persian translations, will be of some use to Sanskrit scholars to know, how some particular doubtful passages of the Sanskrit works, thus translated were understood in the time of Akbar (1542-1605). They may not be of much use in the work of literal translation, but they must have a value of their own, in case of particular doubtful words or passages, to know how they were understood in the time of Akbar. Though they are the work of Mahomedans, it must be remembered that learned Brahmins had a hand in their interpretation. Our sources of information on the subject of these translations are—

1. The *Āin-i-Akbari* of Abul Fazl.
2. The *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh* of Abd-ul-Qadir Badaoni (Lowe's translation pp. 265, 329, 330, 346, 413.)

## II

Akbar's love for his Hindu subjects and his eclecticism had drawn him towards Sanskrit literature and had led him to ask the scholars of his Court to translate some Sanskrit works. But that must not lead one to say, that Sanskrit was not known by some Mahomedan scholars before Akbar's time. Elliot gives us a very interesting note on the question, under the heading of "The Knowledge of Sanskrit by Muhammadans," in his *History of India*.<sup>1</sup> It seems that, during the Khalifate of Al-Māmūn (born 786 A. C.), the famous son of Haroun-al-Rashid, whose times are known as the golden age in the history of the Mahomedans, the knowledge of Sanskrit was possessed by some of the alumni of his Court. It seems that Al-Māmūn held at his Court, religious Conferences, somewhat like those held by Akbar. The Pahlavi *Gajashtha Abālis*, i. e. the cursed *Abālish*, was a religious disputation, held (about 825 A. C.) at one of such conferences between one Ādar Faroba, the compiler of the Pahlavi *Dinkard*, and a Zendic heretic, known as *Abālish*. Elliot calls his age "the Augustan age of Arabian literature". Some Indian Medical treatises in Sanskrit are said to have been translated from Sanskrit into Arabic in his Court. The

well-known Sanskrit works on medicine of Caraka and Suśruta were translated into Arabic ere this. Two Hindu doctors are said to have held appointments as body-physicians at the Court of Harun-al-Rashid. Some books on astronomy, astrology, music, dreams, agriculture &c. were translated from Sanskrit into Arabic in the time of these Khalifs. Albiruni, who, on account of his "modern spirit and method of critical research," is spoken of by Dr. Sachau, the translator of his *Chronology*, as "a phenomenon in the history of Eastern learning and literatures"<sup>1</sup>, is believed to have known Sanskrit well enough to draw materials from Indian sources. The works of other subsequent Mahomedan authors named by Elliot point to a knowledge of Sanskrit by their authors. Again, the fact that the book of Kalileh va Damneh was translated into Pahlavi from Sanskrit by the courtiers of Chosroes I (Noshirwan, the Just), shows that Sanskrit was known by some individual scholars in Persia even in Sassanian times. From the *Tārikh-i-Ferishta*, we learn, that, long before Akbar, King Feroze Taghluk had got some Sanskrit works, in the library of a Hindu temple at Nagarkote in the Kangra Valley, translated into Persian. We read there (Elliot VI p. 227): "The people of Nagrakote told Feroze, that the idol which the Hindoos worshipped in the temple of Nagrakote was the image of Nowshaba, the wife of Alexander the Great, and that that conqueror had left with them the idol (which the Brahmins had made at the time the Conqueror was in these parts, and placed within their temple, and that now that image was the idol of the people of this country).<sup>2</sup> The name by which it (their country) was then known was Jwalamookhy.<sup>3</sup> In this temple was a fine library of Hindee books, consisting of 1300 volumes. Feroze ordered (sent for some of the wise men of that religion and ordered some of the books to be translated and especially directed) one of those books, which treated of philosophy, astrology, and divination, to be translated into prose (verse) in the Persian language, by (one of the celebrated poets of the period) Eiz-ood-Deen, Khalid Khany and called it

1 "The Chronology of Ancient Nations" of Albiruni, translated by Dr. C. E. Sachau, Preface p. x.

2 The portion enclosed in the brackets is not found in Brigg's *Ferishta* I, p. 454. ( Vide Naval Kishore's Text Vol. I. pp. 147-48). The text gives the names of the queen and the temple as *جا مہی* and *نوشاہ*.

3 i. e. Volcanic. I had the pleasure of visiting this part of the country and the Jwalamookhy in May 1900.

Dulayil Feroze Shahee, (It is in truth a book replete with various kinds of knowledge both practical and theoretical)." 1

Amir Khusru, who lived in the 8th century Hijri (Died 725 A. H. 1325 A. C.), and who is well-known for the historical interest of his poems, having written poetical accounts of the reigns of Alā-ud-din Khilji and his predecessors, had somewhat familiarised Persians of literary taste like Akbar with the contents of the Sanskrit literature. Among his various works, the *Nuh Sepehr* (نُه سَپَہر), i. e. the Nine spheres, is well-known, as containing some account of the reign of Kutb-ud-din Mubarak Shah. In the 3rd Sepehr or sphere, he thus speaks of the Indian languages of his time, and, among them, of Sanskrit in particular: "As I was born in Hind, I may be allowed to say a word respecting its languages. There is at this time in every province a language peculiar to itself, and not borrowed from any other—Sindī, Lahorī, Kashmirī the language of Dugar, 2 Dhūr Samundar; Tilang, Gujarat, Ma'bar, Gaur, Bengal, Oudh, Delhi and its environs. These are all languages of Hind, which from ancient times have been applied in every way to the common purposes of life. But there is another language more select than the others, which all the Brahmins use. Its name from of old is Sahaskrit, and the common people know nothing of it. A Brahmin knows it, but Brāhmaṇī women do not understand a word of it. It bears a resemblance to Aṭabic in some respects, in its permutations of letters, its grammar, its conjugations, and polish. They have four books in that language, which they are constantly in the habit of repeating. Their name is Bed. 3 They contain stories of their gods, but little advantage can be derived from their perusal. Whatever other stories and fables they have, is contained in *kaḥits*, *parwānas*, and *nāmahs*. The language possesses rules for composition and eloquence. The language is very precious, inferior to Arabic, but superior to Dari; and though the latter is certainly sweet and melodious, yet even in that respect this language does not yield to it." 4

1 Elliot's History of India VI p. 227.

2 "The country between Lahore and Kashmir."

3 Veda.

4 Elliot's History of India Vol. III pp. 563-4.

## III

According to the Akbar Nāmah<sup>1</sup>, Akbar was placed under the tutelage of Mulla Asāmu-d-din on 20th November 1547, when he was 4 years, 4 months and 4 days old, that being pointed out by astrologers as a very auspicious day, "such as might happen once during cycles and life-times." Naturally, he could not take to much learning at this tender age and devoted himself to play. Latterly, it being thought, that the above tutor, who himself was devoted to pigeons, was not good enough, he was replaced by one Maulānā Bāyazīd,<sup>2</sup> but with no better results. When he grew up as a boy and continued truant and unlettered, the courtiers in charge of him, once complained to his father about his indifference. Thereupon, his father sent him a mild letter of gracious remonstrance, "a gracious letter containing instructions and admonitions, full of kindness and paternal affection, and not at all of a censuring or cautioning character." Therein, he quoted the following couplet of Shaikh Nizāmi<sup>3</sup>

غافل منشین نہ وقت بافی ست - وقت ہنرا ست و کار سازی ست

i. e. Do not sit careless. This is not the time of play. This is the time of acquiring learning and of action.

Then, the father, cast lots (قرعر) between three persons—Mulla Abdu-l-Qadir, Mulla-Zada Mulla Asanu-d-din, and Maullānā Bāyazīd—as to who may be the best instructor. The happy lot (قرعر سعادت) fell on the name of Abdu-l-Qadir and he was appointed instructor.

In spite of all these attempts, Akbar did not take to regular book-learning, and his Minister Abul Fazl defends him, saying, that Akbar was a gifted man. God had given him wisdom and learning as a Divine gift and he, therefore, did not require, man-taught learning. He said: "They did not know that the task-masters of creation (i. e. the Higher Powers) were taking care that the inspired mind of this nursling of Divine light should not become the reception chamber of inking impressions (i. e. book-learning) or the alighting stage of the sooty types

1 Beveridge's Translation, Vol. I (1902) p. 519.

2 Ibid. pp. 520, 588.

3 The Bengal Asiatic Society's Text of Akbar-nāmah, edited by Abdur Rahim, Vol. I p. 316.

of the exoteric sciences".<sup>1</sup> Further on, he says: "It is not hidden from the wise and the acute that the appointment of a teacher in case like this, springs from use and wont, and does not pertain to the acquisition of perfections. For him, who is God's pupil, what occasion is there for teaching by creatures, or for application to lessons? Accordingly his holy heart and his sacred soul never turned towards external teaching. And his possession of the most excellent sciences together with his disinclination for the learning of letters were a method of showing to mankind at the time of the manifestation of the lights of hidden abundances, that the lofty comprehension of this Lord of the Age was not learned or acquired, but was the gift of God in which human effort had no part."

Akbar's total disregard for any education before all the above tutors, one after another, has led some to class him as an illiterate, as one not knowing to read and write. But after all, it seems that Abul Fazl was in the right. Whatever his disregard and indifference towards, what we call, the literacy of the three R's may be, he was one of the best and wisest kings India has seen. He may be called the Aśoka of the Mogul period. In spite of his so-called illiteracy, his Court was, as it were, "une véritable académie". Poets, philosophers, learned divines, artists, painters, musicians, calligraphists all assembled at his Court and found help and support. So, as a patron of literature, Akbar took an interest in Sanskrit literature also. Dr. F. W. Thomas has pointed out to Mr. Vincent Smith,<sup>2</sup> that, in the Mackenzie Collection of India Office, there exists a Sanskrit History of part of Akbar's reign. But Akbar's interest in Sanskrit literature has been more actively shown in his attempts to get various Sanskrit books of importance translated into Persian.

As a great patron of literature he had amassed a number of books and had formed a large library (کتاب خانہ). Akbar's Library. A part of this was within the sacred precincts of his palace (مشکوٰی مقدس Mashku-i-muqaddas i. e. the Harem) and a part without. The learned men (کاردانان) of his Court brought the books directly before the King and he got them read from the beginning to the end, marking with his own hand the

1 Translation by Beveridge, Vol. I. pp. 521-28.

2 Akbar the Great Mogul. p. 486.

place on the pages where they stopped from day to day. The readers (خوارنده) were paid in proportion to the number of pages read. He got Hindi (Sanskrit), Yunāni (Greek), Arabic and Persian books translated into other languages by persons versed in languages (زبان دانان). We read in the Akbar Nāmah, that, when in the 35th year of his reign "Padre Farmaliun arrived at the Imperial Court from Goa....., a man of much learning and eloquence, a few intelligent men were placed under him for instruction, so that provision might be made for securing translations of Greek books and of extending knowledge."

The following list prepared from the Āin-i-Akbari (Bk. I *āin*. 34) of Abul Fazl and the Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh of Badaoni, gives us the names of all the Sanskrit books translated at the direction of Akbar and of all the translators. The first nine books are referred to, both in the Āin-i-Akbari, and in the Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh. The tenth is mentioned in the latter only. The eleventh is mentioned only in one little-known book, the Chahār Gulzār Shujāi. From the abstract of Chahār Gulzār Shujāi of Hari Charan Dās, as given by Elliot,<sup>1</sup> we learn, that, at the time of Alamgir II, there were available for scholars, the translations in Persian of the following Sanskrit books Rājāvali, Rāmāyana, Mahābhārata, Bhāgavata and Jog Bashist, the translation of which last book is there attributed to Faizi. This author speaks of the translation of the Mahābhārata as that done by Faizi,<sup>2</sup> but we know, that Faizi's share of the work was merely that of putting it into an elegant form. From an abstract of the contents of the Siyarul - Muta Akhkhirin of Ghulām Husain Khān, as given by Dowson in Elliot's History,<sup>3</sup> we learn, that some other works on history also were translated from Sanskrit by Faizi. Dowson says of its contents, that it gave "a summary of the ancient history, as derived from the Sanskrit works translated by Faizi and others."

1 Vol. VIII. p. 205.

2 Ibid p. 207.

3 Vol. VIII. p. 194.

A list of Sanskrit  
Books translated  
at the direction of  
Akbar.

	Names of Books	Names of Translators.
1	کشن جوشی Kishan Joshi	... Abul Fazl
2	گنگا دهر Ganga-dhar	... Abul Fazl
3	مهیش مهانند Mahish Mahanand	... Abul Fazl
4	مهابهارت Mahābhārata	... Naqib Khar and four <sup>1</sup> others.
5	راماین Rāmāyana	... Naqib Khan and Badaoni and Shaikh Sultan of Thanessar.
6	آتھروین Atharvan ( Atharva Veda ).	Haji Ibrahim of Sarhind.
7	لیلاوتی Lilavati	... Abu'l Faizi
8	هریوینس Harivams (Harivamśa)	... Maulāna Sheri
9	کسر عشق نل و دمان Kisseh-ishq-i-nal va Daman (Nala Damayanti)	... Abu'l Faizi
10	سنگھاسن Battisi Singhāsan	... Badaoni
11	جوگ Basishta Jog	... Abu'l Faizi

I will speak briefly here of some of the above books. But, first of all, I will speak of the Mahābhārata which is the most important of all them.

#### IV.

Of all the Sanskrit works, which Akbar got translated, the Mahābhārata had his most earnest attention. The Mahābhārata The late Prof. Max Müller said : "I expect the time will come, when every educated native will be as proud of his Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana as Germans are of their Niebelunge, and Greeks, even modern Greeks, of their Homer." Akbar seems to have taken a similar view and thought it advisable to place it, in its Persian translation, in the hands of all the learned men of his Court. We learn from the Āin-i-Akbari, that when the translation was finished all the

1 Vide below for the names.



Amirs of the Court took a copy of it. We will collect here all the particulars about the translation made at the direction of Akbar.

Abul Fazl speaks of the Mahābhārata as one of the ancient books (کتب قدیم)<sup>1</sup> of Hindustan. "The book contains nearly one hundred thousand verses. His Majesty calls this ancient history Razm nāmah, (رزم نامہ) i.e. the book of wars."<sup>2</sup> In another part of his work, he says: "In this work, although there are numerous extravagant tales and fictions of the imagination, yet it affords many instructive moral observations, and is an ample record of felicitous experience."<sup>3</sup>

In his account of the Subah of Delhi, while speaking of Thanisar (تہانسر) as "one of the most sacred places of pilgrimage," and of the Saraswati flowing near it as a river<sup>3</sup> "for which the Hindus have great veneration," he refers to the Lake Kuruksetra (کرکھسیت) near it, which "pilgrims from distant parts come to visit (worship at) (بر نیایش) and where they bathe, and bestow charitable offerings," and says, that it is "The scene of the war of the Mahābhārata which took place in the latter end of the Dwāpar Yug." This leads Abul Fazl to give the contents of the Mahābhārata. It may interest students of the Mahābhārata to know, how a Mogul Minister described its contents, as he learnt then (Vide Jarret's Translation Vol. II pp. 282-84 Bengal As. sty's Text pp. 515-16).

We find a very long dissertation by Abul Fazl under the heading of "The Learning of the Hindus"<sup>5</sup> (دانش ہندوستان).<sup>6</sup> Therein, he describes the Learning of the Hindus, nine Schools of philosophy (تفصیل نمر دانا), the sixteen Predicaments (صدائے), the Vedānta and other subjects of Hindu Learning. He speaks of the Jaina religion, of Baudha, of the Nāstika or Cārvāka school, the eighteen sciences, (Aṭharā Vidyā), and Karma. Under the heading of

1 Bk. I *āin* 34 Blochmann's Translation Vol. I p. 104. Blochmann's Text. I, p. 115 P. 22.

2 Jarrett's Transl. II, p. 285.

3 *Āin-i-Akbari*, *āin* 34 Bengal A. Society's Text, p. 115, l. 20. Blochmann's Translation I, p. 104.

4 Jarret's Trans. II, p. 281.

5 "The Learning of Hindus" Jarrett's Trans Vol. III, p. 125 et seq.

6 Blochmann's Text Vol. II, p. 61 et seq.

this last subject, Karma, Abu'l Fazl refers to the Mahābhārata and says that the recital of its concluding portion, known as Harivamśa, was, among several others, a cure to remove sterility.

Abul Fazl's Āin-i-Akbari is generally admired. It is taken to be serving, as it were, as a Gazeteer of Akbar's time. Abul Fazl was, as it were, the William Hunter of Akbar's reign. But the last part of his work, which treats of this subject of Hindu learning, is specially admired by Jarrett. He says. "The range and diversity of its (Āin-i-Akbari's) subjects and the untiring industry which collected and marshalled, through the medium of an unfamiliar language, the many topics of information to their minutest details, treating of abstruse sciences, subtile philosophical problems, and the customs, social, political and religious of a different race and creed, will stand as an enduring monument of his learned and patient diligence. Comparing his work with the modern development of statistical science and our present accurate and exhaustive methods of tabulating the resources and summarising the extent of knowledge, the changes in the prevailing religious beliefs, in the laws, and in the administration of a state, and all that marks the relative, material and moral progress or decadence of a nation at any definite period, though there is much to be desired, his comprehensive and admirable survey yet merits the highest praise. He had intended to compare the Hindu systems of philosophy with those of Greece and Persia and to conclude the review with his own criticisms on the several merits of these schools, but he laboured under the disadvantage of unfamiliarity with Sanskrit and he had to take the statement of his Pandits tested through translations at second hand. He found his Hindu informants, as he says, of a retrograde tendency, spinning like silk worms, a tissue round themselves, immeshed in their own opinions, conceding the attainment of truth to no other, while artfully insinuating their own views, till the difficulty of arriving at any correct exposition of their systems left him in a bewilderment of despair."<sup>1</sup>

Badaoni, thus refers to the Mahābhārata<sup>2</sup>: "Among the remarkable events of this year (990 H. 1582 A. C.) is the translation of the Mahābhārata, which is the most famous of the Hindu books, and contains all sorts of stories, and moral reflections, and

Badaoni's Account of the Mahābhārata.

<sup>1</sup> Jarrett's Trans. Vol. III, Preface p. I-II.

<sup>2</sup> Lowe's Translation Vol. II, p. 329.

advice, and matters relating to conduct and manners, and religion and science, and accounts of their sects and mode of worship, under the form of a history of the wars of the tribes of Kurus and Pāṇḍus, who were rulers in Hind, according to some, more than 4000 years ago, and according to the common account, more than 80,000. And clearly this makes it before the time of Adam. Peace be upon him. And the Hindu believers consider it a great religious merit to read and to copy it. And they keep it hid from Musulmans."

As to what led Akbar to get the Mahābhārata translated, Badaoni says, that he (Akbar) had got the Shāhnāmāh, and the story of Amir Hamzeh transcribed in 17 volumes in 15 years and had got those volumes illuminated in gold. Thereafter, he was once hearing the poetic version of the story of Abū Muslim and the Jami-ul-hikāyat, and such other stories, when a sudden flash of thoughts came to his mind that after all, these were books of poetic imagination. <sup>1</sup>(اینها شاعری و ساختگی است)

So, he would better get translated the "Hindu books, which holy and staid sages had written, and were all clear and convincing proofs and which were the very point on which all their religion and faith and holiness turned."<sup>2</sup> He said to himself: "Why should I not have them done in my name? For they are by no mean trite, but quite fresh, and they will produce all kinds of fruits of felicity both temporal and spiritual and will be the cause of circumstance and pride and will ensure an abundance of children and wealth as is written in the preface of these books."<sup>3</sup> With thoughts like these, Akbar directed the work to be undertaken and at first he himself took an active interest in it. "Having assembled some learned Hindus he gave them directions to write an explanation of the Mahābhārata, and for several nights he himself devoted his attention to explaining the meaning to Naqib Khan, so that the Khan might sketch out the gist of it in Persian."<sup>4</sup>

We learn from the Āin-i-Akbārī of Abul Fazl and the *The Translators of Munta-khab-ut-Tawārikh* of Badaoni, that the Mahābhārata, several scholars had a hand in translating the Mahābhārata into Persian.

1 Text II, p. 320. Lowe's Translation II, p. 320.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. p. 330.

The *Ain-i-Akbari*<sup>1</sup> gives the following names :—

1. Naqib Khan
2. Maulānā Abdul Qādir Badaoni, and
3. Shaikh Sultan of Thanessar, spoken of as Sultān Hāji of Thanessar by Badaoni.<sup>2</sup>

In the *Muntkhab-ut Tawārikh* of Badaoni we find the following additional names.<sup>3</sup> :—

4. Mulla Sheri<sup>4</sup>
5. Shaikh Faizi, the brother of Abul Fazl.

Abul Fazl also was associated with the work inasmuch as he wrote the Preface.

As to the respective parts which these scholars had in the work we get the following information :—

The first three scholars had, besides the work of translation, a general supervision (إقتلام) over the whole work. Abul Fazl wrote the Khutbah (خطبة) i. e., the address or preface of about two quires or sections (بمقدار دوجزو)<sup>5</sup>. Badaoni translated two out of the 18 sections. Mulla Sheri and Naqib Khan did a part of the work and the rest was completed by Sultan Hāji of Thanessar. Shaikh Faizi converted their "rough translation into elegant prose and verse, but he did not complete more than two sections (فصلين). Sultan Hāji, then revised these two sections and verse. Not only did he do so, but he also revised his work which formed a large share of the work. He did this work of revision with very great care. Badaoni says: "The Hāji aforesaid revised these two sections, and as for the omissions which had taken place in his first edition, those defetets he put right, and comparing it word for word was brought to such a point of perfection that not a fly-mark of the original was omitted."<sup>6</sup> He was busy with his work for four years<sup>7</sup>. When he was translating the *Mahābhārata*, somebody

1 Bk. I *Ain*. I 34. Blochmann's Text p. 116.

2 Lowe's Translation Vol. II, p. 331.

3 Ibid.

4 This name is given as Mulla Shei by Dowson (*Elliot's History* p. 537).

5 Badaoni, Text II, p. 321. Transl. II. p. 331.

6 Ibid p. 330.

7 Badaoni, Text, Vol. III. p. 118.

once asked him, what he was writing. He said: "I render into modern language, the knowledge of 10,000 years."

(عرف ده هزار ساله را بزبان حال مواءم میسازم)<sup>1</sup>

It seems, that at first, Naqib was entrusted with the work. It was on the third night after the first conception of the work that Akbar sent for Badaoni and asked him to be a colaborator with Naqib Khan. Mulla Sheri was the third and Sultan Haji of Thanessar the fourth to join the work of translation. Faizi's share in the work was not that of direct translation but that of ornamentation, i. e. of touching up the translation and putting it in an elegant form. Abul Fazl's work was merely that of writing an Introduction or Preface.<sup>2</sup>

We learn from Badaoni that, during the first few nights after the conception of the thought of having the *Mahābhārata* translated, Akbar helped the first translator. He himself devoted his attention to explaining the meaning to Naqib Khan, so that the Khan might sketch out the gist of it."<sup>3</sup>

I will give here a short account of the translators. I will first speak of Naqib Khan, who was from the very beginning associated with the work. He was the first person who was asked to translate it.

Naqib Khan was one of the 415 grandees of the Court of Akbar enumerated by Abul Fazl in the *Āin-i-Akbari* (Bk. II *Āin* 30). He is No. 161 in the list. According to the *Maasira-i-Umara'* of Nawāb Samsam-u-d-Daulah. Shāh Nawāz Khān, his ancestors belonged to Iran. On his arrival at Court with his father, who had fled from Persia and who was appointed a preceptor by Akbar, he became one of the favourites of the King (منظور التفات). He received the title of Naqib Khan in the 26th year of Akbar's reign. He rose higher in Jehangir's time. According to the *Tuzuk-i-Jehangiri*, his original name was Ghiyāsu d-din. Jehangir says of him in his *Memoirs* that he was "one of the Saifi Sayyids, and was originally from Qazwin".<sup>5</sup>

1 Badaoni's *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh*, Text, Vol. III, p. 118.

2 *Ibid* p. 331.

3 *Ibid* p. 330.

4 The Text edited for the Bengal Asiatic Society (1891) by Maulana Mirza Ashraf Ali, Vol. III p. 815.

5 The *Memoirs of Jehangir* by Rogers Beveridge, Vol. I p. 264.

An interesting account of this man is given by Badaoni, his contemporary and collaborator in the work of translation, who in his *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh* speaks of him as one with whom he had even the relationship of a contemporary fellow-student and co-religionist"<sup>1</sup> (یہ بانی ہم عصری و ہم درسی و عقد اخوت دینی).<sup>2</sup> Badaoni speaks of him as "a very miracle of knowledge in manners and customs, chronology, biography and all subjects of conversation, one of the wonders of the day and a blessing of the Age."<sup>3</sup> They both were at one time pupils under Qazi Abu-l-Ma'ali.<sup>4</sup> Badaoni speaks of him further on as reading before Akbar *Haiwāt-ul-haiwān*, which, thereafter was entrusted to Abul Fazl for being translated into Persian and which was then translated by Shaikh Mubarak, the father of Abu-l-Fazl. That he was a man of influence with Akbar appears from the fact, that Badaoni had to seek his help in persuading Akbar to permit him to go to fight in the army led by Mān Singh, son of Bhagwan Das, against Kokand and Kanbolimi.<sup>5</sup> He, with Badaoni, was appointed one of the seven scholars who were asked to write a history of all Islam kings from the time of the death of the prophet to that of Akbar.<sup>6</sup>

The original name of Badaoni was Abdul Qādir. His poetical name was Qādirī. He was called Badaoni from the fact of his being born at Badāon near Delhi. 2 Badaoni. He was versed in various sciences. Having a very beautiful voice, he was appointed the Court Imam for Wednesdays. Though he lived at or near the Court for nearly forty years in close company with Abul Fazl, Faizi and their father Shaikh Mubarak, there was not much intimacy between them, because being a bigoted Mahomedan, he looked at their new views as heretical. Besides being one of the translators of the *Mahā-bhārata*, he also translated *Rāmāyana*, for 24,000 *ślokas* of which, he received 150 Ashrafis and 10,000 tangahs. He was much known for his historical work, known as *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh*, wherein he describes the career of Akbar, as seen by his bigoted eyes. This history extends upto A. H. 1004, i. e.,

1 Lowe's Translation of *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh*. Vol. II. p. 24.

2 Ibid, Lees and Ahmed Ali's Text II. pp. 30-31.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid, Translation p. 45.

5 Ibid p. 233.

6 Ibid pp. 327-28.

upto 11 years before Akbar's death. He did not dare to put his History into publicity, to avoid coming into trouble at the hands of Akbar for his extreme bigotry in criticizing Akbar's religious views. It was brought to light after Akbar's death in the time of Jehangir, who, when he questioned his (Badaoni's) sons, whether they knew that their father was secretly writing that history, was told that they were ignorant.

We learn from Badaoni<sup>1</sup> that Shaikh Sultan was also spoken of as Hāji Sultān Thanessar (Thaneshwar), as he had been on a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. <sup>3</sup> Shaikh Sultan of Thanessar. He was engaged for four years in the work of translating the Mahābhārata. Naqib laid the foundation of the translation and he completed it. He fell into the displeasure of the King on account of a charge of killing a cow preferred against him. So, he was sent away to Bakkar (بکر). The Khān Khānān treated him well there, and, at last, he was pardoned and appointed a Karuri (کروری) of Thanessar and Karnal.

Mulla Sheri or Maulānā Sheri was a Court-poet. Besides <sup>4</sup> Mulla Sheri the translation of the Mahābhārata, he was asked to translate the Haribans, "a book containing the life of Kṛṣṇa." Knowing that Akbar was in favour of reverence to the sun, he once composed a poem called Hazar Shu'ā (هزار شعاع), i. e., thousand rays in praise of the Sun and presented it to him. Akbar was much pleased with the poem. Badaoni says, he did it for flattery (خوش آمد).<sup>2</sup> He was killed in the war with the Yusufzais (H. 994).<sup>3</sup> It was the same war in which occurred the death of Birbal, which Akbar deplored much, but which pleased Badaoni as a proper punishment for his opinions.

Shaikh Faizi, whose share in the translation of the <sup>5</sup> Shaikh Faizi. Mahābhārata was simply that of putting the translation of the above four scholars into elegant language, was the brother of Abu'l Fazl. He had also a hand in the translation of another work, viz. the Līlāvati.<sup>4</sup> He also translated the Hindu story of the love of Nal and Daman. Abu'l Fazl speaks of his brother as a Court-poet and

1 Text III. p. 118.

2 Text II. p. 336. Lowe's Translation II. p. 346

3 Lowe's Trans. II. p. 362.

4 Āini-i-Akbari, Blochmann's Transl. I. p. 105.

philosopher.<sup>1</sup> His verses were impressed on some of the coins of Akbar. He was one of the staunchest followers of Akbar's Ilahi faith. His name was Abu'l Faiz, and Faizi was his *Takhullus*. Blochmann speaks of him and his brother Abu'l Fazl as "the greatest writers that India has produced."<sup>2</sup> Besides poetry, he was versed in medicine and he treated the poor free of charge. He was Akbar's "constant companion and friend". He was created "Malik-us-shu'arā or Poet Laureate" He is said to have written 101 books.

Badaoni was well paid by the King for his labours.

But he does not seem to have placed his heart  
The Translation, not a Labour of in the work. A bigoted Imam as he was, Love with Bada- he found the task to be somewhat irreligious.  
oni.

He speaks of the contents of the work "as puerile absurdities, of which the eighteen thousand creations may well be amazed."<sup>3</sup> He adds: "Two parts were written. Such discussions as one never heard! as, Shall I eat forbidden things? Shall I eat turnips?"<sup>4</sup> But such is my fate to be employed on such works. Nevertheless I console myself with the reflection, that what is predestined must come to pass."<sup>5</sup>

Badaoni was such a bigoted Mahomedan, that he thought that all those who were associated with the work of translating the religious book of a foreign religion, were, as it were, condemned for hell. He says "Most of the scholars, who were engaged in this work, have now been gathered to the Kurus and Pandus, and to those who still remain, may God (He is exalted!) grant deliverance and grace to repent."<sup>6</sup>

1 Ibid. p. 28.

2 Ibid p. 490.

3 Ibid II. p. 330.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

چه اعتراضات که نشنید و حرام خورم و شلغم خورم این معنی  
(داشت گویا نصیب فقیر ازین کتابها پس بود) (Leo's Text II p. 320)

What Badaoni means is, that the King found fault with his translation and considered that he was getting money for not doing things properly. Blochmann's translation of these sentences is more intelligible: "But the Emperor took exception to my translation and called me a *Harāmkhur* and a turnip-eater, as if that was my share of the book." (Blochmann's *Āini-i-Akbari* I. p. 105 n. 1.)

6 Ibid p. 330



Badaoni's extreme bigotry seems to have made him a suspected man at the Court. He himself gives an instance,<sup>1</sup> where, what he thought was his faithful rendering of the *Mahābhārata* seemed to have been attributed to his bigotry and brought him into some displeasure with the King and he had to defend himself. Akbar, one day, said to Abul Fazl: "We thought that Badaoni was an unworthy individual of Sufi tendencies, but he appears to be such a bigoted lawyer that no sword can sever the juggler vein of his bigotry." Badaoni was sent for, and on learning, why he was sent for, inquired of His Majesty, as to which book of his it was to which the alleged bigotry was attributed. The King replied that it was the *Razm-nāmah*, i. e., the *Mahābhārata*, which was known by that name. In his translation of that, Badaoni had translated "a certain story in which it is narrated, that one of the teachers of the people of India, when on the point of death, said by way of advice to those present: 'It is right that a man should step out of the limits of ignorance and negligence, and should first of all become acquainted with the peerless creator, and should pursue the path of knowledge; and not be satisfied with mere knowledge without practice, for that yields no fruit, but should choose the path of virtues, and, as far as in him lies, withdraw his hand from evil actions, and should know for a certainty, that every action will be enquired into'." Having given this passage, he wrote this hemistich after it:

هر عمل اجرى و هر کرده جزائى دارد

i. e., Every action has its recompense and every action has its reward. Akbar believed in the Indian belief of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls (*tanāsukh* تناسخ), which prescribed, that as a result or punishment of evil actions, one had to return to this earth, and that oftener than once till he purged himself from the effects of this bad action. Now, the above passage, which, Badaoni pleaded, was a mere rendering from the *Mahābhārata* seemed to go, at least in appearance, against the belief of the transmigration of soul, inasmuch, as it showed that every action will be inquired into in the other world by the two angels, *Nakir* and *Mankir* (نکیر و منکیر), who, according to the Mahomedan belief, judged the action of the departed souls, and assigned due punishment's or rewards there without the necessity of their returning to this world.

Akbar suspected Badaoni that he, as a bigoted Mahomedan, put in his own Mahomedan belief in the translation of the Mahābhārata. Badaoni thus defended himself, thereby adjusting what seemed superficially to be the general or Mahomedan view to the Indian view of the Transmigration of souls. He says "Eventually, I impressed upon all the courtiers the fact, that all the people of India speak of the reward and punishment of good and bad actions. Their belief is as follows: When a person dies, the scribe (Muharrir محرر) who writes the chronicle of the deeds of mankind throughout the course of their lives, takes it before the angel, who is the Seizer of Souls (قابض ارواح) and is called the King of Justice. After he has examined into their good and bad actions, and has seen which has the preponderance, he says, 'This person has his choice'. Then he asks him: 'Shall I, first, for thy good actions take thee to Paradise, that thou mayest there enjoy to the full, delights in proportion to thy good actions, and after that send thee to Hell to expiate thy sins, or vice versa?' When that period comes to an end, then he gives orders that the person should return to the Earth, and entering a form suitable to his actions, should pass a certain period. And so on *ad infinitum*, until the time when he attains absolute release, and is freed from coming into and leaving the world." <sup>2</sup>

Badaoni says, that after the above explanation, "that affair passed off well". But Badaoni's future did not seem to pass off well. At one time, Akbar was on the point of appointing him "to the guardianship of the blessed tomb of His Holiness the Khwājāh of Ajmir. But he did not do so, saying: "Since whenever I give him anything to translate, he always writes what is very pleasing to me, I do not wish that he should be separated from me". The King then asked him to complete the remainder of the translation, begun at the direction of Sultan Zein-ul-Abidin of Kashmir, under the name of Bahr-ul-asmār (the Sea of Tales), of a Sanskrit book, which Jarrett thinks, was the Rājatarāṅgiṇī, the history of Kashmir by Kalhana. Here again Badaoni shows his bigotry by speaking of the Hindu work as a book of "Hindu fictions" (افسانہ ہندوی) <sup>3</sup>

1 Ibid II. p. 414.

2 Ibid Lowe's: Vol. II. p.:414.

3 Text II. p. 401.

Akbar at one time, presented him "with 10,000 tankabs in small change and a horse."

When the work of translation was completed, it was "fairly engrossed, and embellished with pictures".  
 The Translation illustrated with paintings. Then "the Amirs had orders to take copies of it, with the blessing and favour of God"<sup>1</sup>

The Court of Akbar was well-known for patronizing the arts of writing beautiful hand and painting. Abul Fazl describes in the *Āin-i-Akbari* (Bk. I, *āin* 34), eight calligraphical systems then current in ancient Irān and Turān, India and Turkey, and gives a list of the best caligraphists of the time.

As in calligraphy, so in the art of painting, Akbar was always ready to appreciate good work. Abul Fazl says: "Most excellent painters are now to be found, and master-pieces worthy of a Bihzād,<sup>2</sup> may be placed at the side of the wonderful works of the European painters who have attained world-wide fame. The minuteness in detail, the general finish, the boldness of execution &c., now observed in pictures, are incomparable; even inanimate objects look as if they had life. More than a hundred painters have become famous masters of the art, whilst the number of those who approach perfection or of those who are middling is very large. This is especially true of the Hindus: their pictures surpass our conceptions of things. Few, indeed, in the whole world are found equal to them."<sup>3</sup> Such being the advanced state of the arts of calligraphy and painting, no wonder if the manuscripts of the translations of the *Mahābhārata* were beautifully illustrated.

It is not known, if all the persons who were entrusted with the work of translating the *Mahābhārata* knew Sanskrit well. It seems that Hāji Sultān of Thanessar, who worked continuously for four years after it, knew Sanskrit well. Others, if they knew it, did not know much.

(a) This appears from what Badaoni himself says of his part of the translation. In one place, he speaks of one Divi, a Brahmin (دیوی برہمن), as an interpreter (Ma'bar موبار).

1 Ibid.

2 A famous painter of the Court of Shāh Ismā'īl of Persia. He lived at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century.

3 Blochmann's Trans. I. p. 107.

4 Lowe's translation II. p. 265. Text II. p. 257.

the Mahābhārata. It appears from this that learned Brahmins interpreted and the translators put down the interpretation in Persian.

(b) Further on, we read, that when Akbar first conceived the idea of getting the Mahābhārata translated, he "assembled some learned Hindus" and "gave them directions to write an explanation of the Mahābhārata and for several nights, he himself devoted his attention to explaining the meaning to Naqib Khan, so that the Khan might sketch out the gist of it in Persian".<sup>1</sup> This shows that the translators were, to a certain extent, dependent upon the Hindu interpreters.

(c) Again, the very fact, that Akbar, as referred to above, once suspected Badaoni of interpolating his own bigoted Mahomedan view of the state of the soul of a deceased person in his translation of the Mahābhārata, shows that the translation was not expected to be a word for word translation. It is true that Badaoni says in one place that Sultān Hāji of Thanessar, while revising Shaik Faizi's work and his one portion of the translation, compared these "word for word with the original ..... and the work was brought to such a point of preparation that not a fly-mark of the original was omitted". But still we should not take it to be a literal translation, but a very free rendering.

(d) Again the fact that Faizi put the work of the translators "into elegant prose and verse", also shows that a literal translation was not intended at all.

Any how, whether all the translators knew Sanskrit well or not, Akbar supplied them with the help of good learned Hindus. Both Abu'l Fazl and Badaoni refer to that help. For example, Badaoni thus speaks of his translation from *Sinhāsan Battisi* (سنگھاسن بتیسی): "A book called *Singh-āsan Battisi*, which is a series of thirty-two tales about Rajah Bikramājī, King of Malwā, and resembles the *Tutti-nāme*, was placed in my hands; and I received His Majesty's instructions to make a translation of it in prose and verse. I was to begin the work at once, and present a sheet (ورقی) of my work. A learned Brahmin (برہمنی دان) was appointed to interpret the book for me. On the first day, I completed a sheet containing a beginning of the first story, and when I

presented it, His Majesty expressed his approbation. When the translation was finished, I called it Nāmeḥ-i Khirad-Afzā (نامہ خرد افزا), a name which contains the date of its composition.<sup>1</sup> It was graciously accepted, and placed in the library".

From all the above facts we see that the translations were not literal translations.

## VI.

To enable students to judge for themselves, I give below my translation of the Persian Text of the first section of the second *parvan* from the Mulla Feroze Library Ms. which I produce for inspection. The spellings of proper names differ, but I give them as I find them in the Ms.

Specimen Trans-  
lations for compa-  
rison.

(Translation of the Persian Text of the first section of the second *parvan* from the Mulla Feroze Library Manuscript.)

"The second *parva* (parvan) of the Mahābhārata which is named sabhā-parva.

"The Historians of the events of this story thus describe the affair: When Kunti and Arjuna, having returned from the jungle of Khandiu, came to the shores of the waters of a deep-cut river-bank, the God (Div) Mahadib (lit. the great Dib or Div, Māhādeva), whom Arjuna had saved from being burnt, having folded both his hands on his breast, came before Arjuna and said: 'O Arjuna! Thou gavest me life (i. e. saved me) from this fire, in which, had mountains been involved, they would have been burnt. Now, in return for this good act (of thine), what service is it that you order which I may perform (for thee)'. Arjuna said: 'I expect nothing from you in return for my saving you from (being burnt in) fire. But if thou desirest that thou must do some service for me, do what Kṛṣṇa orders thee to do.' Then Mahadib coming before Kṛṣṇa said: 'Enjoin some service to me, so that I may do it'. Kṛṣṇa said: 'If you (at all) wish to do some work, it is required that you may erect for Raja Huzishtar (Yudhiṣṭhira) such a great building as would have no equal of it on the surface of the earth—such a one that no man can ever prepare a place like it, and whatever the buildings of Gods (Divs) or God-created men or

1 The chronogram gives the date to be 989 Hijri (1581 A. C.).

2 Lowe's Translation II. p. 156 Text, p. 183.

saints<sup>1</sup> or ascetics<sup>2</sup> do not contain, may all be contained by it; and you paint in it the paintings of all Divats and Divs and men and animals and serpents. Mahandit became glad and said : ' I accept ( to do all ) that '. Then, Kṛṣṇa and Mahandit went towards Delhi. When they reached Delhi, then Huzishtar ( Yudhiṣṭhira ) and his brothers were much pleased to see them. Then Huzishtar caressed Mahandit, and Mahandit at an auspicious hour, laid the foundation of the building on an extensive scale, and fixed 10,000 gaz for its width."

## VII.

The Persian Texts of the two Mss. which I have examined—the Mulla Feroze Library Ms. and the B. B. R. A. S. Library Ms.—vary a good deal. Both differ from the original Sanskrit, but the Mulla Feroze Library text seems to be much nearer the original Sanskrit than the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Library Text. In the latter, the so-called translator has begun his work in the first *parvan* with a number of Persian verses, which have nothing to do with the *Parvan*.

The Translators have shortened the homage paid to Nārāyaṇa &c. in the commencement. That may perhaps be due to their bigotry. We saw above, that Akbar suspected the bigotry of, at least, one of the translators, Abdul Qadir Badaoni. The Mulla Feroze Ms. gives only سري گنش آنم Sri GaneshānamI.

They have more or less followed the learned pious Brahmin interpreters. For example, in the Sanskrit text Kṛṣṇa is simply spoken of as Kṛṣṇa ( कृष्ण ). But the translators speak of him as *Shri Krishnaji* ( कृष्णजी ). This form is a form of respect used by pious people in speaking of Kṛṣṇa. The Brahmin interpreters must have used this, what we may call, colloquial or popular pious form, and the Persian translators have followed them, and not the original which good translators ought to do.

In this paper, I have dwelt at great length upon the Mahābhārata, because it is the most important book and it is referred to at some length by the principal historians of Akbar's time: I will conclude this Paper with an account of the translations of some three Sanskrit works referred to by these historians.

Translations of  
other Sanskrit  
Works.

1 ماز mar, Lord, a Saint.

2 غرانی ghurran "Lives free from care."

The translation of this book was entrusted by Akbar to Badaoni who speaks of it as being superior to The Rāmāyaṇa. the Mahābhārata (در تصنیف بر مہا بھارت سبقت دارد)<sup>1</sup>

"It contains 25,000 couplets (شلوک) and each (*śloka*) portion consists of 65 letters (حرفی). The story is about Rām Chand Rājah of Oudh whom they also call Rām. And the Hindus pay him worship as a God in human form. And the sum and substance of it is that a demon with ten heads, named Rāvaṇa, ruler of the island of Lankā deceived his wife Sītā and carried her off. And Rām Chand with his brother Lach'hman went to that island. And a great army of monkeys and bears, whose number the intellect cannot count, gathered together, and threw a bridge of the length of 400 *cosse*s over the briny ocean. And some of the monkeys, they say, leapt that distance, and others of the monkeys went on foot. And there are many contradictory idle tales like this, which the intellect is at a loss whether to accept or reject. At any rate Rām Chand mounted on the monkeys passed over the bridge, and for a whole week made a tremendous fight of it, and killed Rāvaṇa and all his children and relations, and put an end to his family which had lasted a thousand years. And having entrusted Lankā to Rāvaṇa's brother he turned to his own city. And in the opinion of the Hindus, he reigned 10,000 years over the whole of Hindustan, and then returned to his original abode. And the opinion of this set of people is, that the world is very old and that no age has been devoid of the human race, and that from that event 100 thousand years have passed. And yet for all that they make no mention of Adam, whose creation took place only 7,000 years ago. Hence it is evident that these events are not true at all, and are nothing but pure invention, and simple imagination, like the Shāhnāmāh and the stories of Amir Hamzah, or else it must have happened in the time of the dominion of the beasts and the *jinn*s<sup>2</sup> but God alone knows the truth of the matter".

Badaoni had some collaborators in the work of translating the Rāmāyaṇa. This appears from what he says further on of one of "the remarkable events (غرایبی) of this time. "A low caste woman coming into the Audience Hall said "that she had become a man." Badaoni says here that one of the translators

1 Text II p. 336. Lowe's trans. II. p. 346.

2 Lowe's Transl. II. p. 547.

(معتبران) of Rāmāyana "went out of the company of translators" and examining her testified that she was a woman.<sup>1</sup>

Abul Fazl speaks of it as "one of the four divine books".

The At'harban. Badaoni was entrusted with the work of translating it and he thus speaks of his work: "In this year,<sup>2</sup> a learned Brahmin, Shaikh Bhāwan, who had come from the Dak'hin and *nolens volens* turned Musalman, came to visit His Majesty and was admitted to great intimacy and His Majesty gave him the order to translate the Atharva Veda which is one of the four well-known sacred books of the Hindus. Several of the precepts of this book resemble the laws of Islam. I was appointed to render it from Hindi into Persian. As, in translating, I found many difficult passages, which Shaikh Bhāwan could not interpret either, I reported the same to His Majesty, who ordered Shaik Faizi, and then Hāji Ibrahim, to translate it. The latter though willing, did not write anything. Among the precepts of the At'harban, there is one which says that no man will be saved unless he reads a certain passage. This passage contains many times the letter, l, and resembles very much our *La-illāh illa'llāh*. Besides, I found that a Hindu under certain circumstances may eat cow-flesh; and also that Hindus bury their dead but do not burn them. With such passages, the Shaikh used to defeat other Brahmins in argument, and they had in fact led him to embrace the Islam (God be thanked for this)".<sup>3</sup>

The Hari Vamśa, which passes as a supplement to the Hari Vamśa. Mahābhārata, is referred to by Albiruni, in whose time it was taken to be an authority on some Indian matters.

1 Ibid p. 348.

2 983 A. H., 1575 A. C.

3 Lowe's translation Vol. II. p. 216 with correction made on p. 424.



## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*The Bhagavadgīta or the Song of the Blessed One*, interpreted by Franklin Edgerton, The open Court Publishing Company, 1925.—The author of this attractive little book of about one hundred pages truly observes in his Foreword that the Bhagavadgītā 'has permeated the collective religious consciousness of the people from one end of India to the other,' but it may be a news to some to be assured that what is known now-a-days as the "Gandhi movement" is 'a true child of Hindu religious thought.' At any rate the author need not have gone thus far to prove the 'timeliness' of his book. The problems dealt with in the Gītā are of perennial interest and any serious and scholarly attempt to understand the message of the poem is bound to evoke interest in all earnest peoples—Americans or otherwise.

The author has no new theory to put forth. He disapproves of Garbe's attempt to get rid of the 'inconsistencies' in the poem by pronouncing certain stanzas (about 170 out of a total of 700) as interpolated. He is anxious to interpret the poem *taken as a whole*. Not that he, like some orthodox commentator, shuts his eyes to these 'inconsistencies', and tries to explain them away. He in fact notices more 'inconsistencies' in the poem (p. 98) than does Garbe: but he finds the genius of the poem to lie in just these very inconsistencies and in the absence of any logical method. "The Gītā makes no attempt to be logical or systematic in its philosophy. It is frankly mystical and emotional" (p. 95). The consequence is that the teaching of the poem even on important topics such as the nature and functions of God, the scope and the end of duty, or the means of achieving the Summum Bonum of life is, according to Prof. Edgerton, an easy common-sense compound of both 'yes' and 'no'. Can such a poem, we wonder, have so long continued to maintain its hold over a people who are reputed to possess an instinct of philosophising? what is more, can it at all have been written in an age coming, presumably, after the tense dialectics of the Pre-Buddhist and Buddhist Philosophies? \* The author of the poem certainly gives evidence of

\* When on p. 5 the author says—'The very concept of a philosophical "system" did not exist in India in the time of the.....Gītā'—we assume that he intends to imply that the Gītā is post-Buddhist.

his power of close reasoning as for instance in his arguments against samnyāsa in chapter iii. To understand the real secret of the power of the poem over the Indian mind one must follow neither the path of analytic dissection indicated by Garbe, nor the path, let us say, of blinking common-sense compromise of 'yes' and 'no' advocated by the author of the present dissertation. It is evident that the *Gitā* has corrected or criticised the current views and opinions such as the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā, the Bhākti, and the Vedānta. It could hardly have done this except from a philosophical platform of its own, which apparently found a place for all these rival views by bringing them under some kind of a harmonious synthesis.\* To find out the exact nature of this is to truly solve the great problem of the *Gitā*. This is feasible and has been already achieved with no small measure of success: but we cannot permit ourselves an excursus into that field within the limits of this review.

A few points of minor criticism may here be offered. On the very first page of his book the author explains the name of the poem as 'the song (*gītā*) of the Blessed One or the Lord (Bhagavad)'. But there is no Sanskrit word like *gītā* (fem.) meaning a song. It is either *gīta* (neut.) or *gīti* (fem.). *Gitā* is the fem. of the adjective, and it means sung or more accurately recited or taught. It qualifies 'Upaniṣad' understood. The full name of the poem is then Bhagavadgītā Upaniṣad, and the root *gai* originally meant not singing but solemn declaration: cf. "Gītās cāyam arthoṅgirasā—yasyām vānmanāścaksuṣor anubandhas tasyām ṛddhir iti"—said of a *prose* statement.—On p. 82 Prof. Edgerton thus translates the much discussed stanza "Yāvān artha udapāne" etc. (ii, 46)—"As much profit as there is in a well into which waters flow from all sides, so much is there in all the Vedas for a wise man"—the italics are ours. We had thought that all possible interpretations of the stanza were already in the field, but one has to wait and learn. A well into which storm water flows in and renders it insanitary is not an old Hindu conception. The stanza\* surely is to be interpreted in the light of the Pāli—"Kiṃ kayirā udapānena āpā ce sabbada.siyum"—*sarvataḥ* being understood as loc. sing. of the pronoun (=sarvasmin): every-

\* This is not exactly Dahlmann once more, let us add in passing.

\* Full discussion in the *Gitārahasya*, pp. 630-632.

place being full of (rain)-water there remains no need for a well. Compare, "Tṛṣito Jāhnavitīre Kūpaṁ vāñchati durmatih".—On p. 99 our author observes—"There is absolutely no documentary evidence that any other form of the Gītā than that we have was ever known in India" Surely the author could not have been unaware of the statement in the first part of the Bhīṣmaparvan chapter immediately following the conclusion of the Bhagavadgītā where the total number of stanzas in the whole poem is said to be 745, even though he may not have heard of the publication of a Gītā of 26 chapters and 745 stanzas by the Śuddhadharmamaṇḍala of Madras. 1917.—On p. 67, footnote 188, the author has correctly perceived the incompatibility of the pronoun 'eṣā' in stanza ii.39 not referring to stanzas 31-38 that go immediately before it, but referring to stanzas 11-30 that come still earlier; but if he had been faithful to his initial resolve of not bringing interpolations *à la mode de Garbe* to explain away inconvenient 'inconsistencies' in the poem, he might have realised that stanzas 31-38 form also a part of the 'Sāṃkhya' teaching. The argument in this part of the poem may be succinctly stated as follows. why *must* I fight and, may-be, kill Bhīṣma?—Because there is no 'killing'\* but a 'changing of the vesture' of the soul. But why must *I* compel a change before the normal time?—Because, according to the true Sāṃkhya view every one must be loyal to his nature. When the lamp burns the unwitting child's hand, the lamp never argues why, but simply performs its natural function. So must the ksatriya, like any other force in nature, discharge his 'natural' duty of never refusing a fair fight. If one once gains the truly universal point of view (vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ) the question why 'this' rather than 'that' and why 'I' rather than 'he'—so far from being shamelessly dodged (p. 62)—never rises at all.—Space forbids us from further developing this argument. It is enough if we merely state as our opinion that most of the alleged inconsistencies in the Gītā can be shown to be due to an attempt on the part of the author of the poem to first state a current view in its normal acceptance and then to introduce certain of his own modifications into it.

For the rest, Prof. Edgerton's interpretation forms an agreeable reading, its chief merit being the manner in which

\* The Sāṃkhya in fact is 'akariyā' vādin.

all the scattered statements of the poem on a given topic are gathered together with a view to exhibit their agreement as well as difference. The *Gitā* has evoked considerable mass of critical literature in the Vernaculars--and especially in the Marathi--since the publication of the late Mr. Tilak's *Gitārahasya*; and it is to be hoped that European and American writers on the subject will not continue to ignore that literature altogether, seeing that a good deal of it is both scholarly and critical.

S. K. B.

*Samarāṅgaṇa sūtradhāra*—The book is published under the authority of Baroda Government who had to entrust the work of editing it to Mahamahopādhyāya T. Ganpati Śāstri as he is the only Sanskrit scholar who is conversant with Indian Engineering phraseology. The book had thus to go from Baroda to Trivendrum and await the convenience of the Śāstri. Baroda Government is however to be congratulated for having been able to secure such an Editor for its publication.

The name of the publication viz. समराङ्गणसूत्रधार is only to be explained on the understanding that it was compiled by सूत्रधार named समराङ्गण under the auspices of राजाभोजदेव. मण्डन another सूत्रधार under the auspices of राजा कुम्भ has similarly compiled four texts viz. वास्तुमण्डन, प्रासादमण्डन, रूपमण्डन and कोदण्डमण्डन, treating of the same subject. The compilation probably goes under the authorship of राजाभोजदेव under the commonly accepted maxim 'यस्यान्नं तस्य तत्कर्म' any work is to be considered as his who supplies the necessary funds for it. Without such a theory the name has no significance and cannot be construed.

The great peculiarity of this text is that it gives its contents in the shape of a series of questions asked by the sons of विश्वकर्मा to their illustrious father. This is generally done in a plain statement at the beginning of a work, the questions pertain to the three sections of वास्तुखण्ड of the शिल्पसंहिता by भृगु viz. (1) वेदमरचना or the construction of Buildings, (2) प्राकाररचना or the construction of Defensive works and (3) नगररचना or the construction of Towns. In the शिल्पसंहिता of भृगु however, the treatment of the subjects is more systematic than in the compilation under review as detailed below :—

(a) The third chapter giving the contents, called प्रश्नाध्याय begins with the questions about the evolution of the world. All Indian scientists begin their texts with the Evolution of the world

in the light of the particular science and they consider their science incomplete without such ending in the Creator at both the ends. The son then asks his questions about the construction of Defensive works in the stanza beginning from कतिप्रकारं दुर्गं च दुर्गकर्मक्रमश्चकः ।. 12½. After this he asks information about the construction or planning of Towns from

नगरग्रामखेटानां निवेशाः स्युः पृथक्पृथक् (16) to

तथा कृषितुला शिल्पकलापण्योपजीविनः ।

हिंसाश्रिताश्च पुरुषा निवेश्याः स्युः कथं क च (30)

After this come the questions pertaining to House Construction from निवेशाः कीदृशाश्चैषां क्रियन्ते वा भवन्ति ते (30) to हस्तस्य लक्षणं मानसंज्ञा वै जायते कथं (56.) The chapter ends with the defects and rectification with प्रायश्चित्त and such other ceremonials. So far it is all right.

(b) In treating of the subject however no serial or systematic method is observed as will be seen from the synopsis of the text given below.

- (i) Chapters 4 to 7 are devoted to the description of the evolution of the world.
- (ii) Chapter 8 is devoted to the selection of sites.
- (iii) Chapter 9 deals with हस्तलक्षण and measurements.
- (iv) Chapters 44 and 45 deal with the qualifications of the Engineer and Engineering Science.
- (v) Chapters 10 to 14 pertain to town planning.
- (vi) Chapters 15, 30, 38 and 49 to 54 treat of the construction of palaces and their appendages.
- (vii) Chapters 16 and 28 treat of building materials.
- (viii) Chapter 17 pertains to flags and banners.
- (ix) Chapters 18, 25 and 27 treat of buildings.
- (x) Chapter 26 treats of Astrology &c. as applied to buildings.
- (xi) Chapter 29 treats of Amenities.
- (xii) Chapter 31 treats of the construction of Machines.
- (xiii) Chapters 32 and 33 pertain to stables.
- (xiv) Chapter 34 treats of the principles of construction
- (xv) Chapter 35 pertains to the method of laying down foundation stones and 36 and 47 of the ceremonies pertaining to the same.

(xvi) Chapter 37 treats of lining out, Chapter 39 of doors, 40 of Plinth and 41 of masonry.

(xvii) Chapter 42 treats of omens, 43 and 44 of broken doors and 48 of defects in buildings and their consequences.

Thus the treatment is not systematic but haphazard.

The language of the text is more grammatical and is similar to that in use at present because it is only a recent compilation. The style is more obscure and the meaning of words more in conformity with their roots only when the text is old.

Another peculiarity that distinguishes this text under review from other similar works is that it treats in detail of इन्द्रध्वज and यन्त्रविधान. The chapter on इन्द्रध्वज treats in detail about the origin and construction of flags, banners and that on यन्त्रविधान of the construction and uses of Machines. The treatise gives the general principles of Machine construction as adopted by Indian Engineers but the details of the construction of various machines have not been given and that on purpose for secrecy.

यन्त्राणां घटना नोक्ता गुह्यं नाज्ञतावशम् ॥ ७९ ॥

On the whole however the treatise is a valuable addition to the printed Sanskrit texts on Indian Engineering. It throws much light on the methods adopted by the विश्वकर्म school of Indian Engineering. The Government of Baroda and Mahāmahopādhyāya T. Ganapati Sastri are to be congratulated for bringing to light this valuable work which is only the first part of the text.

The printing is clear and correct except the few mistakes noted below and the price (Rupees five) is rather high with the ordinary binding.

Reference.		Incorrect.	Correct.
Page.	Stanza.		
36	18	यथाक्रममीदोषा	यथाक्रमममीदोषा
184	171	एकत्रममैरपत्रहृष्टै	एकत्रममैरपरत्रहृष्टै
227	30	स्त्रीणांस्त्रीनभिर्भवेद्	स्त्रीणांस्त्रीनामभिर्भवेद्
231	5	गम्येहरमनुष्याणां	मनोहरमनुष्याणां
236	21	पाषाणसिद्धिहेम्नांच	पाषाणसिद्धिहेम्नांच

K. V. V.

**Yoga-Mīmāṃsā**—Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 75—edited by Shrimat Kuvalayānanda (J. G. Gune) at the Kaivalyadhāma, Lonavala (Bombay, India)—Annual subscription Rs. 7.

The “Yoga-Mīmāṃsā” is a quarterly organ of the Kaivalyadhāma founded with the object of “recording scientific researches in Psycho-physiology, Spiritual and Physical culture etc. with their application to Therapeutics”. Without showing our scepticism as to whether the Western laboratory methods of research can be made to reveal spiritual wonders, we may congratulate the Editor on his attempt to develop the objective character of the Indian Philosophy by subjecting the spiritual experiences of man to experimentation. Apparently the Director of the Kaivalyadhāma believes in the principle that whatever exists, exists in some quantity and what exists in quantity can be measured. Statements of a purely speculative nature if corroborated by laboratory experiments will acquire scientific value and more light will be thrown on the nature of the Yogic psychoses which are at present regarded as quite mystical. Psychology in its relation to other sciences such as Physiology needs to be studied without merging the one into the other and the efforts of the Kaivalyadhāma will, therefore, be awaited with eagerness by all interested in such studies.

The present number of the journal consists of (1) the Scientific section; (2) the Semi-scientific section and (3) the Popular section. There are in all 29 illustrations which illustrate the experiments in Psycho-physiology carried on in the Āśrama.

P. K. G.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

1. The Bhāgavadgītā or Song of the Blessed One, India's Favourite Bible interpreted by Franklin Edgerton, Assistant Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Pennsylvania, Published by the Open Court Publishing Co., 122 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois (U. S. A.)—Price \$ 1.00.

2. The Influence of English Literature on Urdu Literature with a preliminary Survey of the Rise and Growth of the latter by Sayyid 'Abdul'-Latif B. A. Ph. D. (Lond.), Professor of English, Osmania University, Hyderabad (Deccan)—Published by Forster Groom and Co. Ltd. 15 Charing Cross, S. W. 1. London—Price 5s.

3. The Dāṭhāvamsa—a history of the tooth-relic of the Buddha, edited & translated by Bimal Charan Law, M. A., Ph. D., B. L.—Published by Motilal Banarsidas, Proprietors, the Punjab Sanskrit Book-Depot, Lahore.

4. The Cariyāpitaka, edited with an introduction by Bimala Charan Law, Published by Motilal Banarsidas, Lahore.



## **First Sixmonthly Report of the Mahabharata Workers' Committee,**

*for 1924-25.*

From,

The Secretary,

Mahabharata Workers' Committee,

To

The Chairman,

Reg. Council, B. O. R. Institute,

Sir,

I have the honour to submit a six-monthly statement on the progress of the Mahabharata work at the Institute, as desired by the Regu. Council in their Reso. III of 20th July 1924.

The Mbh. workers' committee was first appointed to take charge of the Mbh. work by the Executive Board in their Reso. 3 dated, 17th March 1924 and approved of by the R. C. in their Reso. I of the 28th March 1924.

Personnel of the Committee as at first formed consisted of (1) Dr. V.G. Paranjpe (2) Dr. R.D. Karmarkar (3) Dr. A. B. Gajendragadkar, and (4) Mr. N.B. Utgikar. To these, Principal V.G. Apte was added by the Exe. Board Reso. 4 of 29-5-24. Mr. Utgikar resigning his membership later on ( Exe. Board Res. 8 19-7-25 ), the strength of the Committee remains as at first, viz. of four members. The R. C. in their Reso. II dated 20-5-24 have decided to pay annually an honorarium of Rs. 300 to the members of this Committee, not in service of the Institute, but actively engaged in the supervision work. Of the four members of the Committee Dr. Gajendragadkar alone being out of Poona could not take an active part in the supervising work, though he attended some of the Committee's meetings.

The Mbh. Workers' Committee met six times to discuss and discharge the various business connected with the Mbh. Work, points worth mention being:—

(i) Rough Mbh. mss. slips have been prepared from Aufrecht's catalogue, additional ones being had from collections not mentioned therein.

(ii) Mss. libraries in different parts of India have been approached with a view to secure Mbh. mss. on loan for work at the Institute. Some mss. have accordingly been received from Benares Sanskrit College, and the Central Library, Baroda, some including Tanjore having refused this favour.

(iii) Lists of Mbh. mss. added to the different libraries have been and are being secured.

(iv) Circular letters to Revenue officials in different parts have been despatched through Bombay Govt. with a view to trace Mbh. mss. in possession of private individuals. Appeals too have been issued requesting the public to contribute money and mss. for the Mbh. work.

(v) Negotiations have been opened with the Mysore University, the Viśvābharati, and Prof. Lévi of Paris, with a view to opening collation centres at Mysore, Shantiniketana and Paris.

(vi) System of collation by individuals instead of by batches is brought into force with effect from the 5th of May 1924, and arrangements have been made to have the collation checked by some competent members of the staff; the members of Mbh. workers' Committee being in touch with the progress of the collation, have tested the time speed of each member of the staff and rechecked a portion of the collation already checked, and have come across very few irregularities, the work in general being found to be quite accurate.

(vii) Collation work done during the six months ending 30th Sept. 1924 :—

(a) Udyogaparvan, Adhs 57—72

” ” 91—196 ( end )

Total vv. 4866 collated from 11 mss.

(b) Collation of the whole Udyoga. consisting of vv. 7622 checked from 10 mss.

(c) Droṇaparvan, Adhs. 1—127 vv. 5229 collated from 9 mss.

(d) Droṇaparvan, Adhs. 1—90 vv. 3217. Checked the collation.

In addition to this, collation of a portion of the Droṇaparvan from mss. lately received from Benares Sanskrit College, has been done.

The different tests in the course of the experiment have shown that the quantity of collation work done by individual

system is much greater than that done by batches, and a sense of personal responsibility keeps the work from being affected in quality. The Committee, therefore, prefers and continues work by the individual system.

The total expenditure incurred on different heads during the last six months was Rs. 7974-5-6 as against the receipts amounting to Rs. 13396-11-6 leaving a balance of Rs. 5422-6-0 only.

The sources of income for the Mbh. Deptt. are at present as follows:—

- 1 Shrimant Pant Pratinidhi, Chief of Aundh.—Rs. 5000 annually.
- 2 Govt. of Madras, Rs. 1000 annually.
- 3 „ Burma, Rs. 500 „
- 4 „ Baroda, Rs. 600 „
- 5 University of Bombay, Rs. 3000 annually.
- 6 Govt. of Bombay, one third of the expenses but not exceeding Rs. 6000 annually till the work is completed.

The annual budget of the Deptt. is always within this amount. The Deptt. has taken a loan of about Rs. 5000 from the General Deptt. of the Institute, but this was an extra expenditure on the edition of the *Virātaparvan*. The Institute's funds are not touched at all, while spending on the Mbh. Deptt. Whatever money is earmarked for this Deptt. from time to time, is spent for it. Under these circumstances there is no danger of the Deptt. spending any of the Institute's funds.

As regards an estimate of the total work, it is rather premature for the Committee to give one, as the whole question would be thrashed out by the Regulating Council by the end of the year, when permanent arrangements for the carrying out of the work would be made, when also questions like the co-operation with the European scholars and the possibility of securing the fund collected for the Mbh. work in Europe would also have to be dealt with.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant

R. D. KARMARKAR,

*Secretary*

## **Second Six-monthly Report of the Mahabharata Workers' Committee,**

*for 1924-25.*

**FROM,**

**THE SECRETARY**

**MAHABHARATA WORKERS' COMMITTEE,**

**Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.**

**To**

**THE CHAIRMAN,**

**REGULATING COUNCIL,**

**Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.**

**SIR,**

I have the honour to submit the second six-monthly Report (from October to March) on the progress of the Mahabharata work, entrusted to the Mahabharata Workers' Committee by the Regulating Council. The report has been submitted a month earlier so as to be before the Regulating Council when they would consider the Mahabharata question.

2. The Personnel of the Committee continued as it did at the time of my last six-monthly report and consisted of—

(1) Dr. R. D. Karmarkar (Secy.)      (2) Dr V. G. Paranjpe  
(3) Prin V. G. Apte, and      (4) Dr. A. B. Gajendragadkar.

3. The Mahabharata Workers' Committee met 11 times, during the course of the year under report to discuss and discharge the various business connected with the work of the Mahabharata Department. In addition to those mentioned in my last report, some important points are :—

(a) The propaganda for the collection of Mahabharata MSS although it has not actually secured us much manuscript material, has yet become a sure means of creating interest in our work in the different provinces of India.

(b) Collation centres have been opened at Paris and Santiniketan, and efforts are being made to have such centres at Benares, in Malabar and at Tanjore, (work is, since, begun at the last two centres.)

(c) Collation under individual system has been all along going on in the year under report. The attached statement

will clearly show how successful this trial has been in point of quantity. As for quality, too, it will be seen that in as much as the whole collation is subjected to a careful revision, it may safely be said to be reliable.

(d) The Mahabharata Workers' Committee has, before undertaking a new parvan for collation, tried a new way for selection of manuscripts : whereas manuscripts were hitherto being taken up without following any definite rules, we first got prepared a statement of all the manuscripts of Karna-parvan, in the Manuscript Library at the Institute. Points regarding omissions, additions, v. ls, and colophons, all to the number of about 80 were marked and fixed by comparing an apparently old manuscript with the G. K. (Bombay) edition and then all these points were referred to in all the manuscripts, the difference or agreement being noted in the statement. This statement was discussed at great length and ultimately 6 manuscripts from a total of 15, have been selected for collation.

(e) It is expected that collation of the Karna-parvan from these 6 manuscripts will be finished and revised by the end of March 1925.

4. This Committee, provisionally appointed by the Regulating Council for a period of one year only, would automatically dissolve in March next. I would therefore request the Regulating Council to propose and fix upon any other arrangements to conduct the Mahabharata work at the Institute.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

R. D KARMARKAR,  
SECRETARY

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# STATEMENT I.

Year.	Collation done.	Expenditure on collation.	other expenditure.	Total expenditure.
1919-20	48071	Pay ( staff ) ...1498-4-11 Coll. sheets ... 213-8-0 <hr/> 1711-12-11	3555-9-0	5267-5-11
1920-21	48183	Pay ... 3114-13-8 Sheets ... 1178-0-0 Copying ... 195-0-0 <hr/> 4487-13-8	6221-12-6	10709-10-2
1921-22	53646	Pay ... 6489-3-1 Sheets ... 40-0-0 Copying ... 660-7-10 <hr/> 7189-10-11	5650-14-0	12840-8-11
1922-23	92368	Pay ... 6405-4-0 Sheets ... 102-0-0 <hr/> 6507-4-0	10475-15-3	16983-3-3
1923-24	178331	Pay ... 6660-0-0 Sheets ... 371-12-0 Copying ... 10-8-0 <hr/> 7042-4-0	17183-1-5	24225-5-5
1st April 1924, to 29th January 1925.	Collated 184226 Revised 162180	Pay ... 5767-9-3 Sheets ... 389-0-0 Mss. ... 14-6-0 <hr/> 6170-15-3	4966-1-10	11137-1-1

1. The pay of the Secretary Mahabharata Department is not included in the expenditure on collation.

2. During the five years 1919-24 when the group system was in force for collation work, the total collation-*without revision*-amounted to 420604 verses with expenses of Rs. 26938-14-6 giving an average of 15.6 verses per single Rupee.

3. In the year 1924-25 we have under the individual system *revised* collation of 162180 verses with an additional unrevised collation of 22048 verses by the end of January 1925, i. e. with an expense of Rs. 6170-15-3. We have 29·8 verses per Rupee.

4. Three efficient hands from the staff, were, all through the year, engaged in revising the collation. Had this not been the case, the unrevised collation would have been increased by 60000 verses more ; thus raising the average of verses to 39·8 per Rupee.

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